United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
COP17/CMP7
Summary for Policymakers
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
COP17/CMP7

Summary for Policymakers

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56, rue Saint-Pierre, 3e étage
Québec G1K 4A1 Canada
Téléphone : 418 692-5727
Télécopie : 418 692-5644
Courriel : iepf@francophonie.org
Site Internet : www.iepf.org

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FOREWORD

On course for Durban in South Africa for successful negotiations!

The international community - political, economic, social and environmental - is meeting shortly for two weeks of negotiations on climate change (CC). The goal is consensus on the best technical, legal, institutional and financial provisions which could be adopted and implemented by Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (KP) to help to reduce, if not control, the negative impacts of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) on the living conditions of populations on the planet.

We remained confident and hopeful after Cancún and Durban should provide a minimum of resources and operational mechanisms to plug the "ambition deficit" seen in Copenhagen under commitments by countries to lower their greenhouse gas emissions.

On the eve of 2012, the end of the first KP commitment period, with maintaining the Protocol one of the major challenges of these negotiations, the indicators and other data garnered throughout the world do not bode well for the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions forecast by the outcome of the IPCC scientific surveys, mainly an increase in temperature of under 2 degrees Celsius by 2050.

However, consensus does exist to a certain extent on the necessary and useful resources and on concrete actions to be put into operation since the COP15 of Copenhagen, boosted by the COP16 in Cancún. The agreements mainly cover:

- the expressed willingness of countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to limit the rise in temperature to below 2 degrees C,
- the early (30 billion per year 2010-2012) and long-term (100 billion per year 2013-2020) financing to prepare and implement adaptation and/or mitigation projects,
- training and capacity-building of players in developing countries to face up to the impacts of climate change,
- the transfer of appropriate technologies with setting up of centres,
- the need to continue the negotiations and other exchanges in a multilateral context with suitable technical and institutional tools and mechanisms that can provide credible, fair results for all parties concerned, be they developed, emerging, developing or least developed.

Although it can seem difficult to realize the consensus agreements already reached due to the global financial and economic crisis, others, on the other hand, like the Green Climate Fund, technology transfer and adaptation/miti-
igation projects, can be achieved as long as the desire and confidence shown by the countries in the practical and operational provisions identified in the various working groups are converted into actions. Let us hope this holds true in Durban.

This Guide prepared by the Francophonie for negotiators and delegates to the COP updates, among other things, the progress in discussions and exchanges. It is also an element of contribution to the positioning of all concerned to reach consensus in Durban on how to access additional financing for technical and technological capacity-building, with a view to preparing and executing projects to adapt and/or mitigate the negative consequences of climate change. Vulnerable populations have huge expectations for actual access to these financial and technical resources announced by the international community and the COP17 in Durban could and should help achieve them.

Pleasant reading and enjoy the conference!

Fatimata DIA Touré
Director of IEPF
1. INTRODUCTION

The reality of climate change today is addressed within a difficult political context, whose agenda is mainly concentrated on economic and social factors, which retain a large measure of our attention. As the end of the period of the Kyoto Protocol agreement nears, the Parties will make every effort at the Durban Conference (South Africa) to establish a multilateral long-term cooperation framework. This 17th Conference of Parties (COP) at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which will be held from 28 November to 9 December 2011, will have as its principal objective the pursuit of collective reflection aiming to realise a climate agreement for the post-2012 period.

In parallel, gathering together within the 7th Conference of Parties acting as a Reunion of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (RCP), the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol will discuss the future role of this unique instrument, which imposes upon the majority of developed countries (not the United States) a set of legally-binding objectives for the reduction or quantified limitation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, for the period from 2008-2012.

Urgent arbitration on the future of the Kyoto Protocol

A sense of urgency motivates several Parties regarding the future of the Kyoto Protocol. The plan was for the Copenhagen negotiations in 2009 to culminate in an agreement on the Protocol to avoid discontinuity between the first and second periods of the commitment. It is now too late for any agreement on a second commitment period to be ratified in time for implementation in 2013. Should the Protocol be renewed in Durban, a gap between the two commitment periods would therefore be inevitable.

In addition, the announcements by some countries regarding their refusal to commit to a second period of engagement within the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Australian-Norwegian proposal to end the Protocol in favour of a broad agreement, have caused discontent among the developing countries, who consider that the Protocol is the only chance of now presenting legally-binding emission reduction targets.

Towards the political resolution of the “ambition deficit”?

The Durban Conference will be held in the context of the many advances achieved by the 2010 Cancún Agreements. At Cancún, the Parties reiterated their willingness expressed in Copenhagen to realise efforts to limit the rise in
the mean global temperature to 2°C. Yet, the mitigation targets announced to date by the developing countries are insufficient to comply with this objective. The “deficit of ambition,” as it is today common to call it, between the level of emissions to attain in order to limit the rise in global temperature to 2 degrees (44 gigatonnes)\(^1\) and the level of emissions upon which the developed countries’ targets depend today represents between 5 and 9 gigatonnes\(^2\).

In order to close this gap, several developed countries are counting on the engagement of developing countries for the implementation of reduction measures. The share of greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries has been rising constantly since 1990 (increase of 62.6% between 1990 and 2005\(^3\)) and China is now the world's largest GHG emitter\(^4\). Based on this comment, developing countries are now being asked to become involved in the efforts through appropriate national mitigation actions, provided they are supported financially, technologically and for capacity-building by developed countries. Many developing countries have indicated actions as targets, strategies, mitigation programmes or projects since Copenhagen whilst calling on the principle of historical responsibility that would mean the developed countries acting first. The uncertainty surrounding sustainable and predictable support and the persistent hesitation of developed countries to increase the ambition of their targets is nevertheless holding back putting facilitation mechanisms into operation for these mitigation actions, where the voluntary aspect still has to be clarified.

Similarly, the type of targets announced by the developed countries still have to be determined. Under the auspices of the Convention, the preferred approach during the two last climate summits in Copenhagen and Cancún opens the way to a system whereby the mitigation targets chosen by the developed countries will not be legally binding. This is contrary to the coercive mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol which provides for sanctions for failure to comply with the assigned objective. Uncertainty about the future accord negotiated in the context of the COP17 does not, today, allow the Parties to be confident on the fact that the promised reductions in emissions presented by the developed countries in Copenhagen, then confirmed in Cancún, will be respected.

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1. According to the IPCC (2007a), the Annex I Parties should achieve 25% to 40% emission reductions by 2020 compared with 1990 to stabilise the temperature rise at 2°C.
2. UNEP, 2011.
3. According to the databases of the Climate Analysis Indicator Tool of the World Resources Institute Version 7.0., the Parties not included in Annex I produced GHG emissions of 11,967 MtCO₂e in 1990 and 19,459 MtCO₂e in 2005.
The double challenge of Durban: continue progress on the technical issues and unite politically on the bases of Cancún.

In Durban, the Parties should continue the progress made in Cancún. The implementation of the Cancún Agreements on the Green Climate Fund, the Climate Technology Mechanism, and the registry for mitigation actions for developing countries and the Framework for adaptation, raises the question of how to achieve the climate financing promises of developed countries. The challenges linked to the contribution of the private sector in granting 100 billion US dollars per year from 2013 to 2020 promised in Copenhagen, those linked to splitting this sum between adaptation and mitigation and the additionality of funds with respect to public development aid augur difficult discussions on the capacity of the developed countries to mobilise this financing in a durable and predictable manner. The discussions on the mobilisation of financial resources will be a weighty matter in Durban.

The materialisation of the advances of Cancún through the implementation of certain mechanisms constitutes an essential step in maintaining the momentum begun by the Cancún Agreements and the trust needed between the Parties for the elaboration of the post-2012 multilateral climate framework. However, it appears imperative that Durban supplies more clarity on the architecture of the future climate regime as well as its nature - whether or not legally-binding - to ensure the continuity of the multilateral process.
2. BRIEF HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Since the adoption in 1992 of the UNFCCC on the fringes of the Rio Declaration, the threat from global warming for human beings and ecosystems has gradually been included in the international agenda. In the belief that the commitments made in Rio under the UNFCCC to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by the year 2000 fell short of the mark, the 3rd COP adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. Under this Protocol, the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC which have ratified the Protocol are obliged to reduce overall, by 2012, the emission level of six GHG by 5.2% compared with the 1990 level.

Having postponed the adoption of decisions on how to achieve this 2012 reduction after signing the Protocol, the Parties continued the negotiations after 1997. The Marrakesh Agreements adopted in 2001 clarified the various ways and means of making the Kyoto Protocol operational. However, the Protocol was only ratified in 2005 and its implementation was delayed in a number of countries, such as Australia and Russia. The United States, the world’s second largest GHG emitter\(^5\), has not ratified the Protocol and is therefore not subject to any obligation to reduce GHG emissions. Furthermore, certain Annex I countries which have ratified the Protocol will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to comply with their individual emission reduction targets by 2012\(^6\).

In parallel to the discussions on the Kyoto Protocol, in 2005 the Parties embarked on a dialogue about long-term cooperation to reach an agreement targeting concrete and rapid reduction of global GHG emissions in the medium and long term by all countries. The Bali Action Plan adopted during the COP13 in 2007 provided a road map targeting reaching an agreement on a post-2012 climate regime. This en-

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6. As a rough guide, GHG emissions (excluding the Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry - LULUCF - sector) between 1990 and 2005 increased by 13.6% in Japan, 27% in Canada and 38.7% in Australia. According to the databases of the Climate Analysis Indicator Tool of the World Resources Institute Version 7.0., Japan produced GHG emissions (excluding the LULUCF sector) of 1.193 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 1990 and 1.356 MtCO2e in 2005; Canada produced 582 MtCO2e in 1990 and 739.3 MtCO2e in 2005; Australia produced 402 MtCO2e in 1990 and 559 MtCO2e in 2005.
capsulates both the mitigation commitments of developed countries and mitigation and adaptation efforts by developing countries supported by financial, technological and capacity-building resources from developed countries.

The Copenhagen Conference in 2009 restated the political intention to continue negotiations on combating climate change in line with the goal of stabilising the temperature rise at 2°C and providing financial support for the mitigation and adaptation actions, mainly via the Green Climate Fund. The Conference however failed to reach the agreement sought on a post-2012 climate regime. In Cancún in 2010, the negotiations got a second wind with the adoption of the Cancún Agreements by the COP16 (see Box 1). These Agreements mark decisive progress in the on-going process of negotiating a post-2012 regime as, since early 2011, they have formed the basis of discussions aiming to make operational in Durban the mechanisms created by these Agreements.

**BOX 2. THE CANCÚN AGREEMENTS**

Under the auspices of the Convention

**A Shared Vision**

The Agreements set the objective of stabilising the mean global temperature increase at 2°C, while opening the door to an eventual objective of 1.5°C. They agreed that the peak emission year for developing countries would fall later than that of developed countries. The long-term collective objective by 2050 and the determination of peak years will be considered in Durban.

**Mitigation**

Developed countries: The Agreements noted the developed country targets and asked for an increase in the level of commitment.

Developing countries: The Agreements created a registry listing the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) for the NAMA supported internationally to facilitate their matching with the available support.

**Financing**

The Agreements required, from the developed countries, a new, larger, predictable and more adequate financing level, as well as improved access for mitigation efforts, including REDD-Plus, and adaptations for developing countries, together with Development and Transfer of Technologies and capacity-building. The financing provided by the developed countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing guidelines and those that may be adopted by the CMP.
The developed countries agreed to collective financing objectives of:
- 30 billion US dollars for the 2010-2012 period; and
- 100 billion US dollars per year until 2020.

The Agreements created the Green Climate Fund and a Standing Committee to support the COP in improving financing coherence, mobilisation and coordination.

Adaptation
The Agreements created the Cancún Adaptation Framework whose objective is to strengthen the action engaged in the area of adaptation. They also created a support process for LDCs to formulate and implement adaptation plans and an adaptation committee responsible for promoting stronger action for adaptation in line with the Convention. Finally, a working programme was established for particularly vulnerable developing countries in terms of adaptation.

REDD+
An agreement was obtained at Cancún on the definition of the activities of REDD+. It confirmed, inter alia, that the REDD+ mechanism would be deployed in three phases (Phase I, II and III), firstly the preparation, then the implementation and finally the execution focusing on the outcome of political actions and national measures and national strategies or action plans and it detailed these three phases.

Response Measures
The Agreements invited the developed countries to conceive and implement response measures through taking account of their impact on the developing economies and creating a forum on the impacts of these measures.

Development and transfer of technologies
The Agreements set up a technology mechanism (to be operational in 2012) charged with accelerating the development and transfer of technologies for adaptation and mitigation measures. A Technology Executive Committee and a Climate Technology Centre and Network were also set up. They provide for the financing mobilised to be used for Development and Transfer of Technologies.

Under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol
The mandate of the AWG-KP was redefined and the continuity of work will be made on the basis of the latest negotiation texts.

LULUCF
The Parties agreed to consider emissions and absorptions. The Agreements established a series of innovating elements to be considered by the Parties when preparing their reference level.

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7. An Internet site has been set up to report the amounts pledged so that the commitments announced by these countries can be monitored: see http://www.faststartfinance.org/content/contributing-countries.
3. ISSUES OF THE DURBAN CONFERENCE

The Durban Conference agenda includes issues relating to GHG emission mitigation, adaptation, financial support, technologies and capacity-building. This section analyzes these themes to identify stumbling blocks in each of the issues and highlight the geopolitical dynamics which are a feature of climate diplomacy.

In addition to these issues of substance, the question of the architecture of the future post-2012 climate regime and the type - whether or not legally-binding - of resulting actions will surely take centre stage in the Durban negotiations. Numerous Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have recently announced their refusal to undertake a second commitment period, thereby endangering the continuity of this agreement which is today the only instrument imposing legally-binding mitigation obligations. Although the developing countries are insisting on renewing the Protocol alongside a wider agreement under the Convention, major expectations are weighing on the discussions striving to achieve this agreement for the post-2012 period. The international community is holding its breath as to the nature of this agreement, yet to be clarified, just like the renewal of the Protocol, all the more that many developed countries favour reaching a single agreement. Today there is no guarantee of this agreement culminating in legally-binding mitigation obligations. With the probable advances of the issues of substance in Durban, the issues of form will be decisive for the continuity of the multilateral process.

3.1 Mitigation of GHG emissions

The Bali Action Plan provides for the Parties to agree on a shared vision, ultimately intended to reach a long-term objective of reducing GHG emissions. Agreement on the shared vision would be a boost to the Parties in determining mitigation efforts by developed and developing countries by 2020. The lack of consensus on the percentage objective of a long-term reduction in emissions and the peak emission year form the crux of the disagreement between the Parties over the shared vision. This deadlock is holding back hugely the medium-term objectives for the developed countries and the mitigation actions of the developing countries.
Mitigation in developed countries and adoption of GHG emission reduction targets

These objectives are now being discussed at the same time in two distinct working groups: the first group is operating under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) (which includes the United States) and the second under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) (which excludes the United States as it has not ratified the Protocol). The aim is to reach agreement on the quantified emission reduction objectives for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

**Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the auspices of the Convention (AWG-LCA)**

At Durban, under negotiations on developed country targets, the Parties will mainly tackle plugging "the ambition deficit". According to the lowest stabilisation scenario of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the developed countries should reduce their emissions by 25% to 40% in 2020 compared with 1990 to limit the rise in mean global temperature to 2 to 2.4°C. The mitigation targets currently promised by the developed countries would achieved a global reduction in emissions of 13% to 18% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels (Table 1). Today the talk is of an emission reduction range, as several countries have put forward reduction objectives conditional on a series of criteria, such comparable commitments by other parties or using specific accounting rules for emissions and absorptions from the forest sector as well as market mechanisms. These factors will have a significant influence on the scale of mitigation efforts by these countries.

Moreover, many developed countries believe that examining the temptation level must take into account the efforts of developing countries which can help reduce the gap, especially the large emitters. Nevertheless, the developing countries are not unanimous in wishing to participate in any global GHG emission reduction target. The developing countries consider that their participation must remain voluntary and that the principle of historical responsibility implies that the developed countries have the responsibility of acting first.

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9. FCCC/TP/2011/1
The type of commitments of developed countries and their comparability are also among the most divergent points in the negotiations on a post-2012 regime. While the developing countries would prefer that a global objective be set and then divided among the developed countries in order to pursue a top-down approach\(^{10}\) in harmony with that of the Kyoto Protocol, the Cancún Agreements open the way to a bottom-up approach\(^{11}\) which makes it far more complex to compare announced targets. In addition, the terms "targets" and "commitments" mark a difference with respect to the binding nature of the actions which would be undertaken.

To this effect, the discussions on the actions taken in a measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) manner aim to ensure the possibility of comparing mitigation efforts by developed countries, increase their transparency and ensure compliance with commitments. The heart of discussions covers the process introduced by the Cancún Agreements for an international analysis and review (IAR) of emissions and absorptions in relation to quantified emission reduction objectives for the entire economy of developed countries. The Parties must decide if this is aiming to verify compliance with commitments announced by the countries and the effects of the non-compliance. It could, for example, resemble the Kyoto Protocol compliance system, whereby failure to comply with commitments leads to sanction some developed countries, like the United States, are against this.

Another stumbling block relates to the accounting rules for emissions and absorptions as the use of different rules from one country to the next could risk culminating in difficulties in comparing objectives and progress made.

**Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)**

Since 2007, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have been seeking agreement on the scale of GHG emission reductions to be achieved by them in aggregate and the individual or joint contribution to be made by each of these Parties to reducing GHG emissions. As no agreement has been reached on a top-down approach, the Parties have put forward the same individual targets as announced after the Copenhagen Accord, which must henceforth be converted into quantified emission reduction objectives for the future commitment period(s). As for the AWG-LCA negotiations, the submitted targets would not meet the objective of stabilisation at 2°C.

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10. Top-down approach: defining a global objective for Annex I Parties and distributing this objective between them as individual targets.
11. Bottom-up approach: individual commitments proposed by the Parties.
A large number of Parties believe that the scale of their quantified figures depends on applicable accounting rules for emissions and absorptions from the forest sector as well as market mechanisms. These Parties wish firstly, therefore, to agree on these rules before reaching agreement on the scale of objectives.

Furthermore, the discussions on renewing the Kyoto Protocol are threatened by the announcements by some countries on their refusal to undertake a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. The willingness of the EU and Australia to condition their commitment under the Kyoto Protocol on similar large emitting countries making similar undertakings, including the United States and emerging countries, makes the negotiations even more complex as the latter do not wish to see legally-binding emission reduction obligations imposed on them.

The issue of renewing the Kyoto Protocol also raises the question of the continuity of flexibility mechanisms should the Protocol not be renewed.

**TABLE 1.**
**INDIVIDUAL GHG EMISSION REDUCTION TARGETS PROPOSED BY THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex I Proposed national targets</th>
<th>Reference year</th>
<th>Target year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia 25% if an ambitious global agreement emerges from the negotiations to stabilise GHG levels at 450 ppm or less (which is equivalent to 24% below 1990 levels). Unconditional 5% reduction. Reduction of up to 15% if the global agreement does not stabilise GHG levels at 450 ppm but the main developing economies agree to considerably restrict their emissions and if the advanced economies make commitments comparable to Australia.</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada 17% (not conditional on the adoption of a global agreement), to be adjusted depending on the objective announced by the legislation in force in the United States.</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union and its member States 20% to 30% on condition that developed and the most advanced developing countries commit to suitable mitigation actions to limit the temperature rise to 2°C.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1
Mitigation in developing countries supported by developed countries

Since 2009, the potential contributions by developing countries in terms of mitigation through nationally appropriate mitigation actions or NAMA have been debated fiercely. According to the Cancún Agreements, the objectives of the NAMA is to arrive at a deviation of the emissions compared to the level corresponding to business as usual thanks to appropriate and adequate assistance from the developed countries. This support can be technical cooperation, financial aid or capacity-building assistance.\(^\text{13}\)

The central issue of the discussions is how to report on mitigation actions by developing countries. It is understood that the NAMA supported by the developed countries will be listed in the NAMA registry created by the Cancún Agreements, with the future format defining how to measure and report these actions. The Registry will also make it easier to identify sources of financing as the developed countries must list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex I Parties</th>
<th>Proposed national targets (% of GHG emission reductions)</th>
<th>Reference year</th>
<th>Target year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>25% subject to ambitious objectives from the major economies.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>10-20% The scale of the target will depend on the commitments made by the developed countries, efforts by the most advanced developing countries based on their capacities, an effective regime for the LULUCF sector, recourse to a carbon market and the adoption of a global agreement to limit the temperature rise to 2°C.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>15% to 25% if the main emitters commit to legally-binding reductions and subject to appropriate LULUCF regulations.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17% acknowledging that the final objective will be adjusted according to the legislation promulgated. The legislation in question would lead to a 30% reduction by 2025 and 42% by 2030, in line with the objective of reducing emissions by 83% by 2050.</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^\text{13}\) Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 52.
the financial support available and granted. How the nationally-supported NAMA will be measured, report and verified in communications intended for the UNFCCC remains hanging in the air.

Whereas the developed countries would like to obtain detailed information on these actions, whether or not they receive international support, (e.g. assumptions used to calculate the emission reductions forecast for the NAMA), the developing countries fear that an examination of this information could lead to an assessment of the relevance of their measures and a standardisation of actions, policies, projects or strategies.

For the developed countries, this information could be used to calculated the contribution made by developing countries to the global mitigation efforts. The developing countries fear that such a process could culminate in setting mitigation objectives similar to those of developed country actions. For example, under the Registry, the developing countries do not want the forecast emission reductions indicated for the NAMA supported internationally to give rise to a duty to achieve a given result. The developing countries also wish to avoid having to submit over-complex information, at the risk of facing the same issues as those encountered when submitting Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) projects to the CDM Executive Council. Furthermore, many developing countries lack the necessary capacity to measure and verify the emission reductions from their mitigation policies or actions. It will therefore be critical in Durban to agree on the means available to build up the capacity of these countries.

Lastly, the Cancún Agreements set up an international consultation and analysis (ICA) process to review information reported by the developing countries. The form has not yet been defined. Although the countries agree that this process should target capacity-building in developing countries, the developing countries themselves insist that this should not be more restrictive than the IAR process for the developed countries and that it should not end up verifying compliance of emission reductions achieved with forecasts.

**Reductions of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD)**

Due to the essential role that can be played by conservation, sustainable forest management and the increase in forest carbon stocks to reduce the emissions resulting from deforestation and degradation, certain Parties have suggested calling this strategy "REDD-Plus". It was agreed in Cancún that this approach would be implemented in three phases, firstly the preparation, then the implementation and finally the execution focusing on the outcome of political actions and national measures and national strategies or action plans.

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15. Decision 1/CP 16, paragraph 73.
The key point for Durban is to clarify the main components of the third and final phase (full implementation) and more especially its financing. Diverging view on the sources of financing for full REDD+ implementation is preventing the discussions from moving forward. Whereas the developing countries favour financing via public funds, for this source guarantees a more regular and predictable financing, the developed countries are emphasising the importance of sources of private financing and mainly the use of market mechanisms to finance the REDD+. The Parties must also agree in Durban on how the REDD+ financing is governed, namely the scope of this governance which must be implemented internationally or nationally. The possibility of creating an REDD+ window under the Green Climate Fund is being studied for this purpose.

**Economic and social consequences of response measures**

A large number of developing countries fear they may suffer from the negative consequences of response measures to climate change implemented by developed countries. As a rough guide, countries with economies principally based on fossil fuel exports fear that the mitigation actions implemented in the developed countries urging a reduction in fossil energy consumption will have a negative impact on their economies. The major sticking point concerns the impacts on the economy of developing countries. Developing countries would like especially to avoid response actions constituting arbitrary or discriminatory commercial actions against imports from developing countries. In addition, the special interest that could be given to the least developed countries (LDC) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) has re-launched the discussion about the categorisation of developing countries.

**3.2 Adapting to climate change**

Adaptation is critical, given the challenges of climate change in meeting objectives of sustainable development and combating poverty in developing countries. The Bali Action Plan recognises the need to enhance actions for adaptation, mainly through increased financial resources, investments and technologies designed to support adaptation\(^{16}\). The Cancún Agreements confirm that the same priority should be given to mitigation as to adaptation.

The Parties made important progress in Cancún regarding the institutional stakes linked to the adaptation by created a Framework for adaptation\(^{17}\). This Framework plans for the implementation of an Adaptation Committee charged with promoting the implementation of an enhanced action for adaptation in a coherent manner under the Convention. Negotiations from now on will be about the composition, details and procedures relating to the Adaptation Committee, including the establishment of

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links with other institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund. The question of the form and content of the future programme on the losses and damages which falls under the Framework for Adaptation is also hanging in the air. Insufficient progress has been made on setting up an entity insuring against climate change-related risks and the risk management options under this working programme to hope for agreement in Durban.

The repeated need for more financing is a major stumbling block. In Cancún it was restated that early financing for adaptation would be available to the most vulnerable developing countries in priority, including the LDC, the SIDS and the African countries.

3.3 Financial support

Financial support has been discussed extensively within the AWG-LCA since the Bali Conference. Whereas the developing countries wish to make sure that they have easy access to adequate financing, the developed countries insist on good governance of the granting of financing. Despite Parties agreeing on the need for an effective financing mechanism, the institutional arrangements and governance of the mechanism are taking a long time to reach to consensus. An important stage was reached with the creation of a Standing Committee through the Cancún Agreements to assist the COP in the operationalisation of the Convention’s financial mechanism. Since Cancún, a transition committee has been tasked with settling procedural and operational issues of the future Standing Committee planned to take up the baton from the transitional committee. The Cancún Agreements also created a Green Climate Fund, designated as an operational entity for the financial mechanism of the Convention.

Early financing and long-term financing

In Copenhagen, developed countries were committed to providing new and additional financial resources of 30 billion US$ for 2010-2012 complying with a balanced split between mitigation and adaptation. This financing known as "early financing" was confirmed in Cancún. One of the main criticisms of early financing is the lack of transparency in the financing granted and the difficulty in distinguishing between climate financing and development aid financing. These criticisms provide a basis for the negotiations on how to measure, report and verify the financing granted.

In terms of the long-term financing of 100 billion US$ per year until 2020, the Cancún Agreements state that increased, new, additional, predictable and adequate financing must be made available to developing countries, especially the LDC. The

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18. Decision 1/CP.16
19. The presentations of this workshop can be found here: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/financial_mechanism/fast_start_finance/items/5646.php
magnitude of this stated sum prompts disagreements over how to generate this financing and especially over the respective roles of the private and public sectors\textsuperscript{20}. The 2010 report by the High-Level Consultative Group on financing climate change whereby it will be "difficult but feasible" to achieve the objective of mobilising 100 billion dollars per year by 2020\textsuperscript{21} had launched the debate on sources of climate financing and the need to avoid recycling public development aid.

The developing countries do not see the private sector financing as a predictable source of financing, whereas the developed countries believe that increasing the private financing share is essential to achieve the 100 billion US\$\textsuperscript{22}. As the report by the Consultative Group identifies new sources of public and private financing\textsuperscript{23}, such as quota auctions or fees on carbon credits, some Parties wish to base the discussions on these ideas.

**Putting the Green Climate Fund and the Standing Committee into operation**

The Parties should also prepare the architecture of the Green Climate Fund created by the Cancún Agreements\textsuperscript{24}. The developing countries express major difficulties in accessing existing funds and wish to develop a simplified and effective approach allowing "direct access" to Green Climate Fund resources. The developed countries wish that developing country actions meet certain criteria of transparency, guaranteeing good use of resources.

An important stage was reached with the creation of a Standing Committee through the Cancún Agreements, with the main objective of improving consistency, mobilisation and coordination of financing. The issues mainly concern relations between the Committee and the COP and Committee’s role of coordination and rationalisation in the granting of climate financing. The developing countries wish the Standing Committee to operate under the auspices of the COP, thus playing a supervisory role and meeting their need for sufficient, reliable and predictable resources. The developed countries believe that the Standing Committee should simply have a consultative role as they consider that under no circumstances must it take over the current role of the COP which provides directives to the financial mechanism of the Convention.

\textsuperscript{20} http:// unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/ facilitators_note_finance_17june_09.50.pdf


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{24} http://unfccc.int/files/na/application/pdf/07a01-1.pdf
Climate financing MRV

The climate financing MRV support rules are seen as a guarantee of transparency and a way of obtaining a full picture of the climate’s financial flows, mainly to make the financing more predictable. This transparency will also ensure the additionality of the financing compared with the public development aid and a certain balance between mitigation and adaptation.

The developing countries maintain that the method of reporting financial support is neither uniform nor complete. The countries should therefore agree on how to improve climate financing MRV systems, such as recourse to common reporting formats or registration of the available and granted financing within the NAMA Registry, for example. Monitoring the financial support granted via mechanisms not linked to the Convention and by private financing is therefore a major issue.

Several developing countries would like the Standing Committee to play a role in supervising compliance with MRV recommendations of the financial support from developed countries in order to ensure mobilisation of financial resources, whilst the developed countries believe that the Standing Committee cannot play a role in supervising compliance with MRV stipulations. According to them, it would be more likely to manage the information issued by other bodies than to produce it itself.

3.4 Technological support and capacity-building

Development and Transfer of Technologies

The question of Development and Transfer of Technologies has gained more importance under negotiations on a post-2012 regime. The relevance of this question comes mainly from the tremendous technological challenge posed by the need to reduce GHG emissions in the developed countries and the importance of technology transfers to encourage implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries.

The technology mechanism created by the Cancún COP comprises a Technology Executive Committee (TEC), mainly in charge of assessing needs, and a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), which should advise the countries and facilitate the coordination between the national and regional networks. The Parties should decide in Durban on which will be the technology mechanism management entity and on its interactions with the other mechanisms in the Convention. They should also determine the potential role of the technology mechanism in financing Development and Transfer of Technologies and in managing issues relating to the intellectual property rights. The technology mechanism can be expected to be put into operation in Durban.
Enhanced action for capacity-building

The issues related to capacity-building cover the ways of increasing monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of capacity-building. The countries have recognised the difficulties in monitoring capacity-building actions which often go hand in hand with the granting of financing or technology transfer. The Parties should decide on any directives to be communicated to the financing and technology mechanisms and to the Framework for Adaptation and other appropriate entities to implement and monitor capacity-building actions by these mechanisms and entities.
4. EXPECTATIONS OF THE DURBAN CONFERENCE

Two years after the Copenhagen Conference, the negotiation difficulties over the future of the Kyoto Protocol and the definition of a future agreement under the Convention is helping to play down the expectations for Durban. Nevertheless, the Durban Conference appears to provide an opportunity to make progress with the fundamental issues since it is probable that the mechanisms put in place by the Cancún Agreements will become operational.

As regards the form, Durban provides a new opportunity to discuss the structure of the post-2012 regime. Those who do not want the Kyoto Protocol to be renewed hope to obtain a clear mandate in Durban to negotiate a unique agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC, which engages developing countries in global mitigation efforts to the same extent as developed countries. In 2011, certain developed countries suggested adopting a timetable at Durban to reach a legally-binding agreement in the forthcoming months. For developing countries, reaching an agreement about a road map aimed at renewing the Protocol, at the same time as a mandate for an agreement under the auspices of the Convention, is more a question of necessity than choice for Durban.

Whatever the outcome of negotiations on the future of the Kyoto Protocol, the question of the legal nature of mitigation targets and actions of countries will be decisive for the next stages in the process. With certain countries opposed to legally-binding mitigation commitments in the context of an agreement under the Convention, the Parties will have to be imaginative in order to avoid a possible deadlock which could hinder negotiations on the issues of substance. In fact, the prolonged disagreement over the nature of the mitigation targets and actions could hinder an agreement on the international consultation and analysis (ICA) for developing countries and the international analysis and review (IAR) process of the mitigation targets of developed countries. The question of the objective of these processes, namely if they aim to implement a verification system to check the conformity of the targets and/or mitigation actions, is intrinsically linked to that of the legal nature of these targets and actions. This point is, to date, the most complex issue of the negotiations on the topic.

The issues of substance fuel the most realistic expectations. The Cancún Agreements have indeed prepared the ground for the implementation of different mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Framework and the
Technology Mechanism. Since the majority of issues regarding procedures linked to these mechanisms were resolved in 2011, a decision to render them operational after Durban is quite likely. Nevertheless, without solving the differences regarding the mobilisation of financing, these mechanisms could quickly be considered to be devoid of substance. It is thus imperative that an agreement be reached on the contribution and abundance of the sources of mixed financing for the 100 billion US dollars promised every year from 2012 to 2020 by developed countries, as well as on the demands for transparency regarding the financing granted.

As with the issue of increasing the ambition of the mitigation targets, that of mobilising the support needed for the mitigation and adaptation actions of developing countries depends on the political will of the governments.
FACT SHEETS

Sheet 1.
Gender in climate negotiations

Context 25:
Not only do men and women contribute differently to the causes of climate change, but they also experience its effects differently and, when they have a choice, recommend different solutions for counteracting its consequences. Women are normally more vulnerable than men to the effects of climate change, for they form the majority of the world's poor. They are also affected disproportionately by climate change due to contextual inequalities like unequal access to resources and decision-making processes. The gender dimensions are an aspect that is still widely ignored during international discussions on climate change. Although a few references were introduced in the Cancún Agreements, the need to involve women further in international climate change policies is still topical.

Gender equality in delegations: progress since Copenhagen 26:
In 2009 (COP15), women accounted for:
- 9% of heads of delegation,
- 27% of delegations.
In 2010 (COP16), women accounted for:
- 12% to 15% of heads of delegation,
- 3% of delegations.

Gender in the Cancún Agreements 27:
The preamble recalls the vulnerability of certain groups, including women.

In the text on the shared vision, the importance of gender equality is given as a criterion for effective action in all aspects of climate change. Gender issues also appear in two sections of text on mitigation. Mention is made firstly under the potential environmental and socio-economic consequences of response measures, stating the need to consider the consequences on women (and children). Secondly, the text on mechanisms to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests (REDD+) indicates that national strategies should consider the gender dimension.


26. According to the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)

The text on *capacity-building* adds also that support granted in this context must consider the gender aspects.

Lastly, the text on *adaptation* indicates that the adaptation actions must take a gender-sensitive approach. Gender is also referred to under the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (PANA).

In addition, the decision to create the Technology Executive Committee refers to Decision 36/CP.7 on: "Improving the participation of women in the representation of Parties in bodies established under the United Nations Framework Convention."

Other decisions under the Cancún Agreements, mainly those relating to the Amended New Delhi Programme on the implementation of *Article 6 of the Convention* and to the education, training and awareness-raising of the public, emphasise the promotion and participation of women and national and international scales.

**Issues for Durban**

In Durban, progress in the Cancún Agreements should be included in a legally-binding text to ensure gender equality in benefiting from the action. In addition, several aspects merit being strengthened to take gender into account.

In terms of financing the *clean development mechanism*, despite progress in Cancún on the loan programmes favouring small projects and easier access for countries with less than ten registered projects, it is still possible to advance in terms of gender equality.

In addition, an equal split between *men and women in decision-making committees* still requires improvement. Indeed, the composition of the adaptation committee is, in this respect, fundamental, as is that of the Green Fund Transitional Committee (Cancún). The explicit mention of the principle of equality in the text is important in analysing current provisions, for example under the composition of the High-Level Group on climate financing (Copenhagen) which only includes two women in its twelve members and that of the Executive Board for a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) with one woman out of ten members. A balanced split between men and women on decision-making committees would ensure that gender considerations are fully integrated in the criteria considered for grant approvals to ensure that men and women benefit from and have equal access to financial mechanisms.

It will also be useful in Durban to ensure that *gender experts are included in all phases of the decision-making process*, that the capacity-building is based on a participative approach that includes women and other stakeholders and to *establish a sex-differentiated database* linked to climate change, at international scale, to incorporate the different needs and priorities of men and women.

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The regional groups and the main negotiation coalitions

The climate change negotiations process revolves around regional groups and negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are derived from the official United Nations classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests. During negotiations, the countries usually speak on their own behalf or on behalf of a negotiation coalition.

United Nations Regional Groups

The regional groups do not necessarily share the same interests in relation to the negotiations on climate change. The members of the Bureau are elected within regional groups and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

The regional groups are Africa, Asia and the Pacific Region (including Japan), Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC, from the Spanish) and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG). The other countries are Australia, Canada, the United States, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.

The African Group

The African Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation coalition. It has 53 members, all of whom share a variety of causes for concern, such as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the fight against poverty. The Group currently makes joint statements, mainly on questions relating to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building and financing.

Negotiation coalitions

AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States)

AOSIS is an ad hoc lobbying group which gives a voice to the majority of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) during negotiations at the United Nations. The SIDS share their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, especially the rise in sea levels which is threatening the very existence of several islands. AOSIS has 39 members and four observers. Most AOSIS countries also belong to the Group of 77 and China and ten are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC) 30. Bahrain is the only SIDS member of the United Nations which does not belong to AOSIS; conversely, the Cook Islands and Niue belong to AOSIS but are not SIDS members of the United Nations 31.

Least Developed Countries (LDC)
The group of LDC comprises 49 countries among the least developed (33 in Africa, fifteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean). They defend their interests jointly with the United Nations, especially in relation to climate change. They share considerations about their vulnerability and their need for support in planning their adaptation. The UNFCCC also recognises the special needs of the LDC, which are the least capable of facing up to the impacts of climate change.

The Group of 77 and China (G-77/China)
The G-77/China comprises 130 developing countries and China. China is an associate member rather than a full member of the G-77. China cooperates closely with the G-77 over climate change-related issues; the group therefore takes its positions “on behalf of the G77 and China” 32. In particular, the G-77/China supports the economic interests of its members in miscellaneous questions within the United Nations. The G-77/China member countries can sometimes adopt diverging positions during the climate change negotiations, which they then defend via another negotiation coalition or regional group 33.

European Union (EU)
The EU is a political and economic union of 27 member countries. It is represented by the European Community, which is a Party to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, but which has no voting right distinct from that of individual countries. Despite some differences, they often adopt a common position and speak with a single voice during climate change negotiations.

Umbrella Group
The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the European Union and which has been formed in the context of climate change negotiations. It has emerged from the JUSSCANNZ 34 group and is active in all the UN forums despite the group not always comprising the same countries. Although informal, the list normally includes Australia, Canada, the United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine (other countries are added periodically, depending on the topics addressed). The group has been focusing its activities since 2001 on information sharing rather than negotiation.

Coalition for Rainforest countries
This coalition started to take shape in 2005 under the initiative of Papua New Guinea. Its goal is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition includes 32 countries: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of

33. See www.g77.org.
34. JUSSCANNZ is the acronym for Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand.
the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay and Vanuatu.

Environmental Integrity Group

The Environmental Integrity Group was formed in 2002 by three OECD members which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Mexico and the Republic of Korea. Monaco and Liechtenstein are now also collaborating with this negotiating group. Mexico and the Republic of Korea are the only two OECD members not included in Annex I. Member countries are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.

Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)

CACAM groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I countries with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The reason is that the UNFCCC does not define the term "developing country" clearly and that these countries do not view themselves as developing countries despite their exclusion from Annex I of the Convention. The CACAM countries rarely take a common stance on other issues.

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)

ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation to promote cooperation between the socialist countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated by the United States. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, representing a hub of five countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on a goal of restricting temperature rises to 1 to 1.5°C and on the principle whereby the developed countries must take a lead partner role in the global effort to combat climate change.

Cartagena Dialogue:

The Cartagena Dialogue is an informal group created during the COP-16 in Cancún. It brings together thirty industrialised and developing countries working with a view to establishing a comprehensive and legally-binding regime within the UNFCCC. The aim

37. Ibid.
of the dialogue is to openly discuss the reasons behind each country’s position and to explore the areas in which convergence and reinforcement of shared action could emerge. The members commit, nationally, to becoming or remaining low-carbon. The group comprises thirty countries from different regions and development levels. Its members already include countries from the European Union, LDC, the African Group, an informal coalition of Latin American countries comprising Panama, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic and AOSIS, along with other countries such as Australia and New Zealand or the United Arab Emirates.

BASIC

BASIC is a group of countries made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the Copenhagen Conference (COP15, December 2009). After the meeting, BASIC published a series of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, in particular a second commitment period for developed countries by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol and scaled-up financing for the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to share their positions and to develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important emerging countries and large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor in international climate negotiations.
Sheet 3.
Positions of main countries and negotiation coalitions on the post-2012.

**Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS)**

AOSIS believes that the goals of reduced GHG emissions are founded on stabilising the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide at 350 ppm and limiting average global warming to below 1.5°C. It estimates that global GHG emissions should reach their ceiling in 2015 and be reduced by 85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. AOSIS is asking that the Annex I Parties achieve a 45% drop in their emissions by 2015 and 90% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. AOSIS calls for promises to be transformed into quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELRO). AOSIS has also supported the possibility of creating a "common space" between the two ad hoc working groups to discuss the magnitude of the global emission reduction target of the Annex I Parties. It also underlines the need to increase support for adaptation. AOSIS is also in favour of setting up an insurance mechanism for extreme events. It calls for the creation of an international mechanism regarding losses and damages for COP-18.

**Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)**

ALBA bases its position on the principles stated in the World People's Declaration on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth of 22 April 2010, adopted during the conference of the same name held in Cochabamba, Bolivia on 19-22 April 2010. ALBA is demanding goals to stabilise the concentration of carbon dioxide at 300 ppm, with a limitation in temperature rise of between 1 and 1.5°C. ALBA urges developed countries to reduce their emissions by 40 to 50% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels. The group would like the decisions to be taken by consensus in Durban. ALBA maintains that developed countries must reduce their emissions by 50% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels. ALBA believes that developed countries must make sure that their technologies are free of patents and intellectual property rights.

**South Africa**

South Africa would like to see the key mechanisms of the Cancún Agreements made operational. It would like the outcomes of Durban to be balanced, equal and credible and underlines the importance of reciprocity. It supports positive incentives to stimulate the participa-

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40. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2.
42. IIDD, 2011c, p.3 et 12.
Saudi Arabia, a major oil exporter, emphasises the need to take account of potential negative impacts from mitigation measures by Annex I Parties on the economy of developing countries, above all those exporting fossil energy. Saudi Arabia thus supports compensation for losses and damages attributable to the impacts of response measures. It favours an international consultation and analysis procedure (ICA) based on the rules which are already in place in order to fill the gaps in the compatibility system.

Brazil would like the Annex I Parties to reduce their emissions by 40% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels and to define their commitments using a top-down approach reflecting the scientific data. It has also expressed the desire to reduce its GHG emissions by 36.1% to 38.9% by 2020. It takes the view that the recommendations for actions taken in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (MRV) should be applied to implementing sustainable development actions by developing countries regarding their expected results in terms of reducing GHG emissions. Brazil is also in favour of instigating a compensation mechanism for losses and damage caused by the negative impacts of climate change in developing countries. It calls for the full application of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) work programme. Brazil considers that financing should come mainly from public funds to ensure predictability and be supplemented by auctioning of assigned amount units (AAU).

China is open to introducing certain measures to combat climate change through nationally appropriate mitigation actions, provided that the developed countries offer technological and financial support which can also contribute to the sustainable development and energy safety of the country. favouring a goal of 40% less emissions by Annex I Parties by 2020, China maintains that the contribution by developing countries to the global mitigation effort will depend on these Parties achieving their financing and technology transfer commitments. It believes that the prerequisites established by the Annex I countries
only hinder progress in the fundamental debate. In addition, it does not support the mandate for the negotiation of a second mandate under the Convention, but favours a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. It also wishes that the mechanism be placed under the authority and management of the COP.

Coalition for Rainforest countries\(^{46}\)

The aim of this coalition is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition hopes that the REDD+ partnership objectives will be achieved.

Republic of Korea\(^{47}\)

The Republic of Korea supports the idea that a post-2012 regime should include incentives to encourage developing countries to make voluntary commitments to reduce GHG emissions in the form of nationally appropriate mitigation actions, provided that the developed countries offer technological and financial support. South Korea wants nationally appropriate mitigation actions implemented without support to be recorded on a voluntary basis in the register.

United States\(^{48}\)

Having until recently rejected any negotiation process under the auspices of the UNFCCC, the United States did a U-turn in 2007 by maintaining that the Convention was the appropriate forum for negotiations on a post-2012 regime\(^ {49}\). The United States wishes to give precedence to a national target for reducing GHG emissions. It rejects any idea of bringing the two AWG together since it did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It wishes to operationalise Copenhagen’s target of 2°C and supports a legally-binding agreement inasmuch as all countries have obligations. The United States is demanding greater participation by developing countries in reducing GHG emissions. It supports developing countries implementing nationally appropriate mitigation actions meeting recommendations for actions taken in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (MRV). In addition, the United State emphasised that the Cancún Agreements should form the basis of negotiations (as opposed to the Bali Action Plan) and it does not want to draw up a legally-binding instrument for the moment. It is in favour of a bottom-up approach.

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47. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, p.74.
48. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, p.79.
49. The United States made these statements mainly at the G8 Summit at Heiligendamm in June 2007 and during the meeting of APEC leaders in Sydney in September 2007.
Given the historical responsibility of developed countries, G-77/China considers that the negotiations for a post-2012 regime should focus on the Annex I Parties adopting restrictive targets for reducing GHG emissions covering all sectors of the economy. G-77/China believe that the mitigation efforts by developed countries should be defined under a top-down approach and reflect the scientific data. The group believes that it is imperative that the negotiations lead to the adoption of a legally-binding agreement. The group is seeking more support from developed countries, especially for financing the adaptation and technology transfers. It calls for improved sharing of information regarding the negative consequences of the response measures. G-77/China stresses the need to continue to cover all costs arising from national communications in Parties not included in Annex I. G-77/China also highlights the need for international recognition of developing countries using their own resources. It supports the creation of an insurance mechanism for losses and damage caused by extreme events and setting up a technical and performance indicators committee to measure the support for capacity building.

The African Group suggests that the Annex I Parties achieve a 40% drop in their emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. It stated that an agreement on a second commitment period at Durban is "absolutely essential". This group is in favour of adopting nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing countries which comply with the MRV requirements, provided that financial and technological support is provided by the developed countries. It insists on a simplified procedure for providing support, including direct access. It insists that measures related to bunker fuels respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. It underlined the need to consider a process enabling LDS to formulate and apply national action plans. It demands that the work programme on losses and damages be linked to the Framework for adaptation drawn up in Cancún. Lastly, it campaigns for the strengthening of an international assessment and analysis process for developed countries, and for a decision in Durban on long-term financing, making the Green Climate Fund operational and urgent adaptation measures.

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50. IIDD 2011c, p. 9, 10 and 15, IIDD 2011a, p.13.
The EIG mainly supports the creation of new market mechanisms and the strengthening of the CDM. It also believes that the international consultation and analysis should facilitate developing country mitigation measures, build up capacities and improve transparency.

India is demanding the adoption of ambitious reduction goals for the Annex I Parties. India supports developing country implementation of nationally appropriate mitigation actions on a voluntary basis provided the developed countries provide financial and technological support. Its upholds including supported actions in the register and using national communications to report supported and unsupported mitigation actions. India is in favour of the objective of limiting the rise in temperature to below 2°C provided that this includes the principle of fair distribution of the carbon space based on the per capita cumulative share of emissions. India stressed that developed countries’ compliance with commitments should include improving support relations provided to developing countries.

Japan believes that all Parties should be involved in the mitigation efforts through mandatory emission reductions by reaching a new agreement. It is therefore in favour of adopting a legally-binding agreement which includes the major economies and supports cooperation between the ad hoc working groups. Japan supports the global objective of a 50% drop in emissions by 2050.

The OPEC countries emphasise the need to consider the potential negative impacts of mitigation measures in the Annex I Parties on developing country economies.

The LDC Group demands stricter global targets, short, medium and long-term adaptation plans and long-term financing. It also stresses the need to consider a process that enables them to formulate and apply national action plans and to strengthen and create regional centres and networks to facilitate the implementation of adaptation measures.

Russia is in favour of adopting a binding agreement including large emitter countries. It is opposed to withdrawing the special status of countries with economies in transition.

52. IIDD, 2010b, p.9 and 11.
54. IIDD, 2011a, p.17 and 18, IIDD, 2011c, p.4.
55. IIDD, 2010b, p.27; IIDD, 2010c, p.5; OPEC, 2006.
56. IIDD, 2011a, p. 20 and 9.
57. IIDD, 2011a, p.17 and 18.
The European Union wishes the rise in the average global temperature to be stabilised at 2°C. Under a post-2012 global agreement, the European Union is committed to reducing its emissions by 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels and by 30% if the other developed countries, including the United States, commit to similar reductions and if the most advanced developing countries commit to contributing to this objective based on their respective responsibilities and capabilities. The European Union emphasises that a robust and transparent emission compatibility system is necessary to achieve the objectives and to ensure that the MRV system works. It reaffirms its preference for a single legally-binding framework under the Convention, containing the essential elements identified in the Cancún Agreements, and the need for robust market mechanisms and a top-down approach.
Sheet 4.
UNFCCC side discussion forums

A highlight of 2011 was the holding of miscellaneous formal and informal forums. Most of them were aiming to move the negotiations forward and thus achieve an ambitious result in Durban. A description of each of these forums is provided below

Transitional Committee for the Design of the Green Climate Fund

Present: 40 countries

Description: The aims of the transitional Committee for the design of the Green Climate Fund were to draw up operational rules of the committee and to prepare documents to make the Fund operational. These documents must define its general principles, its structure and the governance type as well as other technical details. During these meetings, it was also decided that the Fund would be governed by a committee of 24 members equally distributed between developed and developing countries.

In 2011, four meetings were held in Mexico City, Mexico on 28 and 29 April, in Tokyo, Japan in July 2011, in Geneva, Switzerland from 11 to 13 September and in Cape Town, South Africa on 16 and 17 October.

Summit of Heads of State and government on the three rainforest basins

Present: 68 countries

Description: The first Summit of Heads of State and government on the three tropical forest basins was designed with a view to concluding the negotiation of the cooperation agreement between the Congo, Amazon and Borneo-Mekong basins. Although the representatives did not manage to accomplish this task, they adopted a joint declaration in which they set in place a timetable for the adoption of a cooperation agreement. Some members are responsible for finalising the cooperation agreement project and hope to be in a position to adopt it at the Rio+20 meeting in June 2012 at the latest.

The first Summit was held in Brazzaville, Congo from 29 May to 3 June 2011.

59. Statement from the first meeting, see: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/green_climate_fund/items/5869.php

60. Joint declaration of the Summit, see:http://www.3bassinsforestiers.org/fr/index-in.php?show=sommet#
Ministerial meetings of BASIC countries

Present: Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

Description: Recalling their contribution to the work of the 16th COP (December 2010), the BASIC countries met several times in 2010 to decide on a joint stance. Stating their association with the Copenhagen Accord, they support a two-pronged approach and reaching a legally-binding agreement included a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and an agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC. At these meetings they specified that the Cancún Agreements do not replace the Bali Road Map which must continue to guide discussions at the UNFCCC.

The participating countries met officially in 2011 in New Delhi, India (26-27 February), Zimbali, South Africa (28-29 May), Inhotim, Brazil (26-27 August) and China (31 October - 1 November).

G8 Summits

Member countries (8): United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada and Russia

Description: This informal group of the eight most developed countries in the world meets annually to discuss economic questions and global issues such as combating climate change. Developing countries are frequently invited to G8 summits. The European Union is represented at each meeting. During the last G8 meeting in Deauville, France on 26-27 May 2011, the assembled leaders discussed means of combating global warming. This year, the members made certain commitments in favour of green growth, combating climate change and biodiversity.

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62. Declaration from the G8 at Deauville, see: http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/francais/pour-la-presse/communiques-de-presse/un-nouvel-elan-pour-la-liberte-et-la-democratie.1313.html

63. For example, in 2010, invitations were extended to South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Colombia, Haiti and Jamaica.

64. G8 Muskoka Declaration Recovery and New Beginnings, Muskoka (Canada) 25-26 June 2010, see: http://g8.gc.ca/g8-summit/summit-documents/g8-muskoka-declaration-recovery-and-new-beginnings/
G20 Summits

Member countries (19 + European Union): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union.

Description: The G20 held its first meeting in reaction to the global economic crisis in November 2008 during the Washington Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy. The Summit was also attended by the President of the World Bank, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the Financial Stability Forum. The political leaders put together an action plan in Washington, which was reviewed at the London Summit in April 2009, to improve transparency and financial responsibility, promote the integrity of financial markets and reform the international financial institutions. Declarations by the G20 frequently cover climate change65.

In 2011, the G20 was held in Cannes, France on 3 and 4 November.

6th UN-REDD programme's Policy Board Meeting66

Present: 16 countries

Description: The UN-REDD programme, launched in 2007, is a joint initiative between the FAO, UNEP and UNDP. This programme intends to help LDC to prepare the implementation of REDD. At the sixth meeting, the group created a work group responsible for preparing a Framework for national programmes. This new group must identify the prerequisites for the implementation of the REDD+ in member countries. The group must present a project at the meeting on 20 and 21 October.

In 2011, the UN-REDD programme policy board meeting was held in Da Lat, Vietnam on 21 and 22 March and in Berlin, Germany on 20 and 21 October.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


French-speaking information network to facilitate the circulation of current news on sustainable development in French: http://www.mediaterre.org/


The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a language - French - and common values. It currently groups 75 States and governments, including 56 members and nineteen observers, totalling a population of 890 million people. The Report on the French language 2010 sets the number of French speakers at 220 million.

The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies. The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman and official representative. Abdou Diouf has been the Secretary General of the Francophonie since 2003.

Member States and governments
Albania • Principality of Andorra • Armenia • Kingdom of Belgium • Benin • Bulgaria • Burkina Faso • Burundi • Cambodia • Cameroon • Canada • Canada-New Brunswick • Canada-Quebec • Cape Verde • Central African Republic • Chad • Comoros • Congo • Côte d'Ivoire • Cyprus • Democratic Republic of Congo • Djibouti • Dominica • Egypt • Equatorial Guinea • Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia • France • French Community of Belgium • Gabon • Ghana • Greece • Guinea • Guinea-Bissau • Haiti • Laos • Lebanon • Luxembourg • Madagascar • Mali • Mauritania • Mauritius • Moldavia • Principality of Monaco • Morocco • Niger • Romania • Rwanda • Saint Lucia • São Tomé and Príncipe • Senegal • Seychelles • Switzerland • Togo • Tunisia • Vanuatu • Vietnam.

Observers
Austria • Bosnia Herzegovina • Croatia • Czech Republic • Dominican Republic • Estonia • Georgia • Hungary • Latvia • Lithuania • Montenegro • Mozambique • Poland • Serbia • Slovakia • Slovenia • Thailand • Ukraine • United Arab Emirates.

THE FRANCOPHONIE SERVING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF - Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) was born in 1988 from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. This action was expanded to the environment in 1996. Based in Quebec City, the Institute today is assisting in:

- training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- developing partnerships in the energy and environment sectors for sustainable development.

Its 2010-2013 programme, in synergy with other programmes of the International Organisation of La Francophonie, especially under mission D of the Ten-year strategic framework of the Francophonie - "Developing cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity" - IEPF:

- Helps to prepare national sustainable development policies and strategies and implement them in the energy and environment sectors; trains and enhances the ability of supervisors and professionals to use and master environmental management tools for sustainable development.
- Supports the participation of countries in international negotiations on the environment and sustainable development and the implementation of conventions, through discussions, technical support and mobilisation of experts.
- Develops partnerships, publishes guides, specialist journals and scientific and technical works in French in the energy and environment sectors.
- Coordinates information and expertise networks for sustainable development.
- Carries out any other function entrusted to it by the competent OIF bodies.
This Guide prepared by the Francophonie for negotiators and delegates to the COP updates, among other things, the progress in discussions and exchanges. It is also an element of contribution to the positioning of all concerned to reach consensus in Durban on how to access additional financing for technical and technological capacity-building, with a view to preparing and executing projects to adapt and/or mitigate the negative consequences of climate change. Vulnerable populations have huge expectations for actual access to these financial and technical resources announced by the international community and the COP17 in Durban could and should help achieve them.