


United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP20 and CMP10

Summary for policymakers



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FOREWORD FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE IFDD

On the road to Paris 2015 to adopt a Post-2020 Climate Agreement, the 20th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 10th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, being held in Lima, are looking decisive in achieving an ambitious objective in combating greenhouse gas emissions.

- The acceleration of the ratification of the Doha Amendment for after Kyoto,
- The implementation of results from Warsaw on finalising the draft text for the future 2015 agreement, the operating mechanisms of the Green Climate Fund, managing loss and damage from climate change, the REDD+, the Adaptation Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network,
- Clear and precise modalities for preparing planned contributions decided nationally through adaptation/mitigation projects conceived in the various socio-economic development sectors,

mainly form the major challenges and issues on which the Lima negotiations should make positive moves forward to mark the path to an agreement that is potentially already accepted by all categories of development players throughout the world.

Huge numbers of these players attended the Climate Summit in September, called by the United Nations Secretary General and made up of announcements for political, technical and financial commitments to low-carbon activities and the promotion of renewable energies; they have shown the way with this all-out effort. The Climate Summit has breathed new life into the negotiation process by putting the policies and the players from the business world and civil society in the firing line, to accelerate making the necessary decision for urgent actions to combat the adverse effects of climate change on sustainable development.

There is room for hope, therefore!!

In the recently-published Fifth IPCC Report, the experts and scientists have indicated and specified the strategic guidelines to be scrutinised rapidly to control the consequences of climate change in time. Development players have gradually started to become globally aware of the topic in constructing sustainable development policies incorporating practical and useful ways and means for the desired strategic changes.

This annual Summary for policymakers that you are accustomed to receiving shortly before the Conferences of the Parties is the contribution that the International Organisation of the Francophonie, through its subsidiary body IFDD, makes available to negotiators for active, enlightened participation in Lima, a meeting which we hope will finalise the adoption of principles and base documents to rise to the challenge of Paris 2015.

PLEASANT READING AND ENJOY THE MEETING!!!

Fatimata DIA

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INTRODUCTION

With a year to go until the adoption of a post-2020 climate agreement in Paris, the Lima Conference brings to mind the events preceding the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, which ended in an *a minima* agreement and entrenched national positions. In 2008, the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was already being used as a scientific basis to calls on the international community to take action. This report called for collective effort from developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25% to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020, in order to limit the average temperature increase to 2°C¹. In 2014, despite the strengthening of GHG mitigation policies and a decrease in emissions of almost 23% in 2012 compared to 1990 levels by Parties obligated under the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. developed countries except the United States)², according to the Fifth IPCC Report, global anthropogenic GHG emissions were at their highest level in history between 2000 and 2010³. Even though the 2°C limit has become the goal to achieve since its adoption under the Copenhagen Accord, carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentrations reached 400 parts per million (ppm) in 2013, i.e. the level at which CO₂ concentrations should have stabilised in order to increase the chances of limiting the global average temperature increase to between 2°C and 2.4°C⁴.

This fact brought hundreds of thousands of citizens onto the streets of the largest cities all over the world on 21 September this year. The aim behind this global demonstration was to call upon world leaders invited to New York by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, to take urgent action. Announced at Doha in 2012, the United Nations Climate Summit held on 23 September 2014 was intended to be a high-level political initiative to give new momentum to the negotiation process. After many technical issues were resolved at the Doha and Warsaw conferences, the process seemed to lack ambition and inspiration to take it forward to Lima and then Paris in 2015. The New York Climate Summit made it possible to reaffirm political will and to reveal a certain number of actions that could provide reassurance on the effectiveness of the future 2015 climate agreement. Prior to the New York Summit, the Abu Dhabi Summit (4-5 May 2014) and the High-Level Round Table under the Kyoto Protocol and ministerial dialogue on the Durban Platform (5-6 June 2014) offered a chance to prepare the ground for the Climate

1. IPCC, 2007.

2. https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2014/application/pdf/4_june_kp_round_table_final.pdf.

3. <http://mitigation2014.org/>.

4. IPCC, 2007.

Summit by familiarising Ministers with the complexities of the negotiation process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

The 20th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) and the 10th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) being held from 1 to 12 December 2014 in Lima (Peru) now have the major responsibility of maintaining political momentum and achieving a credible outcome to the debates on a post-2020 agreement, which is to be adopted in Paris in 2015. The mandate of the working group tasked with preparing this agreement, the Durban Platform, is however sufficiently broad in scope to allow differing interpretations of what could be considered a success in Lima. The decision to formalise the mode of negotiation in this forum by establishing a contact group in March 2014 is a first step towards concrete results for Lima and a means of ensuring transparency in the negotiations for many countries. Following the declarations made by world leaders in New York in September, which confirmed the political will of many countries, Lima is now an opportunity to capitalise on this political dialogue to benefit the technical negotiations. Lima also offers the chance to increase the number of countries which have ratified the Doha Amendment establishing the second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. This amendment ensures minimum mitigation efforts until 2020 from developed countries representing only 15% of global GHG emissions. To date, eighteen Parties have ratified this Protocol, including only two developed countries (as at 30 September 2014).

One of the priorities for Lima will be to find concrete solutions to close the gap between the GHG emissions pathway that corresponds to mitigation efforts pledged so far, and the pathway that is necessary to restrict the global temperature increase to 2°C by 2020. Imagination will be needed to close this gap, which amounts to 8 to 12 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂-eq), almost as much as the total emissions from the world energy supply sector⁵. Several organisations and coalitions used the New York Climate Summit as an opportunity to make their mitigation actions more visible. Although the emission reductions anticipated by these initiatives, which are sometimes specific to a particular sector or GHG, are not enough to close the gap by 2020 on their own, will they be enough to encourage countries to raise the ambition of their commitments?

With regard to the post-2020 period, the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), which were the subject of a hard-fought compromise in the final minutes of the Warsaw negotiations in 2013, raise more questions than answers. What form should they take? What legal force will they have? What level of transparency must they respect? How can equal efforts by the countries be ensured? Should they include financial contributions? The reluctance of some countries to reveal their INDCs before 2015 is currently mainly due to the lack of answers to these questions. Now that

5. UNDR, 2013a.

China has overtaken Europe in CO₂ emissions per capita, expectations are growing from high GHG emitting developed countries and developing countries. Since Doha, the mobilisation of high-level policy makers aims to prevent any attempts from Parties to leave the negotiation table under the guise of needing national approval of the commitments to be made. Reaching an agreement on the scope of INDCs and the conditions surrounding them would subsequently enable Parties to present their INDC. It should be noted that it has not been possible to achieve such commitments for the post-2012 agreement provided for by the 2007 Bali Action Plan, and this was an important contributing factor in the failure of the Copenhagen Conference in 2009.

The capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the place given to mechanisms and institutions created under the auspices of the Bali Action Plan, such as the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage or the Adaptation Committee, are also two major challenges for Lima. The pledges for finance amounting to almost 280 million US dollars announced at Warsaw have since been complemented by the commitment of fewer than 10 countries to provide 2.3 billion US dollars. One of the fundamental questions for Lima is to determine whether the GCF will be able to count on capitalisation of 10 billion US dollars, as many countries have called for, in order to move towards the target of mobilising 100 billion by 2020. The progress made in 2014 by the GCF Board on the Fund's operating modalities and the confirmation of the creation of a specific private sector facility will certainly reassure the most hesitant Parties, even though many questions remain unanswered. In New York this September, the commitments made by a number of financial institutions were a testimony to the wide variety of climate finance players. A coalition of institutional investors committed to "decarbonise" 100 billion US dollars by December 2015 and to measure the carbon footprint of at least 500 billion US dollars of investment. Furthermore, the other mechanisms created since the Cancún Conference in 2010, such as the GCF, the Technology Mechanism or the Adaptation Framework must find their role in the post-2020 agreement. This is already the subject of discussions within the subsidiary bodies responsible for making the final adjustments to these mechanisms.

To help the readers in better understanding the challenges of the Lima Conference, this summary provides a brief history of the negotiations (Chapter 1) and an overview of the main issues that will be negotiated this year (Chapter 2). It concludes with an analysis of expectations for the Lima Conference. The final section comprises a set of fact sheets that will provide a useful reference for new readers.

Although this publication is intended especially for negotiators from member countries of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF), we hope that it will also be useful to all other delegates.

4 Introduction

1. SHORT HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS UP TO THE WARSAW CONFERENCE

From Rio (1992) to Bali (2007)

Since the adoption in 1992 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), consideration of the threat from global warming has gradually been included on the international agenda. With the aim of finalising commitments made in Rio under the UNFCCC to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, the 3rd Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. By virtue of this Protocol, the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC⁶ which have ratified the Protocol were obliged to reduce overall the emissions of six GHG by 5.2% compared with 1990 levels, in the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. The Parties continued with negotiations after 1997 on the more controversial items in the Protocol. The Marrakesh Accords adopted in 2001 subsequently adopted the operationalization modalities for the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Protocol was only ratified in 2005 and its implementation was delayed in a few countries.

With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts thanks to support from developed countries, the Parties embarked on a dialogue about long-term co-operation in 2005. A specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues was thus formed in 2007 (Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action – AWG-LCA) side by side with the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

From Bali (2007) to Warsaw (2013)

In 2007, the 13th Conference of the Parties provided a two year road map: the Bali Action Plan. This aimed to reach an agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen on a post-2012 climate regime under the Convention. Having failed to reach a detailed agreement in Copenhagen, the Parties did however agree to move the negotiations forward on a post-2012 regime during the next Conferences of the Parties. The Cancún Agreements resulting from the 16th Conference of the Parties in 2010 then

6. The UNFCCC Annex I countries designate developed countries whereas the non-Annex I countries designate developing countries.

created formal institutions (Green Climate Fund - GCF, Adaptation Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network - CTCN), set up a registry for optimising Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) and launched an initiative targeting the Reductions of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+).

In 2011, in Durban, the 17th Conference of the Parties created the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). The mandate of the ADP is to enable the adoption of a new protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention, which will be applicable to all Parties. This agreement should be adopted by 2015 for implementation in 2020. The decision to create the Durban Platform marks the start of a new and significant chapter in the collective effort by Parties to combat climate change. In fact, with the difficulty of keeping discussions going under a multilateral climate regime since Copenhagen in 2009, the Durban Platform opened a more inclusive climate regime transcending the traditional lines separating the so-called "developed" and "developing" countries⁷.

The "Doha Climate Gateway" was adopted in one go during the last evening of the 18th Conference of the Parties. This Gateway refers to two major outcomes - the adoption of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the conclusion of the 2007 Bali Action Plan negotiations. The Parties thus ended the mandates of two Working Groups under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), resulting in a certain streamlining of the UNFCCC process, by reducing the number of negotiation groups from five in 2012 to three from 2013 onwards (the ADP and the two permanent UNFCCC subsidiary bodies). The Doha Decision reaffirms the ambition of Durban to adopt a new agreement in 2015 and to make a negotiation text available before May 2015, the content of which would be discussed in Lima in 2014. Regarding the Kyoto Protocol, the Doha Decision encourages countries to implement the second commitment period (which commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 2020) before they ratify it.

From Warsaw (2013) to Lima (2014)

However it is interpreted, it must be acknowledged that the Warsaw Conference (2013) did not reflect the sense of urgency of climate change. It did however lead to a series of important decisions which map out the route towards the Paris Conference in 2015 and define the expectations for the Conference in Lima in December 2014.

The Warsaw Decision invites the Parties to intensify their efforts to reduce the ambition gap for the pre-2020 period, by implementing their quantified emission reduction objectives or their Nationally Appropriation Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) (see Section 2.3)⁸. The Warsaw Conference also decided to accelerate the work on rai-

7. IISD, 2014a

8. Decision 1/CP.19.

sing the ambition level before 2020, for example through the technical examination of measures offering high mitigation potential and by inviting the Parties to cancel Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). One of the advances in Warsaw towards the 2015 agreement was to clarify further the modalities for preparing the draft negotiation text and the submission process for the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of the Parties to the Convention (see Section 2.1). INDCs represent the climate efforts of countries that will be included in the 2015 agreement. Even though a necessary consensus was reached on the term "contributions" in the final minutes of negotiations in Warsaw, it has not yet resolved the issue of the differentiation among contributions from countries with different levels of development and the contributions for means of implementation (i.e. financial support, technology transfer and capacity-building).

The creation in Warsaw of an International Mechanism for Loss and Damage was a positive signal towards the implementation of the Cancún Agreements and the Durban and Doha decisions (see Box 1 Encadré 1). REDD+ was also the subject of numerous decisions in Warsaw, which together form the "Warsaw Framework for REDD+" (see Section 2.6). REDD+ attracted attention with pledges for finance amounting to almost 280 million US dollars. The contrast between this sum and the 6.9 million US dollars intended for the GCF in December 2013 fuelled the crisis in confidence between developed and developing countries in terms of financial support. A high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance was established at the Warsaw Conference that will meet every two years until 2020.

BOX 1:

THE WARSAW INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE⁹

At the Doha Conference (2012), the Parties adopted a historical decision on the establishment of an institutional mechanism aimed at addressing loss and damage in developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Despite numerous contentious issues that remained outstanding after Doha, the Warsaw Conference finally culminated in establishing the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.

The functions of the Mechanism relate to the following aspects: improving knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management approaches for the adverse effects of climate change; strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant stakeholders; and enhancing action and support, especially in terms of finance, technology and capacity-building.

The Warsaw decision also encourages the flow of information and the strengthening of institutions and networks in this field (especially in the most vulnerable countries) at the national, regional and local levels, as well as their cooperation and coordination.

9. Decision 2/CP.19.

The Mechanism has an Executive Committee, under the direction of the Conference of the Parties, in order to supervise the execution of the functions of the Mechanism. This committee has been established on a provisional basis and will submit its biennial work plan in Lima. A review is scheduled for 2016 of the Mechanism, its structure, its mandate and its effectiveness.

Regarding the advances of the Durban Platform since Warsaw (see Section 2.1), the creation of a contact group to accelerate the work of the ADP seemed to restore a certain level of confidence required to resume negotiations in 2014. Despite differences of opinion concerning the relevance and role of this group, it was established in Bonn in June, after which the countries promised themselves a refreshed momentum for the negotiations. At the ministerial level, a high-level dialogue held on 6 June aimed to raise the level of pre-2020 ambition and to give fresh impetus to negotiations on the 2015 agreement. Furthermore, the high-level round table that took place on 5 June aimed to assess the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and to give ministers the chance to increase their quantified commitments for emissions reduction and limitation. Although no concrete decision resulted from the discussions, many consider that they facilitated the exchange of views at the United Nations Climate Summit in New York three months later, where some of the 120 Heads of State announced their national commitments and their ambitions in terms of reducing emissions and providing financing.

The last ADP session before the Lima Conference (Bonn, last October) left the impression that negotiations at Lima will be arduous. The differences in opinion between the Parties - and within the various groups and coalitions of Parties - became increasingly polarised on certain issues relating to the 2015 agreement and INDCs. These divergences could make it all the more difficult to find a compromise in Lima and to produce a text for the post-2020 agreement by May 2015¹⁰. It is therefore up to the Lima Conference to make sufficient progress to secure the development of the negotiating text for the agreement, in line with the deadlines agreed by the Parties.

The following sections provide an overview of some of the key issues that will be discussed in Lima and attempt to shed light on this last step before the Paris Conference.

10. IISD, 2014c.

2. OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATION ISSUES

This chapter gives an overview of some of the main issues that will be discussed in Lima. They include issues relating to climate change mitigation (Sections 2.1 to 2.6), climate change adaptation and addressing loss and damage (Section 2.7) and support for developing countries (Section 2.8). Recent developments in taking gender into account in the negotiations are also summarised briefly (Section 2.9).

Mitigation efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are a major issue in the climate negotiations. Under the Durban Platform, the negotiations aim to identify measures to reduce the pre- and post-2020 ambition gap (Section 2.1). Two work programmes under the subsidiary bodies also focus on clarifying developed country commitments, including certain outstanding issues under the Kyoto Protocol (Section 2.2), and on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) in developing countries (Section 2.3). At the same time, the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of these mitigation commitments and activities are designed to ensure a certain transparency. This transparency is a key issue in the discussions of the Durban Platform on the contributions of countries (Section 2.4). Other discussions will take place in Lima to set out the form of the new market mechanism, the role of other non-market-based approaches (Section 2.5) and to put the final touches to the Reductions of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) mechanism (Section 2.6).

Some impacts from climate change will be unavoidable regardless of our mitigation efforts. The design and implementation of **adaptation** measures is therefore crucial to limit the adverse effects of these impacts, especially for the most vulnerable countries (Section 2.7).

Another key issue in the negotiations is the **support for developing countries**. This mainly includes financial support, development and transfer of technologies and capacity-building (Section 2.8). For some Parties, commitments from developed countries and the provision of means of implementation are an essential prerequisite to the participation of all Parties in the 2015 agreement.

Efforts to take **gender** into account in the negotiations have advanced significantly in recent years (Section 2.9). Since the Doha Conference (2012), the topic has been allocated its own place within the negotiations, whereas previously it was considered under the "Other matters" agenda item.

2.1 The Durban Platform negotiations

In 2011, the UNFCCC created the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)¹¹. The ADP aims to prepare by 2015 "*a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties*" (called Work stream 1, focusing on the post-2020 period) and to "*enhancing mitigation ambition [...], with a view to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties*" (Work stream 2, focusing on the pre-2020 period)¹². With a year to go until Paris, the Lima Conference should therefore demonstrate progress towards the objective of reaching an agreement that matches the level of urgency of climate change, for both the pre-2020 and post-2020 periods.

Note that the Durban outcomes intentionally avoided readopting the asymmetry contained in the Bali Action Plan between developed and developing countries, thus leaving open the issue of differentiation in the form, content and even the legal nature of commitments applying to the different countries. The Durban Platform is therefore different from the Kyoto Protocol, which limited emission reduction commitments to developed countries, expressly excluding the introduction of any commitments by developing countries. The Durban Platform provides for obligations applicable to all Parties signatory to the UNFCCC. This currently raises many fundamental questions, the answers to which will determine the nature and substance of the post-2020 agreement. How can responsibilities in terms of commitments be balanced between developed and developing countries? What will be the legal nature of these commitments? How can the new agreement planned for the Paris Conference be prepared so that it is really in keeping with the urgency of climate change? These questions should be answered in Lima, in order to close the ambition gap by 2020 and to allow countries to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) for the post-2020 agenda, before the Paris Conference.

Pre-2020 period: Work stream 2

Despite the sense of urgency in the face of rising temperatures, accentuated by the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC - see Sheet 4)¹³, a huge gap remains between the emission level required to keep the rise in global temperatures to 2°C and the level corresponding to efforts by countries for the pre-2020 period. Recent ADP sessions have therefore continued the debate on how to increase the level of mitigation ambition by 2020. Several developing countries recall that the first steps would be for the developed countries to boost their commitments and for the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to ratify the Doha Amendment. Work has been undertaken to this end under the work programme on the commitments/targets of developed countries under the Convention (see Section 2.2). Howe-

11. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 2-7.

12. Decision 1/CP. 17.

13. IPCC Working Group III: http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_approved.pdf.

ver, none of the countries which have taken on commitments, even conditional ones, under the Cancún Agreements (2010), have proposed to increase their commitments for 2020. On the contrary, the Warsaw Conference instead saw some Parties review their objectives downwards.

Under ADP Work stream 2, the Parties focus their efforts on concrete actions that could potentially close the gap between the ambition level of the Parties' mitigation commitments and the level required to limit the rise in temperature to 1.5°C or 2°C. A series of Technical Expert Meetings since Warsaw have allowed the Parties to focus on the sectors representing a particularly high mitigation potential. Six meetings were thus held in 2014 on the topics of renewable energies, energy efficiency, land use, urban environment, reduction of GHGs other than CO₂ and carbon capture, use and storage. The Parties have agreed on the usefulness of these meetings and there is considerable interest in continuing them beyond the Lima Conference.

The Parties have also tackled the contentious issue of improving financial support, technology transfer and capacity-building under this Work stream. Several developing countries believe that *pre-2020 ambition* needs a broader definition, in line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, to ensure that the issues of adaptation and means of implementation are not overlooked¹⁴. For some countries, this is a condition for their contribution to the collective mitigation effort. One of the most contentious issues concerns a clear road map for long-term finance, in order to improve the transparency and predictability of finance that is granted (see Section 2.8). On this topic, several developed countries have asked the developing countries to create an environment conducive to investments supporting mitigation efforts, especially from the private sector.

All these items will be discussed at length in Lima as, for many Parties, the 2015 agreement will be heavily influenced by the degree of success in reaching an understanding on the pre-2020 period. Furthermore, the level of collective efforts for the pre-2020 period will have considerable impact on the level required for the post-2020 period. Note also that several developing countries consider the increase in pre-2020 ambition from the largest emitting countries as a political prerequisite for giving their approval to the 2015 agreement.

In Lima, it is therefore planned that the Parties consider a draft decision that consolidates the progress made on the pre-2020 period¹⁵. In Bonn in October, the ADP produced a new version of this draft decision that proposes, among other things,

14. See for example: Like Minded Group of Developing Countries: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2013/in-session/application/pdf/adp2-2_closing_plenary_statement_lmdc_pakistan.pdf; Arab Group: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2013/in-session/application/pdf/adp2-2_closing_plenary_statement_arab_group.pdf; and G-77/China: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2013/application/pdf/adp2-2_closing_plenary_statement_g77_china_fiji.pdf.

15. ADP.2014.8.DraftText and ADP.2014.9.InformalNote.

to convene a *Forum on Accelerated Implementation of pre-2020 Climate Action* in June 2015, to consider the status of mitigation efforts undertaken by the Parties for the pre-2020 period¹⁶. Numerous Parties wish for Work stream 2 to continue its activities after 2015, but opinions differ on the objectives and duration of this approach.

Post-2020 period: Work stream 1

With regard to the post-2020 period, the Parties' efforts are focused on two main points: preparing the components of a draft text for the 2015 agreement ready for the Lima negotiations; and preparing the process for developing Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that will contain the commitments made by countries for the post-2020 period. One of the key issues is to make sure that the level of ambition contained in Parties' INDCs for post-2020 is in keeping with that required by the science. The communication of these INDCs by the Parties as early as possible is therefore a key step in the negotiations towards the Paris agreement. The announcement made by the European Union and the United States of their intention to have their INDCs ready by the first quarter of 2015 could help to boost confidence and encourage other Parties to do the same¹⁷.

Nevertheless, there are still numerous divergences over the definition and scope of INDCs, the associated information and communication requirements and the INDC review and assessment process. While many developed countries want INDCs to be focused exclusively on the mitigation objective, many developing countries are pushing for the contributions to address mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation. Some Parties also request that these contributions are associated with objectives for finance, technological support and capacity-building¹⁸. Whereas the developing countries insist on the predictability of financing so that they can develop long-term strategies, the vast majority of developed countries reject quantified objectives for climate finance¹⁹.

In Warsaw (2013), the Parties reaffirmed the need to review the elements of a draft text for the 2015 agreement no later than the Lima Conference, with a view to making a negotiating text available before May 2015²⁰. Among other things, they will have to agree on how the principles of the Convention will be applied to the 2015 agreement, such as the principles of equity and transparency. To this end, numerous countries have called for a rigorous transparency regime, supported by a robust

16. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_oct_2014/in-session/application/pdf/adp2-6_i3_24oct2014t2100_dt.pdf.

17. IISD, 2014b.

18. IISD, 2013a

19. New Zealand: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/new_zealand_submission_to_the_unfccc_on_the_adp_work_stream_1_-_elements_-_october_2014.pdf.

20. Decision 2/CP.18, para. 9.

Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system, both for mitigation efforts and the support granted and used. Other elements causing divergence between the Parties include the legal form of the 2015 agreement, how the notion of applicability to all Parties will be interpreted and the different approaches for aggregating national contributions into a global effort, of which the scale is founded on science and equity.

The role assigned to adaptation has also been debated since the start of negotiations under the ADP. The developing countries believe that the new agreement should treat mitigation and adaptation equally and some suggest a global objective for adaptation that would be linked directly to the global mitigation objective²¹.

During the negotiations at the ADP in Bonn in October 2014, divergences of opinion that had already been raised in these different areas largely persisted and in some cases were heightened. The Parties also did not agree on the method by which the ADP should produce a negotiating text. This risks generating a delayed start for the negotiations in Lima. Note that a document setting out the different options considered for the 2015 agreement will be available in Lima.

2.2 Developed country commitments/targets under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol

The emission reduction objectives between now and 2020 announced so far by the developed country Parties to the UNFCCC remain significantly below the reduction level considered necessary by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to limit the rise in temperature to 2°C²². Since 2012, a work programme has been encouraging these countries to submit more ambitious objectives. The programme also seeks to identify the common features among the different objectives presented by these countries, in order to measure the progress made towards achieving these objectives and to assess the collective level of ambition and the comparability of countries' efforts²³. This aspect of the programme seeks to address the difficulty in comparing the different objectives, due to associated conditions such as the inclusion of agriculture and forestry sectors, the recourse to market mechanisms or comparable commitments being made by the most advanced developing countries.

Advances in 2013 have helped to resolve some of the issues, for example regarding global warming potential (GWP) and the gases and sectors covered, upon which the calculation of emissions and removals largely depend²⁴. In Lima, with the work of the programme scheduled to finish in 2014²⁵, the Parties will attempt to draw

21. African Group: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp_2_african_group_29042013.pdf

22. IPCC, 2007.

23. Decision 1/CP.18, para. 8.

24. IISD, 2013a

25. Decision 1/CP.18, para. 9.

conclusions on the basis of these points of convergence²⁶. Many countries are hoping that the progress made under this work programme will facilitate the negotiations under the ADP on the increase in ambition and the post-2020 accounting regime.

At the same time, the ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, which involves the commitments of Parties for the second period of the Protocol (2013-2020), is proving to be a slow process. Only eighteen countries had ratified this amendment as at 30 September 2014, whereas, according to the current rules, 144 are needed for it to enter into force²⁷. This amendment has also given rise to several methodological issues under the Kyoto Protocol and these will be discussed in Lima. For example, the addition of new activities under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the agricultural and forestry sectors raises technical issues, including managing the risk of non permanence of emission reductions.

2.3 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA)

The objective of NAMAs is for developing countries to achieve a deviation in emissions relative to “business as usual”, thanks to technological, financial and capacity-building support from developed countries²⁸. For the developing countries, the preparation and implementation of NAMAs is subject to the provision of adequate and transparent support. The NAMA Registry, an Internet platform launched by the UNFCCC Secretariat in 2013, is designed to facilitate the matching of NAMAs with such support²⁹. The first successes through this Registry were announced in 2014: a NAMA from Georgia for sustainable forestry with the support of Austria; and a NAMA from Azerbaijan for low-carbon end-use sectors, supported by the Global Environment Fund³⁰.

A work programme which started in 2012 and will end in Lima provides a better understanding of the **diversity of NAMAs**. It also discusses the issues of transparency and matching NAMAs to international financial support. The main discussion points relate to the level of information to be provided by developing countries on their NAMAs. Whereas the developed countries stress the need for the transparency of NAMAs and for the assessment of their impacts, the developing countries emphasise the technical difficulties in compiling the required information and developing the baselines and the measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) processes³¹. In Lima, the Parties will have to decide on a future process aimed at a better understanding of

26. FCCC/SBSTA/2014/L.4.

27. <http://unfccc.int/7362>.

28. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 48.

29. www4.unfccc.int/sites/nama.

30. FCCC/SBI/2014/L.18; FCCC/SBI/2014/INF.10.

31. IISD, 2014b.

the diversity of NAMAs, on the basis of the experience acquired through this work programme. Discussions such as these are crucial to help make progress in the ADP debates on the efforts required from countries. In fact, some developing countries could use their NAMAs as a starting point for presenting their INDCs.

2.4 Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)

The MRV system refers to any process or system which aims to assess and monitor the impacts of mitigation measures and/or the support provided (measuring) and to document this information in a transparent way (reporting), so that it can be examined for accuracy (verification). Under the UNFCCC, this mainly concerns national communications, through which the Parties provide information on their actions taken to mitigate and adapt to climate change as well as on the support provided and received³². The Cancún Decision (2010) requires the submission of national communications every four years and the submission, every two years, of a biennial report for developed countries and of an updated biennial report for developing countries³³. These communications and reports are subject to various international review and analysis processes. The developed countries submitted their first biennial report early in 2014, whilst the developing countries should submit their updated biennial reports by the end of 2014. The Least Developed Countries and the Small Island Developing States can however submit their reports less frequently.

In Lima, the Parties will focus mainly on the status and compilation of these various reports and communications that are crucial for assessing the level of ambition between now and 2020. Furthermore, the question of the transparency of countries' efforts - before 2020 and under the implementation of INDCs after 2020 - is closely linked to MRV issues. The lessons learnt from applying the MRV regimes of both the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol will be useful to the MRV regime that will be established under the 2015 agreement.

The discussions in Lima will also cover the mitigation of emissions from fuels used in international air and sea transport. Although the Parties are in agreement on the fact that the two specialised agencies of the United Nations - the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation - are best placed to deal with the mitigation of GHG emissions in these sectors, the Parties have not yet agreed on the responsibility for emissions reduction that the UNFCCC could require from these bodies. The issue of impacts from the implementation of mitigation measures on the economies of developing countries, especially those with an economy highly reliant on tourism, is also an area of disagreement.

32. Decision 18/CP.8 for the Parties included in Annex I and Decision 17/CP.8 for Parties not included in Annex I.

33. Decision 1/CP.16

2.5 Issues regarding market-based and non-market-based approaches

Two market-based mechanisms have existed for several years now under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol and allow Parties to the Protocol to generate and/or exchange emissions reduction units, commonly called "carbon credits". These mechanisms are the Joint Implementation (JI) between two developed countries and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) between a developed country and a developing country. The CDM modalities and procedures³⁴ and the guidelines for the application of the JI³⁵ were adopted in 2005 with, for both, a review planned for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (which started in 2012). As neither of these reviews was completed in Warsaw (2013), the Parties should consider the proposed reforms and possibly adopt them in Lima.

In parallel to these existing mechanisms, discussions have taken place since Bali (2007) on establishing new instruments: the New Market Mechanism (NMM), the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) and Non-Market-based Approaches (NMA). Whilst the NMM and the FVA urge developing countries to undertake mitigation actions at a wider scale than CDM projects (policies, for example) and to finance them by selling or acknowledging a part of emission reductions achieved, NMAs would be separate from any market system. A new programme of work has been created for NMAs³⁶, mainly because of the scepticism of certain Parties towards using market mechanisms and to counterbalance the FVA and the NMM.

Discussions on these new instruments have been slow since 2013, mainly due to the greater importance given to the 2015 agreement, and several major issues remain to be resolved³⁷. What are the objectives and scope of the FVA, NMM and NMA? How can they operate as a coherent whole and avoid double counting of units generated under these different mechanisms? How will these three new instruments interact with the CDM and JI? While these instruments are called on to play a major role under the 2015 agreement, several Parties believe that the outline of the Paris agreement should be known before discussing the details of these new instruments.

2.6 Issues related to REDD+ and agriculture

The objective of the Reductions of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+) is to create mechanisms that incentivise developing countries to better protect and manage their forestry resources³⁸. With a

34. Decision 3/CMP.1.

35. Decision 9/CMP.1 and Annex.

36. Decision 1/CP.18, para. 47.

37. GIZ UNFCCC carbon markets: www.giz.de/expertise/downloads/giz2014-en-climate-carbon-mitigation-highlights-4.pdf.

38. Namely: the "+" of REDD+ was added to the acronym REDD to emphasise the importance of conservation, sustainable management of forests and the strengthening of stocks of forest carbon in developing countries.

record number of seven decisions adopted in *Warsaw in 2013, the REDD+* is seen as the success story of this Conference. This package of decisions is referred to as the "Warsaw Framework for REDD+". This framework focuses on a series of methodological, institutional and financial issues and puts an end to most of the discussions that followed the adoption of the Bali Action Plan in 2007, for example on the guidelines for monitoring changes in forest cover and carbon stocks.

The REDD+ issues currently pending relate to non-carbon benefits and non-market-based approaches. Some countries, such as Bolivia, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, consider that it is important to have a holistic approach that includes the multiple benefits of forests, including the non-carbon benefits, such as the protection of biodiversity³⁹. However, other countries consider that taking non-carbon benefits into account would over-complicate monitoring activities and other methodological aspects. In Lima, discussions on the REDD+ will focus on non-market-based approaches, such as those combining mitigation and adaptation for integrated and sustainable forest management⁴⁰.

The Bonn session in June 2014 marked an undeniable step forward for agriculture with the establishment of a contact group to address agriculture and to identify areas for discussion. Some countries, such as those of the G-77/China even consider that these efforts contribute to the preparation of a "road map" for agriculture for the 22nd Conference of the Parties⁴¹. However, despite this enthusiasm, which contrasts with the sense of failure of the sessions in previous years, there are still many stumbling blocks. Those likely to resurface in the coming discussions relate to the consideration of mitigation in the agricultural sector and the means necessary for the implementation of actions in this sector. The developing countries fear having to make efforts to reduce emissions in the agricultural sector. For these countries, agriculture is a key economic sector, sometimes representing more than one quarter of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), particularly in Least Developed Countries. In Lima, the Parties will therefore work on finalising an agreement on the areas that should be the subject of scientific and technical work in 2015 and 2016.

2.7 Adaptation to climate change and approaches to address loss and damage

As underlined by the most recent Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC - see Sheet 4), the impacts of climate change already being observed will continue in varying degrees in the future depending on the ambition level of our mitigation efforts. Some impacts are now unavoidable, regardless of our mitigation pathway. It is therefore crucial that adaptation measures are designed and implemented, especially in the developing countries that are most

39. IISD, 2014b.

40. Decision 1/CP.18, para. 39 and FCCC/SBSTA/2014/L.8, para. 3.

41. IISD, 2014b.

vulnerable to the adverse effects of these impacts. Numerous Parties ask that adaptation and the associated means of implementation be given the same priority as mitigation in the UNFCCC negotiations, especially in the 2015 agreement.

Adaptation is viewed as a pillar of the Bali Action Plan and its role was boosted in 2010 with the creation of the Cancún Adaptation Framework and the Adaptation Committee. The framework aims to boost adaptation, mainly through supporting Least Developed Countries in formulating and implementing National Adaptation Plans (NAP). NAPs help countries to assess and reduce their vulnerability to the consequences of climate change, to identify their medium- and long-term requirements and to incorporate adaptation in their development plans⁴². Clear and practical indications will be essential to facilitate the design and implementation of NAPs. The Least Developed Countries Expert Group has thus developed technical NAP guidelines that will be reviewed and, if necessary, revised in Lima, taking account of experience acquired during their application⁴³. The acceleration and predictability of financial support for adaptation, a prerequisite to the NAP process, will be an important issue for discussion in Lima⁴⁴. The role of NAPs in the 2015 also remains to be defined; numerous developing countries consider that they play a major role as "*starting points*" for communication and support for adaptation.

The Lima agenda will also include the Nairobi Work Programme on the impacts of climate change and the vulnerability and adaptation to this change (NWP). Since 2006, the NWP has been assisting developing countries in particular to make informed decisions on adaptation actions and measures. The future of the NWP is now at stake. In 2013, the Warsaw Conference decided to maintain it, in order to fill knowledge gaps raised by the Adaptation Framework, whilst also requiring that the NWP improves its relevance and effectiveness⁴⁵. In Lima, the scope and modalities of the review of the NWP and its progress should be established.

In some situations, the impacts of climate change are beyond the capabilities of adaptation. The Doha Conference thus adopted in 2012 a historical decision on the establishment of a mechanism to address the loss and damage associated with the impacts of climate change in developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of such impacts⁴⁶. This concerns in particular the islands and countries whose very existence is threatened by rising sea levels and storm surges (not forgetting Typhoon Haiyan which struck the Philippines in autumn 2013 at the same time as the Warsaw Conference was being held). In Warsaw, the modalities of this mechanism proved to be one of the main areas of disagreement, but the conference finally culminated in the establishment of the "Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and

42. NAP portal: <http://unfccc.int/6057.php>.

43. Decision 18/CP.19 and www.unfccc.int/7279.

44. FCCC/SBI/2014/L.19, Annex.

45. Decision 17/CP.19.

46. Decision 3/CP.18, para. 9.

damage" (see Encadré 1)⁴⁷. The outstanding issues for Lima relate mainly to the composition and work plan of the Executive Committee of this mechanism, the extent of the support for it and the sources of financing. This last issue crystallises the disappointment of particularly vulnerable developing countries, which were hoping that the mechanism would be based on financial compensation and the rehabilitation of the affected systems. In addition, the way in which the issue of loss and damage and the Warsaw mechanism should be incorporated into the 2015 agreement could prove controversial during the debates in Lima.

2.8 Financial, technological and capacity-building support

The questions relating to financial support, transfer of technologies and capacity-building have held a significant place in the negotiations since the adoption of the Bali Action Plan in 2007. It is largely through these forms of support that developing countries can undertake ambitious and effective mitigation and adaptation actions, thereby contributing to the global mitigation efforts and minimising the adverse impacts of climate change.

Financial support

Since the Bali Action Plan was adopted in 2007, climate finance has been recognised as one of the cornerstones of the whole negotiation process. The Cancún Agreements adopted in 2010 specify that long-term financing should be provided to the tune of 100 billion US dollars a year until 2020 through a combination of public and private sources⁴⁸. A work programme on long-term financing, created in 2011, culminated in 2013 with the establishment of biennial communications in which developed countries report on their strategies for increasing financing between 2014 and 2020⁴⁹. To mobilise the political will on the issue of finance, the Warsaw Conference also agreed to organise a high-level ministerial dialogue every two years on climate finance, starting in 2014 and continuing until 2020.

The Adaptation Fund was created under the Kyoto Protocol specifically to finance the total cost of concrete adaptation projects and programmes run by developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, which are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change⁵⁰. It is financed by revenue coming mainly from a 2% levy on the transaction of credits from the Clean Development Mechanism. The viability of the Fund's financing sources is now in danger due to the falling price of these credits. In Lima, the Parties should take stock of this issue and, if appropriate, decide to diversify the Fund's resources to ensure the provision of sustainable, predictable and adequate financing.

47. Decision 2/CP.19.

48. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 98.

49. Decision 3/CP.19, para. 10.

50. Decision 10/CP.7.

The Standing Committee for Finance (SCF) was created by the Cancún Agreements to assist the Conference of the Parties in managing the Convention's financial mechanism, particularly to improve the coherence, mobilisation and coordination of financing⁵¹. In Lima, the SCF will present its initial report on the biennial assessment of flows of climate finance⁵². This report is eagerly awaited as it will provide the basis for potential decisions to improve the transparency of climate finance and of the outcomes achieved thanks to the financial support.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF), which will be in charge of channelling a major part of the 100 billion US dollars promised, was conceived in 2010 as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country Parties⁵³. The Fund is administered by a Board of 24 members, with an equal number from developing and developed countries. In 2013 and then in 2014, the GCF Board agreed several modalities necessary for its operation. These include an initial resource mobilisation process, establishing an investment framework, policies and procedures for the initial allocation of the Fund's resources and an initial assessment procedure for project and programme proposals. At the New York Climate Summit, several countries announced contributions to the GCF, for a total of 2.3 billion US dollars. Other countries have undertaken to make announcements on climate finance before the end of 2014, with the expectation that the total amount will reach 10 billion US dollars. A major issue for the implementation of the GCF will be the simplification, improvement and streamlining of access to finance and the harmonisation of approval and accreditation processes between the GCF and other existing institutions. Other questions will relate to the possibility of quantified mid-term objectives between 2014 and 2020 and on the amount of financial support required for the post-2020 period. Note that the fifth review of the financial mechanism of the Convention will be another major agenda item in Lima, as the lessons drawn from reviewing the procedures and activities of the mechanism's operational entities could be very useful for the GCF.

Technology development and transfer

The development and transfer of technology holds a special importance within the UNFCCC as it can facilitate the concrete Implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures⁵⁴. The objective of the **Technology Mechanism** created in Cancún in 2010 is to help strengthen the development and transfer of technology in order to support climate change mitigation and adaptation policies⁵⁵. It comprises a Techno-

51. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 112.

52. http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/scf_8_background_paper_ba_2909.pdf.

53. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 102.

54. UNFCCC Articles 4.1c, 5 and 7.

55. Decision 1/CP.16

logy Executive Committee (TEC), that supervises the assessment of technological needs and assumes the role of catalyst and sponsor of technological cooperation, and a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), that advises countries and facilitates coordination between the national and regional technological development networks. In Warsaw, the Parties confirmed their desire to make the technology transfer processes operational by adopting the CTCN modalities and procedures⁵⁶. The CTCN will thus be in a position to support the Parties in preparing project proposals through capacity-building activities, based on their technological needs. The outstanding issues for Lima relate to the necessary improvements to the Technology Mechanism, the synergies that can be explored between the TEC and other institutions and the thorny question of intellectual property rights.

The Technology Mechanism is also supported by the Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer, which aims to increase the level of investment in technology transfer, in order to assist developing countries in meeting their technological needs⁵⁷. Under this programme, the Global Environment Fund (GEF) is responsible for supporting the TEC and CTCN in financing and supporting the implementation of pilot technological projects⁵⁸. In Lima, the GEF activity report for 2014, consultations on potential support from the GEF to the CTCN and the assessment of the Poznań strategic programme will serve as the basis of discussions, so that the Parties can work on possible improvements to the Technology Mechanism⁵⁹.

Capacity-building

So that the developing countries and countries with economies in transition can apply the provisions of the Convention and the processes resulting from the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties included in Annex II (the richest developed countries) must support capacity-building activities in these countries and strengthen international cooperation in this area⁶⁰. Capacity-building has become a major topic under discussions on the 2015 agreement, affecting both mitigation and adaptation. Its cross-cutting and fragmented nature does, however, make inter-Party dialogue more complex. With this in mind, the Durban Conference in 2011 notably decided to hold an annual Durban Forum on Capacity-Building⁶¹. The Forum reviews capacity-building in depth, with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, so that everyone can share their experiences and exchange their ideas, best practices and lessons learned in terms of capacity-building activities carried out.

56. Decision 25/CP.19.

57. Decision 2/CP.14.

58. www.thegef.org/gef/TT_poznan_strategic_program.

59. FCCC/SBI/2014/L.12.

60. UNFCCC Articles 4.5 and 6 and Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol.

61. Decision 2/CP.17

In 2014, the Parties recognised, although without adopting a decision, that capacity-building is a leading issue in the 2015 agreement and that it must cover both mitigation and adaptation. The discussion over its role in the agreement will continue in Lima, as will the more general question of improving capacity-building activities undertaken at national scale. There are differing opinions on the institutional mechanisms to support the implementation of capacity-building actions. Several developing countries propose creating an international capacity-building mechanism, whilst others favour strengthening existing mechanisms or creating a working group to identify capacity-building needs.

2.9 Taking gender into account in the negotiations

The Doha Conference (2012) made remarkable progress in the consideration of gender in the UNFCCC negotiations. Whereas previously questions regarding gender had to be examined under the "Other matters" agenda item, Doha introduced a slot for discussing gender regularly in the programme of the Conference of the Parties and proposed a gender workshop, which was held in Warsaw for the first time.

The discussions in Doha led to the adoption of two major decisions. The first confirms the progress made during previous sessions on the issue of gender equality for each pillar of the Bali Action Plan⁶². The second relates to the promotion of gender balance and how to enhance the participation of women in the negotiations and in the representation of Parties⁶³. In Warsaw - as will be the case in Lima - the discussions focused on this second decision. Several proposals have been put forward on how to enhance its application, including the introduction of a framework for action with a timetable, capacity-building for all women delegates to the UNFCCC or training and awareness-raising on the topic of gender⁶⁴. These proposals will be considered in Lima⁶⁵.

An annual report on gender distribution within the bodies formed under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol will be presented at the Lima Conference⁶⁶. This will track progress made towards the goal of gender balance.

62. Decision 1/CP.18.

63. Decision 23/CP.18.

64. FCCC/SBI/2013/L.16, Annex.

65. FCCC/SBI/2013/20, para. 208.

66. FCCC/CP/2014/7.

3 EXPECTATIONS OF THE LIMA CONFERENCE

As the final step before Paris, the Lima Conference is the last milestone in the negotiation process to finalise the next climate agreement in 2015. According to the Convention, the text of any new agreement must be communicated to the Parties at least six months before the Conference at which it is scheduled for adoption⁶⁷. The Paris deadline in December 2015 therefore requires the Parties to the UNFCCC to advance in preparing a draft text in December 2014 in Lima.

Since the adoption of the Durban Platform in 2011, the Parties have gradually outlined a new international governance framework for climate change. The invitation issued at the Warsaw Conference (2013) for Parties to submit Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the UNFCCC Secretariat before the Paris Conference (2015) points to the nature of the 2015 agreement. The Parties have been left to assess the ambition of their mitigation contributions, thereby emphasising the voluntary contribution of the Parties and the cooperation between them. To date, this so-called bottom-up approach has not produced emission reduction commitments that would limit the rise in temperatures to 2°C. The major question for 2015, when the countries start to submit their INDCs, will therefore be to make sure that together these contributions are sufficiently ambitious.

The Lima Conference has a crucial role to play in creating the sense of trust needed by the Parties to negotiate their INDCs for the post-2020 period that live up to the climate challenge. It is absolutely essential to conclude the 2013-2015 review and reach agreement on the information to be included in INDCs as any delay could jeopardise the success at Paris.

Furthermore, the post-Lima period will only favour fruitful negotiations for a Paris agreement if other progress has been made. Several Parties, mainly developing countries, condition their commitment to the Paris agreement on significant progress being made in the operationalization of the Kyoto provisions and the results of the Bali Action Plan, mainly in terms of finance and pre-2020 ambition.

Nevertheless, with time running out, the focus on the Paris agreement risks pushing other issues into the background, notably regarding the mechanisms created since the 2010 Cancún Conference, including the Green Climate Fund, the Technology Mechanism, the Framework for Various Approaches and the Adaptation Framework. It will therefore be important in Lima to find a good balance so that a positive outcome can be achieved for all the Parties.

67. UNFCCC Articles 15 and 17.

There is no doubt that considerable political mobilisation will be required in the run up to Paris. The United Nations Climate Summit, organised by the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon last September, breathed a certain optimism into the process by securing the support of numerous Heads of State for an ambitious agreement in Paris. In this spirit, it is anticipated that Lima will address urgently the outlines of the Paris agreement whilst recognising within the agreement the technical issues to be finalised during subsequent sessions.

The Lima Conference is therefore the last step in a long negotiation process. Its success is therefore essential in order to reach an ambitious, universal and binding agreement for adoption in 2015 in Paris for the post-2020 period.

FACT SHEETS

Sheet 1.

The regional groups and the main negotiation coalitions

The climate change negotiations process revolves around regional groups and negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are derived from the official United Nations classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests. During negotiations, the countries usually speak on their own behalf or on behalf of a negotiation coalition.

United Nations Regional Groups

The regional groups do not necessarily share the same interests in relation to the negotiations on climate change. The members of the Bureau are elected from regional groups and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

The regional groups are Africa, Asia and the Pacific Region (including Japan), Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC, from the Spanish) and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG). "The others" are Australia, Canada, the United States, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.

The African Group

The African Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation coalition. It has 54 members, all of whom share a variety of causes for concern, such as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the fight against poverty. The Group currently makes joint statements, mainly on questions relating to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building and financing.

Negotiation coalitions

AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States)

AOSIS is an ad hoc lobbying group which gives a voice to the majority of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) during negotiations at the United Nations. The SIDS share their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, especially the rise in sea levels which is threatening the very existence of several islands. AOSIS has 39 members and five observers. Most AOSIS countries also belong to the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China) and nine are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC)⁶⁸. Bahrain is the only SIDS member of the United Nations which does not belong to AOSIS; conversely, the Cook Islands and Niue belong to AOSIS but are not SIDS members of the United Nations⁶⁹.

Least Developed Countries (LDC)

The group of LDC comprises 48 countries among the least developed (34 in Africa, thirteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean)⁷⁰. They defend their interests jointly with the United Nations, especially in relation to climate change. They share considerations about their vulnerability and their need for support in planning their adaptation. The UNFCCC also recognises the special needs of the LDC, which are the least capable of facing up to the impacts of climate change.

68. <http://aosis.org/members/> and <http://unohrrls.org/about-sids/country-profiles/>

69. *Ibid.*

70. <http://unohrrls.org/about-ldcs/>.

Group of 77 and China (G-77/China)

The G-77/China comprises 133 developing countries and China⁷¹. China is an associate member rather than a full member of the G-77. China cooperates closely with the G-77 over climate change-related issues; the group therefore takes its positions "on behalf of the G-77 and China". In particular, the G-77/China supports the economic interests of its members in miscellaneous questions within the United Nations. The G-77/China member countries can sometimes adopt diverging positions during the climate change negotiations, which they then defend via another negotiation coalition or regional group⁷².

European Union

The EU is a political and economic union of 28 member countries. It is represented by the European Community, which is a Party to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, but which has no voting right distinct from that of individual countries. Despite some differences, they often adopt a common position and speak with a single voice during climate change negotiations.

Umbrella Group

The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the European Union and which has been formed in the context of climate change negotiations. It has emerged from the JUSSCANNZ⁷³ group and is active in all the UN forums despite the group not always comprising the same countries. Although informal, the list normally includes Australia, Canada, the United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine (other countries are added periodically, depending on the topics addressed).

Coalition for Rainforest Nations

This coalition started to take shape in 2005 under the initiative of Papua New Guinea. Its goal is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition includes 47 countries: sixteen countries from Africa, six from Central America, eight from South America, nine from Asia, five from Oceania, and three from the Caribbean⁷⁴.

Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)

The Environmental Integrity Group was formed in 2002 by OECD members which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Mexico and the Republic of Korea. It has subsequently been joined by Monaco and Liechtenstein. Mexico and South Korea are rare OECD members that are not included in Annex I (see Sheet 6). Member countries are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts⁷⁵. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.

Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)

CACAM groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I countries with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the

71. <http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html>.

72. <http://unfccc.int/6343.php>.

73. JUSSCANNZ is the acronym for "Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand".

74. www.rainforestcoalition.org.

75. Yamin, F. and Depledge, J., 2004.

Kyoto Protocol⁷⁶. The reason is that the UNFCCC does not define the term "developing country" clearly and that these countries do not view themselves as developing countries despite their exclusion from Annex I of the Convention⁷⁷. The CACAM countries rarely take a common stance on other issues.

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)

ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation to promote cooperation in these areas between the socialist countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated by the United States⁷⁸. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, representing a hub of five countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on a goal of restricting global warming to 1 to 1.5°C compared with pre-industrial levels and on the principle whereby the developed countries must take a lead partner role in the global effort to combat climate change⁷⁹.

Cartagena Dialogue:

The Cartagena Dialogue is an informal group created during the COP16 in Cancún in 2010. This "alliance of progressive countries" brings together some thirty industrialised and developing countries working with a view to establishing a comprehensive and legally-binding regime within the UNFCCC. The aim of the dialogue is to openly discuss the reasons behind each country's position and to explore the areas in which convergence and reinforcement of shared action could emerge. The members commit, nationally, to becoming or remaining low-carbon. Although the group is informal, there are members from the European Union, the Group of LDC's, African Group, APEID countries and the Umbrella countries. At the third meeting of the Cartagena Dialogue (1-4 April 2014, Majur, Marshall islands), the group discussed ambitious objectives for the new climate agreement that should be signed in 2015⁸⁰.

BASIC

BASIC is a group of countries made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the Copenhagen Conference (COP15, December 2009). After the meeting, BASIC published a series of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, in particular a second commitment period for developed countries by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol and scaled-up financing for the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries⁸¹. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to share their positions and to develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important emerging countries and large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor in international climate negotiations.

76. *Ibid.*

77. <http://unfccc.int/1031.php>.

78. www.alianzabolivariana.org and www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/article.

79. www.portalalba.org/index.php/2014-03-29-22-04-24/documentos/1299-2010-06-25-x-cumbre-otavalo-ecuador-declaracion-especial-sobre-cambio-climatico.

80. <http://climate-1.iisd.org/news/cartagena-dialogue-to-accelerate-preparations-for-post-2020-targets/>.

81. www.sei-international.org/publications?pid=1643.

Like Minded Group of States

The *Like Minded Group* is a spontaneous coalition of countries created during the Bonn Conference on climate change in May 2012. It is part of the G-77/China and aims to reinforce and unify this group⁸². It is made up of several countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active South American Parties, especially Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba. Commonly called the Like Minded Group, this coalition is also found in other international forums, especially the World Trade Organisation. It is a group of States uniting around a very strong central position on major questions for developing countries, mainly equity and respect for the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities⁸³. Note that several large oil producers are found in this group.

82. www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20121005.htm.

83. www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate130301.htm.

Sheet 2.

Positions of main countries and negotiation coalitions on the post-2012 regime.

Alliance of Small
Island States
(AOSIS)⁸⁴

AOSIS wishes to limit average global warming to below 1.5°C compared with pre-industrial levels, to minimise the damage and climate change to which the SIDS are especially vulnerable given the rise in sea levels⁸⁵. AOSIS believes that the INDC must include mitigation and adaptation commitments. It considers that more Parties should submit an INDC and that support must be given to developing countries in preparing INDC if appropriate. It asks that the relationship between mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage be defined in the 2015 agreement and that it contains commitments by developed countries to financing. Indeed, AOSIS emphasises the need for adequate, additional and predictable financial support for developing countries in implementing mitigation and adaptation measures.

For Work stream 2 (WS2) for the pre-2020 period, AOSIS considers that the developed countries must make an effort to plug the mitigation gap by 2020, but that the possibilities for mitigation must be examined by all the countries, taking account of the support necessary for their implementation in the developing countries. AOSIS underlines that a technical, collaborative process focused on solutions is necessary to identify and review the options to reduce the mitigation ambition gap. It requests leading countries to share with others their experiences by informing the potential of attenuation measures they envisage. Technical discussions on the potential of attenuation of measures taken or to be taken will enable to have the opinion of experts and identify the necessary means to implement them.

Independent Alliance
of Latin America and
the Caribbean
(AILAC)⁸⁶

AILAC believes that all components of the 2015 agreement should enjoy the same relevance and have the same legal nature, including mitigation (and therefore REDD+), adaptation and loss and damage and the means of implementation. These countries favour a revision mechanism so that the Parties can increase the ambition level. AILAC emphasises the importance of means of implementation and asks that the historical responsibility of developed countries be included in the agreement along with the relationship between this responsibility and climate finance. It considers that the developed countries must make mitigation efforts. For AILAC, Lima must culminate in a draft text that sets out the ambition level, extent and nature of the agreement. It considers that the Warsaw mechanism on loss and damage deserves a central position in this agreement.

84. IISD 2014a; IISD 2014b; AOSIS: https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-5_submission_by_aosis_ws2_20140607.pdf ; et https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/aosis_ws2_submission_-_final_-_18_sept_14.pdf .

85. FCCC/SB/2014/MISC.1/Add.1.

86. IISD, 2014b; AILAC: https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2.4_submission_by_ailac_20140310.pdf.

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)	ALBA underscores that the key to a new agreement must be equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities ⁸⁷ . It asks that adaptation be given the same attention as mitigation in the new agreement ⁸⁸ . ALBA is in favour of non-market-based approaches and is concerned that the market mechanisms can reduce the responsibilities of the Parties ⁸⁹ .
South Africa ⁹⁰	South Africa stresses the importance of fair and equitable distribution of efforts and encourages common and binding commitments for the adaptation and implementation ⁹¹ with technology transfer, promotion of local innovation and the participation of women and young people ⁹² . It considers that the 2015 agreement must include a global adaptation objective that recognises the localised nature of adaptation needs, themselves affected by the mitigation ambition level. It wishes to set a 50% reduction in global emissions compared with 1990 by 2050 as a long-term global objective. The objective for the developed countries would be to reduce their emissions rapidly by 2030, having reached their maximum in 2015, and to have a zero emission objective in 2050. South Africa is in favour of a hybrid approach for assuming commitments (which consist in the combination of ascending and descending approaches) and a system of international verification of commitments and actions based on rules accompanied by a mechanism of conformity ⁹³ . It believes that the equity and relevance of INDC and the adequacy of their financial components should be assessed by a technical committee in 2016, with a final inclusion in the agreement in 2017 ⁹⁴ .
Saudi Arabia	For the 2015 agreement, Saudi Arabia is emphasising the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities along with the sustainable development objectives ⁹⁵ . It considers that the economic and social consequences of response measures must be dealt with in the future agreement. Given its dependence on hydrocarbon exports, Saudi Arabia must adapt to the response measures as well as to climate change. Saudi Arabia wishes equal attention to be given to finance, technology transfer and capacity-building and would like the emphasis placed on the action of the public, rather than the private sector ⁹⁶ .

87. IISD, 2013b.

88. IISD, 2014a.

89. IISD, 2014b.

90. South Africa: https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/application/pdf/adp_elements_southafrica.pdf and https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/application/pdf/adp_indc_southafrica.pdf.

91. IISD, 2013b.

92. IISD, 2013b.

93. IISD, 2014a.

94. IISD, 2014b.

95. IISD, 2014a and IISD, 2014b.

96. *Ibid.*

Brazil

In the framework of discussions on the spectrum of commitments, Brazil has clarified the proposal made in 1997 that aims to promote a differentiation on the basis of contributions to planet climate warming rather than on current emissions⁹⁷. Each country defines their commitment at the national level on the basis of its historical responsibility thanks to a methodology elaborated by GIEC who will guide the national consultation process⁹⁸. Brazil considers that two sorts of commitment should be possible for the developing countries, one achieved with national financing and the other with additional financing⁹⁹.

Brazil has also proposed the development of a procedure aimed at authorising the parties to remove URCE from resulting MDP projects and thus not to use them to compensate their emissions in order to increase the demand for these credits and consequently the ambition¹⁰⁰. Brazil has underlined the importance of incorporating adaptation systematically into the INDC and ensuring the required financing. It has warned against setting a global adaptation objective that "would freeze the needs"¹⁰¹.

China¹⁰²

China is of the opinion that any attempt to modify the differentiation between developed and developing countries is useless because it is the basis of the Convention. It insists that any advancement be based on the Bali Plan of Action and that the legal nature of the agreement be defined by the substance of the results of negotiations. It considers that the commitments of developed countries to provide financial, technological and capacity-building support must be as legally-binding as the mitigation commitments. According to China, the pre-2020 ambition gap may be eliminated if the Annex I countries reduce their emissions by 40% compared with 1990 and it calls on these countries to make commitments to this effect. It suggests that the economic recovery serve as an opportunity for developed countries to start a transition towards strategies of development based on low carbon intensity¹⁰³.

97. IISD, 2013b.

98. Brazil: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_brazil_workstream_1_brazilian_proposal_20130912.pdf.

99. IISD, 2014a.

100. Brazil: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_brazil_workstream_2_cdm_voluntary_cancellation_20130918.pdf.

101. IISD, 2014b.

102. China: https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/application/pdf/20140306-submission_on_adp_by_china_without_cover_page.pdf.

103. IISD, 2013b.

Coalition for Rainforest Nations ¹⁰⁴	The aim of this coalition is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition seeks the inclusion of an REDD+ mechanism as a key component of the 2015 agreement, based on the Warsaw Framework for the REDD+. It considers that the commitments of the 2015 agreement must be to limit global warming to 1.5°C or less compared with pre-industrial levels.
South Korea ¹⁰⁵	South Korea insists on the need to apply the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities. It also wishes for a balance between the strength of a future agreement and a wide participation by countries to that agreement. That requires a reflection on the experience of Kyoto with binding commitments limited to certain countries. It underlines that greater participation requires sufficient incentives through the input of means of implementation for the developing countries, mainly the LDC and the SIDS. It also proposes preparing an MRV system for financing and a better cooperation with existing mechanisms ¹⁰⁶ .
United States	<p>The United States calls for ministers to become more involved to take political decisions in order to highlight the level of ambition and underscores the need for transparency and imputability ex ante and ex post of commitments made. The United States has emphasised that the Cancún Agreements should serve as the basis for negotiations (as opposed to the Bali Action Plan). On the issue of financing the United States insist on adequate environments for private investments that developing countries must create in order to attract financial support. It also sustains a better understanding of international cooperation initiatives. Elsewhere they sustain the progressive elimination of subsidies for fossil fuels¹⁰⁷.</p> <p>It is also in favour of an bottom-up approach combined with a consultation process that it views as a guarantee of the ambition that must be achieved. Regarding the form of the agreement it proposes that decisions be adopted on the operational details of the 2015 agreement in order that the agreement capture only the essential elements in order to facilitate the revision of decisions in the future¹⁰⁸. The United States seeks a new categorisation of Parties and asks that the agreement takes into account changes in emissions and the economic development of the Parties¹⁰⁹.</p>

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104. Coalition of Rainforest Nations: https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-5_submission_by_cfrn_20140604.pdf.
105. South Korea: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_republic_of_korea_workstream_1_20130319.pdf.
106. IISD, 2013b.
107. United States: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_usa_workstream_2_20130312.pdf.
108. United States: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_usa_workstream_1_20130312.pdf.
109. United States: https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/u.s._submission_on_elements_of_the_2105_agreement.pdf.

The United States acknowledges the need to include adaptation as a key component of the 2015 agreement in order to advance the scheduling and national action for adaptation through the NAP. In terms of mitigation, it intends to submit its INDC during the first quarter of 2015. It suggests an end date for initial INDC of 2025 in order to encourage the ambition (rather than 2030). For Lima, the United States wishes the Parties to agree on the information to be included in the INDC and to devote time within the ADP to present and discuss the INDC of Parties in 2015¹¹⁰.

Group of 77 and
China (G
77/China)¹¹¹

The G-77/China argues for more targeted and urgent progress, taking into account the observations of the fifth IPCC Assessment Report. It calls on a balanced approach for both ADP work streams for mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation. Adopting mitigation measures by developed countries in the scope of SA2 is for them key given their historical responsibility. It is also the reason for which the G77/China considers that the negotiations for a post-2012 regime should focus on the Annex I Parties adopting restrictive targets for reducing GHG emissions covering all sectors of the economy. It also requests that these countries increase the ambition level of their commitments by 2020. In terms of the financing for the post-2020 period, the G-77/China considers the 100 billion US dollars a year as a "*starting point*".

The African Group¹¹²

The African Group suggests a scheme based on equitable multilateral rules with a strong link to fair access to sustainable development. This group wishes to see a global objective for adaptation and a mitigation objective in the 2015 agreement to limit global warming to below 1.5°C compared with pre-industrial levels. The African Group proposes the use of a reference framework to reflect mitigation actions and adaptation measures taken by the countries leading to equity. It would also allow supplying a mechanism to review commitments made. According to this group the Parties contemplated in Annex I would assume quantified commitments of reduction of emissions and those in Annex II commitments in support of developing countries, mainly through the supply of Green Funds for Climate. It asks that the financing commitments match the temperature limitation objective and the needs of developing countries in terms of mitigation and adaptation, especially in Africa. This group proposes a medium-term objective for 2016 of sixty to seventy billion US dollars annual financing to achieve

110. United States: https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/us_submission_fall_2014_final.pdf.

111. IISD, 2014b.

112. African Group: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_african_group_workstream_2_20130919.pdf; http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_african_group_workstream_2_20130919.pdf; https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/application/pdf/adp_w1_elements_africangroup.pdf; https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2-5_submission_by_sudan_on_behalf_of_the_african_group_finance_20140610.pdf.

the objective of 100 billion US dollars a year by 2020. It thinks that 600 billion US dollars a year will be necessary later on in 2030. It stresses balanced financing between mitigation and adaptation.

Like Minded Group of States¹¹³ The Like Minded Group of States criticises the Parties belonging to Annex I and Annex II for not having fulfilled their respective commitments satisfactorily whilst developing countries make greater efforts. It stresses therefore that from now onwards the commitments made for the pre- and post-2020 periods must be respected and that the allocated funds are sufficient. This group wishes that the efforts by developing countries are combined with adequate and additional financial support. It supports top-down mitigation objectives for the Parties included in Annex I and bottom-up for the other Parties.

Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) The EIG is of the view of making a decision on the common understanding of the commitment of mitigation for the objective of 2°C, its modalities, schedule and structure. It also wishes a reform to the subsidies to fossil fuels¹¹⁴. EIG is also in favour of making commitments that are legally restricting and a system of conformity on the basis of common but differentiated principles and equity as well as common rules of accountability and MRV. According to EIG all countries should provide information on their commitments ex ante in order to become the object of consultations¹¹⁵. It underlines that a draft text on the 2015 agreement must see the light of day in Lima by emphasising the importance of clarity, transparency and understanding of INDC and the information that has to be provided. EIG believes that adaptation deserves equal priority with mitigation in the agreement, which should require all Parties to prepare and implement national adaptation plans and strategies. It supports the participation of local and sub-national players in adaptation and gender-sensitive approaches¹¹⁶.

India¹¹⁷ India insists that GIEC, the examination 2013-2015 and the subsidiary organs be implicated in the work of the ADP and that the GCF, the Technological Mechanism and the Adaptation Committee be operational. It wishes

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113. Like Minded Group of States: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2_lmhc_29042013.pdf; http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_lmhc_workstream_2_20130312.pdf; https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-5_submission_by_malaysia_on_behalf_of_the_lmhc_crp.pdf.

114. IISD, 2013b.

115. IEG: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_eig_workstream_1_20130923.pdf.

116. IEG: https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-5_submission_by_eig_20140605.pdf.

117. Inde: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_india_workstream_2_2030309.pdf and India: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_india_workstream_1_20130913.pdf.

for increased ambitions. It underscores that for the agreement of 2015 to be valid it must be generated by a process of formal negotiation, structured, open, participatory and led by the Parties. Like China, India insists on the application of the principles of the Convention in a manner such that they not be reinterpreted. India also encourages the development of MRV demands for support and a common scheme of accountability for mitigation commitments of the Parties included in Annex I and a system of conformity. For the Parties not included in Annex I, India considers that the INDC depend on national development priorities and that sufficient financing is a prerequisite to their submission¹¹⁸. For India the technological pillar of the ADP must also resolve the stakes of intellectual property rights.

Japan¹¹⁹

Japan supports a new, unique and legally-binding instrument including all the major economies. It calls on major economic powers to present quantified emission reduction objectives for the entire economy. It supports the global objective of 50% reduction in emissions by 2050 and to achieve this, an 80% reduction in GHG emissions compared with 1990 for developed countries. For Japan, the commitments of the Parties must be decided at national level, but according to international accounting rules and a common mechanism of transparency to allow for comparison. This mechanism will include a review of the performance of Parties.

Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC)¹²⁰

The OPEC countries emphasise the need to consider the potential negative impacts of mitigation measures of the Annex I Parties on the economies of developing countries. These countries also underline the importance of being able to adapt, especially by diversifying their economies.

Group of Least
Developed Countries
(LDC)¹²¹

The LDC Group requires more targeted and ambitious negotiations and deplores the slow progress and the lack of willingness to increase the pre-2020 ambition. It believes that this is primordial in facilitating the limitation of the rise in temperatures to below 1.5°C. This group calls on proactive participation by all countries.

For the 2015 agreement, the LDC Group stresses the importance of the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities. In order that countries select the highest level of ambition possible, the LDC propose a differentiation between developed countries, transition, average income, most vulnerable and less advanced. They stress the fact that international cooperation initiatives cannot replace commitments of countries in the medium and long term¹²². They propose that the agreement

118. IISD, 2014b.

119. Japan: https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_japan_workstream_1_and_2_20130910.pdf.

120. OPEC: www.opec.org/opec_web/en/2670.htm

121. LDC Group: https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/submission_by_nepal_on_behalf_of_ldc_group_on_views_and_proposals_on_the_work_of_the_adp.pdf.

122. IISD, 2013b.

take the form of a protocol accompanied by decisions setting out the details and modalities of implementation to allow immediate operability¹²³. They support a five-year cycle for the contributions that should be linked to the IPCC assessment reports and a periodic review. They propose for the developed countries absolute emission reduction objectives for the entire economy, with a more flexible approach for the developing countries. The LDC seek the creation of a conformity mechanism based on the MRV principles to ensure compliance of Party commitments. The Group asks that adaptation be given balanced attention based on the mitigation measure applied. It also requests commitments from the developed countries to provide sufficient means of implementation. The LDC seek the inclusion of loss and damage in the agreement, especially with provisions for investment in risk management and financial compensation for residual loss and damage.

Russia¹²⁴

Russia is in favour adopting a legally-binding agreement including the participation of all countries, especially large emissions countries, that compensates for the weaknesses of Kyoto Protocol whilst taking into consideration its positive aspects and accomplishments. This agreement must also consider scientific, ecological, economic and political aspects in order to have a solid base for a fair settlement of climatic stakes in the long term. The commitments of developed and developing countries can be differentiated but must be the subject of a single international legal instrument. Russia does not agree to the distinction of countries as operated by the 1992 Convention and asks that the contributions of Parties be based on their respective levels of social and economic development. It supports a ten-year commitment period and emphasises the preparation of commitments by the Parties as it does not agree to a top-down approach.

European Union¹²⁵

The European Union wishes a new agreement to be equitable, global, legally binding and dynamic. It proposes the following structure for the agreement: the objectives, a common scheme for accounting and MRV (mainly through the consolidation of current MRV rules), market mechanisms, adaptation, means for implementation, transparency of support, regular evaluation, and the adjustment of efforts of mitigation and conformity. It encourages the Parties not committed to do so as soon as possible and to reinforce the role of UNFCCC on the issue of HFCs. It demands further work on the use of land, energy efficiency, renewable energy, carbon

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123. LDC Group: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_ldcs_20130903.pdf.
 124. Russia: https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/submission-awg-dp-russia-april_2014-eng.pdf.
 125. European Union: https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/application/pdf/el-05-20_eu_adp_ws2_submission.pdf; https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/application/pdf/el-02-28-eu_adp_ws1_submission.pdf; http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_eu_workstream_1_design_of_2015_agreement_20130916.pdf;

sequestration and sustainable development. The European Union also proposes a process of evaluation of commitments made by countries through the definition in Lima of required information, the submission of country commitments in the first quarter 2015 at the latest (for those ready to do so), their evaluation and inclusion in the agreement of 2015. This evaluation will be made on the basis of criteria used to measure ambitions. It considers that the 2015 agreement has a critical role to play in increasing adaptation activities, incorporating them in national scheduling and providing the necessary support for their implementation. For the pre-2020 mitigation ambition, the European Union believes that a results-based approach relying on the existing mechanisms is necessary, mainly through technical meetings of experts.

Sheet 3.

UNFCCC side discussion forums

In 2013, several events included the issue of climate change on their agenda, including the G7, the third International Conference of Small Developing Island States and the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Note that in September the United Nations Secretary General gathered world leaders together at a summit dedicated to climate change issues, in order to boost the political dynamics prior to the COP20 negotiations. A description of each of these meetings (and several others) is provided below.

Remember also that 2012 was marked by the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) that had occupied a large space on the international environmental scene. Rio+20 launched a process for introducing a post-2015 development agenda, including new sustainable development objectives include one relating to combating climate change (see Box 5 Box 5).

Ministerial meetings of BASIC countries on climate change

Participants: Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

Description: The 18th ministerial meeting of the BASIC group of countries on climate change was held on 7-8 August in New Delhi, India. Following this meeting, the press release from the BASIC countries underlined the importance of capitalising immediately the Green Climate Fund (mainly from public sources) and to achieve a draft text during negotiations in Lima for the 2015 climate agreement¹²⁶. These countries reiterated their statements on the fact that the agreement should include the six pillars of mitigation, adaptation, financing, technological transfer, capacity-building and transparency. They emphasises the principle of common by differentiated responsibilities and the historical responsibility of developed countries, by requiring these countries to make global efforts towards GHG mitigation and increase their support for developing countries for mitigation and adaptation measures¹²⁷.

On 10 October 2014, the 19th meeting was held in Sun City, South Africa, where the member countries discussed the results of the United Nations Climate Summit (see Box xxx). Although they welcome the commitments announced by the world leaders relating to mitigation measures and to contributions and financial partnerships, they also underlined the need to increase the ambition level of developed countries for the mitigation of GHG by 2020. The BASIC countries reiterated their position above on the 2015 agreement and requested visibility for the support that will be provided to the developing countries for the implementation of their contributions post 2020¹²⁸.

126. Press release from the 18th meeting of BASIC countries on climate change: <http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/press-releases/Joint-statement-18th-BASIC-New-Delhi.pdf>.

127. <http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/basic-call-for-finalizing-elements-of-draft-negotiating-text-in-lima/>.

128. Press release from the 19th meeting of BASIC countries on climate change: www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/19thbasic_ministerialmeeting_concluded.

G7 Summit

Member countries (7): United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada¹²⁹

Description: This group of seven of the most developed countries in the world meets annually to discuss economic questions and global issues such as combating climate change. During the last meeting of the G7 on 4-5 June 2014 in Brussels, Belgium, and despite pressing political issues like events in Syria and Ukraine, the member country leaders also set aside some discussion time for the issues of climate change, mainly in the light of the 5th IPCC Assessment Report (see Sheet 12)¹³⁰. After the Brussels Summit, their declaration recognises the need for "urgent and concrete action" on climate change. It reiterates their commitment to achieving, in 2015, an ambitious climate agreement for the post-2020 period and to honour the target of mobilising financial support of 100 billion US dollars a year by 2020¹³¹.

G20 Summits

Member countries (19 + European Union): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union.

Description: This group of twenty of the most developed countries in the world meets annually to facilitate world cooperation and discuss questions that are mainly economic but which also relate to global issues such as development, energy and climate finance. During their meeting Saint Petersburg in Russia on 5-6 September 2013 the countries recognised that climate change will have a significant impact on the world economy. The G20 countries committed in full to implement the results of Cancún, Durban and Doha. They greeted the efforts of the secretary general of the UN in mobilising political will as well as complementary initiatives through multilateral approaches based among others on the Montreal Protocol. They also affirmed sustaining the operations of the Green Funds for Climate and repeated their demand for examination of means to mobilise resources efficiently considering the objectives, regulations and principles of the UNFCCC with their Finance Ministers¹³². In 2014, the G20 leader summit was held in Australia on 15-16 November, with "growth and resilience" as its theme¹³³.

Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF)¹³⁴

Participants: Sixteen countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States) and the European Union.

Description: Since 2009, the MEF has been uniting representatives of seventeen major economies to promote discussions between developed and developing countries on the questions of energy and climate change. The aim is to mobilise political will towards an ambitious climate agreement in

129. Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014 and therefore the group, which was the G8 with Russia, is currently the G7.

130. <http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/g7-declaration-highlights-energy-security-climate-change-sustainable-development/>.

131. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143078.pdf.

132. Declaration of G20 in St Petersburg: <http://www.g20.org/documents/>.

133. www.g20.org/.

134. www.majoreconomiesforum.org/.

Paris in 2015. These countries examine concrete solutions to the challenges of clean energy supply and GHG emission mitigation. In 2014, the 18th, 19th and 20th meetings of the MEF were held in May in Mexico City, Mexico, in July in Paris, France and in September in New York, United States respectively¹³⁵. The participating countries addressed several key issues about preparations for the 2015 agreement during these discussions. Regarding the INDC, the participants all agree that mitigation must be included in INDC, but opinions diverged on including adaptation and financing. There are also divergences over the end date of INDC (2025 or 2030) and on the differentiation of Parties in the agreement. Despite these divergences, the MEF delegates agreed that the INDC should be submitted as early as possible to facilitate the consultation phase and most MEF members expect to be ready to do this during the first quarter of 2015. In Paris last July, the delegates addressed the question of climate finance, underlining the importance of mobilising both public and private sources and developing incentives for "green" investments, whilst diverting the financing of energy production from fossil fuels.

12th UN-REDD programme's Policy Board Meeting¹³⁶

Participating countries: 25

Description: The UN-REDD programme, launched in 2008, is a joint initiative between the FAO, UNEP and UNDP. This programme aims to support the developing countries in preparing the implementation of their national programmes for the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+).

The UN-REDD Programme Policy Board has the goal of providing strategic direction to the global REDD programme and approving the financial allocations to the programmes in the partner countries. The Board is made up of representatives from partner countries, donors from the multi-partner trust fund, the civil society, indigenous peoples, the FAO, UNDP and UNEP. During the 12th meeting in Lima, Peru on 8-9 July 2014, the Board approved the allocation of more than 35 million US dollars to support the national programmes for the REDD+ in several countries, including Argentina, Côte d'Ivoire and Mongolia. During a day of exchanging information, several ministers underlined the important recognition of forests in the negotiations at the UN Climate Summit (see below) and the COP20 in Lima.

Third International Conference on Small Developing Island States (SDIS)¹³⁷

Participating countries: representatives of 115 countries

Description: Climate change was the subject of a specific multi-stakeholder dialogue during the 3rd International Conference on the SDIS (1-4 September, Samoa). The discussions underlined the need to incorporate climate change and the reduction of disaster risks in the development policies and to set up partnerships to facilitate adaptation, mainly at local level¹³⁸. The Samoa Pathway, the final document of the conference, reiterates the special circumstances of SIDS in sustainable development and climate change given their vulnerability especially with rising sea levels¹³⁹. For this purpose, the SIDS seek the implementation of the International Warsaw Mechanism on loss and damage. They deplore the gap in global mitigation ambition pre- and post-2020 and the inadequate financial support for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures in the deve-

135. www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings/.

136. www.un-redd.org/PolicyBoard/12thPolicyBoard/tabid/133354/Default.aspx.

137. www.sids2014.org/.

138. www.sids2014.org/content/documents/593climate.pdf.

139. www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.223/3&referer=/english/&Lang=F.

loping countries. The SIDS stress the importance of climate finance, requesting the developed countries to increase the support provided and to capitalise the Green Climate Fund.

United Nations Summit on Climate Change¹⁴⁰

Description: The aim of the Climate Change Summit was to facilitate the adoption of a post-2020 climate agreement by 2015, even though it was not held under the auspices of the UNFCCC. It took place on 23 September 2014 in New York. On this occasion, the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon, invited heads of government, directors of private companies and civil society representatives to set out ideas for ambitious actions to combat climate change. Over 120 Heads of State accepted the invitation and announced their national commitments and ambition to reduce GHG emissions and provide financing. Further information, see Box 3.

69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Participants: General Assembly member States

Description: In September 2014, the General Assembly launched its 69th session, which must culminate in September 2015 with the adoption of a post-2015 development agenda, including sustainable development goals (SDG), three months before COP 21 in Paris (see Box 5). Following a work programme in 2012 and 2013, culminating in proposed SDG, we are now entering the intergovernmental negotiation phase. The question of whether climate issues should be included in the SDG has proven to be controversial, particularly in terms of the cross-cutting nature of this topic and of the need to avoid overlapping with the UNFCCC negotiations. At this stage, a specific climate goal has been proposed as follows: "*Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts*" while acknowledging that the UNFCCC is the primary forum for negotiations in this area¹⁴¹. At the closure of the general debate of GA-69 on 30 September 2014, numerous member States underlined the importance of taking climate change into account in the post-2015 development agenda. The climate regime agreement post-2020 also occupied an important place in the discussions due to its implications for the implementation of future SDG. The negotiations within AG-69 between now and September 2015 will determine the final place of climate in the SDG and in the post-2015 development agenda and therefore the strength of the signal to send to the negotiators for the Paris COP in December 2015.

140. www.un.org/climatechange/summit/.

141. A/68/970, goal 13, p.22: www.un.org/fr/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/970.

Sheet 4.

Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

The IPCC was created in 1988 to provide policymakers with regular assessments of the climate situation, in order to understand better changes in the climate, the risk and consequences of climate change and any adaptation and mitigation strategies.

Since 1990, the IPCC has been publishing every five to six years an Assessment Report of the climate made up of observations from three working groups. The first group takes an inventory of scientific research into changes in the climate. The second assesses the consequences of climate upheavals in miscellaneous sectors and attempts to propose adaptation solutions. The third covers the mitigation of the effects of human activity on the climate.

The Fifth IPCC Assessment Report, published in 2013 and 2014, represents the most comprehensive assessment to date and is based on several thousand scientific and archived climate studies¹⁴². Its observations are based on more efficient systems than previously, enabling more in-depth understanding and analyses than in previous reports.

First working group: Scientific elements (published in September 2013)¹⁴³

This section presents the major observations with a higher level of confidence than the previous reports, mainly in terms of the role of human activities in climate change. Thus, "*It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century*"¹⁴⁴. Note that these observations depend on four different mitigation scenarios (Representation Concentration Pathways - RCP). The four RCP contain "one mitigation scenario leading to a very low forcing level (RCP2.6), two stabilisation scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6) and one scenario with very high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5)"¹⁴⁵.

Other key observations include¹⁴⁶:

- "Warming of the climate system is **unequivocal**".
- "Since the 1950s, **many of the observed changes are unprecedented** over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased"
- "**Human influence on the climate system is clear**. This is evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiative forcing¹⁴⁷, observed warming and understanding of the climate system".
- "New GHG emissions will imply continued warming".

142. 5th IPCC Assessment Report: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5.

143. First working group: www.climatechange2013.org.

144. http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf

145. http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf (box RID.1).

146. http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf

147. Radiative forcing is "the change in energy flux caused by a driver and is calculated at the tropopause or at the top of the atmosphere". The surface will be warmed when the radiative forcing is positive http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.

- "Limiting climate change will require **substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions**".
- "Global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st century is **likely to exceed 1.5°C** relative to 1850 to 1900 for all RCP scenarios except the most ambitious¹⁴⁸". "It is likely to exceed 2°C" according to the mitigation scenarios where the radiative forcing has not reached its maximum towards 2100.
- In all the envisaged mitigation scenarios, except for the most ambitious, "**warming will continue beyond 2100**".
- "Most aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO₂ are stopped".

Second working group: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (published in March 2014)¹⁴⁹

This section reviews the potential and adaptation limits to climate change by taking into account impacts noted and future risks of climate change along with the vulnerability of human and natural systems. It emphasises the possible risks of climate change and the principles to be followed for efficient adaptation. It includes a regional atlas that underlines the observations for each continent. The main global observations include¹⁵⁰:

- "**Increasing magnitudes of warming increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and irreversible impacts**"
- "**Changes in climate have already caused impacts on natural and human systems** on all continents and across the oceans". Evidence of these impacts has increased since the last IPCC Assessment Report.
- With sufficient mitigation, these changes pose **huge risks for human health, food security and economic development**.
- The impacts of recent extreme climate events "**highlight the serious vulnerability and exposure**" of certain natural and human systems to the current climate variability, whilst major uncertainties exist over responses to these systems in the future.
- With rising sea levels, the world's coastal communities "**will increasingly experience adverse impacts** such as submergence, coastal flooding and coastal erosion".
- An increasing number of land and fresh water species worldwide face a **high risk of extinction**.
- **Immediate mitigation measures are essential** to avoid hazardous climate change; early action will earn more time for us to adapt to the impacts.
- **Adaptation measures are also essential**, but there are limits and some risks will be inevitable.
- "Many key risks constitute particular challenges for the least developed countries [...], given their limited ability to cope".

This report notes that adaptation is starting to be incorporated in certain scheduling processes and that adaptation experience is accumulating in all regions.

148. The mitigation scenarios used by IPCC are called Representation Concentration Pathways (RCP) The four RCP contain one mitigation scenario leading to a very low forcing level (RCP2.6), two stabilisation scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6) and one scenario with very high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5)". The RCP can therefore represent a whole range of climate policies for the 21st century. See: http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf

149. Second working group: www.climatechange2014.org.

150 http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf

Third working group: Mitigation of Climate Change (published in April 2014)¹⁵¹

This section is linked to the global UNFCCC goal¹⁵². It presents the changes in GHG emissions up to the present day and possible trajectories until 2100 using different mitigation scenarios. It assesses the cross-cutting and sectoral mitigation measures, the needs of such measures and the climate finance issues. The key observations of this section include¹⁵³:

- Despite a growing number of mitigation policies, total anthropogenic GHG emissions **"were the highest in human history from 2000 to 2010"**.
- "About half of cumulative anthropogenic CO₂ emissions between 1750 and 2010 have occurred in the **last forty years**".
- **"Economic and population growth** continue to be the most important drivers of increases in carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion".
- "Mitigation scenarios in which it is likely that the temperature change caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions can be kept to less than 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels are characterised by **atmospheric concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm CO₂eq**" (compared with 396 ppm in 2013 globally¹⁵⁴). These scenarios require a large-scale transition in the power supply sector, which is currently a major source of GHG emissions.
- "Baseline scenarios, those without additional mitigation, results in **global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7°C to 4.8°C** compared with pre-industrial levels".
- **International cooperation** is required to reduce the GHG emissions effectively along with **new forms of investment**.
- "Within appropriate enabling environments, **the private sector**, along with the public sector, can play an important role in financing mitigation".

Synthesis Report¹⁵⁵

This report for policymakers incorporates and summarises the observations of the three working groups and two special reports on renewable energy (2011) and extreme event risk management (2012).

What is the importance of the Fifth IPCC Report for the Lima negotiations and beyond?

The IPCC observations will feed the negotiations in Lima this year and Paris in 2015, mainly in terms of the mitigation commitments by the Parties to remedy the pre-2020 ambition gap (Section 2.1.1)¹⁵⁶ and under the new 2015 agreement (Section 2.1.2). The Fifth IPCC Report is also viewed as an essential contribution to the 2013-2015 review (Section 2.2.13).

151. Third working group: www.mitigation2014.org.

152. Convention objective (Article 2): "stabilisation, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system".

153. http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_approved.pdf

154. WMO: https://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press_releases/documents/1002_GHG_Bulletin.pdf

155. <http://www.ipcc-syr.nl>.

156. See also UNEP "Emissions Gap Report 2013": www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport2013.

In 1995, the Second IPCC Report had provided the scientific knowledge base necessary for the Kyoto Protocol negotiations (1997). Can the Fifth Report stimulate, through the ADP, a sufficiently ambitious new agreement to plug the gap between the current emissions trajectory and the one required to limit the rise in temperatures above 2°C (see Section 2.1.2 on the ADP)? How will the Parties capitalise on this Report to intensify their efforts in implementing mitigation and adaptation measures and in granting financial and technological support for these measures? How should the various sectoral and regional issues be managed? Through the NAMA (Section 2.2.2) and the national adaptation plans (Section 2.2.8.2), for example?

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ENERGIES 2050 was born with the certainty that the development trajectories of our societies are not inevitable and that they can be changed for the better. As an informal network since 2007, and as a French non-profit and non-governmental organisation working exclusively in the general interest since 2011, ENERGIES 2050 contributes relentlessly to the transformation of our societies for a more humane, plural and united future.

Gathering members and partners from more than fifty nationalities, ENERGIES 2050 works in France and internationally to set up a new, positive and inclusive development model and to convert constraints into opportunities for action. As a collective adventure in the quest for better ways of living together, ENERGIES 2050 has committed to the Great Transition, including the energy transition, sustainable cities and regions and the shift towards a more humane, plural and united society, bringing peace and respecting the common goods of humanity.

ENERGIES 2050 is active in the following topics: eco-development and sustainable development; climate, environment and energy policy; energy transition; development of renewable energy sources; responsible and sustainable tourism; buildings and the construction sector; challenges and opportunities in rural and urban areas; sustainable cities; natural resources and the common goods of humanity; ecological and environmental economics; responsible business dynamics and corporate performance; low-carbon development strategies; gender; environmental education; social dynamics; behaviour change and citizen action; and the social solidarity economy.

ENERGIES 2050's activities are part of an ongoing vision for solidarity and equity. ENERGIES 2050 argues for all world citizens to be involved in setting up a new, shared development model, to be designed together.

ENERGIES 2050's actions and research simultaneously take place at the local level - as the anchor point for implementing and testing new approaches - and at the global level, since the idea is to share and spread successful experiences, whilst learning from mistakes made along the way.

ENERGIES 2050

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L'Institut de l'Énergie des Pays ayant en commun l'usage du Français (IEPF - Energy Institute for Countries with French as a common language) came into being in 1988 following the 11th Summit of the Francophonie held in Quebec in 1987. It was created following the global energy crises from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. In 1996, the Institute took the resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 as the major guide for its action and became the *Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie* (Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) And in 2013, following the Rio+20 Conference, it was renamed **Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable** (IFDD - Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development). The Institute is a subsidiary body of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF - International Organisation of the Francophonie) and its headquarters are in Quebec City.

Its mission is to contribute to:

- training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- support for development players in initiatives to prepare and implement sustainable development programmes;
- the promotion of the sustainable development approach in French-speaking countries;
- the development of partnerships in the various economic and social development sectors, mainly environment and energy, for sustainable development.

The IFDD programme is implementing the following five projects in synergy with the other programmes of the International Organisation of La Francophonie, especially those coming from mission D of the Ten-year strategic framework of the Francophonie - "Developing cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity":

- Support for institutional frameworks for preparing and implementing national sustainable development strategies;
- Support in mastering environmental management tools;
- Support in preparing and implementing energy policies;
- Support in participating in international negotiations on the environment and sustainable development;
- Support for the broadcasting of information for sustainable development.

www.ifdd.francophonie.org

The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a language - French - and common values. It currently groups 77 States and governments, including has to date 57 members and twenty observers. The Report on the French language worldwide 2010 sets the number of French speakers at 220 million.

The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies.

The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman and official representative. Abdou Diouf has been the Secretary General of the Francophonie since 2003.

57 member States and governments

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Twenty observers


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
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
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Note

[illegible]







The international scientific community has reached a consensus: human influence on changes to the climate system is clear. The impacts associated with climate change present huge risks for human health, food security and economic development. It is in this context that negotiators are meeting in Lima for the 20th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Here they will embark on a major step in the preparations towards the adoption, at the Paris Conference in 2015, of a new agreement on the post-2020 climate regime. The Lima negotiations will play a decisive role in the success of the Paris Conference. Many key issues still have to be resolved regarding the form and the principles of the 2015 agreement as well as the contributions from Parties for the pre- and post-2020 periods. Support for developing countries - notably through the Green Climate Fund - is also a key issue in the negotiations. For some Parties, commitments from developed countries and the provision of means of implementation are an essential prerequisite to the participation of all Parties in the 2015 agreement.

To help readers in better understanding the challenges of the Lima Conference, this summary provides a brief history of the negotiations (Chapter 1) and an overview of the main issues that will be negotiated this year (Chapter 2). It concludes with an analysis of expectations for the Lima Conference. The final section of the document comprises a set of fact sheets that will provide a useful reference for new readers. Although this publication is intended especially for negotiators from member countries of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF), it will also be a useful tool for all other delegates.



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