United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
COP18 and CMP8

Summary for policymakers

Doha Conference: a turning point towards a new era of negotiations?

Doha, Qatar
26 November to 7 December 2012
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Drafting Committee and Editorial Committee

In partnership with

Editorial Management
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This summary document has been prepared by EcoRessources, on behalf of the Institut de l’énergie et de l’environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF). It does not necessarily represent the viewpoint of one or other of these organisations.

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Layout
CodeJaune, Design and Creativity, Quebec City, Canada


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PRINTED IN CANADA - November 2012

This guide has been printed using vegetable inks on recycled paper.
FOREWORD

Rio 1992, Kyoto 1997, Marrakesh 2001, Montreal 2005, Nairobi 2006, Copenhagen 2009, Cancún 2010, Durban 2011, Doha 2012 - intense negotiations on climate change have now been going on for twenty years. These are significant stages and dates in the negotiation process which has raised global awareness to the importance of grasping the climate problem by the horns and including it in all economic and social development policies that are meant to be sustainable.

From diplomatic negotiation between environmental, climate and foreign affairs experts and technicians on the principles of international law capable of managing climate change, we are now currently witnessing, in addition to negotiations, popular discussions and exchanges at all levels and by all categories of development players seeking appropriate solutions. From the simple citizen to the top policymakers via the elected representatives, the private sector, the civil society and others, this search for solutions with negative impacts on climate change is becoming a priority in the desires expressed during the various Conferences of the Parties and forums. Note, however, that it is struggling to transform into actual national and international commitments that all the countries in the United Nations community must take to resolve the problem, be they developed or developing.

Although Montreal in 2005 saw the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol without the blessing of all the countries involved, Copenhagen 2009 was a decisive moment in this negotiation process, with an agreement on the shared vision (maintain the warming rate below 2 degrees Celsius) and on the need and importance of technical and financial means to support the reduction and control of greenhouse gases (quick-start initiative of US$30 billion 2010-2012 and US$10 billion a year until 2020) with low-carbon development activities.

Cancún 2010 and Durban 2011 set out to provide the content and some pragmatic guidance for the financial and technical commitments laid down in an international context marked by the emergence of economically-significant countries, working to play their parts and take their places in the global arena. The global political and geostrategic environment has moved on and henceforth we shall have to reckon with all the countries and groups of countries conscious of climate issues in these negotiations.

Doha 2012 will launch a new negotiation period, where each player should manage to commit to clear and precise GHG reduction ambitions as well as to concrete low-CO₂ development actions under the Durban Platform. The Platform will set up a second period for the Kyoto Protocol whilst waiting for all the countries to adopt a legally-binding international tool.
Doha will also be used to good effect to ensure:

- the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund,
- the introduction of in-depth training and capacity-building programmes in combating climate change for sustainable development,
- the establishment of financial, technical and technological mechanisms and means for adaptation, mitigation and technology transfer.

This guide made available by the OIF through its subsidiary body the IEPF is intended to provide information on and explain the challenges and issues of climate change debated during this conference. Each player and each country will be able to take a position in line with its interests and provide a conscious, controlled contribution to the global programme of combating the negative consequences of climate change. It is nowadays understood and agreed that EVERYONE must become work on this fight through local, national and international actions. Success is only guaranteed if all developed and developing countries commit to it as included and adopted in the Durban Platform, which is on the agenda for this 18th Conference of the Parties.

Let us give this new stage in negotiations that is about to start the hope and actions required for the fight against poverty, sustainable development and the survival of our planet.

Pleasant reading and enjoy the conference!

Fatimata DIA Touré
Director of IEPF
INTRODUCTION

The reality of climate change today is addressed within a difficult political context, characterised by an agenda that is mainly concentrated on short- and medium-term economic and social factors. After the Durban compromise on continuing discussions under the traditional framework of post-2012 negotiations and under the Durban Platform for a post-2020 regime, the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 8th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), which will be held on 26 November to 7 December 2012 in Doha, will constitute a turning point in climate negotiations.

End of an era for the Bali Action Plan and the first Kyoto Protocol period

As planned in Durban, the Parties will witness in Doha the end of the first period of the Kyoto Protocol and the advent of the second commitment period. They should also put an end to the mandate of the Bali Action Plan. This should mean the shutting down of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the review of the Bali Action Plan, mainly on the questions of ambition, transparency of mitigation efforts and climate financing.

This review will therefore be marked by two observations. In Copenhagen, in 2009, the Parties agreed to limit the rise in the mean global temperature to 2°C. However, the mitigation targets announced to date by the developed countries and the mitigation actions of developing countries would result in a rise in the mean global temperature of 3.5°C and an “ambition deficit” of 6 to 12 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent. In addition, many developing countries are today raising doubts over the transparency of the early financing of US$30 billion granted between 2010 and 2012 and the ability of developed countries to provide sustainably and predictably the US$100 billion promised per year until 2020.

As it coincides with the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the only legally-binding agreement to date, Doha will also be the launch conference for the Protocol’s second commitment period, whose duration and certain questions of operationalisation have been the subject of intense negotiations during 2012. The adoption of this second period in 2013 will boost the trust between the

2. Bridging the Emissions Gap, UNEP

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countries under the Durban Platform negotiations by guaranteeing that the developed countries committed under Kyoto continue to take the initiative in terms of emission mitigation. For the other developed countries which do not want to commit themselves under Kyoto, the Parties should decide on the manner and form of engaging their mitigation pledges made in Copenhagen and Cancún for the period 2012 to 2020.

**Negotiating the turning point towards a new era of negotiations of the Durban Platform**

Doha will mark the advent of a new era in climate negotiations with the definition of the work themes for the ADP which must prepare for 2015 an agreement on a post-2020 climate regime applicable to all countries. The Durban Platform should therefore go beyond the traditional lines of the Bali Action Plan that maintained a differentiation of obligation between the developed and the developing countries. Since 2007, the developing countries have insisted on the commitment of the United States, the second largest global emitter of GHG, in a legally-binding agreement that would respect the principle of historical responsibility and of the right to development. The developed countries have preferred the adoption of an agreement that would commit the emerging countries that are large GHG emitters in the same way as the developed countries in the implementation of mitigation actions. Reconciling these viewpoints is at the heart of the mandate of the Durban Platform, whose adoption allowed an agreement in principle to be reached on renewing the Kyoto Protocol which should be confirmed in Doha.

Doha will therefore test the strength of the Durban compromise, whereby the Parties have approved a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol provided negotiations start on a post-2020 agreement. The countries should state how they envisage the outline and the characteristics of the work programme that should lead to this agreement, which could take the form of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreement with legal force.

The progress in Durban, including the launch of the Durban Platform, an agreement in principle on a second Kyoto Protocol period and the operationalisation of institutions provided for under the Cancún Agreements, offer numerous strengths and opportunities that could be exploited by the Parties in Doha. The negotiators should therefore continue to demonstrate their tenacity and creativity to overcome the deadlocks and to make the Doha Conference a success.
1. BRIEF HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Since the adoption in 1992 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on the fringes of the Rio Declaration, the threat from global warming for human beings and ecosystems has gradually been included in the international agenda. In the belief that the commitments made in Rio under the UNFCCC to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at a level that prevented dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system fell short of the mark, the Parties to the Convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. The developed countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol are obliged to reduce jointly, by the end of 2012, the level of emissions of six GHG by 5.2% compared with the 1990 level.

The Marrakesh Accords adopted the operationalisation modalities for the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. However, the Protocol was only ratified in 2005 and its implementation was delayed in a most countries. The United States, since 2005 the world’s second largest GHG emitter after China, has not ratified the Protocol and is therefore not subject to any obligation to reduce GHG emissions under it. Furthermore, certain Annex I countries which have ratified the Protocol, such as Australia and Japan, will find it difficult, if not impossible, to comply with their individual emission reduction or limitation targets for the first commitment period. Japan and Russia have indicated that they do not intend to participate in the second Kyoto Protocol period. Canada withdrew unilaterally from the Protocol in December 2011, before the end of this first period. Nevertheless, Canada remains engaged in negotiating an agreement that will be adopted by 2015 under the Durban Platform.

In 2005 the Parties embarked on a dialogue on long-term cooperation with the aim of incorporating the major GHG emitters in the mitigation effort and in recognition of the need to deal with the financial, technological and adaptation aspects in the longer term. A specific negotiation framework for the post-2012 issues under the Convention, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-

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3. See: http:// unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/ awgkp_sog_compilation.pdf, p. 6 et 7
LCA) was therefore formed side by side with the working group discussing the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP).

The Copenhagen Accord, a political agreement adopted in 2009, clarifies certain aspects of the negotiations, like the long-term GHG emission reduction targets and financing. The developed countries committed to collective financing objectives of:

- US$30 billion for the period 2012-2012;
- US$100 billion per year until 2020.

In addition, the countries also undertook to enhance their long-term cooperative action to combat climate change and limit the rise in the global temperature to 2°C. This Accord served as the basis for negotiations leading to the Cancún Agreements.

The Cancún Agreements of 2010 made significant progress, mainly consisting of the formal creation of institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Committee and the Climate Technology Centre. Other progress made includes setting up a register to optimise the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) and the launch of the REDD+, an initiative which targets reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and includes the role of conservation, sustainable forest management and development of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.

In 2011, a new negotiation framework was created: the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This new working group is the fruit of a compromise, whereby the Parties have approved a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, provided negotiations are opened under the ADP on a post-2020 agreement that will be applicable to all the countries. This working group commenced its mandate in 2012 with the aim of adopting by 2015 an agreement applicable to all the Parties and which should be implemented in 2020.

The decision to create the Durban Platform marks the start of a new and important chapter in the multilateral negotiation process under the auspices of the Convention. The scheduled end of the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP should therefore mark the transition towards a new era of climate negotiations under the Durban Platform.

6. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1
2. ISSUES RELATING TO THE DURBAN PLATFORM

The Durban Platform is the fruit of a compromise between the main negotiating groups on climate change. The agreement is intending to negotiate (as “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention applicable to all the Parties”) is in return for the adoption of the second commitment period of 2012-2017 or 2012-2020.

The issues relating to the Durban Platform mainly cover the scheduling of the work of the ADP. The Parties should also establish a work plan that will study a set of specific measures to increase the ambition of emission reduction targets.

2.1 Scheduling the work of the ADP

The Decision on the Durban Platform adopted in December 2011 does not state the content of a new post-2020 agreement. It does not mention explicitly, for example, whether or not the agreement should contain emission limitation commitments. In Doha, the Parties should negotiate “the options and the means” to face up the climate challenges, mainly mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, transparency of measures, support and capacity building.

The Parties should define the ADP work programme and the main stages and principles that will guide this work until 2015. The role of the Convention principles, such as the common but differentiated responsibility, equity and historical responsibility in the work of the ADP, still has to be defined. The place given to them will impact taking national circumstances into account and on distinguishing between the contributions by developed and developing countries.

The majority of developed countries feel that the UNFCCC principles must be interpreted in the light of the constant evolution of countries and their economic, political and social situation. However, the Like Minded Group, a new coalition of some forty countries, is fighting for the outcome of the ADP to comply with the principles of common but differentiated responsibility, equity and historical responsibility of developed countries in climate change. These countries support the concept that any outcome under the ADP must be equitable so that the “universality of application” of the post-2020 agreement does not become the “uniformity of application”. Thus, these countries consider that even if the outcome of the Durban Platform must be applicable to all the Parties, this application must be differentiated according to the national circumstances of the countries.

7. Décision 1/CP17, par. 2
An agreement on a precise work plan combined with deadlines set for 2013 seems ambitious for Doha, which could simply be happy to adopt the outline and principal stages of the ADP work schedule. In addition, the ability of Parties to end the mandates of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP satisfactorily for all countries will have a major influence on the success of the ADP in Doha.

2.2 Work plan on improving the ambition level

In Durban, the COP noted with grave concern the major gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation efforts and the emission levels that would hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C compared with pre-industrial levels. The Decision creating the ADP therefore requires it to launch a work plan on “improving the mitigation ambition” and calls for exploring options for a “series of measures” to ensure the most ambitious mitigation efforts possible by all the Parties. Apart from individual efforts by countries, certain Parties point out the need to encourage additional mitigation measures, like recourse to renewable energies, substituting renewable energy sources for fossil fuels and enhancing energy efficiency. They also recommend concentrating on the options proposed in the UNEP report, like the control of the double accounting of emission reductions.

The issues cover the establishment of a mitigation framework for the post-2020 period whilst recognising the need to enhance the mitigation measures for the 2012-2020 period. The Parties should define how to increase the mitigation ambition and engage these means, for example through reduction targets, like the Kyoto Protocol, or through a different approach to emission reduction.

Numerous developing countries believe that implementing mitigation actions depends on the granting of adequate and predictable support. They therefore think that the ambition must also deal with the implementation means. They insist on the need for medium-term financing and to give clear signals to the private sector as well as provide technology transfer and deal with intellectual property rights issues, so that concrete mitigation actions can be implemented and encouraged.

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8. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Decision 1/CP.17.
3. CONVENTION-RELATED ISSUES

As agreed in Durban, the Parties should reach an agreement in Doha that puts an end to the mandate of the AWG-LCA. Nevertheless, a large number of developing countries feel that certain issues of the Bali Action Plan have not yet been resolved. How to engage the objectives and mitigation actions to plug the ambition deficit by 2020 (Section 3.1) and ensure the transition between the end of early financing and the long-term financing will be at the heart of the debates (Section 3.3). At the same time, the negotiations on mitigation (Section 3.2), technological support (Section 3.4) and capacity building (Section 3.5) will aim to identify the outstanding issues and the forums intended to deal with under the scheduled end of the AWG-LCA. The Parties will also clarify the scope and modalities of the review that will take place from 2013 to 2015 to assess the progress made under the Convention (Section 3.6).

3.1 Mitigation of GHG emissions

The Bali Action Plan provides for the Parties to agree on a shared vision, ultimately intended to reach a long-term objective of reducing GHG emissions. An agreement on the shared vision will form the fulcrum for the Parties in determining the mitigation efforts of developed and developing countries in 2020. The lack of consensus on the percentage objective of a long-term reduction in emissions and the peak emission year form the crux of the disagreement between the countries over the shared vision. This deadlock is holding back considerably the negotiations on the medium-term objectives for the developed countries (Section 3.1.1) and the mitigation actions of the developing countries (Section 3.1.2). Mitigation under the REDD+ is held back by the implementation financing issues (Section 3.1.3).

3.1.1 Mitigation in developed countries and adoption of GHG emission reduction targets

In Doha, the Parties will take their time mainly in plugging "the ambition deficit". According to the lowest stabilisation scenario of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the developed countries should reduce their emissions by 25% to 40% in 2020 compared with 1990 to limit the rise in mean global temperature to 2°C. Recent analyses suggest that the current commitments of Annex I Parties would result in a global reduction of emissions of between 11% and 16% by 2020 compared with the 1990 level.

11. http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/developed.html
This ambition gap is difficult to assess precisely given the conditions attached by some countries to their targets. For example, some countries make achieving their target conditional on comparable commitments being made by the most advanced developing countries. The developed countries are expected to state by Doha whether or not the conditions laid down are satisfactory to date.

In addition, the countries associate different rules with their reduction target to account for or offset their emissions. The clarification of these rules will have a huge impact on the amount of effort these countries should make to achieve a target. The ambition of these targets and the amount of effort required will also vary according to the decision on carrying over assigned amount units (AAU) from one commitment period to the next, which will be taken under the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.

Many developing countries, like the G77/China, believe that it is essential to adopt common rules as well as an agreement on the legally-binding nature of targets in order to agree on the ambition level that the developed countries should achieve. The developed countries wish the question of ambition to be dealt with henceforth under the ADP. Nevertheless, the agreement expected from the ADP by 2015 will only be applicable in 2020, which would imply the absence of a guarantee of legally-binding targets for the developed country not committed under Kyoto, by 2020.

### 3.1.2 Mitigation in developing countries supported by developed countries

Since 2007, the potential contributions by developing countries in terms of mitigation through nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) have been debated fiercely. The developed countries underline the need for transparency in developing country mitigation actions and insist on the large emitter countries making commitments to reduce GHG emissions equivalent to those of developed countries. The developing countries make adequate financing and technological support a condition for implementing NAMA. Over the last few years, most large emitter developing countries have announced non-binding quantified emission reduction targets, for which some require international support.

The Parties should clarify in Doha the level of transparency of emission reductions resulting from NAMA and the financial, technological and capacity-building support required to prepare and implement these NAMA. It will be important to understand the mitigation impacts of these measures better, mainly for the scheduled review process of 2013 to 2015 which will re-assess the GHG reduction needs.

The Parties will discuss in Doha the possibility of using a "structured" approach and developing a common format document for all the developing countries, where the targets announced by certain developing countries and the accounting rules used...
can be recorded. Nevertheless, for the developing countries, this exercise in understanding the diversity of NAMA must not result in standardised and categorised NAMA being submitted, at the risk of opening the way to a review of the relevance of a NAMA (for example, an investigation into whether a specific measure can be qualified as a NAMA).

With the setting up of the NAMA register imminent, developing countries will be able to submit NAMA with a view to receiving support for the preparation phase. As many announced NAMA are conditional on support being provided, the developing countries have also requested a support needs assessment for these measures.

3.1.3 Reductions of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD)

Due to the essential role that can be played by conservation, sustainable forest management and the increase in forest carbon stocks to reduce the emissions resulting from deforestation and degradation, certain Parties have set up the "REDD+" international approach. In Cancún, the Parties agreed that this approach would be implemented in three phases, firstly the preparation, then the implementation and finally the execution of actions, policies and national measures and national strategies or action plans, with everything based on the outcome\(^\text{13}\). In Durban, the Parties agreed that the concrete actions leading to measurable results undertaken by the developing countries during Phase III (e.g. GHG reductions) could benefit from results-based financing\(^\text{14}\).

The key point for Doha is to clarify the main components of the third and final phase (full implementation), such as financing modalities, the identification of a market mechanism or the measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) of the support granted. Two types of financing are envisaged: recourse to financing approaches focused on the market, which is supported by the developed countries given the possibility of engaging the private sector, and the recourse to non-market-based financing approaches, such as the public funds, supported by the developing countries. The second approach is thought to be more regular and predictable.

The Parties should also agree in Doha on the governance of the REDD+ financing, like setting up a Board for the REDD+ mechanism, creating registers, creating an assurance or reserve mechanism and designating bodies to review and regulate the REDD+.

\(^{13}\) Decision 1/CP 16, paragraph 73.

\(^{14}\) I.e. on the actual reduction of emissions or the increase in carbon sequestration. This financing will only be made once the emissions (or the increased sequestration) have actually taken place.
3.2 Adapting to climate change

Adaptation is critical, given the challenges of climate change in meeting objectives of sustainable development and combating poverty in developing countries. The Bali Action Plan recognises the need to enhance action for adaptation mainly through increased financial resources, investments and technologies designed to support adaptation.

In Cancún, the Bali process culminated in the adoption of the Cancún Adaptation Framework. The aim of this Framework is to enhance the adaptation action undertaken to reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience of developing countries, taking into account the pressing and immediate needs of particularly vulnerable countries. This Framework plans for the implementation of an Adaptation Committee charged with promoting the implementation of an enhanced action for adaptation in a coherent manner under the Convention.

Under the end of the AWG-LCA mandate, the Parties will concentrate in Doha on the need to continue the work on certain adaptation issues that are not already dealt with by bodies or programmes and, if appropriate, they should rule on setting up other arrangements to create a discussion space. A large number of developing countries identify, for example, the national adaptation plans for countries that are not LDC, adaptation and suitability implementation means, predictability, transparency and responsibility for financing during 2013-2020 as issues that are still outstanding.

For the majority of developed countries, all the aspects of the Bali Action Plan adaptation pillar are already taken into account by the bodies and programmes, for example the Adaptation Committee, the Work Programme on loss and damage and the national adaptation plans. They feel that future adaptation efforts should concentrate more on rationalising existing actions and efforts through a coherent approach for adaptation under the Convention.

3.3 Financial support

Financial support has been discussed extensively within the AWG-LCA since the Bali Conference. An important stage was crossed with the creation of a Standing Committee through the Cancún Agreements to assist the COP in the operationalisation of the Convention’s financial mechanism and the rationalisation of the climate financing. Similarly, the Cancún Agreements also created the Green Climate Fund (GCF), designated as an operational entity for the Convention’s financial mechanism, which will play a major role in the granting of the long-term financing of US$100 billion a year.

15. Decision 1/CP.13
17. Decision 1/CP.16
Whereas the developing countries wish to make sure that they have easy access to adequate financing, the developed countries insist on rationalised and transparent use of the financing. As such, the developing countries fear a gap between the early financing, that will come to an end on 31 December 2012, and the long-term financing, which also raise numerous questions on how to mobilise it.

The relay between early financing and long-term financing

At the COP15 in Copenhagen, the developed countries committed to providing new and additional financial resources to the tune of US$30 billion for the period 2010-2012 in compliance with a balanced distribution between mitigation and adaptation. This collective financial commitment is better known as "early financing". The Cancún COP recorded this commitment and reaffirmed that financing of adaptation will be a priority for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the LDC, the SIDS and African countries. In addition, the COP invited the developed countries to take stock of the early financing granted and how the developing countries could access these resources. The Cancún Agreements also state that the long-term financing should be provided early in 2013 to the tune of US$100 billion per year between now and 2020 through combined public and private sources.

Although the early financing will finish by the end of 2012, Numerous developing countries fear a gap between the end of the early financing and the start of the long-term financing. Although the developed countries keep on guaranteeing that there is no gap, the discussions testify to the need for the developing countries to obtain clear signals on how the US$100 billion are going to be achieved and mobilised. The developing countries are also concerned over financing transparency, including early financing. They believe that many lessons must be learnt from the experience of granting early financing, mainly in terms of compliance with the "new and additional" financing characteristics.

Mobilisation of long-term financing

To ensure that the financial institutions set up in Durban are operational as quickly as possible, mainly through the capitalisation of the GCF, the COP in Durban set up a work programme on long-term financing. This programme catalyses nu-

20. For a list of contributions under the early financing, see: http://unfccc.int/pls/apex/f?p=116:2:367786169977706::NO:::
merous issues relating to the mobilisation of the long-term financing that are also discussed under the AWG-LCA.

The issues for Doha mainly focus on the need to clarify the sources of financing. While the developed countries believe that private sources should play a significant role, the developing countries consider that the public sources should constitute the greater share of financing given their more predictable nature. How to ensure that these financial resources will be "increased, new, additional, sufficient and predictable" is also part of discussions on mobilisation, as the criteria used to assess these characteristics will have an impact on achieving the target of US$100 billion. The transparency of financing through measurability, reportability and verifiability processes is therefore crucial. In addition, certain developing countries believe it is just as important to determine whether the US$100 billion are adequate compared with the needs as it is to reassess the magnitude of this amount based on the needs of these countries. As all these issues are part of the long-term financing programme, certain countries hesitate continuing to discuss long-term financing under the negotiations of the AWG-LCA.

### 3.4 Technology development and transfer

The relevance of the question of technology development and transfer comes mainly from the tremendous technological challenge posed by the need to reduce GHG emissions and the importance of technology transfers to encourage implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries. The technology mechanism created by the Cancún COP comprises a Technology Executive Committee (TEC), mainly in charge of assessing needs, and a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), which should advise the countries and facilitate the coordination between the national and regional networks.

In Doha, the Parties should determine the linkage between the technology mechanism and the financial mechanism, including the GCF. They will also focus on whether the discussions on the additional functions of the CTCN and the TEC should continue in the context of the end of the AWG-LCA mandate. Several countries consider that the intellectual property rights form a barrier to the transfer of technologies and propose identifying a discussion forum for dealing with them. Certain countries believe that the TEC should be given the role of dealing with issues relating to intellectual property rights, for one of its functions is to recommend measures to eliminate the obstacles to technology development and transfer. Other countries are of the opinion that the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) should be the designated forums for discussing the question of intellectual property rights, not the UNFCCC.

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22. FCCC/SBI/2012/CRP2
3.5 Enhanced action for capacity-building

Capacity-building activities are intended to help developing countries and countries with economies in transition to participate fully in the application of the Convention and thus the processes resulting from the Protocol. In Durban, the Parties set up the Durban Forum on capacity building to make it easier to monitor and review its effectiveness. The Parties agreed that the financial resource for capacity building should be provided mainly by the developed countries through the financial mechanisms and by agreements and other multilateral channels.

The discussions are henceforth focusing on the relevance of it continuing to deal with capacity building under the AWG-LCA. Most developed countries are of the opinion that the Durban Forum can answer the questions of substance raised previously by the Parties on this issue. And yet, certain countries believe that this Forum does not allow a valid assessment of the capacity-building service. For these countries, the identification of performance indicators for monitoring and assessing capacity building and the creation of an institutional framework and a financial mechanism to watch over the implementation of capacity building is a question that must still be discussed under the AWG-LCA.

3.6 Review of 2013 to 2015 to assess the progress made

The Cancún Agreements provide for the possibility of revising the objective of limiting the temperature rise to adopt, if appropriate, an objective of 1.5°C instead of the 2°C put forward in Copenhagen. Similarly, the Parties agreed to carry out a review of 2013 to 2015 to assess the progress made towards achieving the Convention’s objective which they can use to determine whether more ambitious mitigation measures are necessary. The review will be led jointly by the subsidiary bodies and should consist of several phases, including information gathering and compilation, technical assessment, technical studies and the preparation of synthesis reports.

In Doha, the Parties should state the modalities for assessing the information collected and the scope of the review. The Parties will examine two options: a first based on the Cancún decision (i.e. that the review must cover the adequate nature of the global long-term objective and the overall progress towards achieving it) and a second that proposes including the assessment of the implementation of commitments by virtue of the Convention, including the implementation means provided to the

24. By virtue, in particular, of Article 4.5 of the Convention and Article 10 (e) of the Kyoto Protocol.
25. Decision 2/CP.17, Section VI
27. Paragraphs 4 and 138 to 140 of Decision 1/CP.16
28. Decision 2/CP.17 VII
developing countries. The Parties should also decide on the forum to assess the information, either through setting up a group of experts or by creating a joint contact group of subsidiary bodies.
4. ISSUES RELATED TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

In Durban, the Parties agreed to renew the Kyoto Protocol for a second commitment period. However, neither the mitigation targets for committed Parties nor the duration of the second period were defined. In Doha, the Parties should therefore communicate information on their quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELRO). The Parties should also decide on carrying over assigned amount units (AAU) that will undoubtedly have an impact on the magnitude of emission reductions to be achieved by the developed countries.

4.1 The conversion of Annex I Parties’ targets into QELRO for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.

Until now, several Parties have evoked individual and collective objectives using different references and some have attached conditions to their targets. In Durban, certain developed countries stated their intention to convert their targets into QELRO for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. they are going to express their reduction commitments as a percentage of permitted emissions compared with the reference year. And yet, the formula for defining the QELRO for the second period has not been identified and most of these targets are conditional on adopting rules which have not yet been defining such as those relating to the carryover of AAU. Similarly, the comparability of the QELRO ambition is a major issue for Doha, mainly in terms of the most appropriate way of deciding on the increase in ambition of stated targets. Thus, the AOSIS countries would like clear, unconditional QERLO expressed in a single figure and for a five-year commitment period.

The Parties are also studying the access conditions to the Kyoto mechanisms like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for the second commitment period with the possibility of restricting it to the countries that have submitted QELRO under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

29. Decision 1/CMP.7
4.2 The carryover of assigned amount units (AAU) to the second commitment period

The AAU are tradable units between the Kyoto Protocol participants; countries that have met or exceeded their target can sell these units to countries that have failed to meet it. The purchase of the number of units equivalent to the lack of compliance of the country showing a shortfall means that it can meet its commitments. The economic recession has made it easier for a large number of countries to achieve or come close to their emission reduction target for the first Kyoto Protocol period. A large number of AAU were therefore stored by countries due to lack of demand. The majority of countries participating in the Kyoto Protocol wish these units to be carried over to the second commitment period, which would help them comply with their QELRO. In Durban, the Parties decided to assess the implications of carrying over the AAU to the second commitment period. Several proposals have been put forward on how to calculate the AAU carryover, but none seem to reach consensus. In Doha, the Parties should therefore adopt the applicable rules for carrying over AAU to the second commitment period according to the implications of each option. The option of not limiting the carryover is also on the table.

4.3 Continuity between the two commitment periods and the duration of the second commitment period

Note that the continuity of two commitment periods implies that any amendments made to the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force before 1 January 2013. To achieve this, three quarters of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (143) should have ratified the amendments before 3 October 2012. To compensate for a gap between the two commitment periods, options will be tabled in Doha for the provisional application of amendments to the Protocol whilst awaiting their entry into force. The ASI-SID and some LDC suggest that the amendments to the Protocol adopted in Doha are legally binding for the Parties from 1 January 2013 via a provisional application whilst awaiting their entry into force.

The Durban Decision provides for two options for the commitment periods:

- either a five-year period (a second period from 2013 to 2017);
- or an eight-year period (a second period from 2013 to 2020).

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Most developed countries prefer the first option as it could mean revised emission reduction objectives after five years. The African Group and numerous LDC underline that this option would avoid blocking the ambition at a low level for eight years and would respond to the conclusions of the Fifth Assessment Report from the IPCC, expected in September 2014. However, some emerging countries prefer the first option because a shorter period also means a risk of them having targets imposed on them after five years. Most developed countries are looking for an eight-year duration for the second commitment period to ensure a transition to the outcome that the Durban Platform has to produce.

31. Müller, B., 2011
EXPECTATIONS OF THE DOHA CONFERENCE

Following the progress made at the Cancún and Durban conferences, expectations are running especially high for the Doha Conference. The duration and certain modalities of the second period of the Kyoto Protocol should be decided, the Durban Platform architecture should be prepared and the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) should come to an end in compliance with the spirit of the Bali Action Plan.

The negotiators are expected to pronounce on how to resolve the outstanding issues, such as the means to increase the ambition and compare mitigation commitments to limit the global rise in temperature to 2°C. The Parties should also agree on the guarantee of granting predictable and transparent financing to the developing countries and ensure that all the founding elements of the Bali Action Plan are resolved in order to end the AWG-LCA mandate on the basis of consensus.

The transition towards the second Kyoto Protocol period also fuels expectations as it remains the only agreement imposing legally-binding emission reduction obligations. Nevertheless, the modalities of this transition still remain uncertain. As certain developed countries will not be involved in this second commitment period, like the United States, Japan, Russia and Canada, most countries wish the mitigation targets of these countries to be recorded in an agreement for the period 2013 to 2020. In addition, the choice of the duration of the second Protocol period (2013 to 2017 or 2013 to 2020) will be decisive in ensuring the transition to the agreement that has to be reached by the Durban Platform for the post-2020 period.

Under the Durban Platform, the Parties should agree on a climate regime in 2015 which should enter into force no later than 2020. Some hope that at this time numerous events will combine to encourage reaching a post-2020 agreement with legal force. China will then be preparing its next five-year plan and the United States could be in a better position to introduce new climate legislation in Congress. To maximise the chances of adopting this agreement in 2015, there must be no delay in Doha that must provide the necessary impetus for such a success. Nevertheless, for a large number of countries, the priority is not to start negotiating the agreement to be reached by the Durban Platform, but to close the work of the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP successfully. The Parties are nevertheless expected to adopt in Doha the outline of the Durban Platform and define the main stages.
The negotiators are going to have to show some ingenuity in meeting such expectations. The Doha Conference offers the opportunity to decide on the key principles on which the ADP should base itself, such as equity. This should instil the necessary trust between the countries to determine how the obligations of both developed and developing countries will be engaged in the new post-2020 agreement. Such momentum could at the same time facilitate the closure of the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA by consensus.
FACT SHEETS

Sheet 1.
The regional groups and the main negotiation coalitions

The climate change negotiations process revolves around regional groups and negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are derived from the official United Nations classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests. During negotiations, the countries usually speak on their own behalf or on behalf of a negotiation coalition.

United Nations Regional Groups

The regional groups do not necessarily share the same interests in relation to the negotiations on climate change. The members of the Bureau are elected from regional groups and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

The regional groups are Africa, Asia and the Pacific Region (including Japan), Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC, from the Spanish) and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG). "The others" are Australia, Canada, the United States, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.

The African Group

The African Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation coalition. It has 53 members, all of whom share a variety of causes for concern, such as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the fight against poverty. The Group currently makes joint statements, mainly on questions relating to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building and financing.

Negotiation coalitions

AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States)

AOSIS is an ad hoc lobbying group which gives a voice to the majority of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) during negotiations at the United Nations. The SIDS share their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, especially the rise in sea levels which is threatening the very existence of several islands. AOSIS has 39 members and four observers. Most AOSIS countries also belong to the G-77/China and ten are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC)\(^2\). Bahrain is the only SIDS member of the United Nations which does not belong to AOSIS; conversely, the Cook Islands and Niue belong to AOSIS but are not SIDS members of the United Nations\(^3\).


Least Developed Countries (LDC)

The group of LDC comprises 49 countries among the least developed (33 in Africa, fifteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean). They defend their interests jointly within the United Nations, especially in relation to climate change. They share considerations about their vulnerability and their need for support in planning their adaptation. The UNFCCC also recognises the special needs of the LDC, which are the least capable of facing up to the impacts of climate change.

The Group of 77 and China (G-77/China)

The G-77/China comprises 130 developing countries and China. China is an associate member rather than a full member of the G-77. China cooperates closely with the G-77 over climate change-related issues; the group therefore takes its positions "on behalf of the G-77 and China". In particular, the G-77/China supports the economic interests of its members in miscellaneous questions within the United Nations. The G-77/China member countries can sometimes adopt diverging positions during the climate change negotiations, which they then defend via another negotiation coalition or regional group.

European Union (EU)

The EU is a political and economic union of 27 member countries. It is represented by the European Community, which is a Party to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, but which has no voting right distinct from that of individual countries. Despite some differences, they often adopt a common position and speak with a single voice during climate change negotiations.

Umbrella Group

The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the European Union and which has been formed in the context of climate change negotiations. It has emerged from the JUSSCANNZ group and is active in all the UN forums despite the group not always comprising the same countries. Although informal, the list normally includes Australia, Canada, the United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine (other countries are added periodically, depending on the topics addressed). The group has been focusing its activities since 2001 on information sharing rather than actual negotiation.

Coalition for Rainforest Nations

This coalition started to take shape in 2005 under the initiative of Papua New Guinea. Its goal is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition includes 32 countries: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay and Vanuatu.

34. Yamin and Depledge, 2004
35. See www.G-77.org
36. JUSSCANNZ is the acronym for "Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand".
Environmental Integrity Group

The Environmental Integrity Group was formed in 2002 by OECD members which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico and the Republic of Korea. Mexico and the Republic of Korea are the only two OECD members not included in Annex I. Member countries are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.

Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)

CACAM groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I countries with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The reason is that the UNFCCC does not define the term "developing country" clearly and that these countries do not view themselves as developing countries despite their exclusion from Annex I of the Convention. The CACAM countries rarely take a common stance on other issues.

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)

ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation to promote cooperation in these areas between the socialist countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated by the United States. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, representing a hub of five countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on a goal of restricting temperature rises to 1 to 1.5°C and on the principle whereby the developed countries must take a lead partner role in the global effort to combat climate change.

Cartagena Dialogue:

The Cartagena Dialogue is an informal group created during the COP16 in Cancún. It brings together forty industrialised and developing countries working with a view to establishing a comprehensive and legally-binding regime within the UNFCCC. The aim of the dialogue is to openly discuss the reasons behind each country’s position and to explore the areas in which convergence and reinforcement of shared action could emerge. The members commit, nationally, to becoming or remaining low-carbon. Although the group remains very informal, its members already include countries from the European Union, LDC, the African Group, an informal coalition of Latin American countries comprising Panama, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, and AOSIS. Two members of the Umbrella Group, Australia and New Zealand, also signed the last declaration.

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38. Yamin, F. and Depledge, J., 2004
39. Ibid.
BASIC

BASIC is a group of countries made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the Copenhagen Conference (COP15, December 2009). After the meeting, BASIC published a series of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, in particular a second commitment period for developed countries by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol and scaled-up financing for the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to share their positions and to develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important emerging countries and large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor in international climate negotiations.

Like Minded Group

The Like Minded Group is a spontaneous coalition of countries created during the Bonn Conference on climate change in May 2012. It is made up of several countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active South American Parties, especially Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba. Commonly called the Like Minded Group, this coalition is also found in other international forums, especially the World Trade Organisation. It is a group of States joining forces around a very strong central position. Although it is too early to analyse the group’s political agenda, equity and respect for the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities seems to be the common link between them. Note that several large oil producers are found in this group.
## Sheet 2.
### Positions of main countries and negotiation coalitions on the post-2012

| Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) | AOSIS believes that the goals of reduced GHG emissions are founded on stabilising the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide at 350 ppm and limiting average global warming to below 1.5°C. It estimates that global GHG emissions should reach their ceiling in 2015 and be reduced by 85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. AOSIS is asking that the Annex I Parties achieve a 45% drop in their emissions by 2015 and 90% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. AOSIS calls for promises to be transformed into quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELRO). AOSIS is insisting that the work of the ADP covers the rise in pre-2020 ambitions, not just the post-2020 regime. In terms of national communications, the AOSIS members underline the need to extend the CGE mandate until at least 2016. They also underline the need to increase support for adaptation. Lastly, they are calling for the creation of an international mechanism regarding loss and damage for COP18. |
| Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish) | ALBA bases its position on the principles stated in the World People’s Declaration on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth of 22 April 2010, adopted during the conference of the same name held in Cochabamba, Bolivia on 19-22 April 2010. ALBA is demanding goals to stabilise the concentration of carbon dioxide at 300 ppm, with a limitation in temperature rise of between 1 and 1.5°C. ALBA urges developed countries to reduce their emissions by 40% to 50% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels. ALBA believes that developed countries must give an assurance that their technologies are free of patents and intellectual property rights. The ALBA countries are hoping for great things from the ADP and defend the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility in all the working groups. In terms of financing, ALBA is calling on the industrialised countries to contribute 1.5% of their GDP to the Green Climate Fund and urges democratic access to resources. |
| Brazil | Brazil would like the Annex I Parties to reduce their emissions by 40% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels and to define their commitments using a top-down approach reflecting the scientific data. It has also expressed the willingness to reduce its GHG emissions by 36.1% to 38.9% by 2020. Brazil is looking for a “robust legally-binding instrument” for post-2020. It is also emphasising the distinctive nature two ADP work components - preparing an agreement and raising the ambition. It reiterates that the Kyoto Protocol is a key component in raising ambitions, main through such mechanisms as the CDM. Brazil is also in favour of instigating a compensation mechanism for loss and damage caused by the negative impacts of climate change in developing countries. It calls for the full ap- |
application of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) work programme. Brazil considers that financing should come mainly from public funds to ensure predictability and must be supplemented by auctioning of assigned amount units (AAU).

**China**

China is open to introducing certain measures to combat climate change through nationally appropriate mitigation actions, provided that the developed countries offer technological and financial support which can also contribute to the sustainable development and energy safety of the country. China has announced that it will reduce its emissions by 40% to 45% per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2020 compared with the 2005 level. China wishes the contribution by developing countries to the global mitigation effort to depend on these Parties complying with their financing and technology transfer commitments. It believes that the prerequisites established by the Annex I countries only hinder progress in the substantive debate. In addition, it is insisting that the discussions on mitigation efforts by developed and developing countries remain separate and that the ADP work plan can only be prepared fully once the work of the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA has been completed. China believes that the work should continue in compliance with the principles stated in the Bali Action Plan.

**Coalition for Rainforest Nations**

The aim of this coalition is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition hope that the REDD+ partnership objectives will be achieved.

**Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**

The EIG mainly supports the creation of new market mechanisms and the strengthening of the CDM. It also believes that the international consultation and analysis (ICA) should facilitate developing country mitigation measures, build up capacities and improve transparency.

**European Union**

The European Union wishes the rise in the average global temperature to be stabilised at 2°C. The European Union is committed to reducing its emissions by 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels and by 30% if the other developed countries, including the United States, commit to similar reductions and if the most advanced developing countries commit to contributing to this objective based on their respective responsibilities and capabilities. It emphasises that a robust and transparent emission compatibility system is necessary to achieve the objectives and to ensure that the MRV system works. It reaffirms its preference for a legally-binding framework under the Convention containing the essential elements identified in the Cancun Agreements and the need for robust market mechanisms and a top-down approach. The EU is pressing for the second commitment period to last eight years. It believes that the principles of the Convention form a good basis for the future regime, but must be interpreted to reflect the common but differentiated responsibilities and the constantly changing respective capacities.
of countries. The EU emphasises that the ADP mandate remains to negotiate a new legally-binding instrument applicable to all and fears the introduction of the Bali Action Plan in the new mandate.

**G-77/China**

Given the historical responsibility of developed countries, G-77/China considers that the negotiations for a post-2012 regime should focus on the Annex I Parties adopting restrictive targets for reducing GHG emissions covering all sectors of the economy. G-77/China believe that the mitigation efforts by developed countries should be defined under a top-down approach and reflect the scientific data. The group is seeking more support from developed countries, especially for financing the adaptation and technology transfers. The G-77/China has underlined the importance of Annex I Parties depositing QELRO to avoid a vacuum between the commitment periods and thus maintain the Protocol and its flexibility mechanisms. The G-77/China is insisting that the outcome of the ADP comply with the objective, the principles (mainly the principles of historical responsibility and of common but differentiated responsibility) and the provisions of the Convention. It supports the creation of an insurance mechanism for loss and damage caused by extreme events and the setting up of a technical and performance indicators committee to measure the support for capacity building.

**Group of Least Developed Countries (LDC)**

The LDC Group demands stricter global targets, short-, medium- and long-term adaptation plans and long-term financing. It underlines also the need to strengthen and create regional centres and networks to facilitate the implementation of adaptation measures. It supports that the work of the ADP must focus on both the raising of pre-2020 ambitions and the post-2020 regime. It urges a second commitment period of five years covering 2013-2017 and on the need to settle the question of the gap in the mitigation ambition.

**India**

India is demanding the adoption of ambitious reduction goals for the Annex I Parties. India supports developing country implementation of nationally appropriate mitigation actions on a voluntary basis provide the developed countries provide financial and technological support. India is in favour of the objective of limiting the rise in temperature to below 2°C provided that this includes the principle of fair distribution of the carbon space based on the per capita cumulative share of emissions. India has stressed that developed countries’ compliance with commitments should include improving support relations provided to developing countries. India has stated that the ADP work plan must reflect the historical responsibility of developed countries and that the discussions should also be based on the Bali Action Plan and the Convention principles. India also insists that the work on sectoral emission reductions (air and maritime transport) be guided by the Convention principles.
Japan supports a new, unique and legally-binding instrument including all the major economies. Japan supports the global objective of a 50% drop in emissions by 2050. It also supports continuing with the CDM provided that it is improved and notes that the new market mechanisms should enable a broad spectrum of approaches, including for the projects and sectoral approaches. Lastly, it sees the ADP as an appropriate framework for discussing the mitigation ambition.

The OPEC countries emphasise the need to consider the potential negative impacts of mitigation measures of the Annex I Parties on the economies of developing countries.

The Republic of Korea has presented its low-carbon growth strategy targeting a 30% reduction in emissions compared with business as usual. It supports the idea that a post-2012 regime should include incentives to encourage developing countries to make voluntary commitments to reduce GHG emissions in the form of nationally appropriate mitigation actions, provided that the developed countries offer technological and financial support. The Republic of Korea insists that the second commitment period should last for eight years and that amendments to the Doha Protocol must be adopted to ensure the implementation of the second commitment period. Lastly, it has restated several times its commitment to an enhanced, global and ambitious multilateral climate change regime.

Russia is in favour of adopting a binding agreement including large emitter countries. It is opposed to withdrawing the special status of countries with economies in transition. It underlines that a new and global agreement is the main objective of the work of the ADP and warns the Parties against using the group’s work programme as a tool for reviewing the “fragile and multifaceted” balance of interests agreed in Durban.

Saudi Arabia, a major oil exporter, emphasises the need to take account of potential negative impacts from mitigation measures by Annex I Parties on the economy of developing countries, above all those exporting fossil energy. Saudi Arabia thus supports compensation for loss and damage attributable to the impacts of response measures. It favours an international consultation and analysis procedure (ICA) based on the rules which are already in place in order to fill the gaps in the compatibility system.

South Africa supports positive incentives to stimulate the participation of developing countries. It underlines the importance of trust in reviewing the ambition level under the Durban Platform. Like the BASIC members, South Africa believes it will only possible to prepare the ADP work programme fully once the work of the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA has been completed and that the outcome of this work will reflect the historical responsibility of developed countries.
The African Group

The African Group suggests that the Annex I Parties achieve a 40% drop in their emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. It insists that measures related to bunker fuels respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. It is campaigning for an international assessment and review process (IAR) for the developed countries. The Group has underlined the need to extend the CGE mandate until 2016 at least and supports a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol lasting five years rather than eight. It is insisting that the outcome of Doha covers all the components of the Bali Action Plan and recognises the urgent needs of Africa, especially in terms of adaptation. Lastly, the group calls for strengthening the mandate of the Nairobi Work Programme and more involvement of the region in the CDM mechanism.

United States

Having rejected any negotiation process under the auspices of the UNFCCC, the United States did a U-turn in 2007 by maintaining that the Convention was the appropriate forum for negotiations on a post-2012 regime. The United States wishes to give precedence to a national target for reducing GHG emissions. It wishes to operationalise Copenhagen’s target of 2°C and supports a legally-binding agreement including the commitments of all the major economies. They have committed conditionally to reducing their emissions by 17% compared with 2005 by 2020. The United States is demanding greater participation by developing countries in reducing GHG emissions. In addition, the United State emphasised that the Cancun Agreements should form the basis of negotiations (as opposed to the Bali Action Plan). It is in favour of a bottom-up approach. It has highlighted the essential components of the Durban Platform, including an instrument with legal force for all Parties. Lastly, the United States shows itself very open to working on cooperative approaches to sectoral reductions, like air and maritime transport.
Sheet 3.
UNFCCC side discussion forums

The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) was a major feature of 2012. The green economy and international governance of sustainable development therefore featured heavily on the international environmental stage. Nevertheless, a few forums assembled countries around questions of climate change. A description of each of these meetings is provided below.

United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development

Participants: United Nations member countries

Description: The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, also called Rio+20, was held on 20-22 June 2012. The event ties in with the "Earth Summits", flagship events that aim to structure the international governance of sustainable development. The event in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 led to the adoption of Agenda 21 and to the advent of international conventions on climate change, biodiversity and, subsequently, combating diversification. Although there was mixed satisfaction with the outcome of the Conference, the countries managed to sign a joint document. This document calls for ambitious measures to be taken urgently, in accordance with the UNFCCC principles and provisions, and underlines that the financing must come from various sources - public and private, bilateral and multilateral -, including new sources, to support mitigation and adaptation measures adapted to the countries, the development and transfer of technologies and the creation of capacities in the developing countries. Lastly, the signatories urge the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Parties to comply fully with their commitments and the decisions adopted under these instruments.

Ministerial meetings of BASIC countries

Present: Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

Description: The BASIC countries met several times in 2012 to settle on a common position. They not only welcomed the decision establishing a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, they also welcomed the establishment of the Durban Platform targeting the entry into force of a new global agreement by 2020. On the other hand, they wished to recall that its mandate is not to renegotiate or rewrite the Convention, its principles and provisions, mainly the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. They welcomed the outcome of Rio+20 during their meeting in July 2012, recalled that the submission of QELRO by Annex I Parties had a shortfall in ambition and underlined the importance of a positive conclusion to

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43. Joint declaration of the 10th meeting of BASIC Ministers, see: http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/10th-BASIC-Meeting-Delhi-Joint-Statement.pdf
the work of the AWG-LCA. The Ministers also took a tougher stance on the inclusion of international aviation in the EU’s emissions trading system.

In 2012, the participant countries met officially in New Delhi, India on 13-14 February, in Johannesburg, South Africa on 12-13 July and in Brazil in September 2012.

**G8 Summits**

Member countries (8): United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada and Russia

Description: This group of the eight most developed countries in the world meets annually to discuss economic questions and global issues such as combating climate change. Developing countries are frequently invited to G8 summits. The European Union is represented at each meeting. During the last G8 meeting at Camp David, United States on 18-19 May 2011, the assembled leaders discussed means of combating global warming. They recognised the need to increase the mitigation ambition level by 2020 if we wish to limit the increase in global temperature to below 2°C effectively. They welcomed the launch of the Durban Platform and the importance of implementing the Cancún Agreements. Lastly, they underlined that any legal instrument should apply to all the Parties, both developed and developing countries.

**G20 Summits**

Member countries (19 + European Union): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union.

Description: This group of twenty of the most developed countries in the world meets annually to discuss economic questions and global issues such as combating climate change. During their meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico in June 2012, the G20 countries committed to implementing fully the outcome of Cancún and Durban. They also agreed to examine how to mobilise the resources effectively taking into account the UNFCCC objectives, provisions and principles aligned with the Cancún Agreements.

In 2012, the G20 met in Los Cabos, Mexico on 18-19 June 2012.

**7th UN-REDD programme’s Policy Board Meeting**

Present: 16 countries

Description: The UN-REDD programme, launched in 2007, is a joint initiative between the FAO, UNEP and UNDP. This programme intends to help LDC to prepare the implementa-

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44. For example, in 2010, invitations were extended to South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Colombia, Haiti and Jamaica.
45. Camp David G8 declaration, see: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/19/camp-david-declaration
46. Los Cabos G20 declaration, see: http://g20.org/images/stories/docs/g20/conclu/G20_Leaders_Declaration_2012_1.pdf
tion of REDD. During the seventh meeting, the group reviewed the progress in implementing national programmes and approved the social and environmental principles of the programme and the criteria as a reference framework for the REDD+ countries. The Board also renewed the working group responsible for preparing a framework for the national programmes, which is in charge of identifying the prerequisites for implementing the REDD+ in the member countries. Lastly, the Board created a working group on the revision of the Policy Board to guide the finalisation of terms of reference and supervise the implementation of the review.

In 2012, the UN-REDD programme policy board meeting was held in Asunción, Paraguay on 28 March and in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo on 26-27 October.
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French-speaking information network to facilitate the circulation of current news on sustainable development in French: http://www.mediaterre.org/
EcoRessources proposes innovative solutions for managing GHG and climate change combined with an expertise in environmental economics and natural resources.

Analysis of international climate change negotiations

EcoRessources offers in-depth analyses of international climate negotiations. The firm analyses especially the challenges and opportunities offered by the options for the development and implementation of an international climate regime. EcoRessources also investigates the potential role of various sectors like agriculture and forestry and how they could be effectively included in such a regime.

Decision support and analysis of climate change policies

EcoRessources conducts studies on preparing and implementing climate change policies for the NAMA and tradable permit schemes and also for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. Our team has the expertise to assess the economic impacts of these policies and to advise on best climate change practices.

EcoRessources specialises in assessing the integral costs and benefits of implementing adaptation strategies and associated risks. These tools are used to assess the fair economic, social and environmental value of various options currently available to counteract the effects of climate change.

Capacity building

EcoRessources develops and offers workshops and training courses adapted to the specific needs of climate change negotiators, governments, private companies and individuals seeking to become proactive in carbon markets and climate change. EcoRessources offers training courses, among other things, on the international climate change negotiations, the NAMA, the market mechanisms and the carbon market.

EcoRessources was created in 2004. Its head office is in Quebec City (Canada). EcoRessources also has offices in Montreal, Lima (Peru), Caracas (Venezuela), Managua (Nicaragua) and Lyon (France. The company offers a global vision and a multilingual and multidiscipline personnel.

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The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a language - French - and common values. It currently groups 77 States and governments, including has to date 57 members and twenty observers.

The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies.

The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman and official representative. Abdou Diouf has been the Secretary General of the Francophonie since 2003.

57 member States and governments
Albania • Principality of Andorra • Armenia • Kingdom of Belgium • Benin • Bulgaria • Burkina Faso • Burundi • Cambodia • Cameroon • Canada • Canada-New Brunswick • Canada-Quebec • Cape Verde • Central African Republic • Chad • Comoros • Congo • Côte d’Ivoire • Cyprus • Democratic Republic of Congo • Djibouti • Dominica • Egypt • Equatorial Guinea • Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia • France • Gabon • Ghana • Greece • Guinea • Guinea-Bissau • Haiti • Laos • Lebanon • Luxembourg • Madagascar • Mali • Mauritania • Mauritius • Moldavia • Principality of Monaco • Morocco • Niger • Qatar • Romania • Rwanda • Saint Lucia • São Tomé and Príncipe • Senegal • Seychelles • Switzerland • Togo • Tunisia • Vanuatu • Vietnam • Wallonia-Brussels Federation.

Twenty observers
Austria • Bosnia Herzegovina • Croatia • Czech Republic • Dominican Republic • Estonia • Georgia • Hungary • Latvia • Lithuania • Montenegro • Mozambique • Poland • Serbia • Slovakia • Slovenia • Thailand • Ukraine • United Arab Emirates • Uruguay.

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The Francophonie serving sustainable development

The Institut de l’énergie et de l’environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF - Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) was born in 1988 from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. This action was expanded to the environment in 1996.

Based in Quebec City, the Institute today is assisting in:

- training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- developing partnerships in the energy and environment sectors for sustainable development.

Its 2010-2013 programme, in synergy with other programmes of the International Organization of La Francophonie, especially under mission D of the Ten-year strategic framework of the Francophonie - "Developing cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity" - IEPF:

- helps to prepare national sustainable development policies and strategies and implement them in the energy and environment sectors; trains and enhances the ability of supervisors and professionals to use and master environmental management tools for sustainable development.
- supports the participation of countries in international negotiations on the environment and sustainable development and the implementation of conventions, through discussions, technical support and mobilization of experts.
- develops partnerships, publishes guides, specialist journals and scientific and technical works in French in the energy and environment sectors.
- coordinates information and expertise networks for sustainable development.
- carries out any other function entrusted to it by the competent OIF bodies.

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The reality of climate change today is addressed within a difficult political context, characterised by an agenda that is mainly concentrated on long-term mitigation issues and the financing required to assist the developing countries to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The 18th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 8th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), which will be held on 26 November to 7 December 2012 in Doha, will constitute a critical stage in climate negotiations.

The Doha Conference will be the launch conference planned for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It will mark the advent of a new era in climate negotiations. One of the main objectives of the Doha Conference is to settle on the duration and modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and to shape the main focal points of the Durban Platform.

The aim of this summary is to assist negotiators to a clearer understanding of the issues of the Doha Conference.