United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
COP 21 and CMP 11

2015: PARIS AGREEMENT

30 November to 11 December 2015
Paris, France
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
COP 21 and CMP 11

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How to use this guide

The Guide to the Negotiations and the Summary for policymakers is enhanced year on year and goes beyond the climate change negotiating structure. Academics, public or private figures and representatives of civil society organisations or international institutions – they are all using the Guide and the Summary increasingly as an independent, factual and up-to-date source for the negotiations with an exhaustive, dynamic review of issues, challenges and opportunities for action.

The editorial team has decided to innovate this year. It wished to boost access to the documents for readers with varying degrees of knowledge about the negotiation process – whether they are first-time attendees or have in-depth knowledge. The aim is still for each individual to access all the information he needs in this guide, but also that every person can dip into it based on his/her priorities and the time he/she can give to it. Efforts have therefore been made to engage more with the general public compared with previous years. Outreach boxes support the descriptions and detailed analyses of the various questions addressed in the negotiations. The notion addressed can thus be seized immediately. Themed sheets and summary tables round out the whole and aim to give the reader all the keys he needs to understand what is happening within the negotiation chamber.

The Guide is also benefiting this year from input from a review committee comprising eminent members from different French-speaking countries involved in the Climate negotiations. This review committee has made the work even more relevant, productive and fully engaged with the reality of negotiators and actors implementing concrete projects resulting from the negotiations.

Part I of this work summarises the historical context of the Paris Conference by retracing the key dates in the negotiation process since the Rio Summit in 1992. It also reports on the outcome of the Lima Conference and negotiation sessions known as “intersessions” in 2015. The intention of this first part is to put into perspective the main negotiating issues of the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) and the 11th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 11), both of which are being held in Paris on 30 November-11 December 2015.

Part II discusses the climate negotiation issues in detail, whether addressed under the Durban Platform (section A) or the permanent subsidiary bodies (section B). A box summarises the issues likely to be addressed during COP 21 and CMP 11 at the end of each sub-section.

The authors conclude with an overview summarising the main climate negotiation issues this year.
Large boxes relating to major questions are found in the text. Written to be accessible to the broadest audience, they give everyone a clear vision of the topic addressed.

The Table summarising the main questions that will be examined during the Paris Conference below aims to help Conference attendees to find their way in the session agendas. They summarise the main questions that will be addressed by the various decision-making bodies in Paris.

Lastly, the themed sheets should provide the reader with invaluable benchmarks. They set out, among other things, the UNFCCC organisational aspects, the stances of the main Parties and coalitions present and the UNFCCC side discussion forums that have been held in 2015. Terminology sheets presenting the French and equivalent English vocabulary specific to the climate change negotiations and the abbreviations and acronyms currently used under the negotiations are also provided.

Readers are referred to other sections of the guide and to the source documents the length of the text so that they can broaden their understanding of a topic if they so wish. Note that only the document listings are quoted when reference is made to UNFCCC documents. These listings, designed to make reading easier, can furthermore be used to find the documents referred to very easily on the UNFCCC website1. Sheet 11 indicates the cross-reference for each one.

We hope that this guide will meet readers’ expectations. We ask them to share their assessment with us by filling in the form at the end of the guide.

Climate change is a serious issue and must not remain within an inner circle of specialists. This Guide to the Negotiations and its accompanying Summary for policymakers augment the authors and editorial team’s firm commitment to give every reader the keys to act.

A few words from the Director of the IFDD

The 21st session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21) being held on 30 November-11 December 2015 in Paris, France is an opportunity for the eighty member States and Governments of the Francophonie to make its mark on the history of international negotiations aiming to maintain the ceiling of global warming below 2°C. The Francophonie at the highest level is part of the drive to seek global and sustainable solutions to climatic disorders. The Conference of Heads of States and Governments, in its final Declaration of the 15th Summit of the Francophonie held in Dakar in November 2014, underlined “the dramatic consequences of climate change, especially on health, land and marine resources, access to water and food production and security”.

In Dakar, the Francophonie through the voice of Heads of State and Government, committed to “backing a universal and ambitious agreement to combat climatic disorders effectively in 2015 in Paris”, whilst stressing “the need to support the countries in low-carbon development trajectories that are resilient to climate change”. More than ten thousand young French speakers took an active part in the “I have my planet at heart” campaign launched in March 2015 by Mrs Michâelle Jean, Secretary General of the Francophonie. The youngsters echoed this action by launching a call for a united, sustainable future last September on the fringes of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which saw the adoption of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).

During the 31st session of the Ministerial Conference of the Francophonie held in Erevan, Armenia on 10-11 October 2015, the Francophonie also restated its commitment and support for an ambitious agreement in Paris, through a resolution on the issues of the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The SDG will enter into force in 2020. It is therefore important for the new post-Kyoto Protocol climate regime to be in step with the new Sustainable Development Agenda. The States must therefore maintain their efforts in this sense so that the climate negotiation process actually leads to an agreement in Paris in 2015. The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (International Organisation of the Francophonie), through its subsidiary body the Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD), has underpinned the French-speaking countries in this drive, by supporting their national processes for preparing Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) Four workshops were organised in different regions between April and July 2015: West and North Africa (Dakar, 14-16 April), Central Africa and Indian Ocean (21-23 April),
Caribbean (20-22 May 2015) and Asia and Pacific (20-22 July 2015). This contribution by the Francophonie was greatly appreciated by the delegates, who continue to share their experiences on the French-speaking INDC experience and information sharing network set up by the IFDD.

In addition, the IFDD, as it normally does, followed the interim climate negotiation sessions in Geneva and Bonn. It organised on-site consultations between the French-speaking delegations to discuss the issues and the state of progress of negotiations. Also, on 1 September 2015, on the fringes of the tenth part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP2.10), the Institute brought together the French-speaking delegates and the COP 21 Presidency to discuss specifically the progress being made in preparing for the COP 21 and its issues.

Readers, the Paris Conference is facing substantial issues. It is the “ultimate” occasion to agree on a universal and binding agreement to “save” our planet. We have once more prepared a Guide to the Negotiations and a Summary for policymakers for this major event. The Guide takes stock of negotiations since the adoption of the framework agreement in 1992 in Rio. Our experts lead you through the labyrinths of decisions and highlight the salient points of the negotiations. They revisit the current negotiating process under the Durban Platform (ADP) and advise of the progress being made in the negotiations. The structure of the wording of the future agreement, the questions of procedure (frequency of national communications, assessment, etc.), the fate of INDC, financing and achieving the 2°C trajectory are all crucial points and issues addressed in this Guide that I invite you to discover.

The IFDD Guide offers the OIF member States and governments a tool for refining their stance, grasping negotiation issues and expressing their viewpoints in the language they speak most fluently at international level. This Guide has been made possible through the mobilisation of the French-speaking expertise and of our partners who we thank most warmly.

I wish you all pleasant reading, in the hope that these negotiations will achieve a fruitful outcome for a global, inclusive and ambitious agreement in Paris.

Jean-Pierre Ndoutoum
Table 1.
Summary table of the main issues which will be examined during the Paris Conference

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2. As per the provisional agendas available on 2 November 2015. See http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/meeting/8926.php for the up-to-date versions.
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Introduction

Paris Climat 2015 – a conference covering all the challenges with a must-succeed brief in a climate-constrained world.

The reality of climate change is now acknowledged virtually unanimously. Scientific analyses highlight gradual disruptions and a global rise in temperatures over the last two centuries, at an increasing pace during recent decades8. They are mainly caused by greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) associated with our consumption and production modes, with consequences that could quickly prove irreversible9. The fifth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) restated in 2013 the anthropogenic (human) origin of this climate change. It henceforth deems the link between the rise in temperatures noted since 1950 and human activities as “extremely likely10”.

In view of this planetary challenge, the negotiation process to face up to climatic disorders is a pioneering experiment in world history. It is in fact the very first time that the governments from almost all countries on the globe have joined forces to face up to a global threat brought to light by science, as part of a complex process with so much potential importance for the economy, the environment, human development or solidarity between peoples. The only precedent is the Montreal Protocol adopted in 1985 on the emission of substances that impoverish the ozone layer, which was, by comparison, simplicity personified in relation to the complex climate change processes. The world agreement on the ozone layer must be a source of optimism, as thanks to the international mobilisation that united most world nations around a same table, the ozone layer is now recovering fast11. Let us wish the negotiation process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the same success. After all, we must remember the overwhelming size of the challenge - no more and no less protecting future generations from the multiple, devastating consequences potentially generated by too rapid a rise in Earth's temperatures. The responsibility weighing on the shoulders of negotiators and policymakers is therefore huge. Humanity cannot do without an agreement, nor settle for a minimal decision that does not resolve the problem today or which puts the essential decisions to be made off “until later”. For we should all pay the price. This reality must be borne in mind as each individual defends the legitimate interests of his/her country.

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8. Source: IPCC, Climate change 2013. The physical science basis.
9. Source IPCC, Climate change 2013. The physical science basis.
10. IPCC, 2013, p. 17.
The agreement anticipated in Paris this year is of major importance in the progress of the climate negotiations. Fruit of a process started in 2011 with the launch of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, with the principal mandate of preparing a legal instrument for 2015\textsuperscript{12}, it holds out hope for considerable boosting of measures taken to face up to climate change. It involves obtaining a commitment from country Parties to the Convention to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions considerably and introduce the necessary measures to increase the resilience of populations and ecosystems to changes in the climate. The Paris agreement will plot the road map for the post-2020 period. At the same time, the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) will be a chance to start plugging the gap between the commitments made by the countries and the reductions in GHG emissions that are really necessary to prevent global warming from reaching perilous levels. As such, the commitments and measures taken for the period 2016-2020 are just as important. The current commitments by the Parties bring us to a rise in average temperatures that could reach about 2.7°C\textsuperscript{13} to 3.5°C\textsuperscript{14} at the end of the century, according to two independent analyses. The trajectory followed in both cases would result in far greater global warming than stipulated by the scientific community, whereby it should not go beyond 2°C. Some Parties even advocate 1.5°C. Over and beyond this barrier, the climate system would suffer dangerous disturbances, potentially culminating especially in a very substantial rise in sea levels and massive population displacements, the desertification of certain regions and their corollary of malnutrition and famine, a huge increase in natural disasters like storms, hurricanes, floods, etc.

Despite a succession of warnings by the IPCC, which already in 2007 called on developed countries to reduce collectively their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 25% to 40% by 2020 compared with 1990\textsuperscript{15}, world anthropogenic GHG emissions were at their highest level in human history between 2000 and 2010\textsuperscript{16}. The temperature of our planet has already risen by 0.85°C since the pre-industrial period and the effect is accelerating: half of this rise has occurred during the last four decades, according to the IPCC\textsuperscript{17}.

This fact brought hundreds of thousands of citizens onto the streets of the largest cities all over the world on 21 September 2014 for the “People’s Climate March”. This huge demonstration by citizens demanded that Heads of State act

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Decision 1/CP.17.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Analysis by ClimateInteractive on 21 October 2015. [Online] https://www.climateinteractive.org/tools/scoreboard.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} IPCC, 2007.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} IPCC, 2014, p. 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} IPCC, 2014.
\end{itemize}
unambiguously in line with the challenges. Following this mobilisation and after long negotiations, last year COP 20 adopted the “Lima Call for Climate Action” which, in the absence of much new input, mainly urges the Parties to raise the ambition level of their GHG emission mitigation commitments during the period up to 2020. The Call also restates the decision to prepare a protocol or other text with legal force, applicable to all the Parties, with a view to its adoption in Paris. In addition, the Call gave fresh impetus to the submission process by countries of their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), whereby the Parties make voluntary commitments, among other things, to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (net reductions or relative reductions compared with a trend-based scenario). This process, slow to start but which ultimately was very successful – 4/5ths of 196 member countries had submitted their INDC by 30 October 2015 - should be one of the pillars of the negotiations in Paris.

Apart from the challenge of raising the ambition level sufficiently high to prevent global greenhouse gas emissions from dangerously disturbing our climate system, the Parties should deal with numerous other questions during the COP 21. Remember that in Lima, they agreed to giving balanced consideration to six issues within the 2015 agreement: mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, capacity-building and transparency of measures and support.

Thus, the question of adaptation to the inevitable consequences of climate change will be one of the major issues in Paris. In practice, at the request of the developing countries, the questions of adaptation and mitigation are increasingly deemed of equal importance. How to deal with adaptation remains a burning question, one which could potentially be far wider than mitigation, given its strong dependence on national and local characteristics, i.e. “national realities”. It is especially important to decide who is going to pay, what aid will be forthcoming and for whom, without forgetting the monitoring and assessment processes.

In addition, the Convention recognises as fundamental the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, whereby the industrialised countries, which have contributed more to global warming that the developing countries, must bear a far larger share of the collective repair bill. This principle is very important for the developing countries and is currently seeing highly-contrasting stances that could lead to really tense situations in Paris. A certain number of developed countries would like more subtle sharing of obligations, mainly with developing countries that are now emerging, including some that have become huge emitters of GHG. Between the lines, the question of financing remains central.

19. Decision 1/CP.20
20. See Decision 1/CP.20, para. 2.
Numerous other points, including some that are highly technical, should still be negotiated in Paris.

The civil society will be once again mobilised massively to support an ambitious agreement. Responding to the call by numerous associations, citizens the world over will be on the streets on 28-29 November, just before COP 21 opens, and on 12 December, the day after it closes, to put pressure on their governments to take strong measures.

**A guide to understand, share and increase the opportunities to act**

The *Guide to the Negotiations* and its accompanying *Summary for policymakers* falls under the wider context of the support provided by the *Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable*, a subsidiary body of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), to French-speaking countries in the international climate change negotiations.

Although this guide is intended especially for the negotiators from OIF member countries, it has year on year become a reference document translated into several languages. We hope that it will be a useful tool for all delegates and that it will make a useful contribution to facilitating the search for a consensus for an ambitious Paris agreement that is realistically in line with the challenges.

Aimed at helping negotiators to better understand the challenges of the COP 21, this guide provides a historical perspective (Part I) and an analysis of the main negotiation issues based on the latest negotiation texts and countries’ stances on these issues (Part 2). Boxes have been added throughout the text in the 2015 edition to clarify certain notions or throw light on specific issues. With the same goal of providing the reader with all the keys to the negotiations, we offer a series of fifteen themed sheets at the end of the Guide that will be useful markers for new readers.
Chapter I. Brief history of negotiations on climate change

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. In this framework document, the UNFCCC signatory countries undertake to stabilise the greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Following this historic event, the question of global warming has increasingly taken centre stage on the international agenda (see Sheet 1). To supplement the commitments made in Rio, the 3rd Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 3) adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997 (Sheet 3). This obliges the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC (developed countries) that have ratified the Protocol to reduce jointly the emission level of six greenhouse gases (GHG) by 5% compared with the 1990 level in the period 2008-2012. This was the first tool to force countries, by virtue of international law, to limit their greenhouse gas emissions.

Controversies over certain points of the Protocol could not, however, be settled in Kyoto and the Parties continued to negotiate on these topics in subsequent years. The Marrakesh Accords adopted in 2001 finally allowed the adoption of operationalisation modalities for the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Protocol only came into force in February 2005 and its implementation was delayed in some countries. Australia only ratified it in December 2007, for example. Canada even withdrew in 2011. And the United States, the largest GHG emitter in the world until 2004 (since passed by China), has never ratified the Protocol.

With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties embarked on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Special working groups were set up in 2005 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved an Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term

22. The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) meets annually. Each conference is therefore referred to using the acronym COP x; Lima was the 20th conference and was therefore COP 20. See Sheet 2 for an introduction to the UNFCCC.

Brief history of negotiations on climate change

Cooperative Action – AWG-LCA which constituted a specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention.

COP 13 (2007) provided a two-year road map on these issues known as the Bali Action Plan. This aimed to reach an agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen on a post-2012 climate regime under the Convention. The Parties did not manage to reach a detailed agreement at the planned date. The negotiations therefore continued during the next COP (Cancún in 2010 and Durban in 2011), before being concluded in Doha in 2012 (see section F, p. 23). At the same time, the Parties, acting as a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, agreed on an amendment to the Protocol providing for GHG reduction targets during a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. With these decisions, the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the UNFCCC and the 8th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 8) in Doha brought the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) to an end.

At the same time, a new stage had commenced with the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in 2011. This group has been working for more than three years on preparing an agreement for the COP 21 in Paris, which would enter into force in 2020. The next Conferences of the Parties, in Doha, Warsaw and Lima, moved in this direction, whilst attempting to plug the ambition gap between the commitments taken by the Parties by 2020 and those necessary to limit global warming to less than 2°C by the end of the century.

Before describing briefly the history of the negotiations by analysing the main stages that are the Bali Action Plan (Section B), the Copenhagen Accord (Section C), the Cancún Agreements (Section D), the Durban Platform (Section E), the Doha Climate Gateway (Section F), the outcome of Warsaw (Section G) and the Lima Call for Climate Action (Section H), Section A will enlighten the reader on the current structure of negotiations and its evolution.

The table below indicates the meeting sequence of various bodies of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
### Table 2. History of Conferences and Meetings of the Parties and of Subsidiary Bodies and Working Groups of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol

Meetings of Subsidiary Bodies (SB-x):
- Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)
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A. Negotiation framework

After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, technical discussions on climate change took place mainly under the auspices of two permanent bodies\(^24\) (see Sheet 5), namely:

- **the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)**, mandated to advise the COP and CMP on improving the effective application of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol;

- **the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)** which advises the COP/CMP on scientific and technical issues involving them.

In addition, as indicated above, two working groups worked to renew the Kyoto Protocol and to make the Bali Action Plan a reality from 2007 to 2012:

- **Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)**\(^25\). This group was established in 2005 to facilitate the negotiations on the commitments of developed countries (Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC) for the second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. These negotiations covered new GHG emission reduction targets and how to achieve them, for example market mechanisms\(^26\).

- **Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA)**. The Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention was initiated during the Montreal Conference (COP 11). It aimed to enhance the implementation of the Convention, mainly by making it easier to analyse cooperation approaches in respect of sustainable development, adaptation and technological potential. At the end of this two-year dialogue uniting all the Parties to the Convention a new subsidiary body, the AWG-LCA, was created in Bali in December 2007\(^27\). Its mandate was to complete successfully, in two years, a process to enable the effective application of the Convention through long-term cooperation action.

The mandate of both these working groups, scheduled to end in Copenhagen in 2009, was extended until the Doha Conference (2012).

\(^{24}\) http://unfccc.int/6241.

\(^{25}\) By virtue of Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol, following Decision 1/CMP.1, Study of paragraph 9 of Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol on the commitments of the Annex I Parties for the following periods.

\(^{26}\) The Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B is a list of Parties which have made quantified commitments to reducing or limiting GHG emissions.

\(^{27}\) Decision 1/CP.13
A new working group then took up the reins:

- **Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)**. Set up in Durban in 2011, the ADP started its work in 2012. Its mandate is to develop a new protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention that will apply to all the Parties. This should enter into force in 2020. It was also tasked with studying measures to compensate for the lack of pre-2020 ambition level in terms of the 2°C objective.

The decision to create the Durban Platform marks the start of a new and significant chapter in the collective effort by Parties to combat climate change. In fact, after difficult discussions since Copenhagen in 2009, the Durban Platform opened a more inclusive climate regime transcending the traditional lines separating the so-called “developed” and “developing” countries.

Figure 1 below summarises the main negotiation stages and the context in which they took place.

**Figure 1: Chronology of negotiations and framework for negotiations**


The widely-publicised COP 13 was held in Bali in a climate of citizen pressure. The delegates had the task of establishing a multilateral cooperation framework for the post-2012 period. Their efforts produced an agreement on a two-year roadmap - the Bali Action Plan. This consists of a set of decisions emanating from the Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing imple-

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28. Decision 1/CP.17
29. Decision 1/CP.13
mentation of the Convention, initiated during the Montreal Conference (2005)\(^{30}\). The Bali Action Plan forms a coherent basis for negotiations with a view to adopting an “agreed outcome”, i.e. a climate regime commencing after 2012.

A change in formulation was one of the most significant developments brought by the Bali Action Plan. For the first time, the terms “developed” and “developing” countries replaced the terms “Parties included in Annex I” and “non-Annex I Parties”. This innovation extended the perspective to new combinations and effort levels by the countries. Another major advance was the link established between the mitigation efforts of developing countries and the financial and technological support from developed countries.

The negotiation process opened up by the Bali Action Plan, that should have ended in 2009, only finally reached an end in 2012 in Doha. It is structured around four focal points:

- **Mitigation.** This issue was shown as one of the most thorny issues of COP 13. The United States, Canada and other Parties favoured tough language on developing countries’ actions and commitments; the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China) sought greater emphasis on a discourse dealing more with the commitments of Annex I Parties, therefore of developed countries\(^{31}\). Lastly, both views were taken into account and the Parties agreed to examine the option of taking\(^{32}\):
  
  - For the developed countries: “measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally-appropriate mitigation commitments or initiatives, including quantified GHG emission limitation and reduction objectives”, taking into account differences in their national circumstances;
  
  - For the developing countries: “nationally appropriate mitigation actions (...) in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing resources and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner”.

- **Adaptation.** It was decided to boost the action for adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, mainly by examining international cooperation in order to achieve the urgent application of miscellaneous adaptation measures, given the immediate needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries, mainly the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the African countries\(^{33}\).

- **Technology development and transfer.** The Bali Action Plan provides for reflecting on effective mechanisms to eliminate the obstacles of access by developing country Parties to environmentally sound technologies at affordable

\(^{30}\) Decision 1/CP.11


\(^{32}\) Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1b.

\(^{33}\) Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1c.
cost and facilitate their roll-out\textsuperscript{34}. The debates on these issues have mainly covered the financing of these technologies and the intellectual property rights. These issues are also discussed in other forums such as those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

- **Financing.** The mitigation measures of developing countries were linked for the first time in Bali to the financial and technological support provided by the developed countries. Financing is also envisaged to help developing countries to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The Bali Action Plan thus sets up the bases for the financial framework to support developing countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts\textsuperscript{35}.

### C. Copenhagen Accord (2009)

The Copenhagen Conference (COP 15) was intended to endorse the main components of a post-2012 climate regime using two negotiating processes, firstly under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and secondly under the Convention (AWG-LCA). But negotiations collapsed on this regime. Only a political agreement in the form of a high-level declaration by a few States could be reached during the COP 15, known as the **Copenhagen Accord**. A total of 114 Parties stated their affiliation to it\textsuperscript{36}. Despite not being legally binding, a positive point is that the Copenhagen Accord includes the two principal GHG emitters, namely China and the United States.

The Accord underlines the political desire of States associated with it to address climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Noted by the COP 15\textsuperscript{37}, the Copenhagen Accord clarifies certain aspects of the negotiations, like the long-term GHG emission reduction targets and financing. The developed countries set themselves the goal of assembling collectively 100 billion US dollars a year until 2020 to finance climate projects of developing countries. Lastly, this Accord served as the basis for negotiations leading to the Cancún Agreements.

### D. Cancún Agreements (2010)

Despite the far more modest expectations than at the Copenhagen Conference, or perhaps because of it, the Cancún Conference resulted in a “balanced set” of decisions which the international community greeted positively. The Cancún Agreements assembled the progress in Copenhagen into a formal agreement and sent a political signal to continue the discussions on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties associated themselves unanimously with this, with the exception of Bolivia.

\textsuperscript{34} Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1d.
\textsuperscript{35} Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1e.
\textsuperscript{36} http://unfccc.int/5262.
\textsuperscript{37} Decision 2/CP.15
The significant progress brought by the Cancún Agreements mainly consists of the formal creation of institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Adaptation Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). Other progress made includes creating a register to facilitate support for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and the launch of the REDD+, which aims at Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) and includes the role of conservation, sustainable forestry management and development of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (the “+” in REDD+).

They also provide for the preparation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), mainly for the least developed countries38.

E. Durban Platform (2011)
The Durban Conference (COP 17) launched the process for negotiating a unique agreement under the UNFCCC, with the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This group has the mandate of implementing “a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”, which should enter into force no later than 202039. Also known as the Durban Platform, this process has made it possible to encourage long-term cooperation involving all the countries. It thus represents significant progress in the central question of whether the developed countries or the developing countries should make the effort. One of the goals of the Platform is indeed “ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties”40.

This progress was not achieved without difficulty. Major greenhouse gas emitters - Canada, Russia and Japan - refused to commit to a second commitment period41, which provoked considerable controversy. However, by reaffirming the willingness of the Parties to reach agreement on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, the outcome of the Durban Conference was ultimately to strengthen trust between the Parties. It testifies to a universal political will to combat climate change with a constructive commitment by the most vulnerable countries and emerging countries. The initiative of China, which announced its willingness to commit to reducing its emissions from 2020 onwards under certain conditions, brought with it other emerging countries that have become major GHG emitters, such as Brazil and South Africa42.

Progress was also made at the Durban Conference on the topic of adaptation to climate change, with a framework and guidelines for the NAP created the previous

38. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 14 to 16.
39. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 2 and 4.
40. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 7
41. Decision 1/CMP.1, Annex 1.
year in Cancún. These aim to build up the capacities of developing countries, mainly the least developed and the most vulnerable countries, in terms of assessing and reducing their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.

F. Doha Climate Gateway (2012)

The Doha Climate Gateway, at outcome snatched at the last minute on the last evening of the 2012 conference, refers to two major elements. Firstly, the adoption of the “Doha Amendment” to the Kyoto Protocol that records the second commitment period in it. This commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 2020. The countries are free to choose its date of entry into force, even if the Doha Decision encourages them to implement the second commitment period before ratifying it. The second element in the Doha Climate Gateway is the conclusion of negotiations under the Bali Action Plan of 2007. In Doha, the Parties finally disbanded the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA, whose mandates had been extended for several years.

The Doha Conference (COP 18) therefore allowed a certain streamlining of the UNFCCC negotiation process. The ADP, SBI and SBSTA henceforth form the only three negotiation groups, compared with the five that existed in 2012. The Doha Decision reaffirms the ambition to adopt “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” by 2015. It also provides for a negotiation text to be available before May 2015. Other major progress made at the COP 18 is the consideration of loss and damage suffered in the developing countries which are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. It thus sets up an institutional mechanism for dealing with loss and damage.

G. Warsaw Conference (2013)

Although the Warsaw Conference (COP 19) proved disappointing in terms of climate urgency, it nevertheless produced a series of decisions which map out the route towards the Paris Conference. One of its advances was to clarify further the modalities for preparing the draft negotiation text for 2015 and for the submission process for the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) of the Parties to the UNFCCC (see section a, p. 35). The INDC indicate the voluntary efforts of countries in terms of climate change that could be included in the 2015 agreement. The term “contributions” adopted finally achieved consensus in the final minutes of the Warsaw negotiations. It nevertheless leaves major issues hanging - differentiation between the countries based on their different levels of development, and the financial support, technology transfer and capacity-building issues.

43. Decision 5/CP.17
44. Decision 1/CP.19
In addition, the Parties were invited in Warsaw to intensify their efforts to reduce the ambition gap for the pre-2020 period, by cancelling, for example, some certified emission reductions (CER)\textsuperscript{45} (see section b, p. 74).

The agreement on the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) rules, which signals its operationalisation, and on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage was a positive signal towards the implementation of the Cancún Agreements and the Durban and Doha decisions. REDD+ was also the subject of numerous decisions of a technical nature, which now form the “Warsaw Framework for REDD+”. In addition, pledges for finance amounting to almost 280 million US dollars were announced in Warsaw for the REDD+. A sum in total contrast to the sum the GCF could count on in December 2013, which was no more than 6.9 million US dollars. This figure greatly fuelled the loss of confidence among developed and developing countries, who deplored the 71% decrease in financing of climate-related activities in 2013\textsuperscript{46}. To remedy this, a high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance was established in Warsaw, with meetings planned every two years until 2020. Directives for the Green Climate Fund were also adopted to make it more operational\textsuperscript{47}.

H. Lima Call for Climate Action and the road to Paris (2014)

On the final straight to Paris, the Lima Conference (COP 20) capitalised on the outcomes of previous Conferences of the Parties and managed to lay the bases for the future agreement of 2015. After extended negotiations, the Parties adopted in December 2014 “the Lima Call for Climate Action”, which contains especially in its annex a draft version of the future Paris agreement\textsuperscript{48}. It also states that this should give balanced consideration to six issues: mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, capacity-building and transparency of measures and support.

The Lima Call also includes a decision about the INDCs. This sets out their scope, the data they can contain, the submission methods and measures to be taken by the Secretariat\textsuperscript{49}. The Parties are invited especially to include elements on adaptation and implementation resources. Lastly, they are asked to specify the reason why they believe their efforts to be fair and ambitious\textsuperscript{50}.

The Parties also adopted a set of decisions under the COP and the tenth Conference of the Parties acting as a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

\textsuperscript{45} Decision 1/CP.19, para. 5c.
\textsuperscript{46} IISD, 2013, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{47} Decision 4/CP.19
\textsuperscript{48} Decision 1/CP.20 Annex
\textsuperscript{49} Decision 1/CP.20, para. 9 to 16.
\textsuperscript{50} Decision 1/CP.20, para. 14
(CMP 10) that was held at the same time. These contribute among other things to the operationalisation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. They establish the Lima work programme regarding gender\(^{51}\), with results scheduled for review during the COP 22 in 2016. The Lima Ministerial Declaration on education and awareness-raising was also adopted during the COP 20\(^{52}\). This aims to raise the awareness of children and the general public to the effects of climate change and encourage them to change their behaviour.

Progress on adaptation remained modest in Lima. Although many countries sought revised guidelines for the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), the Conference of the Parties saw no need for the review\(^{53}\). In addition, the COP expressed its concern in Lima over the lack of funds to meet the needs of the LDCs, and notably the deficit in the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which could support the NAPs formulation and implementation process\(^{54}\).

In addition, the Parties held a first annual high-level ministerial meeting aimed at reinforcing the implementation of measures identified under the work of Workstream 2 relating to the commitments for the pre-2020 period. In terms of financing, the Parties also held their first biennial ministerial meeting relating to the work programme on long term financing. Lastly, the first biennial reports and sixth national communications were assessed under the auspices of the SBI for the first time in Lima, with the assessment of seventeen countries.

\(^{51}\) Decision 18/CP.20
\(^{52}\) Decision 19/CP.20
\(^{54}\) Decisions 3, 4 and 8/CP.20.
Chapter II.
The main negotiation issues

In 2015, the issues at stake in the negotiations linked to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol were discussed within the Durban Platform under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Working Group and the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) (section A) and of the permanent subsidiary bodies (section B): the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).

A. Issues of the Durban Platform

1. Workstream 2: pre-2020 period

This work plan, also called “Workstream 2” (WS2) is intended to “enhance mitigation ambition” with the aim “of ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties”\textsuperscript{56} during the years leading up to 2020.

Implemented during the 17th. Conference of the Parties (COP17) (Durban, 2011), the WS2 aims to correct the gap between the needs in terms of mitigation and the promises of emissions reduction for the period from now until 2020 in the optic of contributing without waiting to maintaining the increase of temperatures to 1.5 or 2°C by 2100 compared with pre-industrial levels. For this, the WS2 considers simultaneously the financial, technological and capacity reinforcement support for the mitigation measures. This gap, multi-form and multidimensional is not taken into account by any mechanism, and would still not be so if the entry into force of the second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol were to materialise. Yet, the Report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) of 2014 dedicated to the gap between voluntary commitments announced (reductions, actions of adaptation, climate finances, technology transfers, etc.) and the commitments of reductions that would be necessary, reminds us that each year gone by in which GHG world emissions do not diminish renders the task increasingly difficult\textsuperscript{57}. On the eve of Paris, the Parties have reiterated their strong preoccupation vis a vis

\textsuperscript{56} Decision 1/CP.17, para. 7.
\textsuperscript{57} UNEP, 2014, p. xix.
the fact that the accumulated effect of commitments announced at Cancún do not allow limiting the increase of temperatures to 1.5 or 2°C\textsuperscript{58}.

The creation of WS2 is the result of this feeling of urgency in face of the increase in temperatures whose consequences could be disastrous in developing countries in general, and in particular those that are more vulnerable. This feeling is today accentuated by the recent publication of the 5th assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; see sheet 12)\textsuperscript{59} and the 2014 Report by UNEP. The latter estimates that there is an excess gap of 8 to 10 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Gt eq-CO\textsubscript{2}) between the emissions anticipated from now until 2020 when the Cancún commitments are taken into consideration and those allowing to limit the increase in temperatures to 1.5 or 2°C\textsuperscript{60}. On a more promising note, the UNEP noted in 2013 that “the technical potential for reducing emissions to levels compatible with warming to 2°C [...] is enough to close the gap between business-as-usual emission levels and levels that meet the 61\textsuperscript{2}° C target, but time is running out”. The challenge is therefore to identify the policies, financing and technology that would allow exploiting to a maximum this potential technology in order to fill the gap from now until 2020; but also the political will to engage the process on the part of involved countries.

At the time of the implementation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), the countries of the Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) strongly insisted on the creation of a working plan in WS2. These countries considered that negotiating a future agreement that wouldn’t go into effect until 2020 could only be accepted if measures to increase mitigation ambition and implement adaptation actions would be made beforehand\textsuperscript{62}. This stance remains unchanged today, to the extent that numerous countries regard greater political mobilisation in this process as essential\textsuperscript{63}. As COP21 approaches, the countries of LMDC and AOSIS have accentuated the importance of reinforcing trust between the Parties, whilst Brazil, China and Iran have underscored that cooperation between the Parties regarding diverse elements to be integrated into WS2 can be perceived as a platform towards an efficient agreement in Paris\textsuperscript{64}. These countries have also made known their opinion according to which the discussions of the WS2 are complementary to discussions that took place in the framework of “Sector of activity 1 (WS1)” (see section 2, p. 29) and also as important. In this respect India had already mentioned that progress pre-2020 would enable to establish this better trust between the Parties \textsuperscript{65}.

\textsuperscript{58} FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, preamble.
\textsuperscript{59} IPCC, 2014.
\textsuperscript{60} UNEP, 2014.
\textsuperscript{61} UNEP, 2013, p. xvi. Our translation.
\textsuperscript{62} IISD, 2011.
\textsuperscript{63} IISD, 2015c, p. 16-17.
\textsuperscript{64} IISD, 2015c, p. 12.
a. Intensify efforts on a national scale and through international cooperative initiatives

On the eve of Paris, the G-77/China, and more specifically AOSIS accentuate the urgency of acting early, more rapidly and as from now\textsuperscript{66}. The G-77/China has suggested that a work programme or mechanism specific to WS2 be adopted in Paris which would force developed countries to more specific and staggered upwardly targets to the increase between 2017 and 2020\textsuperscript{67}. South Africa, LMDC, AOSIS and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) underscore the importance of making progress on the ratification of the Doha Amendment \textsuperscript{68}, whilst only 50 countries did so in October 9 2015, even though it is necessary to have 144 for the Amendment to be enforceable \textsuperscript{69}. The ratification of the Amendment is perceived as closely linked to the progression of WS2 and a possible increase in ambitions of mitigation pre-2020.

For their part, several developed countries, in particular the European Union (EU), Australia, United States, New Zealand, Canada and Norway opposed future work of the WS2 to include anything other than mitigation and the Technical Review Process(PET) \textsuperscript{70}. Several developed countries have underscored during the last session of Bonn before COP21, that the adaptation must not be included in talks aimed at the WS2\textsuperscript{71}. Similarly, the Umbrella Group and the EU both suggested decision elements regarding high-level events for the period pre-2020 to PET and passage of the torch of discussions of WS2 during the closing of works of the ADP, avoiding any consideration regarding the implementation of targets set at Cancún or the Doha Amendment\textsuperscript{72}. The EU announced, in Bonn (ADP 2-9, June 2015), that an increase in its ambitions was an option only possible after 2020\textsuperscript{73}. Elsewhere, no country has of today increased the target announced in Cancún.

Finally one should note that the work under WS2 will be inevitably influenced by work undertaken under the Work Programme on clarification of quantified objectives of reduction of emissions for the whole economy of developed countries.

\textsuperscript{66} IISD, 2015, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{68} IISD, 2015, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{69} http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php.
\textsuperscript{70} IISD, 2015b, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{71} IISD, 2015d, p. 9.
In Lima (COP20, 2014), the Parties had a first high-level annual ministerial meeting aimed at reinforcing the implementation of measures identified in the framework of work in the WS2\textsuperscript{74}. These discussions are based, since a decision taken by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in Doha in 2012 \textsuperscript{75}, on a technical document prepared and updated by the Secretariat\textsuperscript{76} (see box below). This document evolves in particular from the Technical Review Process(PET) effected through the Meetings of Technical Experts (TEM). These allow for an exchange of ideas which all in all is well received\textsuperscript{77}. However, their efficiency is not the matter of unanimity between the Parties\textsuperscript{78}. The AOSIS countries have underscored that it would be useful to ensure the regular updating of the technical document and in addition add an Online window offering a “menu” of suggested public policies. The countries of the Africa Group as well as AOSIS have also suggested preparing a report summary aimed at decision makers \textsuperscript{79}. In this respect the Parties extended the PET from 2015 to 2020, agreeing on both the importance of having a revision mechanism on the efficiency of the process and the pursuit of TEM\textsuperscript{80}. Moreover in order to encourage everyone to engage in concrete actions the Parties agreed to render the initiatives of the countries more visible on the web site of the UNFCCC (see graph hereunder)\textsuperscript{81}.

### Technical document on the measures, options and initiatives regarding potential mitigation of GHG emissions

This document reports on the mitigation benefits of certain actions, options and initiatives which could help to close the ambition gap. It describes the actions, options and initiatives with mitigation benefits categorised by activity (energy efficiency; renewable energy; fossil fuel subsidy reform; pollutants that have a high impact on climate such as hydro fluorocarbons – HFCs – and carbon black) and by economic sector (transport, including international aviation and shipping, land use, including forests and agriculture; waste, etc.).

\textsuperscript{74} http://www.cop20.pe/en/dia-de-la-accion-climatica-de-lima.
\textsuperscript{75} FCCC/ADP/2012/3, para. 31.
\textsuperscript{77} IISD, 2014, n° 619, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{79} IISD, 2014, no 619, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{80} FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, para. 19.
\textsuperscript{81} FCCC/ADP/2013/L.4.
This document also compiles information on benefits besides mitigation, such as economic development, improvements in health, biodiversity improvements, security improvements, energy independence and reductions in public spending. Another important benefit is increasing climate change resilience and adaptation capacity, firstly through mitigation which therefore reduces the costs related to adaptation and secondly by preserving land and forests. The document also talks of the barriers to implementing these actions and presents a list of financial barriers, technological barriers (for example, in the waste sector), methodological barriers (for example, the lack of data on methodologies to quantify carbon capturing in the forest sector), as well as capacity related barriers or shortcomings in countries' regulatory and legislative frameworks.

i. Technical Review Process (PET)

In order to ensure dynamism and constant evolution of the technical examination process (TEP) the ADP has a mandate to make recommendations regarding its future progression at Paris including for matters related to the periodic evaluation of Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) 82. For the purposes of the Forum dedicated to means of making progress on the technical examination of measures of the potential high mitigation and to better understand the potential obstacles of implementation, the Parties made the most of a first meeting specifically aimed at discussing this matter organised in June 2015 to determine which specific issues to look into in the TEM to come and secondly, to identify the improvements that it would be possible to make. For example, India mentioned the importance of being able to go beyond the TEM in order to delay technology transfer underscoring the stakes of copyright 83.

This meeting also allowed the Parties to discuss what they will do for the period 2015-2020 and to look into the results obtained during previous TEMs. The organs of the UNFCCC and other International Organisations (IO) presented their accomplishments in the context of TEP. Another objective of the meeting was to improve the synergy between these institutions in order to accelerate implementation of certain measures and improve participation of non-state actors at TEP, in particular sharing information that is collected there. The participants highlighted the importance of making their discussions more specific and to have a comprehensive debate on manners to eliminate various obstacles, financial and others, that slow down the implementation of some of these, be they at a world level or regional or local 84.

82. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, para. 20.
Taking advantage of work performed during the six Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) that took place in 2014, the participants had two more in June 2015 and dedicated their efforts to sharing their knowledge in terms of implementation in three fields for the potential of elevated mitigation, and linked to energy efficiency and the offer of renewable energy. These TEMs brought together delegates of the Parties, members of UNFCCC as well as public and private investors, companies operating in the field of renewable energy, representatives of civil society, and researchers. We recall above all the six subjects dealt with in 2014, to then deal with the two TEMs that took place this year in more detail:

- TEM on renewable energy (March 2014)
- TEM on energy efficiency (March 2014)
- TEM on land use (June 2014)
- TEM on urban environment (June 2014)
- TEM on capture, storage and use of carbon (October 2014)
- TEM on actions aimed at reducing GHG other than CO\(_2\) (October 2014)

TEM that took place in 2015:

- TEM on offer of renewable energy (June 2015)

During this TEM the participants were able to benefit from the results obtained on renewable energy that took place in March 2014 and the recommendations that resulted there from. In this respect they were able to learn further on the measures presenting a high potential of mitigation that could be rapidly implemented, deployed broadly. The TEM mainly concentrated on decentralised production on the one part, and on political and financial incentives such as preferential rates of repurchase, and quotas of resupply on the other hand. During the discussions participants were able to identify numerous advantages arising from the increase in the offer of renewable energy, including greater energy security, improvement in public health, creation of local jobs and better integration of rural areas in the electric network.

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92. UNFCCC, 2015, p. 5-8.
• **TEM on the accelerated implementation of measures of energy efficiency in urban areas (June 2015)**

The implementation of measures of energy efficiency alone could reduce world annual emissions of GHG from 1.5 to 2 Gt eq-CO₂ from now until 2020. It would be possible to implement them at zero cost or very low cost in the long term, perhaps a profit. The participants at this TEM were able to dedicate their efforts to sharing their knowledge in terms of implementation in three areas with a high potential of mitigation linked to energy efficiency: lighting and urban energy planning, eco-energy buildings, and sustainable urban transport. These discussions enabled the various actors - representatives of the Parties, local governments, private sector organisations and international partners - to share their experience aimed at postponing certain obstacles identified during previous TEMs. These discussions enabled to identify numerous potential solutions among which the adoption of construction codes and principles of architecture and sustainable construction taking into consideration the imperatives of climate change, the creation and improvement of large scale public transport networks in order to replace or reduce those of the private or individual sphere as well as the promotion of eco-energy lighting among the population. The participants also expressed their interest on the fact that existing institutions be made useful in order to facilitate coordination of different initiatives and cooperation in terms of energy efficiency, including CDM, GCF, as well as CRTC whose work has already been done in close cooperation with Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI).

The TEMs have also the mandate to make use of activities linked to the Executive Committee of Technology (TEC), the Climate Technology Network Centre and Network (CTCN), the Forum of Durban on capacity reinforcement (FDRC), the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM - EC) and the functional entities of the financial mechanisms. In Lima, the Parties suggested forming a working group or liaison to coordinate cooperation between the TEMs and these institutions. However, some developing countries, including the Like Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC) and India have stressed for a long time that any international cooperative initiative outside the UNFCCC, albeit welcome, cannot replace developed countries’ quantified emission reduction objectives and should not create obligations for developing countries.

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94. UNFCCC, 2015, p. 21.
95. UNFCCC, 2015, p. 23-24.
96. Lemmet, Sylvie. 2015. *Summary by the facilitator*.
97. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, para. 19 (a)(ii).
98. IISD, 2015, p. 13.
New UNFCCC initiatives to share information on concrete action helping to raise pre-2020 ambition

The Secretariat of the Convention and other cooperation forums implemented, after Warsaw (December 2013), new initiatives to assist the Parties to get familiar with the actions undertaken by other countries in the optic that they could inspire experience of others and increase their mitigation efforts. The potential contributions vary according to their objective (political discussions or implementation of concrete actions), the sectors concerned (energy, transport, etc.), the geographical scope and the type of participation (public or private sector, international, national, regional or local level). In this respect, the following are noted:

- the virtual exhibition of initiatives and projects on topics discussed during the negotiation sessions, leading to GHG emission reductions99;
- a portal providing information on cooperative initiatives undertaken around the world by governments, civil society or the private sector100;
- a world map showing pre-2020 action taken by developed and developing countries101.
- the Clean Energy Ministerial round table that promotes clean energy information exchange and capacity-building.
- Many countries also mentioned the Climate and Clean Air Coalition which, under the auspices of the UNEP, launches concrete projects to reduce emissions of black carbon and methane.

b. Enhancing adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building

The WS2 work plan was put into place, originally, to raise the ambition of mitigation action. However, from 2013, some developing countries considered helpful to expand the scope of this work plan, particularly to ensure that the issues of adaptation and means of implementation were not overlooked in the pre-2020 work plan, by virtue of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities102. The G77 and China suggested in particular that the Parties adopt a TEP for adaptation103. Several developing countries are concerned that developed countries will fail to deliver on

99. https://seors.unfccc.int/seors?session_id=ADP2.5VE.
100. http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7785.php#about.
103. IISD, 2015, p. 11.
their responsibilities, involving them in mitigation actions without providing the means for implementation. They also fear that the agreement will overlook adaptation issues. For these countries, adopting a broader definition of pre-2020 ambition is therefore a condition for many developing countries to contribute to collective mitigation efforts and must consider all elements contained in the decision 1/CP.17. In this respect the current draft of a decision on the WS2, which could be adopted in Paris, contains in particular an article on the subject of support available for the period pre-2020 which would aim to also allow a follow up of the implementation of targets of reduction of emissions of developed countries\(^{104}\). According to them a process of revision of the implementation of mitigation efforts would be made in 2016 and 2017 together with the revision of the support effectively allocated to developing countries for adaptation, financing, transfer of technology and capacity-building during the same period.

Thus, China, South Africa and LMDC argue since Warsaw (2013) for an increase in means of implementation for the Parties not covered by Annex I\(^{105}\). These countries also argue for transparency of provided support\(^{106}\). LMDC, with other countries, argue for rapid capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF)\(^{107}\). India also deplored in Bonn (June 2015, ADP 2-9) that the funds currently available between 2015 and 2018 be limited to 2.5 billion US dollars annually\(^{108}\). In concrete terms, for example, South Africa made a proposal to match financing with the support received\(^{109}\). In this respect the group of African countries argue, among others, that financing be directly linked to efforts of mitigation of developing countries while insisting on the latters’ ownership of the projects and the fact that financing must be equally distributed between mitigation actions and adaptation\(^{110}\).

One of the most prickly issues concerns a clear road map for long-term finance, in order to improve transparency of finance granted and its predictability (see section d, p. 42). For their part several developed countries stress since Lima on the fact that work of the WS2 must be limited to mitigation\(^{111}\). They estimate that in terms of financing, progress has been made in order to mobilise 100 billion US dollars announced and that they can come from numerous sources\(^{112}\).

\(^{104}\) ADP, 2015g, III. Support, para. 15.  
\(^{107}\) IISD, 2013, p. 3.  
\(^{109}\) IISD, 2013, p. 15.  
\(^{111}\) IISD, 2015, p. 12.  
\(^{112}\) IISD, 2015, p. 13.
c. Next steps for the work plan

In Paris, it has been planned that the parties will consider a draft decision\textsuperscript{113} that consolidates the progress made under WS2 and sets the basis for continuing work beyond the life of the ADP. The nature of this work shall no doubt be the object of feisty discussions. Even though a consensus on the efficiency of TEMs and the need of periodic evaluation appears practically reached, the means of ensuring implementation of the objectives of the plan of work remain uncertain. The Parties must also look into the recommendations that the ADP must submit to the COP21 insofar as manners to make progress on the periodic evolution of TEM through PET between 2015 and 2020\textsuperscript{114}.

It is to be seen what space is given to WS2 as attention will instead shift to issues related to the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) at the expense of the pre-2020 ambition\textsuperscript{115}. Certain developing countries such as Brazil and China have underscored the importance they give to progress made during the works of the WS2 on the margin of talks of WS1 and, for India, such progress is also viewed as a matter of trust between the Parties. Therefore, one can think that an agreement on the subject of WS2 will be a precondition necessary to obtain a political backing for the 2015 agreement.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|p{10cm}|}
\hline
\textbf{Main issues relating to the Durban Platform for the pre-2020 period\textsuperscript{116}} \\
(Workstream 2) \\
\hline
In which manner can the results obtained in the frame of the technical review process be transposed into concrete actions in the field efficiently? \\
What link exists between the technical review process and high-level meetings? \\
How can one ensure that they be as efficient as possible? \\
Which organ should be responsible for the technical review process after 2015? \\
In which manner can the different organs of the UNFCCC cooperate in order to sustain the implementation of initiatives of this process? \\
In which manner can the Parties make progress on the efforts of implementation under the aegis of the Convention without creating a duplication of current processes? \\
What could be the role of non-state actors (including territorial communities and the business world) in the implementation? \\
How can the cooperation between organs of the UNFCCC be reinforced in order to improve the implementation of measures? \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{113} ADP, 2015g. \\
\textsuperscript{114} FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, para. 20. \\
\textsuperscript{115} Expert verification. \\
2. Workstream 1: the post-2020 period

Workstream 1 covers the measures that shall be implemented for the period post 2020 in the frame of the agreement that should be signed in Paris in 2015.

One of the objectives of the ADP is the preparation « under the Convention of a protocol, another legal instrument or a wording by common agreement having legal force applicable to all Parties », whose adoption must be in 2015 and enter into force in 2020117. This work is known as being that of the “sector of activity 1 (WS1)” of ADP, covering the period post 2020. The WS1 should arrive in Paris, at an agreement that satisfies all Parties in the form of a consolidated wording that reflects the complexity of objectives and stakes the Parties are faced with whilst being sufficiently concise and flexible to ensure the understanding and respect of the Parties 118. In Lima (COP20, 2014), a draft text was prepared in this respect on the basis of which talks were pursued throughout 2015 119.

One of the first objectives of this agreement shall be to ensure that the Parties come to understand each other on the process leading to an implementation of a collective effort that is sufficiently ambitious. It would be more precisely to limit the increase in world temperatures under the level of 2 °C in 2100 (with the possibility of reinforcing the objective by placing the ceiling at 1.5°C in particular), a vision on which they had agreed in 2010120. This sector of discussions will without doubt be closely linked to the progress that the Parties will accomplish in the framework of work at the WS2. Firstly, because a number of developing countries have stressed their desire that the Parties agree on a revaluation of their ambitions pre-2020 in order to ensure the efficiency and to establish better relatively to possible progress in an agreement that would enter into effect in 2020 (see section 1, p. 19). And secondly, because the level of post 2020 ambition would be necessarily dependent on GHG reductions between 2016 and 2020 by developed countries, taking into account that absolute reductions of accumulated world emissions are necessary (see section b, p. 33).

However, the Parties will have an important task in Paris that goes beyond their collective ambition of mitigation of their accumulated emissions of GHG. Negotiations will continue on the basis of draft agreement obtained following the last session of talks before COP 21 and presented to the Parties just before the last session before Paris (ADP 2-11, Bonn, October)121. As the decision of Durban

117. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 2.
119. Decision 1/CP.20 Annex
120. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 4.
121. ADP, 2015h, art. III, para. 15.
The main negotiation issues show uncertainty remains insofar as the nature of the agreement to be adopted, whilst three options were envisaged in 2012 (see section e, p. 49). Then, it is anticipated that in addition to mitigation, five other issues be integrated to the agreement in an equally balanced manner. It is the adaptation (section c, p. 37), financing (section d, p. 42), capacity reinforcement (section f, p. 52), technology development and transfer (section f, p. 52), and transparency of measures and support (section g, p. 54). The most recent draft of the decision to adopt the agreement of Paris in includes an option whereby the COP 21 would install an intergovernmental preparatory committee to implement the agreement that would take over from the work of ADP these past few years and that could thus facilitate coordination of the application of all these elements.

During the next sessions of negotiations the Parties will face challenges regarding the financing of mitigation and adaptation measures that will be implemented by developing countries, whilst the discourse of the developed countries appears to be towards a limitation of their support in favour of these actions to be implemented in the developing countries. Beginning of September 2015 the Parties also recognised once again the importance of considering both mitigation needs and the needs in terms of adaptation to climate change, which will vary without doubt as a function of the ambition of mitigation efforts (see section b, p. 33). The Parties will thus probably attempt to agree on the best options available to them to implement the different options of mitigation and adaptation on which they could agree in Paris (see section i, p. 57), as well as on the best mechanisms to ensure their implementation and respect (see section h, p. 56).

At the heart of the process leading to the Paris Conference and in part with the object of reinforcing trust between the Parties, they have communicated throughout 2015 their intended nationally determined contributions (INDC) indicating the effort that each one is ready to make individually and voluntarily to reach the objectives of the Convention and, if appropriate, those of the Paris Agreement. The INDC have this way acted as a vehicle allowing to back up the measures to be taken during a first period, and the needs to come, in order to collectively pursue the fight against climate change after 2020. Numbered at 127 (representing 154 countries) as of October 23 2015, this quasi universal participation shows a will, both of developed as developing countries, to reach an agreement on a climate system post 2020. It is therefore essential to properly seize the occasion of the INDC as well as their possible evolution to better understand the development of work of WS1 in Paris.

122. ADP, 2015h.
a. Intended nationally determined contributions (INDC)

To arrive at the adoption of an agreement in 2015 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has decided on an unusual bottom-up approach where each Party is responsible for consigning in a planning document its commitments in favour of climate. This document is called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). It is expected that the sum of voluntary commitments of each party included in the INDC will enable to limit global warming under the ceiling of 2°C.

In the light of reaching the objective of limiting the increase in world temperatures to 1.5-2°C, the Parties agreed in Warsaw (COP19, November 2013) that their participation in a new agreement aimed at fighting climate change take the form of Intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs)\(^{(124)}\). This decision has led to a long debate on whether they would take the form of commitments or rather announce promises in terms of mitigation. Since February 2015, 127 Parties (representing 154 countries)\(^{(125)}\) totalling more than 87%\(^{(126)}\) of world emissions in 2010 have communicated their INDC to the Secretariat of the Convention as of October 23. The accumulated effort put forward by the Parties would however still be insufficient to limit temperature increases to 2 °C. Based on the INDC presently submitted, an increase of 2.5-2.7°C\(^{(127)}\) or 3.3-3.8°C\(^{(128)}\) from now until 2100 (according to analysts) would appear more probable.

During the Cop20 in Lima (2014), the Parties agreed that the INDCs could include a broad range of information including targets of reduction based on a reference year (not specified) as well as the sectors covered and the means of implementation of the contribution. It was also decided that the INDCs may include a component on the adaptation of impacts of climate change and the means of implementation\(^{(129)}\). The flexibility left to the Parties in terms of information being able to be included in the INDCs arises from the narrow scope of the common ground they reached in Lima. In effect, the positions in this respect persisted to

\(^{124}\) Decision 1/CP.19, para. 2(b).
\(^{125}\) The INDC are available at: https://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.
\(^{129}\) Decision 1/CP.20, para. 12.
The main negotiation issues diverge between developed and developing countries during the Cop20\textsuperscript{130}. Developed countries advocated a strict interpretation of the decision of Warsaw on the INDCs, and wished that these target principally, if not only, mitigation of emissions of GHG of all Parties without strict differentiation and that the INDC be presented in a common format\textsuperscript{131}. The developing countries on the contrary maintained that the INDCs should also include adaptation needs in addition to including means of implementation (in the form of financial support, technology development and transfer, and in terms of capacity reinforcement) coming from developed countries in order that they can contribute to limit their GHG emissions.

As of October 23, 101 out of 127 Parties that submitted an INDC included a component on adaptation of which the majority were developing countries. The developing countries, including those of LMDC, also wished that the quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELRO) for developed countries be integrated into the INDCs whose respect would be unconditional and so that they could be compared and verified\textsuperscript{132}. However, the Parties could not agree in Lima on the inclusion of this type of more specific and detailed information in the INDC.

Thus, and as occurred in Lima, the talks will continue in Paris about the definition of INDC and their place in the Paris agreement. Some advocate a broad definition that would favour a voluntary aspect by countries, whilst others defend a more narrow definition that would make it easy to compare INDCs. Consequently, the scope of application of INDC could either be general or specific and detailed. In this respect the United States put forward their opinion in Geneva (ADP 2-8, February 2015). For them, the diversity of information presented in a INDC is such that it would be more convenient to attach them to the agreement in Paris in a form other than an Annex\textsuperscript{133}.

The question of the implementation of the INDCs and the support to developing countries will also be at the heart of discussions. In Bonn (ADP 2-10, August 2015), Ecuador in particular drew attention to the fact that there is currently an imbalance between the measures suggested in the INDCs that have been communicated until now and the support for their implementation\textsuperscript{134}. South Africa, moderator of the sub-group on differentiation, has highlighted the diversity of points of view on the manner of differentiating the effort of the Parties between themselves; there exists on the other hand a certain consensus on the fact that this question could only be resolved politically\textsuperscript{135}. The LDC in turn are of the opinion that the contributions must refer to mitigation, exclude adaptation and that a process to be

\textsuperscript{130} IISD, 2014, no 619, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{131} IISD, 2014, no 619, p. 29 and 47. See also IISD, 2015c, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{132} IISD, 2015, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{133} IISD, 2015, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{134} IISD, 2015c, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{135} IISD, 2015c, p. 5.
held simultaneously is necessary to deal with implementation\textsuperscript{136}. Sweden for its part highlighted that commitments or measures must be part of the Paris agreement, and on the other hand, that it may imply risks for the sovereignty of the Parties\textsuperscript{137}. Thus, in addition to discussing the potential scope of application of INDCs the Parties will also have to settle on the legal form to be adopted (see section e, p. 49).

\textbf{b. Mitigation}

Mitigation applies to the reduction of greenhouse gases and the preservation and improvement of carbon sinks. Mitigation is essential to reach the objective of an increase in average temperature not exceeding 2°C and limit the consequences of climate change. According to the IPCC, reductions of 20% to 40% of global emissions would be necessary from now until 2030 compared to levels of 1990.

The INDC received approval and almost universal adherence of the Parties to the Convention. As a reminder, the main objective of the process of compilation of INDCs is to be able to limit increases in world temperature to 1.5-2°C. On 30 October 2015, the Convention Secretariat published its summary report listing 119 INDC totalling 86% of global GHG emissions\textsuperscript{138}. In this report, the Secretariat underlines that the current reduction efforts highlighted by the countries for 2025 and 2030 will more than likely result in a rise in temperatures of more than 2°C over pre-industrial levels by 2100\textsuperscript{139}. A similar analysis by the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the rise in temperatures will be close to 2.7°C by 2100 if the INDC are implemented\textsuperscript{140}. The independent Climate Action Tracker scientific analysis arrives at the same figure\textsuperscript{141}.

We should also recall that according to the “\textit{Emissions Gap Report}” of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)\textsuperscript{142}, the Parties have available a total budget of approximately 1,000 gigatonnes (Gt) equivalent of CO\textsubscript{2} (eq-CO\textsubscript{2}) that can still be emitted into the atmosphere from now until 2100 without global warming exceeding 2°C. The implementation of current INDCs would mean this

\textsuperscript{136} IISD, 2015c, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{137} IISD, 2015c, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{138} FCCC/CP/2015/7, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid, p. 11
The main negotiation issues

budget being exhausted by 2060-2075\textsuperscript{143}, after which global net emissions should be nil. The reduction and capturing of world emissions of GHG remains therefore at the heart of the fight against climate change, in particular if the Parties wish to reduce the impact and costs in the long term (see section c, p. 37). In Paris talks will centre around the means available to increase the level of ambition in the future.

\textit{i. Review and assessment process of INDC}

In order to be able to coordinate their collective efforts in the medium and long term to limit world temperatures to 2°C, the Parties will in Paris deal with the means to implement a process or mechanism and revision of INDC\textsuperscript{144}. On one hand this evaluation consists in being able to determine if the effort contained in the INDCs communicated is sufficiently ambitious which will then enable to determine to what extent a heating of this ambition will be necessary\textsuperscript{145}. On the other hand, given that the work must last, the Parties have already dealt in February this year the issue of a review of their ambition for the future\textsuperscript{146}, until their accumulated effort allows to limit the increase in temperature to 2°C.

In Lima the Parties were not able to find an agreement regarding the process of standard evaluation of INDCs whether it be \textit{ex ante} or \textit{ex post}\textsuperscript{147}. The methods regarding the evaluation are therefore limited for the time to being a summary report prepared by the Secretariat of the UNFCCC that would have the objective to make effect of the accumulation of INDC submitted on October 1 2015, such report that should be drafted on November 1 2015 \textsuperscript{148}. The challenge however is to determine in Paris how a method with more specific and uniform criteria can effectively take place and for which Parties it will apply, when certain developing countries including those of LMDC strongly oppose an external evaluation of their INDC and ambition of mitigation contained therein\textsuperscript{149}.

A second issue related to mitigation and that will no doubt be the object of discussions in Paris is that of the process of revision of INDCs which could be cyclical or occasional. This process will be upfront in the case that, current ambitions being insufficient, the Parties decide to agree on an initial period of contributions of reduction of their GHG emissions that would start with the entry into force of the Paris agreement in 2020 whilst agreeing simultaneously on the date a second period of contributions would commence in order to close in on levels of emissions necessary to limit global warming at 2°C\textsuperscript{150}.


\textsuperscript{144} IISD, 2015c, p. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{145} IISD, 2015c, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{146} IISD, 2015, p. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{148} Decision 1/CP.20, para. 16.

\textsuperscript{149} IISD, 2014, no 619 p. 47.

\textsuperscript{150} IISD, 2015, p. 9-10.
For example, the United States advocates communication of new contributions every five years in a synchronous manner between the Parties. This process would be accompanied by a period of consultations allowing a revision of INDCs by the Parties without however this entailing dimensions of evaluation that are descending in other words that would be carried by a third party. Other Parties such as the European Union and LDC countries also sustain the idea of a process of revision every five years, LMDC suggesting that the Parties choose schedules over five or ten years for their contributions. Japan and China propose rather cycles of revision that would take place every ten years, Japan stressing that such a period would send a stable signal to the private sector. Brazil specifies that it would be important to anticipate as from now indicative contributions of a second cycle. Iran finally is of the opinion that the cycles of revision for developing countries should also be conditional on technical and financial support by developed countries.

The AILAC countries consider that it would be important to ensure a progression for future INDC and avoid falling back on their ambitions. The African Group countries on their part believe that in Paris it would be necessary to properly define individual efforts to be supplied through INDC and include in a decision the specifications regarding transparency, clarity and accumulated effect to be expected. The Group also demands proper definition of the different types of measures that could be taken and the manner of communicating them, granting flexibility to countries with limited capacity. However, the notions of collective evaluation of INDC and their possible revision to increase their ambition pose two subsequent issues on which disagreement continues to exist: equity and differentiation of effort of each of the Parties.

**ii. Equity and differentiation**

Between the lines of the need to reduce world GHG emissions one can see the problem of means to arrive there. In Paris, the Parties must agree on the proper manner to share among them a collective effort of reduction of their common GHG emissions. They will attempt to do so whilst an economic and environmental reality oppose each other: since the industrial era all states have not used the budget spending until now in the same proportion. 2000 gigatonnes of CO₂ that have been emitted since the end of the pre-industrial era according to the IPCC, close to four

151. IISD, 2014, no 619 p. 47.
152. IISD, 2015c, p. 11.
153. IISD, 2015c, p. 11-12.
154. IISD, 2015, p. 9-10.
155. IISD, 2015c, p. 11.
156. IISD, 2015c, p. 12.
tonnes out of every five come from developed countries. In contrast, since 2007 development countries have together become the largest emitters. However, it is no less that the Parties experience different levels of social and economic development which poses several challenges at the time of balancing mitigation and economic development whilst the second objective is also set in the principles of the Convention. The challenge with the adoption of the Paris agreement will be then to come to an agreement on a collective effort of mitigation that can be ambitious and equitable, with individual distribution between all Parties. On this subject the Parties have been discussing for a long time now on the possibility of including in their INDC considerations of ambition and equity. Finally it was agreed in Lima that it would be relevant for each Party to specify the reason for which according to them their effort is equitable and ambitious. In the absence of a mechanism or process for evaluation of INDC agreed upon, the Parties will for the time being have to determine for themselves if they judge their contributions to be convenient to these criteria.

Finally, since the adoption of the Convention firstly and the Kyoto Protocol after, the Parties have always agreed to differentiate the effort they should make. This differentiation, represented in each document that appeared equitable at the time of its adoption translated by annexes that established the effort to be made by industrialised countries for their GHG emissions as well as a financial support to be provided to developing countries. In Durban (2012), the Parties completely modified this paradigm. In effect they agreed that all should contribute to the collective effort of mitigation of GHG emissions voluntarily. In contrast, this differentiation is reflected in Paris by the broadness and ambition of the effort provided by the Parties. The developed countries included in their INDC contributions of absolute reductions of their GHG emissions whilst developing ones for the most part submitted two proposals: a first effort that was unconditional according to their respective capabilities to stabilise or limit their GHG emissions whether absolute by comparison to normal state of affairs or by reducing their intensity per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a second effort in the form of a conditional contribution subject to the support, both financial and technical, in terms of their capacity-building.

160. UNFCCC, 1992, art. 4.
162. Expert verification.
164. UNFCCC, 1992, annex I and annex II as well as article 4 para. 2 and 3.
165. Kyoto Protocol, 1997, annex B.
166. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 2 and decision 1/CP.19, para. 2(b).
167. See in this respect the different INDC submitted by the Parties on the chart of submission of INDC of UNFCCC: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.
c. Adaptation and losses and damages

The adaptation to impacts of climate change and the notion of losses and damages are now part of discussions that are taking place in the frame of the Convention under the same heading as mitigation. Regarding adaptation, in 2010 the parties adopted in the Cancún Framework for adaptation\(^{168}\) in order to, among others, improve their knowledge on manners of adapting to expected climate changes and to tools available to encourage resilient development to these impacts. However, numerous developing countries headed by those in Africa, AOSIS and LDC, opine that it would be a good time to implement financial and technical processes enabling to compensate the economic cost incurred for losses and damages linked to certain intense climatic phenomena or that are gradual\(^ {169}\), and for which it would be impossible to adapt to. In this respect the International Mechanism of Warsaw regarding losses and damages was adopted during COP19 (2013)\(^ {170}\).

i. Adaptation

The adaptation has the object of diminishing the vulnerability of a community or country to impacts of climate change today and tomorrow. One also speaks of resilience. Developing countries are in general more exposed and do not have the sufficient technical and financial means to face these new challenges that exacerbate realities that are already fragile and complex.

In Lima (COP20, 2014), the Parties agreed to consider six issues in a balanced manner inside a future agreement on climate change among which adaptation to impacts expected from climate change\(^ {171}\). This latter one occupies a increasingly pre-eminent place in negotiations. It appears gradually recognised by the Parties that it is important to arrive at a parity between adaptation and mitigation in the Paris agreement\(^ {172}\).

As pointed out by several countries, the two issues are in effect directly linked; the greater the ambition in terms of mitigation, the less the countries need to adapt to climate change\(^ {173}\). In the beginning during the COP20 (Lima, 2014), the Parties agreed on the inclusion of a component on adaptation in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) that the countries would com-

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169. IISD, 2015, p. 7.
170. Decision 2/CP.19
171. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 2.
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Communicate to the Secretariat of the Convention during 2015\textsuperscript{174}. At least 100 of them had done this at the beginning of October\textsuperscript{175}. Later, the Parties also agreed to favour increased financial support for developing countries to facilitate implementation of adaptation measures\textsuperscript{176}. In February 2014 the Green Fund for Climate (GCF) Board adopted as an objective to allocate its funds equitably between mitigation and adaptation, i.e. 50/50\textsuperscript{177}. Thus, in Paris adaptation will no doubt be part of the talks.

Although a consensus is evolving on the importance of approaching mitigation and adaptation in an equitable manner in an agreement that would be adopted in 2015, the Parties have not yet reached an agreement on the interpretation for such perspective of equity. Thus, if the developed countries agree with the developing ones on the importance of taking measures of adaptation and favour development that is resilient to climate change\textsuperscript{178}, it appears that they accentuate mitigation when dealing with including quantified commitments to the Paris agreement. Certain developing countries, including China, Brazil and Saudi Arabia wish to avoid an approach centred on mitigation\textsuperscript{179}, the countries of AILAC having proposed that the Parties also commit to determined adaptation at the national level\textsuperscript{180}. The Parties elsewhere recalled in Bonn (ADP 2-10, August 2015) their adhesion to the idea of implementing a process of adaptation determined at the national level impelled by countries, flexible and that does not contain normative aspects or communication channels that are precise\textsuperscript{181}. A consensus also seems in the works regarding the fact that considerations of measure and evaluation not be uniform and descending but rather coherent with national circumstances in which certain measures of adaptation be included\textsuperscript{182}. Certain countries have also stressed the importance of aligning measures of adaptation to take into account the gender issue, an aspect that now is part of the most recent version of a draft agreement in Paris\textsuperscript{183}, \textsuperscript{184}. The issue of respect for human rights through the implementation of these measures has also been raised during the last session of negotiations (ADP 2-11, Bonn, October 2015). However, the inclusion of this point in the agreement remains contentious\textsuperscript{185}, \textsuperscript{186}.

\begin{itemize}
\item 174. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 12 and 13.
\item 176. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 4.
\item 178. IISD, 2015, p. 6.
\item 179. IISD, 2015b, p. 10.
\item 180. IISD, 2015, p. 6.
\item 182. Ibid.
\item 183. ADP, 2015h. A. Draft Agreement, art. 4, para. 3.
\item 184. IISD, 2015d, p. 5.
\item 185. ADP, 2015h. A. Draft Agreement, art. 4, para. 3.
\item 186. IISD, 2015d, p. 5.
\end{itemize}
Others, such as the African Group already proposed a global adaptation goal which would be directly linked to the global mitigation goal and could therefore receive an equal amount of attention as the mitigation goal and be placed at the heart of the future agreement. Introducing such an objective into the Paris agreement is one of the options retained in the most recent draft of the text. They propose also an evaluation of the concordance between the needs of developing countries in terms of adaptation on the one hand, and financing available for implementation of specific adaptation on the other hand. Through such a process higher global warming could be associated with an objective of financing of adaptation needs that is more ambitious for example. For South Africa, that proposes an objective of adaptation quantitative as well as qualitative, this global adaptation goal would demonstrate a common commitment to reduce vulnerability to climate change and would clearly link mitigation ambition and means of implementation. Brazil for its part encourages developing countries to communicate an evaluation of their vulnerabilities to impacts of climate change and their needs in terms of implementation of adaptation measures. It appears that developing countries are of the opinion that adaptation should be dealt with, both in the context of the 2015 agreement as in terms of increase of mitigation ambitions pre-2020 in an optic of integration with other pillars that could take place in Paris. However, developed countries maintain that WS2 must be limited to mitigation (see section 1, p. 19).

**ii. Losses and damages**

It is probable that certain countries will only be able to adapt partially to the effects of climate change, either because of lack of means or because the impact is unpredictable. The term loss and damage is used when adaptation appears impossible. The consequences can be catastrophic with costs that differ from those specifically associated with mitigation or adaptation.

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188. ADP, 2015h, A. Draft Agreement, art. 4, para. 1, Option 1.
189. IISD, 2015, p. 5.
191. IISD, 2015, p. 5.
193. IISD, 2015, p. 5.
A clear consensus has not been reached by the Parties on the issue of losses and damages\textsuperscript{196}. The Parties recognise the importance of including the issue in the talks to take place in Paris but disagreement exists in knowing if the losses and damages will be integrated in an agreement that will have force of law or rather form part of a decision adopted by the COP, in particular\textsuperscript{197}. For example, countries from AOSIS, LMDC, and the LDC state to be in favour of an option considering losses and damages in a distinct manner with respect to adaptation, pleading adding a specific chapter to the agreement of 2015\textsuperscript{198}. The EU opposes such an idea and rather suggests that they be added to the draft agreement an option that stipulates that the notion of losses and damages should simply not appear\textsuperscript{199}. At the other end of the spectrum, LMDC countries also wish that a scheme of indemnity be installed by the Executive Committee on losses and damages\textsuperscript{200}, at the first meeting which took place in 24 to 26 September 2015\textsuperscript{201}. The magnitude of the disagreement regarding losses and damages is such that inclusion in the Paris agreement remains a source of debate\textsuperscript{202}.

The LDC have also suggested a particular accent be put on indemnity of countries affected by climatic phenomena that are gradual\textsuperscript{203}. Because some States more vulnerable to climate change risk even being incapable of adapting, for example to the increase in sea levels, this scheme could also be accompanied by a centre that would coordinate relocation and re-installation of entire communities affected by these phenomena that are gradual\textsuperscript{204}. In this respect countries from AILAC and the Dominican Republic have put forward the idea that financial and technical support provided to alleviate the losses and damages to States be also allocated to communities that need them\textsuperscript{205}. According to the G-77/China, these new regulations could replace the current Mechanism in 2020\textsuperscript{206}. Australia, United States, Switzerland and the EU have rather suggested limiting considerations concerning losses and damages to the decision taken by the COP, of which one would adopt the permanence of the Warsaw Mechanism that would be an integral part of the new agreement after 2020\textsuperscript{207}.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{196} IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{198} IISD, 2015, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{199} IISD, 2015b, p. 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{200} IISD, 2015, p. 19.
  \item \textsuperscript{201} http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/9073.php#Meeting1.
  \item \textsuperscript{202} ADP, 2015h. A. Draft Agreement, art. 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{203} IISD, 2015, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{205} IISD, 2015, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{206} IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{207} IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
\end{itemize}
iii. Institutional arrangements and financing

On the eve of COP21 of Paris, negotiations continued however without arriving at a consensus regarding the various institutional arrangements that could be put in place, not only in terms of adaptation but also on losses and damages. For many developing countries it would be more convenient to reach a new agreement with new arrangements in Paris including insofar as losses and damages are concerned and on the acquisition of new knowledge\(^{208}\). AOSIS proposed in Geneva (ADP 2-8, February 2015) entrusting, through a new agreement, management of adaptation in UNFCCC to the Adaptation Committee\(^{209}\), established in the Cancún agreements\(^{210}\). The LDC, as for them advanced the idea of implementing an international registry that would be fed by regional adaptation centres among others, that could motivate financial institutions to participate in exchange for information on the subject\(^{211}\). Developing countries also wish to reinforce the mandate of the Adaptation Committee in particular through reinforcing links with the GCF and other existing funds of the Convention\(^{212}\).

For developed countries it appears more pertinent to support, in Paris, existing adaptation institutions, particularly on those set up under the Cancún Adaptation Framework, including the Adaptation Committee, national adaptation plans and the Warsaw International Mechanism for losses and damages, as well as the GCF adaptation window\(^{213}\). Along the same lines in Bonn (ADP 2-10), the United States and New Zealand declared that the respective roles of these institutions should rather be re evaluated in the frame of a decision by the COP\(^{214}\). Without necessarily agreeing on the modalities of management of funds allocated for adaptation the Parties appeared to converge following the meeting in Bonn (ADP2-10) on the fact that capital could at least be sent through GCF, Funds for adaptation and for LDC based on bilateral initiatives or coordinated by multilateral institutions\(^{215}\).

Finally, the Parties could not agree until now on certain issues of financing of adaptation and losses and damages. Among others, the developing countries, in particular the African Group and LDC worry as to the efficiency of the national Plans of adaptation in their current state arguing that available financing is insufficient to ensure proper elaboration firstly, and more so for appropriate and complete

\(^{208}\) IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
\(^{209}\) IISD, 2015, p. 6.
\(^{210}\) Decision 1/CP.16, para. 20.
\(^{211}\) IISD, 2015, p. 6.
\(^{214}\) IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
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They would wish also that a decision aimed at filling the voids be taken in Paris accentuating technical, financial and institutional aspects to be filled when preparing the texts. Developing countries also are concerned of an increased mobilisation of financing in the future for adaptation and losses and damages, whose cost linked to impacts of climate change could exceed 150 billion US dollars a year from now until 2030 and jump to 500 billion from now to 2050 when the climate financing anticipated for the time being is 100 billion dollars annually and will be distributed between measures of adaptation and mitigation (see section d, p. 42). Added to this is the Fund for adaptation and the role it will play in the new agreement considering that it is guided by the CMP of the Kyoto Protocol. The issue of financing raises another in itself and last one, which does not reach a consensus as of today. It is a question of agreeing in a way of differentiating the measures and responsibilities in terms of adaptation between the Parties.

d. Financing

Box 1 – CLIMATE FINANCING

The question of financing is at the heart of climate intergovernmental negotiations. It must allow to sustain, particularly in developing countries, the deployment of renewable energy, construction of sustainable buildings and infrastructures, implementation of energy efficient transportation, improvement in agricultural practices, water pumping rendered necessary due to less rain linked to climate change, etc. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “the more we wait to make these decisions the more expensive adaptation to climate change and mitigation will become”. But, if everybody agrees to affirm the need to assemble financing, its implementation becomes more complicated.

North - South Financing

Aware of the urgency, developed countries committed in Copenhagen (2009) to mobilise 100 billion US dollars a year for developing countries as from 2020. In effect, their wealth and historical responsibility in climate change positions them as having to provide the essential of financing for climate change. However, regarding practicalities opposition is often strong with developing countries that have a vocation of being the beneficiaries.

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This type of financing reached 62 billion dollars in 2014 against 52 billion a year earlier according to OECD and the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI)\textsuperscript{221}. 

Global Financing
The North-South flow however only represents one part of global financing destined to climate. According to CPI\textsuperscript{222}, approximately 331 billion US dollars flowed in 2013 at the international level to finance low-carbon development and increase climate resilience. The private sector is the largest contributor with 58% of the total in 2013 whilst the public sector (mainly through financial institutions for development) represented 42%. Although important, this amount of 331 billion would represent half of the funds necessary for financing de-carbon development, evaluated between 700 and 1,000 billion US dollars according to estimates.

Dedicated Climate Funds
The share of climate funds in global financing was limited to 2.2 billion US dollars in 2013, barely 0.6% of the total. They are characterised by their multiplicity, diversity and lack of synergy between them. There are currently 27 according to Climate Funds Update. They vary by origin of financing (multilateral, bilateral, or even regional or national) and their objective (mitigation -focusing often on REDD- adaptation or both). The most recent, the Green Climate Fund (see box), is barely operational. Designed as a giga fund with a vocation to concentrate progressively on climate financing it could provide an answer to this problem of lack of synergies.

The financial support for low-carbon development and resilient to climate change occupies a central place in negotiations. With the goal of facilitating transition towards a low-carbon economy resilient to risks of impact of climate change in developing countries, the Parties agreed in Copenhagen (2009) to mobilise annually 100 billion US dollars as from 2020 coming from developed countries towards developing ones. An objective that was again announced during COP16 in Cancún\textsuperscript{223}. Developing countries desired intermediary objectives in order to obtain an increased amount of climate financing before 2020, according to observers. However, no commitment has for the time being been made by developed countries.

\textsuperscript{223} Decision 1/CP.16, para. 98. The objective of mobilising 100 billion dollars a year from now until 2020 must be understood as being mobilising this amount no later than 2020 and not years leading up to 2020.
In 2013, it is estimated that 34 billion US dollars were sent by developed countries to developing ones, 95 % approximately coming from public funds\textsuperscript{224}. Finally, on September 1 2015, the Green Funds for Climate had officially received 60 % of 10 billion dollars in climate financing that the Parties agreed to provide just before the Lima COP. The financial challenge to be able to limit the increase in world temperature to 1.5-2°C is serious, whilst the World Economic Forum estimates that one would have to invest up to 5,700 billion US dollars each year in infrastructure so called green from now until 2020\textsuperscript{225}. According to the OECD and Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), 57.0 billion US dollars on average have been invested annually for the period 2013-2014 coming from different public and private sources\textsuperscript{226}. After, discussions evolved around various questions that will no doubt be addressed with interest in Paris, in particular those related to sources of this financing and its nature (political or legal constraints) on one part and the modes for mobilisation in the years leading up to 2020, its management and payment on the other hand.

\textit{i. Sources of financing}

Since 2014 the idea of seeing an existing financial mechanism (see section d, p. 42) play a determining role in the new agreement and allow interested Parties to consider improvements in particular through directives for its functioning in the post 2020 period appears to gather consensus\textsuperscript{227}. The Parties also agree on the pertinence of maintaining the Permanent Financing Committee whose role is mainly (i) assist the COP to ensure better coherence and coordination of financial support for measures taken to reduce GHG emissions or adapt to climate change, (ii) rationalise the financial mechanism, (iii) mobilise financial resources, and (iv) effect a MRV process of financing for developing countries\textsuperscript{228}.

However, important stumbling blocks remain regarding sources of financing and their substance; at that time developing countries expressed their dissatisfaction during the last session of the ADP (2-11, Bonn) before Paris\textsuperscript{229}. Developing countries insist in particular on the durability, adequateness, predictability of financing and regular reconstitution of contributions in order to allow them to develop strategies in the long term\textsuperscript{230}. The G-77/China propose that the 100 billion US dollars in

\textsuperscript{227} IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{229} http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/10/22/life-or-death-g-77-demands-climate-finance-guarantee.
\textsuperscript{230} IISD, 2015, p. 19
annual financing anticipated as from 2020 be considered as a minimum threshold that would be raised over time and distributed between developed countries according to a clear formula\textsuperscript{231}. Moreover, the group suggests the creation of a pre-established road map to accompany financing that puts forward sharing of this effort between developed countries and the Parties of Annex II of the Convention in the form of intermediary objectives\textsuperscript{232}. Egypt in particular has already proposed that these objectives of financial support be based on GDP of developed countries\textsuperscript{233}.

The G-77/China suggest also that financing granted be determined as a function of needs and priorities of developing countries in order to allow them to meet the objective of the agreement\textsuperscript{234}. In this respect developing countries also wish that developed countries advise every two years on available financial resources, a report that would contain quantitative and qualitative information regarding the size of the public finance granted by developed countries. Finally, the G-77/China is of the opinion the climate financing should mainly come from public sources and be in addition to all other official aid for development even when other sources, private, bilateral and multilateral also be envisaged. Available financial resources the group sustains would also be used to facilitate direct and improved access to transfer of technology according to an approach that would be driven by the countries. The G-77/China wish moreover to ensure that support be available specifically for the International Mechanism of Warsaw regarding losses and damages linked to incidences of climate change.

In a same tone the G-77/China, in particular AOSIS and the African Group countries consider that financing coming from developed countries should consider the main objective of limiting increases in world temperatures, with AOSIS placing this limit at 1.5°C\textsuperscript{235}. In this respect, developing countries recall that the current level of financing does not enable implementation of all measures included in the INDC communicated up until now\textsuperscript{236}. This should be based on estimates of the World Bank as well as other studies\textsuperscript{237}. For India and the Arab Group countries it would be preferable that financing come from public sources\textsuperscript{238}. Developing countries elsewhere propose that specific financial support be available for an international mechanism on losses and damages to be included in the agreement. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations proposes that REDD+ benefit from a particular financing framework\textsuperscript{239}. The LDC wish that financing needs be re-evaluated on a periodic basis and that among sources of financing withdrawals be done by the International Civil

\textsuperscript{231} G77/China, 2015, para. 5.
\textsuperscript{233} IISD, 2015, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{234} G77/China, 2015.
\textsuperscript{235} IISD, 2015c, p. 7 and IISD, 2015b, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{236} IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{237} African Group: unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2-5_submission_by_sudan_on_behalf_of_the_african_group_finance_20140610.pdf.
\textsuperscript{238} IISD, 2015b, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{239} IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
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Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime organisation (IMO) in order to ensure contributions by operators responsible for emissions in aviation and maritime sectors\textsuperscript{240}.

For their part most developed countries propose that all parties that can do so supply financing support for the period post 2020 in order to support countries that are in most need as a result of the new agreement\textsuperscript{241}. Thus, the financing effort would be but not only carried out by the Parties named in Annex II of the UNFCCC, which would be accompanied by all those that wish to participate individually and collectively\textsuperscript{242}. This evolution confuses the historical differentiation between countries of Annex II and the other ones. Otherwise, at the initiative of New Zealand, most developed countries do not adhere to the idea of implementing objectives with figures of climate financing and prescriptive options of mobilisation of financing\textsuperscript{243}. They rather put forward the implementation by the public sector of legislative and administrative frameworks favouring climate investment sending thus a signal to the private sector on the importance the Parties place on a re-affectation of several hundreds of billions of US dollars in annual investment to climate-acceptable and low-carbon infrastructure ans technology\textsuperscript{244, 245}. The objective of developed countries is thus to facilitate a flow of investments coming from various sources in a context that allows developing countries to obtain better access to financing\textsuperscript{246}.

\textit{ii. Management and disbursement}

As Paris approaches, the discussions concerning management of financing continue. The Parties do not agree for the time being on the precise role to be played by the Green Climate Fund (GCF, see box below) as well as on the mechanisms and organs of financing of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol that the G77/China wish to integrate in the Paris agreement\textsuperscript{247}. In Bonn last August (ADP 2-10), the

\textsuperscript{240} IISD, 2015, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{242} IISD, 2015, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{243} New Zealand: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/new_zealand_submission_to_the_unfccc_on_the_adp_work_stream_1_-_elements_-_october2014.pdf.
\textsuperscript{246} IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{247} IISD, 2015c, p. 7 and IISD, 2015, p. 19.
disagreement related among others to the question of granting or not, through the agreement, a role of main operational organ responsible of financing management to GCF. This position is sustained by the developing countries\textsuperscript{248}. In this respect, the question of knowing if the COP would maintain authority over the GCF, which would allow them to provide certain directives remains. If the question of precise modalities of responsibilities granted to GCF has not reached unanimity a consensus nevertheless appears to emerge however on the fact that the latter as well as the Global Environment Fund (GEF) must form the operational entities of the mechanism of financing of the agreement\textsuperscript{249, 250}. This same consensus appears present in the inclusion of Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) in the agreement\textsuperscript{251, 252}. To ensure proper management of allocated funds LMDC also proposes a registry of financing to be implemented in order to ensure supervision of disbursed financing whilst the countries of the G77/China recalled the importance they give to the implementation of a process of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of financial support coming from developed countries (see section 1, p. 59)\textsuperscript{253}. Finally, countries of the African Group sustain they are in favour of financing that accentuates an appropriation by developing countries of projects that would be sustained financially in their territory\textsuperscript{254}.

Insofar as disbursement of allocated financial support is concerned the Committee of the GCF adopted as an objective at the beginning of 2014 to distribute over time half of the funds dedicated to climate change to mitigation and the other half to adaptation\textsuperscript{255}, in accordance with what the Parties had agreed to in Warsaw (COP19, November 2013)\textsuperscript{256}. Regarding financing for adaptation the GCF agreed that they would allocate a minimum of 50\% to the most vulnerable states\textsuperscript{257}. On this matter, the LDC propose then that 50\% of funds allocated to adaptation be

\textsuperscript{248} IISD, 2015, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{250} G77/China, 2015, para. 10.
\textsuperscript{251} Umbrella Group, 2015. Submission by the United States on behalf of a group of Umbrella Group countries: Decision, para. 44.
\textsuperscript{252} G77/China, 2015, para. 10.
\textsuperscript{253} G77/China, 2015, para. 5.
\textsuperscript{256} Decision 4/CP.19, para. 9(a).
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exclusively distributed to Small island developing States and LDC\textsuperscript{258}, whilst the G-77/China argue rather for a distribution that is equitable for financing between developing countries\textsuperscript{259}. Always on the theme of the LDC, they obtained the support of the USA and New Zealand regarding the creation of direct and rapid access to financing in addition to preparation of files of entities of implementation that ensure this direct access\textsuperscript{260}.

A consensus also appears possible on the question of limiting the attribution of financing to projects that respond to certain particular criterion, be they for example carbon, resilient to the impact of climate change or related to sustainable development \textsuperscript{261}, whilst Bolivia proposes that a mechanism in this sense be created through the Paris agreement\textsuperscript{262}. In this respect countries forming part of the Umbrella Group also suggest that consideration to climate change be integrated to different sources of aid for development, international or national\textsuperscript{263}, and that the Parties envisage either reducing international support for investments related with strong emissions of carbon and not adapted to climate change or increase their support for investments in low-carbon development and resilient to climate change\textsuperscript{264}. The United States have also supported the gradual elimination of subsidies received by fossil fuel industries\textsuperscript{265}. They also propose that in the context of climate change special attention be given to development aid in general\textsuperscript{266}.

Developed countries for their part accentuate the possibility of ensuring the efficiency of funds allocated proposing also a MRV process that is axed on the possibility of aiding developing countries that benefit from financial support to better communicate results obtained linked to particular financing (see section b, p. 33)\textsuperscript{267}. The objective is to confirm that the results achieved through the funds distributed are reached.

Finally, in Lima (COP20, December 2014), the Parties also maintained a first biannual ministerial meeting to deal with the work programme on long term financing. On that occasion the countries in particular decided that a workshop on financing take place on a biannual basis between 2015 and 2020 and that those of 2015 and 2016 deal with adaptation financing, support needed by developing countries and possibilities of cooperation in order to implement favourable environ-

\textsuperscript{258} IISD, 2015, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{259} IISD, 2015, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{260} IISD, 2015b, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{261} IISD, 2015, p. 19, IISD, 2015b, p. 7 and IISD, 2015c, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{262} IISD, 2015, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., article 6, para. 2(c)
\textsuperscript{265} IISD, 2015, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{266} IISD, 2015b, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{267} IISD, 2015, p. 19.
ments for financing. A first session took place in Bonn (ADP 2-9, June 2015), during which the Parties were able to deal with certain challenges of financing including incentives aimed at reducing the vulnerability of countries that are at times insufficient, planning concerning various aspects of adaptation which at times is insufficient or still the lack of prevention that can arise from a deficit of knowledge regarding climate risks. In the context of this work programme developed countries also accepted to revise their approaches and strategies every two years aimed at increasing their financial support in terms of climate change.

**Box 2 – GREEN CLIMATE FUND**

The creation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was decided during the COP 16 at Cancún in 2010. Designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, it aims to channel funds from developed countries to implement climate actions in developing countries and should collect a good part of the 100 billion dollars promised annually from 2020. These funds will be allocated in a balanced manner between projects of mitigation and adaptation. Out of the amount set aside for adaptation, at least half is reserved for African countries, small island states and least-developed countries (LDC).

Only just operational the GCF announced its first financing of projects in November 2015. Last September commitments amounted to 10.2 billion dollars. Its allowance is probably going to increase progressively until 2020.

e. The legal form of the agreement

In Durban in 2011, the Parties determined the objective of negotiating to adopt in Paris during the COP21 “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force”. This would enter into force in 2020 and apply to all Parties. However, the Parties have systematically preferred to negotiate on the substance rather than the legal form wishing to clarify the substance to then define the level of legal constraint that is most appropriate. The choice that will be made between the three forms that could potentially be adopted will influence its character of constraint as well as the manner in which the INDCs will be integrated.

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268. Decision 5/CP.20
270. Decision 5/CP.20
271. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 102.
274. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 2.
A protocol is generally accepted as being legally binding under international law. Its ratification by national institutions with legislative bodies usually grants it force of law\textsuperscript{276}, demonstrating thus the strong political will of signatory countries. Elsewhere a protocol can be accompanied by mechanisms aimed at ensuring respect for the rules which reinforces the obligatory nature as is the case with the Kyoto Protocol\textsuperscript{277}. For the United States such an option could however pose problems and lead to a repetition of what occurred with Kyoto that has never been ratified. In effect, a binding text must be ratified by the US Senate. Inversely a more flexible version of the agreement could allow the President to use his executive prerogatives and approve it, circumventing the Senate\textsuperscript{278}.

\textit{Another legal instrument or an agreed outcome} could be a series of amendments to the Convention or a set of formal decisions each affecting precise elements adopted by the COP such as has been done by the agreements in Cancún. In the case of amendments to the Convention they would only be binding on the Parties that accept to ratify it\textsuperscript{279}. In the case of a series of decisions the binding nature remains uncertain and relies on the good will of countries implementing the measures\textsuperscript{280}. According to observers a certain number of countries would be in favour for the agreement of Paris being a combination of different types of instruments composed for example of a central agreement (with annexes) legally binding, a set of COP decisions and political statements\textsuperscript{281}.

A legally binding agreement such as a protocol would send a clear signal as to the seriousness of the Parties, but it could make some hesitate to submit ambitious contributions knowing that failure to respect them could mean sanctions at the international level\textsuperscript{282}. Another disadvantage is that a protocol could be more complex to amend than other legal forms rendering the agreement less dynamic and more difficult to adapt to circumstances and evolving capacities of countries. The decision of the COP would be less demanding for the Parties and could, according to some, encourage greater ambition from them\textsuperscript{283}. The decisions of the COP also have the

\textsuperscript{276.} IDDRI, 2014, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{277.} Decision 24/CP.7
\textsuperscript{279.} UNFCCC, 1992, article 15.
\textsuperscript{280.} IDDRI, 2014, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{282.} IDDRI, 2014.
advantage that they can be modified by subsequent decisions without need of an amendment to the agreement that would have to be ratified by the countries.

It is also necessary to highlight that the binding nature of a future agreement will depend in part on the manner in which obligations are formulated and on the other hand, of the effectiveness of the mechanism of respect of obligations.

Several countries have supported the adoption in Paris of a legally binding agreement aimed at complying with the objective of the Convention during the communication of their INDC. Singapore and Morocco for example, commit themselves to increase the level of ambition of their contribution conditional in terms of mitigation to the eventuality of such a binding agreement to be adopted in Paris. Numerous countries among which Switzerland, AOSIS countries, Caribbean States, Malta, Mexico, Indonesia and Bangladesh also said they favoured legally binding agreements in the past, whilst the United States are of the opinion that INDCs should not be in the annexes of an agreement given their quantity and degree of diversity and that the structure of the document should enable dynamism in order that ambition can be reinforced over time. The European Union has suggested that the agreement adopted include also modes of entry into force and respect of its elements. In the same vein Russia believes that it would be preferable to establish a strong link between commitments linked to the agreement and respect for them. The Group of Arab States and China wish above all to finalise the substance of a future agreement before dealing with its legal form. Brazil for its part is in favour of a flexible and dynamic agreement easy to review. They wish to avoid the complications linked to the ratification by countries or that the agreement be divided in several agreements that would not all have the same importance.

In final instance, the Parties wish to adopt a durable agreement but also dynamic. From then the agreement must determine long term objectives, the principles and the general frame of action and could leave to decisions the conditions of implementation. The question now is to find the balance which is convenient to all Parties between the elements contained in an agreement and those dealt with by the Decisions. But all in all, the Parties appear reticent to agree on any form that the agreement could take before the Conference of Paris out of fear that any document that might appear specific as the beginning of a decision or a protocol aimed to be adopted during COP 21 may cause bias towards other options. After Lima the elements likely to be found in an agreement are found in a draft contained in annex under Call of Lima in favour of climate action. See also the most recent version rationalised and consolidated by the co presidents of ADP, the draft of the text for Paris (Streamlined and consolidated text): http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2015/in-session/application/pdf/dep2-9_i3_11jun2015t1630_rp.pdf.
f. Capacity-building and clarification and transfer of technologies

A majority of developing countries communicated INDC that propose to make an ambitious effort in terms of mitigation but condition a great part of these efforts to support from developed countries in the form of financing, technology cooperation or reinforcement of capacity. The clarity of climate financing and the support in terms of means of implementation is therefore essential to ensure that negotiations progress positively and that everybody participate in the mitigation effort. In this respect capacity-building (see section 7, p. 104), on one part and the clarification and transfer of technology on the other part (see section 6, p. 100), form part of the issues the Parties have agreed to discuss in a balanced manner in the frame of negotiations leading to a new agreement in Paris in December 2015289.

i. Capacity-building

During the last session of ADP before Paris (2-11, Bonn, October 2015), certain Parties wished to improve the draft text of the agreement in particular clarifying the objective that would aim to fill capacity building290. This could for example have an objective of aiding developing countries to identify, design and implement mitigation measures and adaptation in addition to facilitating the development of technologies and financing. For certain Parties, capacity-building could also have a social component. It would thus facilitate education, training and awareness. Finally, a more institutional dimension could be attached to it, that would aid countries to communicate as soon as possible specific and transparent information. Other options suggest a more circumscribed objective for example limiting reinforcement to certain countries or remaining more general.

These two options form part of a draft decision of the COP aimed at the adoption of the Paris agreement emanating from the last session of ADP (2-11, October 2015)291. The Parties suggest in particular the adoption of a work programme on implementation of a framework for capacity-building in developing countries (see section 7, p. 104). This programme would aim, among others, to deal with gaps and current needs and in distribution of capacity-building in particular at the national level. It would also deal with forms and means to improve coordination and coherence of support in terms of capacity-building including perfecting existing institutional mechanisms. This document translates among others a consensus among the Parties insofar as (i) the importance of capacity-building and (ii) the adoption, as from the Paris, of institutional mechanisms, either new or existing, that are permanent, solid, considering local contexts, sensitive to the question of gender and impelled by the countries292.

289. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 2.
290. ADP, 2015h, A. Draft Agreement, art. 8, para. 1.
291. ADP, 2015h, B. Draft Decision: Capacity-building, para. 53.


\textit{ii. Technology development and transfer}

The importance of a economic transition towards technologies that are low-carbon and resilient to climate change has long been the matter of consensus and will be at the forefront of discussion in Paris\textsuperscript{293, 294}. In this respect in terms of development and technology transfer one of the main stumbling blocks remains the question of intellectual property rights\textsuperscript{295}, whose management at the international level is mainly done through the WTO agreement on aspects of rights of intellectual property rights affecting commerce\textsuperscript{296}. In this sense a disagreement persists on the level of protection that would enable to encourage innovation without subsequently stalling transfer and deployment of technologies to developing countries\textsuperscript{297}. It appears clear however, that the Parties agree on the importance of integrating this into discussions on current mechanisms dealing with technologies. Notwithstanding, the Parties do not agree for the time being on the possible inclusion in the Paris agreement of a notion on research, development and deployment of technology that favours environmental preservation\textsuperscript{298}.

Support for a proposal by the African Group appears to make progress and could in part resolve this part of the disagreement\textsuperscript{299}. This proposal deals with the creation of a framework for reinforced action in terms of development and transfer of technology, cooperative action and institutions. The role of this framework would be to ensure revision, orientation and reinforcement of means made available to institutions and existing mechanisms. It could in particular include devices of MRV and an analysis of obstacles to be clarified and technology transfer. Finally, a consensus exists between the Parties regarding the direct relation between financing, technology and capacity-building as well as the role they play both in terms of the support for measures of mitigation and needs of adaptation of developing countries as for the Paris agreement as a whole\textsuperscript{300}. Countries also agree at the highest level of decision-making on the importance of reinforcing institutional mechanisms that currently exist in terms of implementation, in particular the Executive Committee on Technology (see section 6, p. 100) and to determine the best manner to include them in the Paris agreement.


\textsuperscript{294} Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(d).


\textsuperscript{296} To consult the agreement: https://www.wto.org/french/tratop_f/trips_f/trl_agm0_f.htm.

\textsuperscript{297} France and Peru, 6-7 September 2015. \textit{Aide-mémoire: Second informal ministerial consultations to prepare COP21}, p. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{298} IISD, 2015d, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{299} IISD, 2015c, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{300} France and Peru, 6-7 September 2015. \textit{Aide-mémoire: Second informal ministerial consultations to prepare COP21}, p. 6-7.
g. Transparency of measures and support

Many Parties have defined transparency as an essential element of the 2015 agreement, both for reinforcing trust between Parties (by requiring the latter communicate their actions and progress to the Secretariat in charge of publishing them on the website of the convention), and also to ensure the environmental integrity of the agreement.301. Talks concerning the transparency of measures and support have mainly resulted in considerations on the subject of an MRV system which would apply in a balanced manner to each of the addressed issues in the agreement.302. However, there are different opinions as to whether a mechanism of transparency should privilege differentiation between countries or rigour.303. Four options have therefore been suggested in the most recent draft of a Paris agreement, while a framework on transparency could be created. The latter could apply to all Parties, having methods which differ for developed countries and developing countries, or which could be adapted to the different capacities of the Parties.304. Another proposed option is based more on the already existing institutional arrangements of the Convention.305. In all cases, such a mechanism would cover considerations of transparency in two broad categories: firstly, those that relate to mitigation and adaptation measures, and secondly, those concerning different forms of support – financial, technological, capacity-building.

i. Transparency of measures

Concerning transparency of measures, China suggests among other things the implementation of mitigation measures for developing countries being the subject of a technical evaluation and compliance and respect processes be set up, including consequences regarding compliance.306. The country, in agreement with the other members of the LMDC, equally propose that all MRV provision which concerns the evaluation of the implementation of mitigation actions accomplished by the developing countries be conditional on the magnitude of support received for their implementation so as to be able to carry out monitoring and evaluation.307. This evaluation could also permit a learning process for developing countries, taking the form of a technical analysis that is non-intrusive, non-punitive and respectful of national sovereignty.308.

The discussion about transparency broke down however on a certain number of points. Therefore, Parties will probably address the question of accounting standards which could be integrated into the agreement, while no consensus could be settled concerning the rules which could be fixed concerning market-based

302. ADP, 2015f, p. 38
304. ADP, 2015h, A. Draft agreement, art. 9, para. 1.
305. Ibid., art. 9, para. 1, option 4.
308. IISD, 2015, p. 8.
mechanisms and contributions of the usage of mitigation lands\textsuperscript{309}. It is also not clear, for the moment, in what manner the agreement would distinguish, where appropriate, activities linked with transparency which aim at individual countries and those which would be implemented at the collective level\textsuperscript{310}. Talks also covered the manner of setting up a transparency process that would be evolutionary. In this respect, developed countries favouring a common MRV system which can however take into account national circumstances and which leaves room for constant improvement\textsuperscript{311}. One of the options currently proposed for a mechanism for transparency are measures also favouring the making of comparisons between developed countries\textsuperscript{312}.

\textit{ii. Transparency of support}

Normally, support is perceived as essential to the success of the agreement, notably for its implementation by developing countries\textsuperscript{313}. Parties seem to agree on the idea that the Paris agreement should clearly indicate the objective, the principles and the scope of an MRV system for support\textsuperscript{314}. The current draft of the Paris agreement contains five objectives in this respect, which could ensure that transparency of support allows a better understanding of the support granted and received, that countries can have an overview of the allocated support at the international level, to create an MRV system that is clear about the support granted by developed countries, as well as allowing a clear monitoring of aid received by developing countries and, finally, to avoid financial resources being accounted for more than once\textsuperscript{315}.

According to certain observers, from the view of recent polemics on the transparency of “Fast start” funds allocated by developed countries for the benefit of developing countries, a mechanism of transparency would be seen as a step towards success for the effective implementation of the Convention and a contribution towards a climate of trust. Many developing countries also want predictability and efficacy of available support to be essential parts of the agreement\textsuperscript{316, 317}.

Certain uncertainties remain as to the manner of implementation, at the heart of the 2015 agreement, the rendering of accounts and the accountability of Parties, as much for the ambition of their measures as for the support granted or received. For example, countries have up until now not been able to agree on the manner of assuring transparency, firstly, and secondly to move on to the revision of the provided information\textsuperscript{318}. This could involve, for example, communication of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{309} ADP, 2015f, p. 37
\item \textsuperscript{310} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{311} IISD, 2015c, p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{312} ADP, 2015h. A. Draft agreement, art. 9, para. 2, option 1.
\item \textsuperscript{313} IISD, 2015c, p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{314} ADP, 2015f, p. 38
\item \textsuperscript{315} ADP, 2015h. A. Draft agreement, art. 9, para. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{316} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{317} IISD, 2015b, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{318} ADP, 2015h. A. Draft agreement, art. 9, para. 5.
\end{itemize}
precise information from all Parties on a biennial basis which would be revised by international technical experts. Parties could also appeal to pre-existing MRV devices in the name of the Convention and differentiate the process to follow according to developed countries and developing countries. Finally, even if a strong consensus has emerged as to the importance of treating mitigation and adaptation on a footing of equality\textsuperscript{319}, very little progress has been made to this day concerning the way that transparency of measures and support could equally apply to actions taken concerning adaptation\textsuperscript{320}. During a session of the ADP 2-11 (Bonn, October 2015), certain countries suggested that adaptation be considered concerning transparency as a sharing of possible data, as apprenticeships and as good practices, more than as a term for accomplished progress\textsuperscript{321}.

h. Facilitation on the implementation and compliance

The talks concerning the enabling of implementation of devices or a mechanism of facilitation of an implementation and respect of measures of an agreement that will be adopted in December 2015 will without doubt be influenced at Paris by the legal form which the agreement will take\textsuperscript{322}. However, certain issues which will probably make it to the final talks in Paris emerged more specifically during the October session of the ADP (2-11, Bonn), while certain countries suggested, notably, the inclusion of a requirement in the agreement for Parties to submit contributions at a national level, notions of the duration of these contributions and their lawful nature, as well as the possibility of compliance that would not be punishable\textsuperscript{323}. A mechanism for compliance could also differentiate the anticipated responsibilities between developed countries and developing countries, for example by being more prescriptive towards developed countries and by aiming more towards aspects facilitating implementation in developing countries\textsuperscript{324}.

As uncertainties persist in this regard, a draft decision limits itself for the moment to suggesting that an Intergovernmental Preparatory Committee (IPC) should be responsible for elaborating devices and procedures to follow concerning implementation and promotion of compliance with the agreement. The perspective is that they will be ready to be adopted by Parties during an eventual first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement (CMA)\textsuperscript{325}, as the COP adopted the Kyoto Protocol (1997) having given a mandate to the Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties to


\textsuperscript{320} ADP, 2015f, p. 38

\textsuperscript{321} IISD, 2015d, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{322} IISD, 2015b, p. 11 and ADP, 2015f, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{323} IISD, 2015d, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{324} ADP, 2015h. A. Draft Agreement, art. 11, para. 2.

\textsuperscript{325} ADP, 2015h. B. Draft Decision: Facilitating Implementation and Compliance, para. 63.
define the modalities of implementation\textsuperscript{326}. The countries of the LMDC also suggested during the Bonn session of the ADP (2-10, September) the adoption of a plan progressing in this direction\textsuperscript{327}. Nevertheless, it appears to be important for several countries that the Parties manage, from Paris, to elaborate as much as possible implementation and compliance with the agreement, as this could have an impact on its social acceptability for many stakeholders of their countries\textsuperscript{328}. In fact, several countries have underlined that by proceeding like this, these stakeholders will be able to even better understand the issues once the agreement is presented to them.

Many aspects concerning schemes or a mechanism of facilitation of implementation and compliance of a agreement remain to be clarified, whether that is during the COP 21 or by the intermediary of a work plan after Paris. There is still disagreement about two questions in particular: firstly, that of knowing if such a mechanism should have executive schemes for compliance with voluntary contributions submitted by Parties, or if it should rather have tools for facilitation, or rather the both. Many developed countries prefer an option where only provisions for facilitation apply, while developing countries support the elaboration of an executive branch, Bolivia suggesting that a tribunal should be set up\textsuperscript{329}. Next, a consensus could not for the time being emerge on the question of knowing if these provisions concerning compliance would apply in a uniform way to all Parties, or if an element of differentiation would be integrated and on what basis\textsuperscript{330}. The LDC suggest in this respect that executive provisions apply only to Parties having targets at the level of their national economy\textsuperscript{331}, while developed countries plead for a mechanism applicable to all. A certain consensus seems to be forming however as to the pertinence of assuring that Parties render accounts on the way they honour contributions\textsuperscript{332} through the MRV mechanism. Finally, an efficacious mechanism of implementation and compliance would without doubt allow transparency to be reinforced\textsuperscript{333} (see section g, p. 54).

\textbf{i. Conclusion}

It is expected that the Paris agreement will form a coherent whole, which will relate decisions covering the mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, as well as transparency of measures and support. Therefore, by adopting one legal form rather than another, the Parties can make of their INDC, either legally binding commitments, or simply voluntary commitments (see section e, p. 49 for more details). A distinction can also be made in regards to the nature of

\textsuperscript{327} IISD, 2015c, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{328} ADP, 2015f, p. 41
\textsuperscript{329} IISD, 2015c, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{330} ADP, 2015f, p. 40
\textsuperscript{331} IISD, 2015c, p. 12
\textsuperscript{332} ADP, 2015f, p. 40
\textsuperscript{333} ADP, 2015f, p. 40
contributions or commitments according to specific issues, for example by differentiating this one according to how it relates to mitigation, adaptation or financing. To well understand how the adoption of an agreement at Paris can result in legal commitments for Parties, it is thus pertinent to approach this question from the point of view of commitments that ensue from such an intent. These can be broken down into two particular forms: commitments of means or commitments of result\textsuperscript{334}.

At the approach of the COP 21, developing countries favour the adoption of an agreement which includes binding commitments to outcomes for developed countries, for example by setting up mechanisms of evaluation and compliance with mitigation quantified at the level of the national economy which would be rigorous (see sections a, p. 31, and h, p. 56). Some, such as the countries of the African Group or the AILAC, have moreover suggested that the Parties take a common commitment which takes account of the direct relation between mitigation at the needs for adaptation of countries\textsuperscript{335}. The developing countries put forward the idea that this signifies that the Paris agreement recognises that a rise of mean global temperature exceeding 1.5°C from now to the end of the 21st century would be associated with a raising of the objectives of finance and technologies support for the concerned countries, without having a negative impact on the objectives for development of developing countries (see sections c, p. 37, and d, p.42). They have also suggested that result-based commitments be adopted concerning technological transfer (see section f, p. 52).

Another issue raised is to know if, in the case of a binding legal agreement, developing countries should take result-based commitments in the same way as developed countries. In this case, these commitments of developing countries could for example be linked to the effective provision of methods of implementation by developed countries.

Finally, the nature of commitments will probably influence the form of an MRV system which would be attached to the agreement. A binding commitment to reach the targets for reduction in precise GHG emissions, or the allocation on minimal climate finance, could necessitate a robust and rigorous mechanism of compliance with binding powers, similar in this way to the mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (see section g, p. 54). Commitment to resources could moreover favour a mechanism of facilitation of implementation of measures proposed in the INDC, devoid of binding powers. The legal form which could be based on the INDC will probably have an influence on the very nature of commitments. These contributions are actually accounted for in a register put in place by the Secretariat of the Convention\textsuperscript{336}. They do not have for the moment any force of law clearly

\textsuperscript{334} IDDRI, 2014, p. 12.


\textsuperscript{336} To consult the INDC: \url{http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx}. 

The main negotiation issues
defined by the Parties, which could decide to leave them as they are, or to add them directly in annex to the agreement or again to adopt them by a decision of the COP, among other possibilities (see section e, p. 49).

In the draft text for the agreement, we find two main options when it is a question of Parties making commitments, with the use “should” and “shall”\(^{337}\). Parties will without doubt also have to determine the period during which result-based commitments or resource commitments will exist to limit the rise in temperatures, presently suggested to be below 2 °C or from 1.5-2 °C\(^{338}\) from now to which year, and by what means they will meet these commitments\(^{339}\). The options currently suggested will notably incite countries to reach the ceiling of GHG global emissions at a precise date, or moreover reduce these global emissions according to a precise percentage for a certain date, or again reach a neutral development in carbon within a precise time lapse\(^{340}\). The main challenge, while talks treat of these issues, will be without doubt to arrive at an agreement that all Parties consider as distributing in an equitable way the collective effort against climate change.

**B. Issues of permanent subsidiary bodies**

**1. Issues related to reporting**

Since the adoption of the Bali Action Plan in 2007\(^{341}\), countries have agreed on different requirements aiming to guarantee transparency of Parties actions, whether they are developed or developing. Different guidelines of the UNFCCC imposed mitigation measures and the requirement that support be “measurable, reportable and verifiable” (MRV)\(^{342}\).

The MRV system (measurable, reportable and verifiable) refers to, as part of climate negotiations, any process or system which aims to:

- assess and monitor the impacts of mitigation measures and/or the support provided (measuring),
- to document this information in a transparent way (reporting)
- ... so that they can be examined for accuracy (verification).

MRV requirements aim at a better understanding of the impacts of mitigation actions and financial or technological support and capacity-building

\(^{337}\) ADP, 2015h. A. Draft agreement, articles 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 bis, 9.
\(^{338}\) ADP, 2015h. A. Draft agreement, art. 2, para. 1.
\(^{339}\) Ibid., art. 3.
\(^{340}\) Ibid., art. 3, para. 1, option 3.
\(^{341}\) Decision 1/CP.13.
\(^{342}\) The English acronym MRV for “measurable, reportable and verifiable” became MNV in French.
To date, the main challenge involves the minimal level of standardisation which implies the use of MRV guidance so as to harmonise information transmitted by each of the countries while respecting their national circumstances and respective capabilities.

Several MRV requirements were already established before 2007. It refers in particular to National Communications in which the developed countries and the developing countries provide information on the actions taken to mitigate and adapt to climate change as well as on the support provided and received following different guidelines. The inventories of national GHG, included in the National Communications for the developing countries, and submitted separately every year by the developed countries, as well as the systems of verification of the projects of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are also MRV processes.

Under the UNFCCC, developed countries should develop their biennial reports every two years as well as their National Communications every four years, and this respectively since Cancún (2010) and Durban (2011). It is the same for the developing countries as the LDC and the SIDS can submit reports at a reduced frequency. However, the developed country Parties of the Kyoto Protocol are subject to additional MRV requirements. While developed countries had to submit their first biennial reports at the beginning of 2014, developing countries (excepting the LDC and SIDS) were invited to submit their first updated biennial reports at the end of 2014.

MRV requirements for biennial reports also involve a review and an analysis of data submitted to the UNFCCC by the Party countries. Thus, developed countries are submitted to a process of evaluation and examination at an international level (IAR) which consists firstly of an exam by technical experts then a multilateral evaluation by the Parties during a session of the SBI. The SBI started this process in Lima in December 2014 and continued it in 2015.

The updated biennial reports of developing countries will be the subject of International Consultation and Analysis (ICA). Thus, during the year 2015, fifteen ICA were undertaken on reports of developing countries having submitted them before the end of 2014. They were undertaken by teams of technical experts supported by the Secretariat of the UNFCCC. They will be monitored, during the COP 21 at Paris, by an exchange of views between Parties in the framework of a workshop under the auspices of SBI.

343. Decision 18/CP.8 for the Parties included in Annex I and Decision 17/CP.8 for Parties not included in Annex I.
344. Ibid.
345. Decision 1/CP. 16 para. 40.
347. Decision 2/CP. 17, para. 41.
348. Decision 2/CP.17 Annex II
350. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 63
351. Decision 2/CP.17 Annex IV.
This section sets out issues relating to reporting for Paris, firstly for the Parties included in Annex I of the Convention, then for Parties not included in Annex I of the Convention. With the submission of the first biennial reports in virtue of the new MRV requirements triggered by the Plan of action in Bali, debates should be led principally on the applicability of guidelines established during recent years as well as the technical capacities that they require, in particular for developing countries. The utility of information transmitted for the process of the INDC also constituted an issue for many countries. The first multilateral evaluations in the framework of the IAR will permit to review this process, of which certain lessons could be useful to the ICA process.

a. Notification and examination of National Communications and first biennial reports (Parties included in Annex I of the Convention)

i. Statute and synthesis of the presentation and the exam of sixth National Communications and first biennial reports of Parties included in Annex I of the Convention.

The 44 Parties included in Annex I of the Convention have submitted their National Communications, of which 25 have the deadline of the 1st of January 2014. Concerning biennial reports under the common tabular format, all Parties included in Annex I have submitted except Turkey, which has still not completed it in October 2015.

Following the revision at Warsaw (2013) and at Lima (2014) guidelines for the technical examination of communicated information under the Convention relative to the inventory of the GHG, to biennial reports and National Communications of 44 countries included in Annex I of the Convention, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC has proceeded to the examination of National Communications and biennial reports of those Parties included in Annex I of the Convention. Thirty-four (34) examinations took place in the countries. In effect, because of the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol which apply to countries which are Parties, this exam should take place in situ rather than in a centralised way; countries emitting less than 50 million tonnes of CO₂ could nonetheless opt for a centralised exam after a decision taken in Warsaw.

356. Decision 23/CP.19, para. 75.
The new guidelines revised at Lima\textsuperscript{357} constitute a significant advance since they fix common objectives for the technical examination of information relative to the GHG inventories, to biennial reports and national communication of Parties included in Annex I of the Convention.

These measures include, for example:

- “To permit, in a concern for facilitation and in a manner that is non-conflictual, open and transparent, a technical exam that is in-depth, objective and exhaustive of all aspects of the implementation of the Convention individually and collectively for the Parties included in Annex I”;

- “To encourage the communication of information that is coherent, transparent, comparable, exact and complete by Parties included in Annex I”; and

- “To guarantee that the Conference of Parties disposes of information that is exact, coherent and pertinent for the examination of the implementation of the Convention”\textsuperscript{358}

These guidelines also precise the role of experts and the Secretariat as well as the structure of reports resulting from this technical exam. They also permit to further rationalise the process so as to avoid all duplication and therefore limit administrative costs.

In addition to the writing of reports specific to each country result of the exam of National Communications and biennial reports, the SBI is in charge of preparing a compilation-synthesis of sixth National Communications and the first biennial reports\textsuperscript{359}. This was presented at Lima in December 2014\textsuperscript{360} without reaching a decision. It was decided at Bonn last June to treat this question again in May 2016\textsuperscript{361}.

Several main messages can be drawn from the compilation presented at Lima\textsuperscript{362}:

- The GHG emissions (excluding the sector of Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) of Parties included in Annex I have lowered by 19.1 to 17 MT mega tonnes of CO\textsubscript{2}, which represents a reduction of 10.6\% for the period 1990-2012.

- This reduction is attributed to different factors including the transition of Eastern European countries towards a market economy, the economic crisis of 2007-2012 and the implementation of measures and policies dedicated to the mitigation of climate change and to renewable energies.

- Denmark, Sweden, Germany and the UK were able to reduce their emissions by at least 20\% in 2012 in comparison to 1990.

\textsuperscript{357} Decision 13/CP.20.
\textsuperscript{358} FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.3, Annex 5. (a), (b) and (d).
\textsuperscript{359} Decisions 22/CP.19 and 2/CP.17.
\textsuperscript{360} FCCC/SBI/2014/INF.20
\textsuperscript{361} FCCC/SBI/2015/L.9
\textsuperscript{362} FCCC/SBI/2014/INF.20
• The cumulated projection of scenarios with measures of countries included in Annex I will result in a reduction of emission from here to 2020 of 9.7% compared to 1990, which differs considerably from the projection made following the submission of the 5th National Communications which anticipated a growth of 0.6% for the same period.

Countries generally prefer to concentrate on a reinforcement of their current policies and mitigation measures rather than adopting new ones, even if Australia and the United States make an exception with the implementation of new policies and major measures.

ii. Revision of “guidelines for the establishment of National Communications of Parties included in Annex I of the Convention, second part: FCCC guidelines for the establishment of National Communications”

Since the adoption of guidelines for biennial reports in 2011, countries decided to proceed to the revision of guidelines for National Communications in a desire for harmonisation and so as to avoid the duplication of submitted information (see the table below for a presentation of different sections of National Communications and biennial reports of developed countries). A technical document was prepared at the end of 2014 in order to compile the experiences of developed countries in the preparation of their biennial reports and to direct the revision of guidelines for the establishment of National Communications. Although a decision aiming to revise these guidelines was foreseen for Paris, most of the Parties at Bonn in June 2015, envisaged the rejection of their adoption and held a workshop before the Bonn session of June 2016.

Table 3. Comparison of national communication sections and biennial reports of developed countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National communications</th>
<th>Biennial reports</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National circumstances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. GHG inventory</td>
<td>II. Information on greenhouse gas emissions and their evolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Quantified economy-wide emission reduction target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Policies and measures</td>
<td>IV. Progress accomplished in the realisation of quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets and pertinent information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Mitigation measures and their effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Estimation of reductions of emissions and absorptions and the use of units coming from mechanisms founded on the market and activities relating to land use, land use changes and forestry activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

363. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 18.
364. FCCC/TP/2014/5.
365. FCCC/SBI/2015/10.
366. FCCC/CP/1999/7 and Decision 2/CP.17.
| VI. Projections and incidences of policies and measures | V. Projections |
| VII. Evaluation of vulnerability, impacts of climate change and adaptation measures | |
| VIII. Financial resources and technology transfer | VI. Assistance given to developing countries in the form of financial resources, technologies, and capacity-building. |
| IX. Research and systematic observation | |
| X. Public Education and Awareness | VII. Other information to communicate |

The technical document drawn up by the Secretariat\(^{367}\) compiles the submissions of the Parties and consists of two approaches. The first recognises that, when biennial reports and National Communications are submitted in the same year, the biennial report should be the principle vehicle of notification while national communication should furnish a resume of the issues treated by the two documents. This approach requires the alignment of guidelines of National Communications and biennial reports for duplicated subjects. Some Parties contest this approach because of the more exhaustive character of National Communications concerning measures and policies of mitigation and projections of GHG emissions. In addition, such an approach could involve the revision of reporting guidelines under the Kyoto Protocol which requires supplementary information in the National Communications of the Parties of the Protocol.

On the contrary, the second approach prioritises National Communications as the principal vehicle of notification and the inclusion of crossed references and a resume of the National Communications in the biennial report. This approach involves the aligning of guidelines for National Communications with those of the biennial report for the subjects where the latter contains more current information and to integrate the common tabular model in the guidelines for National Communications.

Although one Party has proposed to prepare a single report the years when National Communications and biennial reports are required, other Parties insist on the singularity of the biennial report which is expected every two years and which therefore constitutes a self-standing document half the time. The revision of guidelines for National Communications constitutes for certain Parties the occasion to enlarge the scope of these guidelines. The technical document identifies several themes for which it is proposed to rearrange information so as to complete National Communications with the information of the biennial reports. For example, for the section on national circumstances, it is proposed to integrate information on the targets on the reduction of quantifiable emissions since they constitute the basis of a country’s efforts. Many countries also ask that National Communications furnish more quantitative information rather than qualitative.

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367. FCCC/TP/2014/5.
While the revision process seems to be of a technical nature, difficult decisions are expected in Paris since the debate will cover many issues of a political nature, notably lined with the process of elaboration of the INDC.

iii. Results of the first phase of the evaluation process and examination at international level (2014-15)

The process of Evaluation and examination at international level (IAR) started in January 2014 with the submission of the first biennial reports and sixth National Communications. It is conducted under the leadership of the SBI and is composed of two steps:

- a technical exam of documents prepared by the countries, and
- a multilateral evaluation of progress achieved so as to attain the targets for the reduction of GHG emissions.

The first evaluation took place in Lima in the framework of the SBI-41 with the evaluation of 17 countries. The SBI-42 then led a second evaluation of 24 countries last June. Belarus and Kazakhstan were evaluated at Paris. For illustrative purposes, the figure below provides a graphic representation of the process for the session of the SBI-42.

Figure 2. Process of evaluation and examination at international level for the session of the SBI-42 (2014-15)

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368. Decision 2/CP.17
Although the first session of the multilateral evaluation of Lima was historic and permitted an open exchange of points of view, most developing countries deplored the lack of base conclusions presented at the SBI. Certain of them hoped that the exercise would help to raise the level of ambition pre-2020 on the behalf of developed countries. The latter have approved of the fact of “going beyond simple reports”\(^{371}\) and of growing trust between countries. This first evaluation was the occasion for certain developed countries to present the measures taken to realise their goals. Sweden thus mentioned their carbon tax introduced in 1991, while Switzerland has been questioned by China and Brazil on the possibility of raising the target and putting in place a reduction of emissions of 30% from here to 2020\(^{372}\).

Unfortunately, countries did not in agree on the manner of concluding this evaluation in Bonn last June, which has alarmed developing countries, such as China. The latter has thus strongly encouraged countries to agree on the conclusions at Paris, so as to “avoid undermining mutual trust”\(^{373}\). Brazil made a call for the Parties included in Annex I to “improve” the provided information and for civil society to closely examine this information. At Lima, Brazil had already underlined the lack of comparability between countries due to utilisation of different parameters\(^{374}\).

It is expected that discussions on the level of ambition post-2020, such as that covered by the INDC, will have an important influence on the effective conclusion of the multilateral evaluation process. These discussion could delay the latter until the last minute at Paris.

**b. Reporting by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention**

Requirements linked to the reporting of information by developing countries have seen an important evolution during recent years, as shown by the figure below.

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\(^{372}\) IISD, 2014.

\(^{373}\) IISD, 2015b.

\(^{374}\) IISD, 2014.
**Figure 3. Evolution of requirements linked to the reporting of information by developing countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>The Convention established obligations for reporting for all the Parties as well as the timetable for initial National Communications of developing countries (Article 12.5 and Article 4.3).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The guidelines for the preparation of National Communications for developing countries were adopted (Decision 10/CP.2).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>First submissions of National Communications by developing countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I (CGE) is constituted so as to assist developing countries in the implementation of their reporting obligations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Guidelines for National Communications are revised (Decision 17/CP.8) and the CGE mandate is extended for the 2003-07 period with a larger mandate for technical assistance (Decision 3/CP.8).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The principal of measuring, reporting and verification is inscribed in the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP.13).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The CGE is extended for the 2010-12 period so as to follow its mandate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The frequency of National Communications of developing countries is raised every four years and additional requirements are adopted including the international consultation and analysis process (ICA) for biennial reports (Decision 1/CP.16).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Guidelines for the preparation of biennial update reports are adopted as well as modalities of the ICA; the deadline for first reports is December 2014 (Decision 2/CP.17).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>The composition of the teams of technical experts is adopted (Decision 19/CP.19) and the mandate of the CGE is extended up to 2018.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. *Information in the National Communications by Parties not included in Annex I of the Convention.*

The Cancún Decision (2010) requires the Parties not included in Annex I to submit their national communications every four years, and their GHG inventories every two years, through their updated biennial reports. National communications are not always the object of a specific examination as is the case for Parties included in Annex I.

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375. Inspired by UNFCCC, 2014.
376. Decision 1/CP.16, para.60.
In October 2015, 110 Parties not included in Annex I submitted their second national communication and 13 Parties their third communication (of which 6 Francophone countries and 4 observer countries). Only Mexico submitted its fourth and fifth national communications377.

It is also to be noted that in October 2015, 15 Parties not included in Annex I had submitted their biennial update reports, of which 7 countries were members or observers of La Francophonie378, and that 16 others must submit their first reports from here to 31st December 2015379.

So as to better understand the different principals of the national communications and biennial update reports of developing countries, the table below provides a comparison of principal sections of these two documents using guidelines adopted by decision 17/CP.8 for national communications and decision 2/CP.17 (Annexe III) for biennial update reports.

### Table 4. Comparison of sections from national communications and biennial update reports of developed countries380

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<tr>
<th>National communication</th>
<th>Biennial update report</th>
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<td>II. Conditions specific to the country (National circumstances)</td>
<td>Updates of national communications (also includes information on institutional arrangements)</td>
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<tr>
<td>III. National GHG Inventories</td>
<td>III. National inventory of GHG emissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. General description of measures taken or envisaged for applying the Convention</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmes consisting of measures aiming at facilitating adaptation to climate change</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmes consisting of measures aiming at mitigating climate change</td>
<td>IV. Mitigation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Other information deemed useful to achieve the Convention’s goal</td>
<td>Update of national communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transfer of technologies</td>
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<td>Difficulties and flaws recorded and needs in terms of financial resources, technical means and capacities</td>
<td>V. Needs and aid received in terms of financial resources, technologies and capacity-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical annex (optional)</td>
<td>Technical annex (optional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

379. FCCC/SBI/2015/L.8 Ghana submitted its own on 21st July 2015, soon after the 42nd session of the SBI.
380. Compiled from: Decision 17/CP.8 and Decision 2/CP.17.
ii. Provision of financial and technical support

To ensure a more regular submission of national communications, greater, faster and more regular financial support will be required. The GEF made a report last June on the support provided to developing countries for the preparation of their biennial update report. In its report, the GEF sets out the 49 countries supported (for the most part to the amount of 350,000 US dollars each) for the preparation of their biennial update reports.\(^{381}\)

Although this element of the agenda allows to measure the amplitude of support provided, most developing countries call for a continuity of this support so as to assure compliance with more and more complex reporting requirements. In this direction, one of the options figuring in the last provisional version of the future 2015 agreement foresees the need to oblige developed countries to provide a road map clearly indicating their annual commitments, at the national level, as much in terms of financial support as technology transfer and capacity-building for the post-2020 period.\(^{382}\) In addition, certain developing countries have demanded training in the use of 2006 IPCC guidelines for the GHG national inventories.\(^{383}\)

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**Issues related to reporting**

How to rationalise reporting processes that the Parties included in Annex I are subject to and avoid duplication of information?

How to rationalise required reports in the years national communications and biennial reports should be submitted by developed countries?

Which sections should be the object of a summary and crossed references and will this involve a revision of guidelines for the preparation of these reports?

Will the process of multilateral evaluation for developed countries result in base conclusions and thus result in a raising of the level of ambition for the period preceding 2020?

How to avoid MRV requirements for developing countries becoming as heavy as those for developed countries?

How to improve support for financial and technical capacities of developing countries so as to conform to the MRV requirements?

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381. FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.7
383. IISD, 2015b, p. 16
2. Market and non-market issues

Discussions on issues regarding market-based and non-market-based approaches treat at once of the improvements to be brought to the existing tools and the creation of future mechanisms.

To this day, two market-based mechanisms have existed under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol and allow Parties to generate and/or exchange emissions reduction units, commonly called “carbon credits”. They are the Joint Implementation (JI) (Section 1H.a, p. 73) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Section b p. 74).

Under current Kyoto Protocol rules, the Parties subject to emission reduction targets can purchase carbon credits resulting from the CDM and JI in order to meet their obligations384 (see Sheet 10 for more details). In 2005 the CMP adopted the modalities and procedures for implementation of the CDM385 and the guidelines for the implementation of the JI386. When they were adopted, it was also planned that the SBI would recommend amendments to the modalities and procedures for a CDM as well as for the JI guidelines for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, certain recommendations were adopted by the CPM-10 at Lima while other questions were examined in Paris with the objective of closing the reform process387.

In addition to the existing mechanisms, discussions have taken place within the framework of the Convention ever since Bali (2007) on the establishment of new instruments388: the New Market Mechanism (NMM)(section c, p. 76), the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) (section d, p. 78) and Non-market Based Approaches (NMA) (section e, p. 79).

The NMM and the FVA are distinguished like this:

- the NMM aims to create a unique market system which necessitates the elaboration of modalities and procedures which will guide countries in its implementation.
- the FVA includes the existence of different efforts or mitigation initiatives which coexist thanks to the adoption of guidelines or common standards. This can also include fiscal systems, like carbon taxes.

In parallel, a new work programme was created for the NMAs389. This mechanism as created in reaction to the scepticism of certain Parties about the utilisation of market mechanisms. It aims to open the debate to benefits other than those relating to carbon as well as mechanisms not based on the exchange of carbon credits.

384. By virtue of Articles 6 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol
388. Decision 1/CP.13.
389. Decision 1/CP.18, para. 47.
Although the new tools were called to play an important role in the 2015 agreement, discussions have slowed down these last years. Enthusiasm for the creation of new market mechanisms has largely been affected by the fall and stagnation of the price of carbon in various markets, such as the European market. Several Parties are in effect of the opinion that it would be necessary to know the outlines of the Paris agreement, before starting discussions on the details of these mechanisms. The principal objectives of these new mechanism is to stimulate mitigation efforts and to help Parties conform to their objectives for reduction of GHG emissions.

The figure below, prepared by the World Bank, shows the diversity of mechanisms existing and planned at national and regional level which function thanks to a carbon price. These mechanisms include systems of exchange for carbon units as well as carbon tax systems, existing and to come.

Figure 4. Existing and planned measures functioning on the exchange of carbon credits

![Figure 4: Existing and planned measures functioning on the exchange of carbon credits](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/05/28/state-trends-report-tracks-global-growth-carbon-pricing)

Box 3 – CARBON MARKETS

Carbon markets issued from the flexibility mechanisms developed in the Kyoto Protocol. They comprise of:

- International exchange of emissions trading. Countries concerned by the objectives of reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) have the possibility to sell their emission allowances, if they have surpassed their objective, or to buy some, if they cannot reach it.

- Clean development mechanism (CDM) This permits developed countries to reach some of their objectives by bringing support to mitigation projects implemented in developing countries. The CDM functions thanks to a compensation mechanism where GHG reductions associated with low-carbon projects in relation to a reference scenario generates carbon credits (1 credit = 1 tonne of CO2), which are then sold on the carbon market.

- Joint implementation (JI) The JI functions on the same principal as the CDM, but concerns the exchange of carbon credits between two developed countries, generated by projects carried out in one of the countries (often a country in transition towards a market economy).

Institutionalised market and voluntary compensation market

States subject to emission quotas are not the only players to make appeal to the carbon compensation process. Certain enterprises or industries are subject to implementations inciting them to reduce their environmental impact and, through the same, reduce their GHG emissions. In addition, more and more players voluntarily invest in carbon compensation. In particular, enterprises or collectives concerned to diminish their ecological footprint.

We must distinguish between two types of complementary carbon markets: the institutionalised market (reserved to State signatories of the Kyoto Protocol and governed by the United Nations) and the voluntary compensation market. Carbon credits, their value and their attribution system are different according to which market you are using.

Types of carbon credits

The two principal types of credits for carbon compensation are the CER (Certified Emission Reduction) and the VER (Verified Emission Reduction).

- CER credits are attributed by the executive office of the CDM. They are subject to a strict process of validation, control and monitoring, realised under the guise of the United Nations. They are the main credits used by players having regulatory obligations relative to their GHG emissions.

- VER credits are units generated by voluntary compensation projects. They are not attributed by the United Nations and respond to different requirements. They are attributed proportionally to the own standards/labels of the voluntary compensation market.

While CDM projects (CER credits) can apply to great industrial projects with an elevated cost, voluntary compensation (VER credits) can correspond to projects of all sizes thanks to simplified steps.
a. Joint Implementation (JI) (SBI)

Joint implementation (JI) allows developed countries, having objectives for greenhouse gas emission reduction by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol, to attain a part of their objectives by supporting mitigation projects in other developed countries (often a country in transition towards a market economy). The CDM functions thanks to a compensation mechanism where GHG reductions associated with low-carbon projects in relation to a reference scenario generates carbon credits (1 credit = 1 tonne of CO₂), which are then sold on the carbon market.

i. Revision of the JI guidelines

Certain improvements have been made to the mechanism during recent years, notably from the unification of the two paths of the JI\textsuperscript{390} and the creation of a process of appeal against the decisions of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC)\textsuperscript{391}. However, the revision of its guidelines, foreseen by the CPM 1\textsuperscript{392}, has still not been concluded. It is also to be noted that since several years, interest for the Kyoto Protocol mechanism has declined.

This decrease in interest has had an important impact on discussions linked to its reform since the demand for JI credits is so weak that it hardly justifies the administrative and management costs created by this mechanism. If the utility of the JI is above all to favour approaches based on results of a larger scope (which is to say that they go beyond an approach limited to the impacts of a single project), the weakness of commitments taken in the name of the Kyoto Protocol endangers the survival of the mechanism\textsuperscript{393}.

In the perspective of cost reduction, Parties have also asked to explore the options for aligning the administrative level with the CDM. A technical document already proposes to thus increase the level of standardisation of methodologies so as to maximise the efficiency of the mechanism\textsuperscript{394}. A synthesis of voluntary technical approaches which could help Parties to respect their commitments with the Kyoto Protocol, in which integrates the JI to national policies, underlines the advantages of such a mechanism for mobilising efforts of the private section in favour of mitigation\textsuperscript{395}. Several approaches are proposed, among which are recourse to emission tallies and benchmarks. The document warns against the risk of counting twice emission reductions realised through the JI and those realised by national policies and proposes, at the same time, solutions to avoid this.

390. Decision 6/CMP.8. Up to the end of 2012, there are two tracks for participating in the JI projects (Decision 9/CMP.1, Annex), depending on whether a Party satisfies or does not satisfy all the eligibility criteria, mainly involving the holding of a national GHG inventory:
392. FCCC/SBI/2013/L.11
393. FCCC/SBI/2015/5.
394. FCCC/TP/2015/1.
395. FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.1.
The main negotiation issues

It is today undeniable that the development of new mechanisms would have a consequent impact on the new form of the JI. Its resemblance to the FVA could eventually lead to a fusion of the two mechanisms in the future, although this is not envisageable while the Kyoto Protocol regime and that which will be created by the new agreement post-2020 remain separated.

ii. Modalities to accelerate the issuance, transfer and acquisition of ERU during the second commitment period

Under the current rules, only Parties having calculated an amount of assigned amount units (AAU), which are the emissions rights granted to the Parties referred to in the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, may transfer and acquire Emission Reduction Units (ERU). So as to permit Parties included in Annex I to deliver AAU for the second period of commitment before the calculation is finalised, it is proposed that 1% of AAU of the first period of commitment can be delivered in advance.

While Parties have reflected on this proposition since 2014, no agreement has been found on the exact percentage, which will be at the centre of the discussions at Paris.

b. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (SBI)

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows developed countries, having objectives for greenhouse gas emission reduction by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol, to attain a part of their objectives by supporting mitigation projects implemented in developing countries. Like the Joint Implementation, the CDM is based on a mechanism of compensation where reduction of greenhouse gases associated with low-carbon projects generates carbon credits, which are then sold on the carbon market.

i. Revision of the modalities and procedures of the CDM

After the adoption of new guidelines for the Mechanism for a clean development in 2010, the revision of the CDM has been in course since 2012. This process is led by the executive board of the CDM which regularly recommends to the Conference of Parties of the Kyoto Protocol modifications to modalities and procedures for their application. These last years, recommendations relative to projects have put the emphasis on aspects linked to social and environmental integrity, to the governance of the CDP and to geographical equilibrium.

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396. Article 6 of the Kyoto protocol and Decision 1/CMP.8 para. 15.
397. FCCC/SBI/2015/L.2
400. Decision 3/CMP.6
This part of the agenda has permitted Parties to express on various occasions their attachment to the CDP and to underline its usefulness for favouring finances based on results. Given the preferences accorded to projects in the LDC for several years (recorded by experts), in particular in Europe, many countries call for a simplification of procedures to favour the emergence of small projects in these counties.\(^{401}\) At Lima, environmental NGOs also insisted on the necessity of respecting human rights in the implementation of CDP projects.\(^{402}\)

Decision 4/CMP.10 adopted at Lima equally underlined the following advances in line with the CDP:

- The registration of more than 7,500 project activities in more than 95 countries;
- The inclusion of more than 1,700 project activities in more than 270 activity programmes registered in more than 75 countries;
- The delivery of more than 1.5 billion CERs and an invested sum of more than 215 billion US dollars;
- The voluntary cancellation of more than 1.6 million units of certified emission reductions (CER);
- The sale of Funds for the adaptation of more than 30 million CERs in the name of the funds;
- The inscription of more than 190 million US dollars of receipts from the sale of the CERs in favour of Funds for adaptation;
- The approval of 56 loans as part of the CDM loan programme\(^{403}\) and a total commitment above 5 million US dollars.

So as to simplify procedures, the CMP.10 decided at Lima to permit validation by a designated operational unit (DOU) and submission for approval by the executive board of a surveillance plan until the first demand for delivery of the CERs for all level of activities of the project and programs of activities (PA)\(^{404}\). Such a measure aims at accelerating the development process of the projects.

Also note that the Parties agreed at Lima to ask the executive board to examine the methodological considerations in case of admissibility of supplementary activities linked to the LULUCF sector. These new activities involve modalities and procedures that give rise to technical issues in establishing reference levels: additionality, monitoring reductions, methods for controlling leaks and the risk of non-permanence, the environmental and socio-economic impacts, etc. A report will be presented at Paris on the technical implications linked to the admissibility of activities with a very small scope and considered as automatically additional in the CDM.\(^{405}\)

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401. IISD, 2014.
402. Ibid.
403. CDM loan scheme.
405. Ibid.
In what concerns the other propositions of simplification, the CMP-10 has asked the executive board to analyse incidences linked to the simplified registration of project activities and activity programmes considered as automatically additional. He has also asked to study to eventual consequences in the case where a DOU realises at once the validation and the verification of a same activity or PA whatever the level of it. Like for the JI, propositions are also examined to improve the management of the CDM and reduce administrative costs.

Before an adoption of an agreement taking into account mitigation commitments both for developed countries and developing countries, discussion on the CDM are vested with a certain importance. Not only can the rules of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms be used as a base of discussion for the implementation of new market mechanisms, but the CDM is also one of the principal mechanisms having permitted a certain developing country to realise its reductions in emissions verified up to now.

Discussions on the CDM have presented the opportunity for certain countries of the AOSIS to open a debate of a less technical nature on the propensity of the CDM to favour net reduction of GHG emissions\textsuperscript{406}. This position involves considering the CDM as an instrument to achieve net reductions also in developing countries, instead of being regarded merely as an instrument designed to generate credits to offset the emissions of developed countries. Similar discussions also took place in the NMM\textsuperscript{407}.

\textit{ii. Procedures, mechanisms and institutional arrangements for appealing the decisions of the CDM Executive Board}

Since several years, it has been proposed to create a mechanism of recourse against the decisions of the CDM executive board\textsuperscript{408} when an agreement can not be found involving it. It is a question of knowing who can appeal (for example, other promoters of projects or even NGOs having an interest in the project) and if it is possible to appeal to positive decisions of the CDM executive board, such as the approval of demands for inscription of projects, or only negative decisions, such as the refusal to deliver of the CER\textsuperscript{409}.

Other issues more procedural concerning the composition of the panel which will study the recourse and its qualification. On this subject, no concrete decision is foreseen for Paris. However, the Parties are invited to share their points of view from now to March 2016\textsuperscript{410}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{407} FCCC/TP/2014/11.
\textsuperscript{408} Decision 3/CMP.6, para.18.
\textsuperscript{409} FCCC/SBI/2012/33/Add.1
\textsuperscript{410} FCCC/SBI/2015/L.12
\end{footnotesize}
c. New Market Mechanism (NMM) (SBSTA)

The New market mechanism (NMM) is an instrument which, contrary to other financial mechanism described up to now, is only at the conceptual stage. Its creation was decided during the Cancún Conference so as to improve the cost-efficiency report and promote mitigation actions which take account of the different characteristics of countries. The subsidiary organ of scientific and technological advisory of the UNFCCC is charged with defining the concept and the functions of the NMM, but advances for the moment are limited.

Since Cancún, the creation of an NMM has been the subject of intense debates. Though it was foreseen that this would operate under the direction and the authority of the COP and that it would improve the cost/efficiency report of mitigation actions 411, many questions remain today in suspense.

Unfortunately, no progress has been realised on this issue since the Bonn session of 2014, or more than a year ago. Although the methodological and institutional issues have been clouded, a technical note was elaborated at the end of 2014 by the Secretariat to synthesise the different types of issues412.

Among these, the degree of flexibility accorded for the implementation of the NMM in each of the countries that wants to participate is more contentious. For example, can countries elaborate their own methodologies of quantifying reductions of emissions and follow their own MRV processes? The answer to this questions depends on the institutional form of the mechanism and its processes.

In what concerns the form of the mechanism, certain countries propose an approach aiming at recognising reductions in emissions beyond the baseline-and-credit in different sectors and across different projects413. This would involve an agreement on the type of projects and the geographical cover of the mechanism as well as the rules of accreditation. For example, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations proposes to include the REDD+ in the NMM414. Other countries are in favour of also recognising approaches bases on the exchange of reductions of emissions 415. The LDC Group considers that the NMM must consist of an extension of the system of exchange of emission by virtue of article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol416.

Of the different positions of Parties on the nature and the governance of the mechanism, three options have been suggested:

1. A centralised mechanism favouring the baseline-and-credit approach;

411. Decision 2/CP.17
412. FCCC/TP/2014/11.
413. Ibid.
415. FCCC/TP/2014/11.
2. A mechanism with a more flexible governance in which the host Parties would have a greater power of decision, favouring the baseline-and-credit approach; and

3. A centralised mechanism favouring at once the baseline-and-credit approach and the approach of exchange of emissions reductions. While the first option offers the advantage of reducing certain administrative costs and to take advantage of the existence of mechanisms such as the CDM and JI, it limits the degree of control of countries on the approval of projects or the extent of their impacts. The second option permits them to decide the approval process and monitoring, and eventually to operate their own system while minimising exterior influence on the rules of the functioning of the mechanism. As for the third option, it seems more difficult to realise to this day as the approach of the exchange of emission reductions involves the adoption of national or sectoral targets as well as common rules which still do not exist for all countries in a sufficiently harmonious manner.

Another capital issue for the NMM is the interpretation of the principal of emission reductions known as “net”. Many countries, notably those of the European Union, desire for the NMM to raise net reductions, that’s to say reductions which do not serve to compensate the emissions for developed countries. AOSIS has also stressed the importance of the net mitigation, but proposes a mechanism which combines approaches at the scale of the whole economy (in the framework of the commitments of the developed countries), sectors (through voluntary ceilings for developing countries) and even, in some cases, projects.

The experience of the CDM is here useful for discussing the propensity of initiatives aiming to compensate emission to realise a net mitigation, for example by recourse to conservative methodologies or the multiplying effect of the project. The absence of quantification of these emission reductions constitutes however a barrier to their recognition as net reductions. The technical note of the Secretariat raises several options to overcome this obstacle such as adjustments on the behalf of the provider or the buyer. It is for example proposed to recourse to dynamic lines of reference which can be adjusted in function of the technological progress in a given sector. Even an allowance of a certain sum of emission reductions is envisageable. It is then a question of deciding to who these reductions are attributed. The Environmental Integrity Group proposes thus to share the reductions between the supplier and the buyer and to agree in order to realise additional reductions.

417. FCCC/TP/2014/11.
420. FCCC/TP/2014/11.
For most of the Parties, the NMM is an instrument which must serve to raise the level of ambition for mitigation. It must therefore be known what will be the place accorded to the NMM in the Paris agreement before negotiating the details of its functioning and governance. It is therefore not likely that a detailed agreement on the subject be adopted by Paris and that the prompt start of the NMM after the COP21\textsuperscript{422}, would happen.

d. Framework for the Various Approaches (FVA) (SBSTA)

The existence of a FVA is justified by the will to recognise at the national level various approaches enterprising at the national or regional level without limiting to mechanisms based on the market. As shown by the last reports of the World Bank on carbon markets and which nevertheless relate to the process of fixing carbon prices\textsuperscript{423}, various approaches are being taken in different countries and regions of the world. In Chilli for example, a carbon tax will be put in place from 2018; in South Korea, a carbon market covers two thirds of the country’s emissions; Quebec has set up a system of exchanges of emission allowances in 2013, at the same time as California, and the two territories have linked their two systems in a formal way in 2014. A coalition of governments and private institutions has also been created to encourage countries to put in place mechanisms aiming at establishing a carbon price, through, for example, a system of exchange of carbon credits or even a carbon tax\textsuperscript{424}.

Since the decision taken in Doha to create a work programme on the FVA\textsuperscript{425}, Parties have worked to define a common framework where different efforts can be recognised. This requires the adoption of common norms and standards so as to guarantee that they end in results that are real, permanent additional and verified\textsuperscript{426}. The question is to know how to respect these requirements while granting to participating countries a certain margin of liberty in the conception and the reach of their efforts. Several options are envisaged, from recourse to methodologies of the CDM and the JI up to a recourse to methodologies appropriate to each country, which will not assure a similar level of environmental integrity for each of the participating countries\textsuperscript{427}. Such methodologies should clarify the manner of developing a reference scenario, of accounting for displacement of emissions, to assure permanence and the additionality of emission reductions.

Another important issue concerns the double accounting for of efforts. Several approaches to counter this risk include participation in a unique system or the participation in several systems on the condition that the emission reductions are

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{422.} FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.13, para. 50.
\textsuperscript{424.} http://www.carbonpricingleadership.org.
\textsuperscript{425.} Decision 1/CP.18, para. 44.
\textsuperscript{426.} Decision 1/CP.18, para. 42, notably
\textsuperscript{427.} FCCC/TP/2014/9.
\end{footnotesize}
The main negotiation issues only generated from a single system. Thus, the options envisaged to encourage net reductions of emissions through the FVA are the same as for the NMM (see section below).

In what concerns the criteria for participation in the FVA, it is proposed to have an commitment or a contribution in the framework of a new agreement as well as an inventory system and a register constituting the base criteria. On the subject of joint benefits in sustainable development, recourse to negative lists of projects or payment of royalties which could be reinvested in the adaptation activities are envisaged.

Discussions on the FVA will benefit from the adoption of a common definition of the concept. As for the NMM, discussions stagnate, notably for the reason of expectations placed in the post-2020 agreement to define the agreement to a recourse to the FVA. It is also anticipated that certain Parties mention in their INDC measures which could be part of a future FVA. Most Parties converge towards the idea that the FVA is a capital instrument to allow them to uphold their commitments taken in the framework of the Convention.

e. Non-market Based Approaches (NMA) (SBSTA)

So as to counterbalance the market mechanisms, certain Parties, such as Bolivia insisted at Doha on the creation of a specific work programme on the NMA. The ideology defended by these countries consists in showing that a market system is not the only way of reducing emissions and that there exist inciting mechanisms other than economic ones.

So as to clarify the distinction between mechanisms founded on the market and those not founded on the market, a technical note to the Secretariat attempts to address a typology of these efforts. The classification includes:

- Economic and fiscal instruments not resulting in credit or exchangeable carbon units (carbon taxes are therefore put in place in Costa Rica, in Japan, in Mexico and in the Canadian province of British Columbia);
- Implementations (such as the Australian code of construction);
- Voluntary agreements (Denmark has implemented a program aiming at improving the efficacy of industrial energy);
- Target-frameworks (such as the target for energy efficiency of the European Union);

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428. FCCC/TP/2014/9.
429. Ibid.
430. Ibid.
432. Decision 1/CP.18, para. 47.
433. FCCC/TP/2014/10.
• Awareness-raising and information programs (such as the program of energy labelling in Europe); and
• Research and development (such as the German program for innovation and new energy technologies).

In addition, different collaboration approaches between countries are envisaged on the basis of different initiatives of existing international and regional cooperation. This includes for example the Centre for renewable energy and energy efficiency of the economic community of the States of West Africa.

Before envisaging an agreement on this issue, Parties must first define the concept of the NMA and distinguish it from other mechanisms like the NAMA and the REDD+. It is very probable that Parties will only enter into the details of these discussions after Paris, when it will be decided what place the NMA will have in the future treaty as well as the role they will play.

### The main challenges linked and not linked to markets

What should be the new modalities and procedures of the CDM and the new guidelines of the JI in a context of a decrease in demand for their credits?

To what extent can the costs of management of these mechanisms be reduced? What will be their link with future market mechanisms created under the Convention?

What should be the form of the future mechanism of appeal against the decisions of the executive board of the CDM?

How can we define the “non-market based approaches”?

What are the objectives of the FVA, NMM and NMA and what role should they play in the future treaty?

How to insure that they lead to net emission reductions while contributing to increasing the ambition of commitments in countries in the framework of the future agreements?

How to avoid double counting of units generated in the framework of these different mechanisms and assure the environmental integrity of mitigation methods which will be taken?

Should the NMM consist in a centralised mechanism with a governance structure that will resemble closely that of the CDM or should it allow a more decentralised approach which would give the host countries more flexibility for the development of their own methodologies, their databases and MRV systems, etc.?

What should be the structure and scope of the FVA? To what extent is a harmonisation of approaches envisageable?

How to insure a balance between environmental integrity and liberty of countries to decide MRV methodologies?

How to take into account the diversity of the NMA in the future agreement?
3. REDD+ and agriculture

The REDD+ mechanism, or Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, aims at giving a financial value to carbon stocks in the forests, while providing developing countries with financial support to invest in conservation projects. Deforestation and forest degradation are responsible for close to 20% of GHG emissions on a global level, which makes it the second contributor behind the energy sector434.

a. The reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) (SBSTA)

With a record number of seven decisions adopted in Warsaw, the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)435 is regarded as the success of COP-19. This package of decisions is referred to as the “Warsaw Framework for REDD+”. While other minor issues need to be decided at Paris, the Warsaw framework has numerous responses that are methodological, institutional and financial permitting the envisaging of the implementation and finance of REDD+ activities (see box below).

### Warsaw framework for REDD+

The Warsaw framework for REDD+ consists of a package of seven decisions, focusing on the methodological, institutional and financial aspects of REDD+.

1. Programme of work on financing focused on results for REDD+436

The financing focused on the results aims to make the support granted to activities of REDD+ conditional on the achievement of specific results. The programme of work begun at Doha led to the creation of an information centre on the internet platform REDD+ of the Convention, on which the information on the results of the activities of REDD+ and on the support on the corresponding results can be published437. The Warsaw framework specifies what information must be provided by developing countries wishing to receive payments based on the results, including the way in which the guarantees have been taken into account and respected. The decision also encourages financial institutions, including GCF, to distribute financing in a way that is equitable and balanced based on results438.

435. The “+” of REDD+ was added to the acronym REDD to emphasise the importance of conservation, sustainable management of forests and the strengthening of stocks of forest carbon in developing countries.
2. Coordination of the support to the implementation by developing countries of activities relating to mitigation measures in the forestry sector, including institutional devices

The Warsaw framework invites interested Parties to design an entity or a national focal point. The entities or national focal points, the Parties and the relevant entities financing activities relating to the REDD+ have been invited to meet on a voluntary basis, on the occasion of the sessions of the subsidiary bodies, firstly in December 2014 and then each year during the sessions of June.

3. Operating modalities of the national forest monitoring systems

Since 2009, the developing countries have been encouraged to develop a national system that is reliable and transparent for surveillance of forests for the monitoring and reporting of REDD+ activities, possibly on the basis of monitoring and reporting at the sub-national level as an interim measure. The Warsaw framework recalls that this system must be based on the guidelines and the latest IPCC directives adopted or recommended by the COP and thus provide data and information that is transparent and consistent over time. The system must also be in accordance with the MRV provisions for Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA). It is also recognised that the national surveillance systems could also provide relevant information on the manner in which the guarantees are respected and taken into account.

4. Calendar and frequency for presenting summaries of information on how the guarantees are taken into account and respected

Since Durban, the developing countries undertaking REDD+ activities must provide a summary of information relating to the way in which the guarantees are respected and taken into account throughout the duration of the execution of activities. The Warsaw framework confirms that this summary must be included in the national communications or be transmitted by the channels of communication approved by the COP (such as the Biennial Updated Reports – BUR), the frequency thus conforming to that of national communications of developing countries. The Parties may also publish this summary voluntarily on the internet platform of REDD+ of the Convention.

5. Guidelines for the technical analysis of reference emission levels for forests and/or reference levels for proposed forests

The developing countries establish reference levels (RL) and/or reference emission levels (REL) to monitor the evolution of the forest cover and carbon stocks. The Warsaw framework confirms that the RL/REL will be subject to a technical assessment on a voluntary basis and sets out the objectives of this analysis. It is limited to assessing to what extent the information provided by the Parties is consistent with the guidelines, while offering a non-intrusive technical exchange of information whose purpose is to facilitate the calculation of RL/REL.

439. Decision 10/CP.19.
441. Inferior level at the national level. This could be regional, rovicial, community level etc.
442. Decision 4/CP.15.
443. Decision 12/CP.19
444. Decision 12/CP.17, para. 3.
445. Decision 1/CP.16
446. The platform can be consulted at: http://unfccc.int/redd.
The analysis should focus on different elements such as: the match with the information contained in the national GHG inventories, taking into account of historical data, the methods, approaches and data used, the description of policies and plans, etc. It is also confirmed that the RL/REL proposed will be assessed technically in the context of the granting of results-based payments.

The evaluation team will be composed of independent experts of the sector of land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) selected from the roster of experts of the Convention in a balanced way between experts from developing countries and from developed countries. The team will meet once a year in Bonn. A final report of the RL/REL and capacity-building needs will be published on the internet platform of REDD+ of the Convention after an exchange with the Party concerned.

6. Modalities of measuring, reporting and verification

The framework of Warsaw requires developing countries to include the data and information used to evaluate the emissions reductions resulting from activities of REDD+ in the BUR. The Parties wishing to benefit from financing focused on results will also have to submit a technical annex containing additional information on the results achieved. If such an annex is provided, two experts of the LULUCF whose names are included in the roster of experts of the Convention, will be included among the members retained for the technical team of experts in charge of examining the BUR.

7. Determining factors of deforestation and forest degradation

The Cancún Agreements encourage the Parties to identify and combat the deforestation and forest degradation factors. The Warsaw framework recognises that the measures to be taken to remedy this are a function of the situation, capacities and means of each country. The Parties, relevant organisations, the private sector and other stakeholders are invited to share their experiences through the internet platform of REDD+ of the Convention.

Certain methodological questions have been in suspense since Warsaw. They are on issues linked to guarantees, to advantages not linked to carbon and alternative modes of action for the integral and sustainable management of forests, like the joint approaches treating mitigation and adaptation.

In addition, certain experts are concerned as to the eventual consequences of finance focusing on results for developing countries. A country soliciting financial support not able to produce researched results could find itself in the same circumstances as that induced by the CDM process, which the similar conditions have led to a lower number of projects implemented in Africa. In addition, the notion of advantages not linked to carbon is not accepted as being part of the results in

448. Decision 14/CP.19
449. Decision 15/CP.19
450. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 68
the negotiations on the REDD+ process. For the record, many African countries, LDCs and SIDS are engaged in the REDD+ process first of all to favour their development, while contributing to the global reduction of emissions. Finance focusing on results forces them to aim solely on results in terms of mitigation. Bolivia thus proposed last October in Bonn to put in place a new mechanism, alternative to the REDD+, which would manage the joint implementation of mitigation and adaptation approaches and the global sustainable management of forests\(^{451}\). The provisional version of the Paris agreement dating from the 23rd October has an option foreseeing the creation of the *Joint mitigation and adaptation mechanism*\(^{452}\) which would be an alternative solution to finance focusing on results\(^{453}\).

### i. Guarantees

The 2010 Cancún Agreements were composed of seven guarantees\(^{454}\), now called “Cancún guarantees”. These have the aim of assuring that REDD+ activities are compatible with national policies and do not have negative environmental or social impacts.

These seven guarantees are:

1. Activities should complement the objectives of the national forestry programmes and international agreements pertinent or compatible with them;
2. National structures of forestry government should be transparent and efficient and take into account legislation and national sovereignty;
3. The knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities should be respected;
4. The integral and effective participation of concerned parties (in particular indigenous peoples and local communities) in the fight against logging and forest degradation, sustainable management and governance of forests, conservation and reinforcement of forest carbon, as well as activities relative to land problems and concern for sex equality;
5. Measures should be compatible with the preservation of natural forests and biological diversity, and aim to conserve natural forests and not convert them, while reinforcing social and environmental advantages;
6. Activities should take into account risks of reversal for CO\(_2\) stores (in case of fire for example the carbon stored by trees is expelled into the atmosphere);
7. Measures should aim to reduce displacement of emissions.

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\(^{451}\) IISD, 2015d, p. 4.  
\(^{452}\) Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism (JMA)  
\(^{454}\) Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, para. 2
Certain countries wished to overcome the absence of guidelines for guarantees to elaborate the summary of information on the way which guarantees are taken into account and respected (see the box on the Warsaw framework for the REDD+ below). Although previous decisions on the REDD+ insist on the sovereign character of the REDD+ initiatives taken by the countries, providing information on the guarantees is a condition of obtaining payments focused on results. It is expected that donors will pay a good deal of attention so as to assure the REDD+ initiative financed does not affect social and environmental conditions while contributing to the realisation of environmental and social benefits. Also Norway, the United States and the European Union have underlined the importance of formulating supplementary principles applicable to information systems relative to guarantees\textsuperscript{455}. It is to be noted that Brazil is the only country to have submitted its summary up to now\textsuperscript{456}.

At Bonn last June, the Parties agreed on a decision project which had for objective the comprehensiveness, the coherence and transparency of information provided by the countries on their guarantees\textsuperscript{457}. It is thus required:

1. to specify which REDD+ activities are targeted by the summary,
2. to include information on the appropriate national circumstances,
3. to provide a description of each guarantee, as understood by the country,
4. and describe the existing systems and processes which can help to take into account and respect guarantees.

It is also required to precise for each guarantee how it will be taken into account and respected. Finally, the draft decision affirms that the guidelines are sufficient and should not be replaced with other guidelines.

\textit{ii. Non-carbon benefits}

The issue of benefits not linked to carbon, such as the protection of biodiversity for example, are the subject of debate since the COP in Doha (2012). In fact, despite the opposition of some countries who have talked of the methodological difficulties related to the quantification of these benefits, many developing countries are considering a possible compensation for the benefits not linked to carbon on the basis of clear methodological guidelines. Certain countries like Bolivia, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, consider joint adaptation and mitigation, as a non-market approach, to be classed in the framework of advantages not linked to carbon. The LDCs, the Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC), and the African Group have insisted on the need for international guidelines in this area.

Finally, a draft decision was proposed in Bonn last June\textsuperscript{458}. It recognised the unique character of these benefits and the necessity of taking into account the national circumstances of each country. It invited the countries to share information

\textsuperscript{455} IISD, 2015b, p. 20
\textsuperscript{456} http://unfccc.int/land_use_and_climate_change/redd_web_platform/items/7282.php.
\textsuperscript{457} FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.5/Add.1.
\textsuperscript{458} FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.5/Add.3.
on the accounting of benefits across the web platform dedicated to REDD+ and
to interested financial institutions. As a compromise for countries not favouring
this approach, the draft decision precises that advantages not linked to carbon are
not a requirement for receiving finance for REDD+. However, it is observed that
this is not the sentiment of most African countries. The latter think that advantages
not linked to carbon are of a great importance and merit being clearly defined,
despite the difficulties and oppositions raised around this question in Bonn in
June 2015.

### iii. Alternative modes of action for the integral and sustainable management
of forests, such as joint approaches treating adaptation and mitigation

At the demand of Bolivia which considers that approaches treating adaptation and
mitigation involve long term finance which are different from payments focusing
on results\(^{459}\), this element was not without difficulty inscribed in the agenda.
Effectively, this issue had an important impact on the way which REDD+ activities
will be financed as it opens the way to a financing option dedicated to modes of
action different from actions benefiting from a finance focused on results.

A draft decision on other modes of action, such as common efforts towards
adaptation and mitigation for the integral and sustainable management of forests,
was finally elaborated at Bonn last June\(^ {460}\). This precises that modes of action are
submitted to the same guidelines as the other REDD+ actions and that they can
attract alternative finances to payments focused on results. So as to attract finance
sources, it is recommended to countries wishing to develop these approaches to
show how they contribute to the durability of REDD+ activities\(^ {461}\).

After Bonn in June 2015, all the draft decisions on the REDD+ issues (including
guarantees, advantages not linked to carbon and alternative modes of action)\(^ {462}\)
had no hook – which could symbolise a divergence – and could thus be adopted
without difficulty by the COP 21 in Paris.

This Bonn session closed 10 years of negotiations on the methodological
guidelines of the REDD+

### b. Agriculture (SBSTA)

In 2011, the Parties decided in Durban to hand the issue of agriculture back into
the hands of SBSTA with the aim of obtaining an agreement on this issue a year
later in Doha\(^ {463}\). Facing numerous divergences, the Parties have not yet found an
agreement to date on the components for a decision for agriculture.

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459. FCCC/SBSTA/2014/CPM.1.
460. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.5/Add.2.
461. Surveyors report.
462. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.5/Add.1, 2 and 3
463. Decision 2/CB.17, para. 75.
In fact, the developing countries are afraid of having to provide efforts of reduction of emissions in the agricultural sector. For these countries, the agricultural sector is a key economic sector representing sometimes more than one quarter of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), particularly in the LDCs. According to the developing countries, any commitments for mitigation for the agricultural sector could have severe adverse impacts on their economies. Thus, developing countries, particularly the LDC and the African Group, insist that discussion on agriculture be based on adaptation and take into account food security priorities\(^\text{464}\). Certain countries, like Chile, propose to envisage insurance mechanisms against extreme meteorological events having destructive consequences on the agricultural sector. For the European Union, this work programme offers moreover the opportunity to identify innovative practices allowing to face climatic variations. It prescribes the “landscape” approach, which allows an environment to be treated in its globality\(^\text{465}\).

Not able to agree on the implementation of a formal discussion group, informal debates regularly took place. At Bonn, two workshops were held:

- firstly, on the issues of early warning systems and contingency plans for extreme weather events and their effects, like desertification, drought, floods, mudslides, storm surges, soil erosion and the intrusion of salt water\(^\text{466}\);
- and secondly, the risk assessment and the vulnerability of agricultural systems in relation to different scenarios of climate change at regional, national and local levels, notably parasites and diseases\(^\text{467}\).

It is expected that the SBSTA examine the reports of these two workshops in Paris, without a draft decision being envisaged. These workshops were the occasion for certain countries to present their respective experiences in early warning systems and risk evaluations. During the first workshop, Russia asked for a closer collaboration to be established between the relevant organs of the Convention which treat adaptation, and research and systematic observation\(^\text{468}\). During the second workshop, China also proposed the organisation of periodic workshops in the framework of the NWP and the Adaptation Committee as well as the creation of regional centres for adaptation\(^\text{469}\).

The question of the implementation of a work programme on agriculture which deals with mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation is also envisaged. To the extent where it is today well understood that mitigation and adaptation should not be treated separately in this sector, this possibility seems to be considered in a growing manner as a possible solution to the question of agriculture in the negotiation process.

\(^{464}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2013/MISC.17.  
\(^{465}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2015/MISC.1.  
\(^{466}\) http://unfccc.int/land_use_and_climate_change/agriculture/workshop/8935.php.  
\(^{467}\) http://unfccc.int/land_use_and_climate_change/agriculture/workshop/8936.php.  
Main issues relating to agriculture

Which areas and scientific and technical works of the SBSTA should be addressed in 2015 and 2016?

How do we consider the issue of mitigation in this sector while avoiding the adverse consequences on the economies of developing countries, above all food security?

Should a work programme on agriculture which would address mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation be put in place?

4. The response measures (SBSTA and SBI)

Response measures, as they are understood in climate negotiations\textsuperscript{470}, are essentially measures taken by developed countries which can have negative social, environmental and economic consequences for developing countries, notably for the most vulnerable.

They are essentially mitigation measures, notably those favouring the development of clean technology, but also certain adaptation measures. Measures concerning clean technology are likely to have adverse effects on certain economic sectors such as the oil industry, and these could constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade. Since Bali, the integration of this issue in the agenda of climate negotiations has resulted above all in a demand supported partly by Gulf countries which want it to be considered in the same way as adaptation and mitigation\textsuperscript{471}.

This issue crystallises a strong opposition between developed countries and developing countries. The latter desire that concrete measures be taken by the first to limit the negative impacts of their measures linked to climate change and that this element of the agenda lead to strong decisions. In addition, they plead for supplementary support from developed countries to counter the destructive consequences of their measures\textsuperscript{472}.

This element of the agenda has evolved during the last years towards the creation in 2011 of a Forum operated jointly by SBI and the SBSTA\textsuperscript{473}. This forum has the objective to improve understanding of the impacts of the implementation of response measures. The programme of work of the Forum was adopted in Durban and is divided into several areas\textsuperscript{474}:

\textsuperscript{470} UNFCCC Articles 3.4, 3.5 and 4.1 (g) and (h) and articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol.

\textsuperscript{471} FCCC/SB/2012/MISC.2 for example.

\textsuperscript{472} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{473} Decision 8/CP.17, para. 3

\textsuperscript{474} FCCC/SBI/2012/15, Annex I.
The main negotiation issues

- Area (a): Sharing of information and expertise, including to account for the positive and negative impacts of response measures and in facilitating understanding;
- Area (b): Cooperation on the response strategies;
- Area (c): Assessment and analysis of impacts;
- Area (d): Exchange of experiences and consideration of the possibilities for diversification and economic transformation;
- Area (e): Economic Modelling and socio-economic trends;
- Area (f): Relevant aspects related to the application of decisions 1/CP.10, 1/CP.13 and 1/CP.16 and the provisions of articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol (issues treated by the SBI and the SBSTA);
- Area (g): Fair transition for the active population and the creation of decent and quality jobs; and
- Area (h): Establishment of individual and collective learning to operate the transition to a society emitting low greenhouse gases.

Since 2012, the Forum is held twice a year during the meetings of the subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC. Discussions, meetings of experts and workshops allow the Parties to discuss such issues as: What response measures are taken? What are their impacts and how to mitigate them? What are the alternatives to these measures?

The subsidiary bodies have also been mandated in Durban (2011) to review the work of the Global Forum and to decide if it should be maintained, with a view to formulating recommendations for COP-19(Warsaw) This issue being extremely contentious, Parties still have not come to an agreement during the COP-20 at Lima, although a draft text was annexed to decisions taken at the COP-20. This draft text was suspended at Warsaw in 2013 before being renewed at Lima. Consultations were held under the aegis of the President of the COP-20/CPM-10, Mr Pulgar-Vidal, without them reaching a concrete decision.

The principal issue is of the eventual creation of a mechanism dedicated to response measures, which is supported by the G-77/China. For Singapore, an institutionalised mechanism is necessary to examine response measures in a systematic way. Saudi Arabia demanded the implementation of a platform allowing the sharing of information on the incidences of response measures.

The principal issue is of the eventual creation of a mechanism dedicated to response measures, which is supported by the G-77/China. This possibility has been successively included and withdrawn from successive versions of the draft

475. Decision 8/CP.17
476. Decision 8/CP.17, para. 5.
478. IISD, 2014.
479. IISD, 2015b, p. 17.
480. IISD, 2014.
decision which should be adopted at Paris.\textsuperscript{481,482} The United States and Australia have suggested focusing on the version prepared in June by the SBSTA, which no longer referred to it.\textsuperscript{483} It foresaw the adding to the work plan of the forum supplementary themes such as economic diversification and transition of the workforce towards decent quality jobs.\textsuperscript{484} But finally, last October, a mechanism for response measures was newly integrated in the draft decision as an option.\textsuperscript{485} It thus proposed the reinforcement of institutional arrangements on response measures, among which the implementation of a dedicated cooperation mechanism and a special work programme on this theme. In addition, following the proposition of certain Parties, response measures were introduced in brackets in the draft of the preamble of the Paris agreement.\textsuperscript{486}

A third theme was proposed at Lima, but it did not figure any longer as an integral part of the work programme in the last projects of the decision: the evaluation and the analysis of impacts across economic modelling. For a good number of developed countries, this theme goes beyond the mandate of the Convention and resists its integration in the work plan.

It is proposed in this text to make a review of the work program every three years from 2018. Many countries also insist on the necessity of linking with discussion on the text of the post-2020 agreement.

The issue of response measures was broached again at Bonn during the last session of the ADP in October 2015. Certain Parties proposed to introduce it in the draft of the preamble of the Paris agreement. Sub-groups working on mitigation first of all and the pre-2020 period secondly, have also proposed options including these issues, in the last case in the framework of reinforcement of the technical examination process (TEP).\textsuperscript{487} The last provisional version of the Decision on the 23rd October 2015 thus includes options proposing the creation and reinforcement of institutional arrangements on response measures, among which the implementation of a dedicated cooperation mechanism and a special work programme on this theme.\textsuperscript{488}

Because of their political tenor, response measures are susceptible to being used to favour compromises on other issues. As for many sensible issues treated by subsidiary organs, the results of these discussions also depend on the taking into account of this issue in the future post 2020 agreement.

\textsuperscript{481} Annex of Decision 20/CP.20.
\textsuperscript{482} FCCC/SB/2015/L.2.
\textsuperscript{483} IISD, 2015b, p. 17
\textsuperscript{484} FCCC/SB/2015/L.2.
\textsuperscript{485} ADP, 2015h. B. Draft Decision, para. 33.
\textsuperscript{486} Ibid, Draft Agreement. Pp 5.
\textsuperscript{487} IISD, 2015d, p. 4, 5 and 9
Main issues relating to response measures

In what form should the Forum continue?

Should it become a mechanism that can decide on concrete actions or be restricted to a dialogue between countries?

At what frequency should it reunite and monitor to proposition of the COP decisions?

What will be its priorities?

What should be its priorities: the improvement of the transparency of the information submitted by the countries on response measures? Should its mandate comport an analysis and modelling function as well as decision-making?

Should it include supplementary themes such as economic diversification and transition of the workforce towards decent quality jobs?

5. Adapting to climate change

Adaptation consists of diminishing the vulnerability of a community or country to the climate changes of today and tomorrow. It is also a matter of resilience. Developing countries are generally the most exposed, and do not have the sufficient technical and financial means to face these new challenges which exacerbate realities already fragile and complex.

Principal questions linked to adaptation: the Nairobi work programme on the impacts of climate change and vulnerability and adaptation to these changes (section a p. 92, the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) (section b p.95) and the issues related to the least developed countries (LDCs) (section c p. 98).

a. Nairobi Work Programme on impacts of climate change, vulnerability and adaptation to these changes

Created in 2006, the Nairobi work programme on the impacts of climate change and vulnerability and adaptation to this change (NWP) is a mechanism for diffusion of information on adaptation. It aims to help Parties, particularly developing countries, to better understand the incidences of climate change notably in what concerns their vulnerability to these changes, as well as make informed decisions about adaptation.

489. Decision 2/CP.11, para. 1. and Annex
The NWP includes the Parties of the Convention, non-governmental, intergovernmental and community organisations, the private sector, professionals and sector experts\(^{491}\).

The activities of the NWP are organised around nine areas of work\(^{492}\):

- methods and tools;
- data and observations;
- climate modelling, scenarios and the application of models on a more local scale;
- climate-related risks and extreme events;
- socio-economic information;
- adaptation planning and practices;
- research;
- technologies for adaptation;
- economic diversification.

When requested by the SBSTA, regular workshops and expert meetings are organised on specific work themes supporting the NWP activities\(^{493}\). This includes for example the meeting of experts of the Adaptation Committee on the promotion of economic diversity and means of subsistence (7-8 September 2015 at Bonn)\(^{494}\).

In addition, the Internet interface of the NWP is intended to facilitate trade and to make public examples, by sector and by region, of adaptive practices, as well as the initiatives of the private sector’s share\(^{495}\). So as to facilitate access to documentation online and respond to different demands for information, it was decided last June that the Secretariat would develop an online information platform\(^{496}\).

The NWP uses the expertise of several partners and sets out their commitments. In April 2015, the number of partner organisations of the NWP reached 302 (a dozen more than the preceding year), while the number of promises of actions increased from 181 to 184 during the same period\(^{497}\). Figure 5 provides the thematic breakdown of these commitments.

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\(^{491}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2014/INF.7

\(^{492}\) http://unfccc.int/5137.

\(^{493}\) http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workshops_meetings/items/6989.php.

\(^{494}\) http://unfccc.int/adaptation/groups_committees/adaptation_committee/items/9030.php.


\(^{496}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.2

\(^{497}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2014/INF.7 et FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.2.
Since the instigation of the Adaptation Committee in the framework of the Cancún agreement (2010), the role of the NWP has been questioned several times. COP-19 also required an improvement in the relevance and effectiveness of the NWP and recommended that its activities be mutually reinforcing, that they relate to the issues and practices and that the NWP establish links with relevant works (such as the national adaptation plans, the technology mechanism, research and systematic observation, etc.) as well as with the relevant organs of the Convention.\footnote{Since Warsaw(2013), efforts were undertaken to avoid duplications between the mandates of the Committee and the NWP and to increase the level of participation in activities undertaken under the aegis of the NWP. The SBSTA-40 (Bonn, June 2014) met to assemble, analyse and diffuse information and knowledge. What should support planning and actions to engage in adaptation at the regional, national and infra national level, concerns notably ecosystems, human establishments, water resources and health, and this, before the SBSTA-45 end of 2016.\footnote{The Paris Conference will be the occasion to take stock of completed progress in what concerns the different activities. The SBSTA will be invited to approve the report of the NWP next December. The main issue will be to show an effective coordination between all the organs of the UNFCCC and its partners. Although the SBSTA recognised in Lima in 2014 the role of the NWP in the response to information needs carried out in the implementation framework of the Cancún adaptation, it is expected that the relevance of its existence and its efficacy will be reviewed at the COP-24, in three years.}}\footnote{498. Source: FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.2\footnote{499. Decision 17/CP.19, para. 2.\footnote{500. FCCC/SBSTA/2014/2, para. 19-27.\footnote{501. FCCC/ SBSTA/2014/L.23.\footnote{502. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.2, figure 1.}}}}}
The SBSTA-41 also called to Lima to diffuse relevant knowledge products developed by the Adaptation Committee so as to orient planning and actions in adaptation and put at the public’s disposition a compilation of good practices and available tools. The necessity of integrating approaches and tools for taking into account the dimension of the genre and local, indigenous and traditional knowledge and practices in the NAP was also underlined. Another important advance at Lima was the approval by the President for the COP-20 for the commitment of the UNEP through the Lima Initiative on knowledge relevant to adaptation (Lima Adaptation Knowledge Initiative) which aims to fill the existing gaps in knowledge so as to permit adaptation actions to pass to a superior level.

At Bonn last June, the NWP activities report was presented for adoption in Paris. It did not present any contentious issues, but insisted on the reinforcement of the collaboration and links with the NWP and other existing work groups on adaptation and recognised the contribution of partner organisation in different areas. This report shows the progress of different NWP activities as well as the next activities for 2016 which Parties must approve in Paris. Figure 6 below presents the different activities which will be undertaken from the SBSTA-45 in 2016.

Figure 6. Activities of the NWP from 2015 to 2016

503. FCCC/SBST A/2014/L.23.
504. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.2
506. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.2
507. Inspired by: FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.2
b. National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) (SBI)

The NAPs aim to build up the adaptation capacities of developing countries, mainly the poorest and most vulnerable countries, by allowing them to assess and reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. The NAP processes should be controlled by the countries in a continuous, participatory and iterative manner. Unlike the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), that have identified and prioritised the urgent needs for adaptation in the short term, the NAPs are broader and more cross-cutting. They cover the needs for the medium and long term and integrate into the development plans. As Figure 7 illustrates, the NAPs require important planning and coordination efforts between institutions at the national level, of which the form and the sequence of steps can vary from one country to another.

Figure 7. Example of the process of conception of an NAP


The principal issue relating to NAPs is on the manner of evaluating the progress of developing countries of the plans and to provide them with adequate support for their development and implementation. Guidelines became available in 2012 and several initiatives are running so as to favour the exchange of experience between countries. A workshop was thus held under the aegis of the Adaptation Committee in collaboration with the LEG the 16 and 17 April 2015 at Bonn. This will consist of experiences, good practices and lessons as well as discrepancies and the needs of countries in the formulation and implementation of NAPs. It ill also profit from the “Expo NAP” events which have, for the first time this year, enlarged the welcome to non-LDC developing countries.

During the April 2015 workshop, it was noted that most countries were in the elaboration stage of their NAP and that they have engaged several activities, such as consultation with stakeholders, putting in place of institutional arrangements and elaboration of travel plans. Twenty-three (23) LDCs thus took part in the world support programme for the NAPs. Several good practices have been recognised, such as the creation of a specific national mandate to assure long term coordination with the NAP processes, if possible at a high level, as well as awareness-raising for all stakeholders involved in their consultation. It has also been remarked that the NAPs will provide an excellent opportunity to support development priorities through adaptation efforts.

In addition, while many countries at Lima supported the NAP guidelines being revised, the COP estimated that this is not necessary at this stage. For them, efforts should focus on the improvement of relationships on the formulation process and the implementation of the NAP and exchanges between countries through workshops and the recently developed online platform “NAP Central”. The LDC are thus invited to transmit their NAP as well as results linked to the formulation process and the implementation of the NAP on the online platform. In July 2015, many countries had submitted their adaptation strategies documents for relevant planning, but only Mozambique had submitted its NAP.

In what concerns the financial and technical support of the formulation process and implementation process of the NAPs, the COP expressed its preoccupation at Lima concerning the lack of funds to meet the needs of the LDCs, and notably the

512. FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.6
515. FCCC/SBI/2014/INF.14
517. Decision 3/CP.20
The main negotiation issues

deficit in the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). This issue created a noticeable tension between developing countries wishing for a better predictability of funds by developed countries. This issue was reiterated at Bonn by the SBI, which encouraged the group of experts of the LDC to follow their collaboration with the GFC, notably in what concerns the preparation proposed by the latter. The objective was to study different possibilities to best help developing countries to access the GFC finance in view of the process of elaboration and execution of the NAP. In the last draft of a decision for the COP21, an option figures according to which an accelerated support programme for the LDC for the formulation and implementation of their NAP should be put in place by the GFC.

In addition, it is to be noted that a support program GSP-NAP for non-LDC countries will soon be financed by the SCCF.

Another preoccupation is based on the monitoring and evaluation of the NAPs by the SBI. To this effect, a draft decision is foreseen on this subject for adoption in Paris. Although the Parties did not have the time to elaborate this issue last June, the SBI has prepared a list of questions in view of evaluating progress on the elaboration progress and the execution of NAPs which will be discussed in Paris. These questions are:

1. Which stage has the country reached in the elaboration process and the execution of the NAPs?
2. How are stakeholders associated with the elaboration and the execution of the NAPs and what are the existing institutional mechanisms?
3. The existing support for elaboration and execution mechanisms of the NAPs.
4. What reference practices and teachings are involved in the process?
5. Monitoring and evaluation and reports relative to the process.
6. General evaluation and future lines of action in view of formulating recommendations after the monitoring and evaluation of progress conforming to paragraph 37 of decision 5.CP/17.

519. Decisions 3, 4 and 8/CP.20.
520. FCCC/SBI/2015/10.
522. FCCC/SBI/2014/INF.14
523. FCCC/SBI/2015/10.
Parties must agree at Paris on the answers to these questions as well as the monitoring modalities. It is foreseen that these questions will be strongly linked with those on the post 2020 agreement as certain countries are of the advice that the NAPs constitutes the base of the INDCs on adaptation.

c. The issues concerning the least developed countries (LDCs)

Article 4.9 of the Convention states that Parties should take fully into account, in their action regarding the financing and the transfer of technology, the specific needs and special situation of LDCs. In 2001, the COP 7 put in place for the LDCs a special work programme, a Group of experts (LEG) as well as a Fund525. An internet portal ("LDC Portal") brings together the activities and the information relating to LDCs526.

The implementation of the work programme of the LEG for 2014 and 2015527 will be evaluated in Paris. It is foreseen that the COP 21 will examine the state of advancement of the work of the group of experts, the question being to know if they should be kept, and if that’s the case, if their mandate should be maintained. The report on the review of the activities of the LEG528, presented during the 42nd session of the SBI last June, prompted discussion from several Parties on the activities of the LEG and its degree of efficiency for the technical support of the LDC in the elaboration both of the NAPAs and the NAPs and the stimulation of South-South exchanges, among others. It is also underlined that several of the documents prepared by the LEG are used by non-LDC countries.

Most of the Parties expressed in favour of maintaining the LEG after 2015, without agreeing on the duration of its mandate. The majority of developing countries envisage that the mandate will continue after 2020. Countries wishing its renewal largely insisted on the necessity of reinforcing collaboration with the existing institutions, such as the adaptation committee and the centre and network of climate technologies.

A list of elements for the future mandate of the LEG was prepared. It seems to orient the role of the LEG towards capacity-building at the national level at once for planning adaptation efforts and for access to financial sources to support these efforts, such as the GCF, the GEF and the Adaptation Fund. Support to the LDCs for the formulation of their INDCs is also mentioned. These advances must be confirmed at Paris with the formal adoption and the mandate renewal of the LEG and its role in the next years.

525. (b)Programme of work: Decision 5/CP.7, p. 32 and FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.13, para. 6
LDC Fund Decision 7/CP.7
528. FCCC/SBI/2015/6.
Adaptation-related issues

How to improve collaboration with the NWP and the other institutions involved in the adaptation issues, such as the adaptation committee?

How to ensure the diffusion of relevant knowledge products developed by the Adaptation Committee so as to orient planning and actions in adaptation and put at the public’s disposition a compilation of good practices and available tools? How to engage the centres and regional networks in these activities?

How to integrate approaches and tools for taking into account the dimension of the genre and local, indigenous and traditional knowledge and practices in the NAPs?

How to evaluate the progress of countries in the development of their NAPs and better incite Parties to share their experiences, notably across the Web portal dedicated to the NAPs?

How to increase the predictability and the amount of financing for the development and implementation of NAPs, including for countries that are non-LDCs?

What is the role to be played by the NAPs in the INDC of developing countries?

The guidelines, are they sufficiently based on real situations of LDCs, notably as regards the technical capabilities of these countries and the international support provided?

Should the mandate of the LEG be renewed and what should be its role?

The work of the LEG, are they sufficiently integrated and coordinated with those of other agencies and programmes, particularly as regards adaptation?

How to encourage the LEG to take more responsibility in matter of financial and technical capacity-building of countries?

Should it furnish support to the access of sources of financing for the formulation and the implementation of the NAPs?

Should the LEG be given a greater mandate authorising it to negotiate support with financial institutions towards the LDCs and other developing countries which do not manage to mobilise resources directly through technical and financial partners?

6. Issues related to the climate technologies (SBI)

Climate technologies related to all technologies that enable to support and reinforce policies of mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

The development and transfer of technologies assume special importance within the UNFCCC as they turn numerous mitigation and adaptation measures into reality\textsuperscript{529}. Several decisions encourage the development and transfer of technologies,

\textsuperscript{529} Article 4.1c, 4.5 and 9 de la CCNUCC, in particular.
headed by those that created the Technological Mechanism (Cancún, 2010)\textsuperscript{530}. The aim of this mechanism is to facilitate the reinforcement of technological development and transfer to support the climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. It comprises a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). Whereas the TEC supervises the assessment of technological needs and acts as a catalyst and promoter of technological cooperation, the CTCN advises the countries and facilitates the coordination between the national and regional technological development networks.

The Parties have been invited since Doha (2011) to name their Designated National Authorities (DNA) to develop and transfer technologies in order to facilitate the operational implementation of the CTCN\textsuperscript{531}. The DNA constitute national coordination entities responsible for interacting with the CTCN. In October 2015 137 DNA have been realised since Doha, including 31 in member countries of the Francophonie and 17 in observer countries\textsuperscript{532}.

In Lima, the COP 20 approved the common annual reports of TEC and CTCN for 2013 and 2014\textsuperscript{533}. On that occasion the Parties expressed their appreciation of the guideline notes of TEC on technologies of adaptation in the sectors of agriculture and water resources\textsuperscript{534}. In addition to preparing guidelines for mitigation technologies TEC must also pursue work on favourable conditions and obstacles as well as reinforcement of institutional mechanisms aimed at actively cooperating with bodies acting inside and out of the frame of the Convention, such as the Adaptation Committee, the Permanent Financing Committee (SFC) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

TEC must also present in Paris proposals to materialise results of evaluations of technological needs, in particular technology plans of action through realisable projects and to integrate economic, environmental and social aspects in the evaluation of technological needs. Since 1998 most developing countries have performed their evaluations\textsuperscript{535}. Already in 2013 the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had estimated that the 250 ideas of technology projects represented a cost of close to 25 billion US dollars\textsuperscript{536} (see the geographic representation and an estimate of costs in figure 8 below). Although few of these ideas have materialised today, in August 2015 32 of these countries had submitted their evaluation of needs in terms of technology\textsuperscript{537}.

\textsuperscript{530} Decision 1/CP.16, para. 117.
\textsuperscript{531} Decision 14/CP.18, para.12.
\textsuperscript{532} www.unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?TEM_ndes.
\textsuperscript{533} Decisions 16 and 17/CP.20.
\textsuperscript{534} Consult also: http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?TEC_documents.
\textsuperscript{535} http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?TNR_cre.
\textsuperscript{536} FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.7
\textsuperscript{537} http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?TNR_cre.
In addition, TEC is responsible for the Poznań Strategic Programme on technology transfer\textsuperscript{539}. Created in 2008, this programme was implemented by GEF, which supports the implementation of pilot technology projects, public-private partnerships that encourage technology transfer as well as the evaluations in terms of technology needs\textsuperscript{540}. As such, it must report on its activities to the COP, as was the case in Warsaw (2013)\textsuperscript{541}.

In Lima, the GEF presented its report on progress achieved\textsuperscript{542}. A good number of efforts of the Fund for the world environment are dedicated to aligning implementation of the Poznań Strategic Programme with the activities of CTCN and in this respect they were requested in June last year to communicate more detailed information on its cooperation with CTCN in future reports\textsuperscript{543}. Discussions also covered the need to intensify support of GEF in the preparation and implementation of results of evaluations of technology needs and to make available the contribution of the Poznań Strategic Programme in this effort. To complete the efforts of this fund the TEC is encouraged to consult the Parties, the FVC, entities of execution of GEF and other competent organisations on the means to increase efficiency of the technology mechanism.

\textsuperscript{538} http://unfccc.int/rtclear/templates/render_cms_page?TNA_ida.
\textsuperscript{539} FCCC/ADP/2014/8, para. 142.
\textsuperscript{540} www.thegef.org/gef/TT_poznan_strategic_program.
\textsuperscript{541} FCCC/CP/2013/3.
\textsuperscript{542} FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.4
\textsuperscript{543} FCCC/SBI/2015/10.
The interim report of the TEC presented in Bonn in June 2015 did not yet include recommendations, but specified the terms of reference for this evaluation.\(^{544}\) One of the objectives contained in these terms of reference included the identification of lessons that could be useful for the implementation of mandates for TEC and CTCN. The report also mentioned the selection of 14 projects representing financing of 58 million US dollars by GEF of which 11 have actually been implemented. These projects had been selected following a call for projects in 2009 and included projects in Ivory Coast and Senegal.

Regarding CTCN, the COP 20 requested it to perfect its procedures of processing requests and continue its work on the criterion relative to the structure of network applicable by the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and criterion of priority applicable by CTRC to respond to requests from DNA.\(^ {545}\) As of today the chances offered by proposed technology to attract private financing and to be replicated constitute important criteria according to experts.

### The main issues related to the transfer of technologies

- How to ensure support in the preparation and implementation of results of evaluations of technology needs of countries?
- How to integrate economic, environmental and social aspects and which are the sources of financing?
- What improvements to make to the Poznań Strategic Programme and which the lessons learned that can be useful for the implementation of mandates for TEC and CTCN?
- How to improve processing of requests of DNA by CTCN?
- Is it necessary to adapt criterion of evaluation of requests?

### Box 4 – RENEW LE ENERGY

Renewable energy is essential in any strategy aimed at arriving at a low-carbon economic model. During the Technical Experts Meeting that took place in Bonn, governments and parties taking part estimated that the objective of limiting global warming to \(2{}^\circ\text{C}\) was still attainable on the condition of rapidly and massively increasing the share of clean energy in the mix. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), it will be necessary to double the capacity of renewable energy from now to 2030 whilst applying economies almost as large.

\(^{544}\) FCCC/SBI/2015/INF.5
\(^{545}\) Decision 17/CP.20.
The following figure shows the path in reduction of GHG emissions that could be attained by the fifteen largest world economic countries if the offer of renewable energy was sufficiently significant:

Source: IDDRI
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/bonn-expert-meeting-on-renewable-energy-supply-faster-action-needed-for-2-c-goal/

**An encouraging evolution**
Investment in clean energy has been strong for the past ten years. In total more than 4,000 billion dollars have been invested in the sector of renewable energy since 2004. The sector of clean energy – including wind, solar, waste recycling, geothermal, small hydro plants and marine – now generate 9.1% of world electricity.

The strong decline in technology costs in particular solar but also wind has accelerated this trend. This, in spite of the strong fall in the price of a barrel during the year – which usually has a negative influence in renewable energy investments – has shown an increase in 2014 reaching 270 billion US dollars, two figures off the record in 2011 according to a report by the UNEP. Another positive signal is China, the largest GHG who has assumed the lead in financial commitments in this area.

7. **Capacity-building (SBI)**

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547. Decision 2/CP.7.
aim to allow developing countries and in transition towards a market economy to apply rules of the Convention and the process emanating from the Kyoto Protocol\textsuperscript{549}. Also, capacity-building affects both mitigation, and at today, the very elaboration of INDC.

Mexico, Ghana and Indonesia have elsewhere shared their respective challenges in terms of technical and institutional capacity in the frame of their INDC during the meeting last June in the Durban Forum\textsuperscript{550} on capacity-building\textsuperscript{551}. The Forum reviews capacity-building in depth, with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, so that everyone can share their experiences and exchange their ideas, best practices and lessons learned in terms of capacity-building activities carried out.

It met this past June to discuss specific theme questions on capacity-building in the frame of the Convention and contribute to the 3rd. comprehensive review of the implementation of the Frame for capacity-building in developing countries\textsuperscript{552}. This Forum provided the opportunity for representatives of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I, the Adaptation Committee, LEG, the Executive Committee of the Clean Development Mechanism, the TEC and the CTCN, as well as the Standing Committee on Finance to present work and the strength of their respective bodies in the promotion of capacity-building in developing countries. They mentioned different types of teaching material, regional workshops, online resources and technical guidelines as well as cooperation with other bodies.

This past June the Parties also started to prepare the terms of reference of the 3rd. review with the objective of finalising it in November 2016 at the COP-22\textsuperscript{553}, that will take place in Marrakesh. An important point of contention is on the role of the Forum to evaluate the performance of activities on capacity-building as a function of several indicators and to formulate recommendations concerning access to sources of financing including those coming from the private sector. It is also a question of creating a Council on Capacity-Building\textsuperscript{554}, something most developed countries refuse. In effect, they wish to limit the number of functional entities under the scope of the UNFCCC. For developing countries conversely it is necessary to create a body the same as for other capital questions that can go beyond the role of exchanges of the Durban Forum on capacity-building. According to certain observers these countries accentuate the highly transversal nature of the theme of capacity-building to defend the implementation of a specific body. They propose

\textsuperscript{549} UNFCCC Articles 4.5 and 6 and Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol.
\textsuperscript{550} http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12635e.html.
\textsuperscript{551} The Durban Forum was created under Decision 2/CP.17.
\textsuperscript{552} This took place on Wednesday 3 and Monday 8 of June. A summary of the discussions is available at the following addresses: http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12631f.html et http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12635f.html.
\textsuperscript{553} FCCC/SBI/2015/L.15
\textsuperscript{554} IISD, 2015b, p. 11.
to refer to concrete examples of the Parties that have already experienced implementation of an autonomous entity. However, the proposal appears not to progress to the extent that the Parties having opposite views hold their positions. In order to facilitate transparency of activities in capacity-building linked to climate change an internet portal has been created and presents different projects under way. The figures below present the distribution of these projects by region and type of activities.

Figure 9. Distribution of capacity-building activities by region and type

Distribution of activities per region

- Africa: 51%
- Latin America and Caribbean: 16%
- Eastern Europe: 3%
- Asia Pacific: 31%

Types of activity

- Application of Article 36 of the Convention: 12%
- Institutional capacity-building: 12%
- GHG inventories: 9%
- National communications: 9%
- CDM: 7%
- Improvement in the decision-making process: 7%
- Creation/optimisation of favourable conditions: 6%
- Vulnerability and adaptation assessment: 6%
- Research and systematic observation: 5%
- Development and transfer of technologies: 4%
- National programmes involving climate change: 3%
- Assessment of mitigation options: 3%
- Education, training and awareness-raising of the general public: 3%
- Information and constitution of networks: 2%

Main issues related to capacity-building

How can capacity-building activities at national scale be improved in developing countries or countries with economies in transition?

Which must be the criterion of performance to evaluate capacity-building in the frame of implementation of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol?

How can the lessons about capacity-building learned from good local or regional practices enrich the Paris agreement?

What institutional mechanisms must be introduced to support the implementation of capacity-building actions?

Is it necessary to create a new body and which should its role be if so?

8. Review and observation

a. State of science and observation (SBSTA and SBI)

In the Copenhagen Agreement in 2009 the Parties established the objective to reduce GHS emissions, to keep the rise in average temperatures below 2 °C of pre-industrial levels. The year after Cancún it was decided to review this objective periodically. This process, known commonly as the “review”, should therefore be particularly relevant for the discussions on a future agreement, especially in terms of the level of ambition.

The review process started in 2013 and will last two years. It was launched with the Doha decision (2012) which specified precise objectives of the review as well as modes of execution. The Parties thus agreed that the review aims to assess periodically and in priority the adequate nature of the long-term global objective of 2 °C and the overall progress made in achieving this objective. It was also decided that the review would take place in a joint SBSTA/SBI contact group and rely on the conclusions emanating from a Structured Expert Dialogue (SED). This expert group is responsible for ensure the scientific integrity of the review process.

The SED are an opportunity for the Parties to grasp the scientific results of the highest importance, mainly the reports of the IPCC, and to ask questions of the IPCC experts. Thus the COP 20 of Lima recognised that the 5th. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report represented the evaluation that was

556. Decision 2/CP.15, para. 1 and 2.
557. Decision 1/CP.16.
558. Decision 1/CP.18.
560. See: https://unfccc.int/7521.
561. The SED can be viewed online at http://unfccc.int/7521.
The most complete and robust on climate change, offering a point of view that was scientific, technical and socio-economic integrated in pertinent questions and that constituted the scientific basis of the ADP\textsuperscript{562}.

A few weeks from the end of the review process the main issues relate to the use of the final report on the SED\textsuperscript{563}, made available in Bonn this past June and on the scope of a possible decision in Paris. In effect, although several Parties wish to refer to the report of SED they do not agree on the nature of the decision. Should it cover the basic elements or limit itself to questions of procedure as desired by China and Saudi Arabia\textsuperscript{564}? In effect from what can be seen from informal discussions certain countries fear that the review may result in too specific recommendations on commitments to make by countries in the frame of a future agreement post 2020 and in particular through INDCs. In addition, AOSIS and the LDCs desire to use this element of the agenda to provide the scientific basis that can lead to the world objective in the long term of 1.5 °C\textsuperscript{565}.

The final report of the SED recognises that the objective of limitation of temperature to 2 °C is “inadequate” for certain regions and ecosystems. It should rather represent the upper bracket of the objective. It also recognises that, even if the state of science aimed at demonstrating that the objective of 1.5 °C is less robust, it constitutes a safer safeguard\textsuperscript{566}. It also argues that current efforts are not sufficient to reach the long term objective. It calls for a change in scale of efforts engaged. SED proposes therefore to consent to an approach encouraging implementation of a “buffer zone” rather than the adoption of a specific number. It also sustains filling the gaps in terms of knowledge for certain regions. This delay has been pointed out in particular for the regions that are most vulnerable such as Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean.

This issue created such an important dispute in Bonn last June that the unofficial draft could not be submitted. This draft text asked the Parties to note of the review for the period 2013-2015 during their participation in the ADP\textsuperscript{567}. The dispute arises mainly on the manner to conclude the review in Paris during the COP21 and use the conclusions to guide the ADP in the development of a text for the agreement. These conclusions would serve, among others, for directives for countries in the elaboration of their INDC. Many expect that the advance on the text of the agreement post 2020 will allow to unblock the situation and adopt a decision in Paris regarding the review.

\textsuperscript{562} Decision 12/CP. 20.
\textsuperscript{563} FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1.
\textsuperscript{564} IISD, 2015, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{565} http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/167_131_130777946613560472-UNFCCC-SBSTA-Bonn-June-2015-.pdf.
\textsuperscript{566} FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, Message 5. [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sb/eng/inf01.pdf.
\textsuperscript{567} http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2-9_i3_11jun2015t1630_np.pdf.
Main issues relating to the 2013-2015 review

Does the decision to end the process of review be limited to questions of form or should it include recommendations that the countries should take note of in particular in the preparation of the INDCs?

Will it conclude on the need to reduce GHS emissions, to keep the rise in average temperatures below 1.5 °C of pre-industrial levels?

How will the results of the review be used by the ADP, in particular regarding the preparation of the INDCs and the possible adoption of a collective objective?

b. Research and systematic observation (SBSTA)

The systematic observation is a research technique in which the researcher observes for themselves the facts on the ground and records them. It is "systematic" because the researcher does not proceed by chance but methodically.

According to the Convention, the Parties have to encourage and support the research work, systematic observation and the creation of data archives that allow for a better understanding of the phenomenon of climate change and the consequences of different response measures to mitigate it. To achieve this, the SBSTA cooperates with, among others, the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) and other partner bodies, such as the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the Committee of Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) and the Global Terrestrial Observing System (GTOS). The SBSTA reviews GCOS and GTOS execution plans on a regular basis.

It is in this context that following the presentation of the WMO in Lima the climate services of the Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS), the SBSTA recommended to request the latter to look into the variability of climate and exchanges at the national level, including to improve observations and surveillance of climate and to sustain the formulation and implementation of national processes of planning and adaptation.

We should also note that for several years now a rapprochement of work by GCOS with that of IPCC has taken place. Thus GCOS, in cooperation with IPCC and the Secretariat organised a workshop from February 10 to 12 2015 to identify the means of improve systematic observation and capacity in particular in developing countries in order to sustain the preparation and adaptation for climate change.

568. By virtue of Article 4.1 (g) and Article 5 of the Convention.
570. FCCC/SBSTA/2014/L.19
571. FCCC/SBSTA/2014/L.19
This element of the agenda is also the occasion to recall the importance of the first part of the 5th. report of evaluation by IPCC that took place in 2013 (The scientific bases) and to encourage scientific centres to review the gaps of data and research in particular concerning possible scenarios of warming by 2100 above 1.5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels as well as repercussions associated to scenarios at the regional and local levels.

A “dialogue on research” has been organised under the auspices of SBSTA since 2009. Under this dialogue, research programmes and bodies advise the Parties regularly of changes in research activities that are relevant to the needs of the Convention in order to improve communication between the Parties and the scientific community. The 7th. Dialogue last June dealt with the review of gaps in data and information, including those of IPCC, and on lessons learned and good practices to reinforce capacity in terms of knowledge and research, in particular in developing countries. Whilst the next Dialogue will take place in May 2016 during the SBSTA-44, the Parties ambitiously also wish to organise a research workshop at the same time as the SBSTA-46 in 2017. The themes to be discussed shall be dealt with at the SBSTA-44 in 2016.

Another issue is the visibility of information and the SBSTA encourages all efforts in this respect. The web site of UNFCCC now includes a page structured according to different fields of work: research, systematic observation, the analysis 2013-15 and cooperation with IPCC.

### The main issues relating to research and systematic observation

**Which will be the themes to be discussed by the research workshop in 2016?**

**Are the efforts to improve visibility of information sufficient?**

**How can we plug the gaps between the data and the international climate observation network?**

### 9. Scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of mitigation

Since the beginning of negotiations mitigation has been the subject of discussions by different bodies. In its decision 10/CP.9, the COP has requested the SBSTA in 2003 to carry out work on scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of mitigation by concentrating its efforts on “the exchange of information and data of experience and views between the Parties on the practical possibilities of facilitating the application of the Convention and solutions offered in this respect”.

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575. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2.
577. FCCP/CP/2003/6/Add.1, p. 22.
After, the SBSTA holds regular sessions in order to consider the most secure scientific data concerning mitigation of climate change and work under way of other bodies emanating from the Convention on related questions. In Bonn this past June the SBSTA decided to close this question578.

10. Questions relating to the mechanisms provided for by the Kyoto Protocol

The decisions of Durban and Doha on the Kyoto Protocol imply several methodological issues whose complexity is exacerbated by the progressive process of ratification of the Protocol. In Paris, the Parties will have the objective of clarifying the current scheme of Kyoto of accounting of emissions and absorptions in particular for the Parties that do not have commitments with figures attached to them for the second period (section a, below) It will be up to the Parties to reach an agreement on the interpretation of the request put forward by Kazakhstan (section b, p. 113). Finally, the admissibility of reforestation of forest lands whose soil is barren in the frame of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) will also be dealt with even when no decision is anticipated in Paris on this issue (section c, p. 113).

a. Methodological considerations related to the Kyoto Protocol (Articles 5, 7 and 8) and criteria applicable to the Parties included in Annex I to the Convention that have made no commitment (SBSTA)

Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol deal mainly with national systems for the development of the GHG inventory by the Parties (Article 5), the methodology used to prepare it and how it is communicated (Article 7) and its review by a group of specialist experts (Article 8). The decisions taken in Durban in 2011579 and the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol in 2012580 involve changes in the communication of information and the inventory review procedures. This has an important impact on the manner in which emissions and absorptions will be accounted for during the second period of commitment.

The Durban Decision introduced new definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines for the accounting of LULUCF-related activities for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol581. In particular, it makes the accounting of emissions and removals of forest management activities mandatory, whereas this was voluntary during the first commitment period. It also makes it mandatory for the Parties to estimate the emissions of fluorinated gases (hydro-fluorocarbon, perfluoro-carbon, sulphur hexafluoride and nitrogen tri-fluoride) when estimating

578. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2, para. 84 et 85.
580. Decision 1/CMP.8.
data and methods are available\textsuperscript{582}. The Decision also obliges the Parties to use the global warming potentials of the fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the 2006 IPCC guidelines for the second commitment period.

The Doha Decision limits the use of surplus assigned amount units (AAU) during the second commitment period\textsuperscript{583}. This decision is intended to ensure the environmental integrity of the Protocol. Since Doha, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol must keep their AAU to less than 2\% of their permits for the first commitment period\textsuperscript{584}.

After the adoption of the Doha Amendment that marks the start of the second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol the Parties identified different methodological issues that would imply amendments to the Kyoto Protocol. Among those issues the new modes of calculation of the AAU for the second period and their registration in the Doha Amendment in particular for Parties with transition economies and the updating of training programs for the purpose of expert teams that participate in the review for the second period of commitment are the most disputed. In Lima, the CRP-10 has elsewhere requested that the review process by experts mentioned in article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol for the last year of the first period of commitment be completed by no later than August 10 2015\textsuperscript{585}.

Regarding the modes of calculation of the AAU the session in Bonn enabled to unblock discussions and agree on provisions satisfactory to Ukraine. Projects of decisions were prepared for discussion and adoption in Paris\textsuperscript{586}. The most significant advance is on the inclusion of Russia in most draft decisions. These call on better clarity on the application of decisions of the Parties that are not mandatory under the second period of commitment\textsuperscript{587}. In Bonn, the Parties agreed on the inclusion of criterion for the Parties not having a commitment in the document that will be prepared by the Secretariat on the issues of accounting and notification\textsuperscript{588}. A separate element of the agenda was created to discuss accounting criterion, notification and review applicable to Parties mentioned in Annex I that do not have a commitment for the second period. However, no decision could be prepared in June last on this matter.

Insofar as the training programme for members of expert teams that will participate in annual reviews as per Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, a draft decision has been prepared for adoption in Paris\textsuperscript{589}. This includes a detailed description of the training.

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\textsuperscript{582. Decision 4/CMP.7.}
\textsuperscript{583. Decision 1/CMP.8.}
\textsuperscript{584. Decision 1/CMP.8.}
\textsuperscript{585. Decision 3/CMP 10.}
\textsuperscript{586. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.13}
\textsuperscript{587. IISD, 2015b, p. 23.}
\textsuperscript{588. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.13 and 10.}
\textsuperscript{589. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.13}
b. Clarification of the Doha Amendment (SBSTA)

Following the adoption of the Doha\textsuperscript{590} Amendment, Kazakhstan has requested clarifications on Section G of this Amendment\textsuperscript{591}. This section states that: "Any positive difference between the assigned amount of the second commitment period for a Party included in the Annex I and average annual emissions for the first three years of the preceding commitment period multiplied by eight shall be transferred to the cancellation account of that Party\textsuperscript{592}.”

Kazakhstan is a special case as it had no obligation to reduce emissions during the first commitment period. But the country now has an objective with figures for the second period. The question therefore arises of what basis should be used to calculate the annual average emissions of Kazakhstan\textsuperscript{593}. Since the end of 2013, the Parties discuss several options to clarify the nomenclature of section G. In the last draft decision\textsuperscript{594}, these options include:

1. the section does not apply to Parties that did not have objectives with figures of limitation and reduction of emissions during the first period of commitment (option that Saint- Lucie wishes to eliminate whilst Turkey, Kazakhstan and Belarus wish to maintain it\textsuperscript{595});

2. the section applies to Parties having objectives for the second period even if they did not have during the first period and the average of emissions for years 2008 to 2010 is used for the Parties without objectives in the first period of commitment;

With respect to the chosen options, certain Parties may have to cancel significant numbers of units to meet this requirement. These cancellations can endanger the ability of these Parties to comply with their commitments for the second commitment period and/or reduce the number of units that this Party can be in a position to use in a future mechanism. For this reason, negotiations in Paris on this issue will apparently be arduous.

c. Taking into account the reforestation of forestry lands in exhaustion as afforestation and reforestation activities under the CDM (SBSTA)

The question of making afforestation activities of forestry lands in exhaustion eligible under the CDM has been discussed intensely for several years. These relate mainly to the definition of forest land whose soil is depleted. In effect, this definition would have a direct incidence on the manner in which the promoter of a CDM project could prove that the forest is in the process of depletion. Given that Brazil

\textsuperscript{590} Decision 1/CMP.8.
\textsuperscript{591} FCCC/KP/CMP/2013/7.
\textsuperscript{592} FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{593} FCCC/KP/CMP/2013/7
\textsuperscript{594} FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.11
\textsuperscript{595} IISD, 2015b, p. 23.
strongly insisted that this element be on the agenda, they proposed in May 2012 that admissible lands be those where one can prove were converted to non-forest activities five years before the start of the project through the last harvest. Such an activity would maintain both the vegetation cover and the integrity of the soil. However, a possible negative externality of the practice is that forestry lands could be exhausted deliberately so that carbon credits can be claimed for the reforestation activities.

Even when no decision was adopted since the 33rd. session of the SBSTA, none is expected in Paris.

### Issues related to the Kyoto Protocol

What are the methodological impacts for the accounting of emissions and removals from the Durban and Doha Decisions that have to be resolved?

Which should be the criterion of accounting, notification and review applicable to Parties in Annex I that do not have a commitment for the second period?

How should Section G of the Doha Amendment be interpreted, especially for the Parties included in Annex I of the Convention that had not make a quantified commitment to limit or reduce emissions for the first commitment period?

What are the implications on the level of effort that the Parties must provide to conform to their commitments in figures?

Is the reforestation of forestry lands in exhaustion eligible as an afforestation and reforestation project activity under the CDM?

### 11. Methodological issues relating to the Convention

#### a. Methods for reporting on financial information for Parties included in Annex I to the Convention

In Lima, the mandate of the SBSTA to recommend a decision on the methods of notification of financial information was postponed by a year for adoption in Paris by COP21. This issue is strongly linked to those of notification and financing. And it implies close cooperation with the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), created by the Cancún Agreements. The Standing Committee was created by the Cancún Agreements to assist the COP in managing the Convention’s financial mechanism, particularly to improve the coherence, mobilisation and coordination of the financing.

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596. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/MISC.10
597. Ibid.
599. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 112.
In Bonn, a joint workshop with SBI, SBSTA and SCF was organised in order to allow countries to exchange views on this issue on the basis of a technical document summarising existing international methods for notification of financial information\(^{600}\). This document describes the difficulties encountered by the SCF in the first biannual evaluation of climate finance flow, such as the quantification of private financing as well as existing initiatives that contribute to improving follow up in climate financing, including for example the initiatives of multilateral development banks and those of the OECD.

Most of the Parties agree on the importance of biannual reports to facilitate transparency as well as the need for a common terminology and to avoid duplication of efforts of notification between different initiatives and institutions. Certain countries wish to avoid possible confusion between information submitted through national communications and those submitted through biannual reports and therefore call for harmonisation\(^{601}\). Several countries are also in favour of this exercise of notification of financial information to measure their efforts on the objective of mobilising of 100 billion US dollars from now to 2020 and to facilitate the process of verification and aggregation of efforts of information submitted. One of the improvements proposed is to specify the statute of granted financing as follows: “provided”, “committed” or “promised”\(^{602}\).

With the anticipated presentation in Paris by the SCF of an update of its work concerning the MRV of support and its recommendations on the methods of notification of financial information\(^{603}\), it is expected that this issue be the object of special attention in Paris. In effect, the SCF recommendations should be taken into consideration in any decision draft submitted to COP 21.

b. Common metrics

The common metrics allowing to calculate the equivalences in CO\(_2\) of different greenhouse gases through the use of global warming potential (GWP). One can also quantify in the same manner in all countries the contribution of greenhouse gas to global warming over a given period based on radiation properties\(^{604}\).

It is a question here of deciding if the new GWP should be adopted in order to consider the scientific advances of the 5th. Report of the IPCC\(^{605}\).

\(^{600}\) FCCC/TP/2015/2.
\(^{601}\) FCCC/TP/2015/2 et FCCC/SBSTA/2015/MISC.3.
\(^{602}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2015/MISC.3, p. 16.
\(^{603}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2, para. 48.
\(^{605}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.8
In Bonn this past 7 June, a special event was organised on the common metrics and gave IPCC the opportunity to provide information on its work and conclusions regarding common metrics in the context of the 5th. evaluation report. The challenge on the scientific and methodological uncertainties linked to the development of the GWP, certain Parties expected that the 5th. evaluation report of IPCC fill the gaps.

The workshop had an informative objective and the discussion will continue in May 2016 during the SBSTA-44. In this manner, no discussion is expected to take place on this issue in Paris.

c. Emissions from fuel used in international air and maritime transport (SBSTA)

The question of fuels used in international air and maritime transport has aroused many differences over several years. The Parties agree on the fact that the two UN special – the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) - are the proper ones to deal with GHG mitigation in these sectors. However, they do not agree on the responsibilities that the CCNUCC could demand of them in terms of emissions reductions according to what emerges from informal discussions. Several developed Parties have thus made reservations concerning possible requests that the CCNUCC process may formulate in regards to these two organisations.

At the request of the Parties, ICAO and IMO presented in Bonn in June last their work relative to emissions from transportation in the marine and air fields. Among the objectives ICAO mentioned its ambition to improve the efficiency of fuel of 2% and to maintain emissions of CO₂ of the aviation sector at the same level as from 2020. The activities of ICAO covers equipment, operational improvement, alternative fuels and the implementation of a world wide mechanism. Seminars on capacity-building are also proposed for member countries in order to support them in preparation of their plans of action.

The IMO for their part advocate above all the adoption by its Committee on protection of marine environment modifications to the directives on energy efficiency as well as implementation of a standard of energy efficiency for new ships.

In this past June developing countries insisted on the necessary respect of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities whilst Japan challenged the application of this principle to the aviation sector. Wishing to avoid negative impacts on mitigation measures in the aviation and marine transportation on developing countries Argentina expressed in the name of a number of countries to be opposed to disguised commercial restrictions and unilateral measures.

607. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.8
608. Decisions 4/CP.1 and 18/CP.5. Validé and the enforcement of 1 si forest users is of paramount importance to both for the formulation and the enforcement of 1
609. FCCC/SBSTA/2015/MISC.4
610. IISD, 2015b, p. 22.
Although there is little chance that this element of the agenda be the subject of an agreement in Paris the draft text of an agreement post 2020 includes an option to manage emissions of GHG for the marine and air transportation sectors\textsuperscript{611}. It provides a contribution by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation to obtain an agreement on concrete measures to limit fuel emissions and on fuels used by air planes and ships.

One of these options is the implementation of reduction of emissions for these sectors which would certainly lead to important debates in the framework of the ADP negotiations (see section A, p. 19).

### The main methodological issues relating to the Convention

Is it necessary to agree on a common terminology for climate finance?

How to avoid duplication of efforts of notification between different institutions?

Should the application of demands for notification of financial information serve to evaluate the realisation of the objective of mobilising 100 billion America dollars from now until 2020?

Are the initiatives of encouraging mitigation in the marine and aviation sectors by ICAO and IMO sufficient?

Are they respectful of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities?

### 12. Gender equality of the sexes in the context of climate change negotiations

Gender refers to the analysis of the status of men/women, the characteristics of each sex, social relationships between men and women or still socio cultural perceptions linked to each sex\textsuperscript{612}.

The recognition of man/woman equality implies recognising the particular vulnerabilities of each sex in the face of climate change. Yet, climate disruption tend to aggravate social and economic inequalities: generally more affected by poverty and precariousness women are also often more vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. At the same time numerous parties agree to affirm that regular activities of


women are closely linked to the environment and climate and that in this respect they could have an important role to play. Their central role in education of children is also underlined.

The subject of gender was dealt with as early as during the Rio International Conference in 1992. The Agenda 21 adopted identified women as one of the “principal groups” of civil society whose participation was judged essential for the realisation of sustainable development. Chapter 24 of this document titled « Global action for the participation of women in sustainable development », was thus dedicated to them. The question of sex equality in climate negotiations also finds its origin in the Beijing Declaration of the fourth world conference on women in 1995 which in particular affirms: “The reinforcement of power of action of women and their full participation on the basis of equality in all fields of social life, including decision-making and access to power are essential conditions for equality, development and peace.”

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**Box 5 – GENDER AND CLIMATE**

The gender aspect is a transversal issue that - although not always considered central in the history of negotiations - is no less of great importance. In effect, taking into consideration the differentiated role of women and men would allow to better fight against climate change and better adapt to it.

In numerous countries, in particular the most vulnerable ones, women are the first victims of climate change. It is they who cook, fetch wood and bring water. It is therefore they who should be the first to be trained to energy saving, who will be the first beneficiaries of the introduction of renewable energy and they who would be the first to suffer from a lowering of the water resources. In their central role as educators of children they are also at the forefront of awareness for future generations.

Better representation of women among negotiators and inside the different organisations created as a result of the Convention would allow to better consider the crucial matter. For the time being progress on the subject is unanimously considered as being still insufficient.

On the other hand, the question of gender has been, for now, essentially dealt with from an organisational point of view whilst many consider that only a global approach would be fit for the issue.

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Based on the Beijing Declaration, the COP7 (2001) put forward in Marrakesh the need to have a more balanced representation of both sexes among elected members of the bodies created under the CCNUCC and the Kyoto Protocol. But ten years later the Parties recognised in 2012 at the COP18 in Doha that in spite of declarations of intentions women continue to be under represented in these bodies. To correct this situation they have established the objective of bringing a balance of women/men inside the bodies of negotiation and decision. Reaching this objective will be reviewed in 2016 during the COP 22 in Marrakesh. However, it appears that there is still a long way to go. According to the annual Report on the composition of sex establishing progress accomplished presented in Warsaw in 2013, parity has only been reached in one body constituted under the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol. On average women represented only 23% of staff in these organisations in 2013.

Other than the question of parity in decision instances, gender equality appears more generally as linked to efficiency of climate action. Thus, in the agreements of Cancún, in 2010, the Conference of Parties recognised that “gender equality and effective participation of women (...) are of great importance to act efficiently on all aspects of climate change”.

As from 2011, the Parties will attempt to go beyond the declarations of principle come up with dealing with this issue in more practical terms. During the COP17, the Secretariat requested the inclusion, in the frame of the Nairobi Work Programme on incidences of climate change and the vulnerability and adaptation to these changes, the application of methods and tools respecting gender equality. It is a question of having the policies relative to climate responding to the differences of men and women in the national and local context. Equally decision 23/CP.18 aims in particular to allow more efficient consideration of the needs of women and men in climate policies on the basis of equality.

Another progress in COP18 in 2012 was the recognition, in the programme of Doha on article 6 of the Convention, that the problem of gender equality is an inter-sector question that concerns all elements of this article, i.e.: the programmes of education and awareness of the public on climate change and its effects; public access to information concerning climate change and its effect; public participation in the review of climate change and its effect and clarification of appropriate measures.

616. Decision 36/CP.7.
618. FCCC/CP/2013/4, table 1.
619. The Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on national communications for Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.
620. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 7.
621. Decision 6/CP.17.
623. Decision 23/CP.18, para. 2.
to face them; training of scientific, technical and management staff; international cooperation in terms of design and exchange of educational material or awareness of the public towards climate change and its effect and programmes of education and training\(^{624}\). Another sign of the growing importance given the subject the COP18 has anticipated the organisation of a first workshop on gender. To materialise the result of Doha, said workshop took place in Warsaw in 2013\(^{625}\).

Following the work conducted under the auspices of the SBI in 2014, the COP20 established a programme of work in Lima regarding gender over two years\(^{626}\), whose results should be reviewed during COP22 in 2016. The Programme deals in particular with the question of women representation in bodies created under the Convention, climate policies sensitive to gender, and tools allowing to integrate the question of gender into activities related to climate change.

Regarding the first subject, the Parties are encouraged to favour training and capacity-building of representatives, in particular the PMA and PEID of African countries.

The Programme also provides for holding workshops. The first took place in Bonn in June 2015 under the auspices of the SBI, and covered mitigation as well as development and transfer of technology\(^{627}\). The question of definition of terms linked to the subject of gender was also dealt with. The report of the workshop should be reviewed by SBI during its 43rd. session simultaneously with COP 21\(^{628}\). The second workshop is anticipated for May 2016 and will deal particularly with adaptation, capacity-building and training of representatives of parties working on gender related questions. In this perspective the Parties are invited to share their views on these questions no later than February 3 2016. Other workshops could also be organised another subjects as a function of needs\(^{629}\).

The Secretariat will for its part have to prepare a technical report on the directives and other tools allowing to integrate questions of gender in activities related to climate change for review by SBI at its 44th. session in May 2016.

During preparatory work for this, the African Group had called for the creation of a frame on gender in the context of climate change to go beyond simple participation of women\(^{630}\) in activities related to climate change. Jamaica had in turn expressed that according to them actions to be proposed should be guided by

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624. Decision 15/CP.18, Annex para. 8.
626. Decision 18/CP.20.
628. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 11.
630. IISD, 2014, n° 609, p. 4.
gender equality and not only gender equilibrium\(^{631}\), a recommendation that was only partially taken into consideration in the decision of COP20 in Lima. It invites in effect the Parties to “advance gender balance” and recommends they “achieve gender-responsive climate policy in all relevant activities under the Convention”\(^{632}\). The group Women & Gender Constituency made a call in December 2014 for a binding agreement in Paris during COP21, ambitious and transforming that respects human rights, gender equality and rights of future generations. It is also favourable to the integration of this subject in the CPDNs, in implementation measures\(^{633}\) and in discussions on development and transfer of technology. It proposed in the respect of this last subject a workshop on gender and technology in the framework of the Technology Mechanism created in 2010\(^{634}\).

The Conference of Lima was also an occasion to incite various bodies created under the Convention such as the Fund for Global Environment and the Green Climate Fund to integrate or reinforce integration of questions of gender in their activities\(^ {635}\).

The subject of gender equality is the object of large consensus among the Parties, both developed and developing countries, as a general and guiding principle even if Saudi Arabia wishes to replace the concept of gender equality by that of “sensitivity to questions of gender”\(^ {636}\). Numerous Parties among which countries of AILAC, LMDCs, LDCs, Switzerland, Norway, Australia and Turkey have thus made a call last September to include equality of gender in the preamble of the agreement in Paris\(^ {637}\). The EU and India had already made similar calls in June last\(^{638}\). The EU, the African Group or even AILAC, among others had also requested that it appear in the objectives\(^{639}\).

These proposals are presented in the draft agreement\(^{640}\) prepared during the ADP-11 that took place in Bonn October 19-23 2015. It is also anticipated that adaptation, in particular, follow the same approach sensitive to gender. Equality of sexes appears also in the draft decision relating to the adoption of the agreement. However, the text of provisional versions of the agreement such as the decision remained only temporary at Bonn. One cannot prejudge how the subject will finally be integrated.

\(^{631}\) IISD, 2014, n° 613, p. 2.

\(^{632}\) Decision 18/CP.20, para. 1.

\(^{633}\) IISD, 2014, n° 617, p. 2.

\(^{634}\) IISD, 2014, n° 614, p. 2.

\(^{635}\) Decision 8/CP.20, para. 17 and 18.

\(^{636}\) IISD 2015c, p. 5.

\(^{637}\) IISD 2015c, p. 4.

\(^{638}\) IISD, 2015b, p. 5.

\(^{639}\) IISD, 2015c, p. 5.

The main issues of the question of gender equality in the context of climate change

Is it necessary to search an “equilibrium” man/woman or “equality” in the sense of bodies created under the CCNUCC and the Kyoto Protocol?

Which should the practical modes of integration of the question of gender in the definition and implementation of policies relative to climate in order to favour gender equality?

Which should be the definitions of terms linked to the subject of gender?

Should the agreement of 2015 refer to man/woman equality?

Should gender equality be one of the objectives of the Paris agreement?

Box 6 – OBJECTIVES OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a set of seventeen global objectives to end poverty, fight against inequality and injustice and face climate change. The concept was elaborated in 2012 at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20) They were then adopted by member states of the UN in September 2015 during the Summit of the United Nations on sustainable development. The SDG replace, as from 2015, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000.

The creation of the MDGs were born from a verification that: Only by adopting a multidisciplinary approach bringing together the three pillars of sustainable development, i.e. social, economic and environmental questions would it be possible to cope with the transition necessary to guarantee human well being and respect for the environment in the long term. The MDGs effectively enabled to make huge progress towards established objectives and thus prove interest in a integrated global programme. However, there has been criticism that not enough has been done to alleviate poverty, negligence between different subjects and lastly, not having dealt sufficiently well with environmental issues.

The new SDGs that will guide policy and financing for development over the next fifteen years are a response to that criticism. These 17 objectives are the following:

1. Eradicate poverty in all its forms and everywhere in the world
2. Eliminate hunger, achieving food security, improving nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture
3. To allow everyone to live in good health and promote well-being for all at any age
4. Ensure quality education in equality and promote learning opportunities throughout life for all
5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
6. Guaranteeing universal access to water, sanitation and sustainable water resource management
7. Ensure access for all to reliable, sustainable, modern and affordable energy
8. Promoting sustained economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
9. Building a resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and encourage innovation
10. Reduce inequalities within countries and from one country to another
11. To ensure that cities and human settlements are open to all, safe, resilient and durable
12. Establish sustainable consumption and production patterns
13. Take urgent measures to fight against climate change and its impact
14. To conserve and sustainably exploit the oceans, seas and marine resources
15. To preserve and restore terrestrial ecosystems, ensuring exploiting them sustainably, manage forests, fights against desertification, revert that process of soil degradation and end impoverishing biodiversity
16. Promoting the advent of peaceful societies, and open to sustainable development, ensure access of all to justice at all levels, effective institutions, responsible and open to all
17. Strengthen the capacity of the global partnership for sustainable development and revitalize it.
A beginning rather than an end... the expectations of the COP 21 and CMP 11

The agreement that should be adopted during the Paris climate change conference, the preparation for which started in 2011 with the adoption of the Durban Platform, is destined to be a landmark in the history of climate negotiations. During this conference that will serve as both the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the Convention and the 11th Meeting of the Parties (CMP 11) to the Kyoto Protocol, new commitments should be made for both the 2016-2020 period and for post-2020 to combat climate change by ensuring low-carbon development that can increase the resilience of populations and economies.

In preparation for this agreement, and following the 2014 Lima Call for Climate Action, the Parties have communicated throughout 2015 their intended nationally determined contributions (INDC) to the UNFCCC Secretariat. These present the effort that each one is ready to make individually and voluntarily to achieve the objectives of the Convention, mainly in terms of reducing or limited greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Out of the 196 Parties of the UNFCCC, 156641 had submitted them as at 30 October 2015. This would account for 87% of global GHG emissions642. This massive participation demonstrates the strong willingness by both developed and developing countries to reach agreement in Paris. Although these commitments are still well below what is needed to reach the Convention’s goal of limiting average global warming to 2°C in 2100 compared with pre-industrial levels (current commitments would only limit warming by 2.7643 to 3.5°C644, i.e. 1 to 1.8°C less than the average temperature that would be achieved by continuing

641. The EU (itself a Party) did this in the name of its 29 member States.
with our current emission trajectory without effort\(^{645}\), the fact that the Parties have made genuine commitments encourages optimism on the possibility of finding mutual ground in Paris. This is confirmed also in certain topics that seem to reach consensus, like the willingness to grant increased importance to adaptation or to reach a legally-binding agreement during the COP 21.

The Parties nevertheless have topics where they disagree significantly. The question of principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities has been a source of major tension between developed and developing countries. The developed countries would like to re-examine the annexes to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1992 and 1997 respectively\(^{646}\). These annexes distinguish between the Parties based on their development level at the time as well as on the historical responsibility for accumulated emissions and serve as a basis for each other’s obligations with respect to commitments to be made by each one. The developed countries maintain that the world has changed over the last two decades and there must now be a subtle distinction. Other Parties feel that they could share the burden and be obliged to reduced their greenhouse gas emissions radically whilst contributing to the financing and capacity-building and technological needs in countries that need them most\(^{647}\).

Furthermore, many developing countries criticise their industrialised counterparts for not having met their pre-2020 commitments, without counting the insufficient mitigation commitments that raise even further doubts over their adaptation capacities. It seems essential to raise the ambition for the current period to boost inter-Party trust and facilitate achieving agreement in the negotiations on the post-2020 period\(^ {648}\).

To complicate things, a certain number of Parties – mainly particularly vulnerable developing countries - are also looking to modify the 2°C global warming limit goal that has figured in the COP decisions since Copenhagen in 2009. This temperature goal would not be enough to meet the ultimate UNFCCC goal, which is to “limit the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”\(^{649}\). These countries are therefore pleading for a temperature rise goal of less than 1.5°C\(^ {650}\).

Nor is the actual scope of the adaptation issue totally consensual. Although the Parties agreed in Lima (COP 20, 2014) to consider mitigation, adaptation,

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\(^{645}\) Ibid.
\(^{647}\) See Sheet 8, the positions of different Parties.
\(^{648}\) See section 1. p 19.
\(^{649}\) UNFCCC, article 2.
\(^{650}\) See especially Sheet 9, the positions of AOSIS, ALBA, the Coalition of Rainforest Nations and the LDC.
finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building and transparency of action and support in a balanced manner within the 2015 agreement as pillars of the future agreement, instead of concentrating mainly on mitigation, as had been the case until then, opinions diverge on how to achieve this. Thus, certain developing countries have decided to include them in their INDC, whereas the developed countries believe that they must focus on the theme of mitigation (see the Party positions, sheet 8). Certain Parties, like the members of the African Group, have also proposed the adoption of a global adaptation goal linked directly to the global mitigation objective. Major mitigation measures could, in fact, reduce the adaptation costs and vice versa. Consensus has yet to be reached on this point, however.

The question of dealing with the consequences of climate change to which it would be impossible to adapt - loss and damage – and setting up a possible compensation regime or increased cooperation is also under discussion. Whereas the most vulnerable countries wish to give major importance to this question, certain developed countries wish to minimise it.

Financing, central in all UNFCCC negotiations, is another very sensitive issue under the Paris agreement. Since Copenhagen in 2009, the developed countries have committed to mobilise every year, from 2020 onwards, 100 billion US dollars for climate projects. Although consensus has been reached over this goal and the major role to be played by the Green Climate Fund, many questions are still outstanding. How to mobilise these funds, their main sources (public and private), how to account for them, transparency and monitoring and the predictability of these funds are all points for which the Parties must reach consensus in Paris. The low capitalisation of the GCF, which had only collected about 10 billion US dollars in October, is a seemingly worrying signal for certain developing countries. COP 21 could be an opportunity for numerous Parties to announce their participation in the capitalisation of this fund.

The negotiations promise to be complex, but the momentum is positive. In early November, China thus announced for the first time during a joint presidential statement with France that it was in favour of a binding agreement in Paris. The fact that the largest emitter of greenhouse gas in the world has taken such a position augurs well for the outcome of negotiations. As for the African Group, member

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651. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 2.
653. See section c p 37.
countries will speak with a single voice, it will not sign an agreement without ambition, its spokesman stated in a press interview\textsuperscript{656}. Another strong signal of the political support enjoyed by the future agreement, the Parties should be represented at the highest level. Heads of State and Government have been invited to the opening of the COP 21 and large numbers should be attending (see Sheet 9).

At the same time, mobilisation is without precedent within the civil society, among local governments and players from the private sector\textsuperscript{657}. Everything is genuinely bubbling over with very many events scheduled throughout 2015 (see Sheet 9) and large citizen demonstrations, especially the “Global Climate March” that will take place in cities the world over on 28-29 November, just before COP 21.

We are seeing a new form of mobilisation, approach and consensus: the solution will come from universal mobilisation by all and the bottom-up approach will be at the heart of the Paris agreement. We can only hope that the fizz is not just a shake-up, but a source of real, concrete and workable responses. The burning question remains in what form and with what legitimacy and guarantees could they be applied. The “measurable, reportable and verifiable” (MRV) process remains essential on this last point.

A successful agreement in Paris is a crucial issue. The majority of Parties now seem to be conscious of this. This should be a driving force towards a positive outcome in the negotiations. Paris is also the “Summit of Solutions”, thereby already opening the page to the implementation changes that will be at the heart of COP 22 in Marrakesh in 2016.


\textsuperscript{657} See especially Sheet 13 on the UNFCCC side discussion forums.
### Sheet 1. Timeline of important milestones in the negotiations on climate change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Important milestones</th>
<th>Negotiation terms</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td><em>Submission of the first Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)</em></td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td><em>Second IPCC evaluation report submitted</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>COP 1 – Berlin</td>
<td>Berlin Mandate</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>COP 2 – Geneva</td>
<td>Second IPCC evaluation report presented</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>COP 3 – Kyoto</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>COP 5 – Bonn</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>COP 6 – The Hague</td>
<td>Conference suspended as not all the questions regarding the protocol application rules could be settled</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Third IPCC evaluation report submitted</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>COP 6 resumed - Bonn</td>
<td>Bonn Agreements: agreement on the implementation of the Protocol</td>
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<td></td>
<td>COP 7 – Marrakesh</td>
<td>Marrakesh Accords: finalisation of technical details relating to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development – Johannesburg</td>
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<td></td>
<td>COP 8 – New Delhi</td>
<td>Delhi Declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>COP 9 – Milan</td>
<td>Decision on afforestation and reforestation under the CDM adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>COP 10 – Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Buenos Aires Work Programme: agreement on adaptation and response measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>COP 11 – Montreal</td>
<td>Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CMP 1 – Montreal</td>
<td>Formation of the AWG-KP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Important milestones</td>
<td>Negotiation terms</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>COP 12 – Nairobi CMP 2 – Nairobi</td>
<td>Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>COP 14 – Poznań COP 4 – Poznań</td>
<td>Poznań strategic programme for technology transfer</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>COP 15 – Copenhagen CMP 5 – Copenhagen</td>
<td>Copenhagen Accord</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>COP 16 – Cancún CMP 6 – Cancún</td>
<td>Cancún Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>COP 17 – Durban CRP 7 – Durban</td>
<td>The Durban Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>“Rio +20” United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development</td>
<td>The future we want</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>COP 18 – Doha CMP 8 – Doha</td>
<td>Doha climate gateway Doha amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Fifth IPCC Assessment Report submitted (first working group) COP 19 – Warsaw COP 9 – Warsaw</td>
<td>Warsaw framework for REDD+ Warsaw international mechanism on loss and damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Fifth IPCC Assessment Report submitted (continued: second and third working groups) COP 20 – Lima CMP 10 – Lima</td>
<td>Lima Call for Climate Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Adoption of SDG during the Sustainable Development Summit Publication of the summary report by the UNFCCC Secretariat on the INDC COP 21 – Paris (planned) CMP 11 – Paris (planned)</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals Paris agreement (planned)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Sheet 2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)**

**Date of entry into force:** 21 March 1994  
**Ratification status:** 196 Parties\(^{658}\), including the European Union (EU)\(^{659}\)  
**Supreme decision-making body:** Conference of the Parties (COP)

Main objective [Article 2]: “[…] stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”

**UNFCCC Annexes:**  
Annex I – List of 41 Parties, including the EEC\(^{660}\): developed countries and countries with economies in transition\(^{661}\),  
Annex II – List of 24 Parties, including the EEC\(^{662}\): wealthiest developed countries\(^{663}\).

**Commitment of the Parties:**  
- All Parties: for example, prepare a national greenhouse gas emission inventory, implement mitigation programmes and adaptation actions, offer cooperative support in technological research and dissemination and facilitate the education and awareness of the general public (Article 4.1).  
- Annex I Parties: mainly, implement national policies to mitigate climate change and weaken emissions in the long term (Article 4.2).  
- Annex II Parties: support developing countries financially and technically, mainly by helping to prepare their national communications, to ease their adaptation to climate change and encourage access to technologies (Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5).

**Link to the Convention site:** [www.unfccc.int](http://www.unfccc.int)  
**Link to the Convention text:** [www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf](http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf).

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\(^{658}\) As at 14 October 2015. [http://unfccc.int/2631](http://unfccc.int/2631).  
\(^{659}\) The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).  
\(^{660}\) Today EU.  
\(^{661}\) [http://unfccc.int/2774](http://unfccc.int/2774).  
\(^{662}\) Today EU.  
\(^{663}\) Originally 25, but Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered into force on 28 June 2002, in accordance with Decision 26/CP.7.
Sheet 3. Kyoto Protocol

Date of entry into force: 16 February 2005.

Ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol: 192 Parties, including the EU; four Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.

Ratification status of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: Eighteen Parties (as at 30 September 2014).

Supreme decision-making body: Conference of Parties acting as a meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).

Main objective: instigate quantified and legally-binding targets for limiting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions to boost the UNFCCC.

Protocol Annexes:

Annex A: List of the six greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide ($CO_2$), methane ($CH_4$), dinitrogen oxide ($N_2O$), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride ($SF_6$).

Annex B: List of 39 Parties, included the EEC: developed countries and countries with economies in transition which have made quantified commitments to reducing or limiting greenhouse gas emissions.

Commitment of the Parties:

Annex B Parties

- Limit or reduce by 5.2% the quantity of GHG emissions compared with 1990 emissions, except countries with economies in transition, which can choose a reference year other than 1990;
- Implement national or regional policies and measures to fulfil compliance with quantified commitments to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (Articles 2 and 4). The Parties can fulfil their commitments through domestic measures and flexibility mechanisms;
- Publish an initial report giving the information required to implement the commitments, especially for the accounting of assigned amounts (Article 7);
- Publish a report demonstrating the progress made in achieving commitments (Articles 3 and 7); and
- Set up a national emissions inventory system based on methodologies approved by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Article 5);

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665. The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
666. Today EU.
667. Article 3 para. 5 of the Kyoto Protocol.
All Parties

• Prepare programmes to establish the national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, to mitigate and facilitate the adaptation to climate change, cooperate to support technology transfer, research and education and present in their national communications information on the actions undertaken to combat climate change (Article 10);

Parties included in Annex II of the UNFCCC

• Finance developing countries, mainly to help them set in place their national emissions inventory and encourage technology transfer (Article 11).

Doha amendment:

The second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at CMP 8 under the title “Doha Amendment” It commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 2020. Thus this period will last eight years and not five years as for the first period. Regarding its effective date, although the Doha Decision encourages countries to implement the second commitment period before the countries ratify it, the countries are free to choose from what date they will enforce it.


Link to the text of the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol according to paragraph 9 of Article 3 (Doha Amendment) for the second period of commitment: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/fre/13a01f.pdf.

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668. Eighth Conference of Parties acting as a Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
669. Decision 1/CMP.8.
Sheet 4. The Durban Platform

Context: The Conference of the Parties in Durban in 2011 provided a new opportunity to discuss the structure of the climate regime pre- and post-2020. Although the 2011 Durban Conference did not result in the adoption of the agreed outcome that the Bali Action Plan provided for, the Conference did give the mandate required to negotiate a single agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC, with the creation of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP).

Supreme decision-making body: New subsidiary body called the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This new working group commenced its work in 2012.

Objectives:
“Prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties” - or “2015 agreement”, which should be adopted by the COP 21 in Paris in 2015 and enter into force no later than 2020;

Identify and explore the options to raise the ambition levels in line with the conclusions of the 5th Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC);

Prepare its work plan, including the mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, transparency of measures, support and capacity-building.


670. Decision 1/CP.17.
Sheet 5. UNFCCC structure and role of the main decision-making bodies

The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)\(^{671}\) commenced its mandate in 2012 and aims “to prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties” for 2015 which should enter into force in 2020.

The Conference of the Parties (COP), the highest authority of the Convention, brings together those countries which, by signing and ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have become Parties to this Convention. As such, the COP aims to implement the ultimate Convention objective.

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) is a totally separate legal entity from the COP and is the supreme decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. The CMP includes the sub-group of Parties to the Convention which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties to the Protocol alone have the right to participate in decisions made by the CMP.

The Bureau of the COP and the Bureau of the CMP administer the intergovernmental process for the COP and for the CMP.

The UNFCCC Secretariat coordinates and organises the meetings of the various bodies and provides technical expertise.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are two partner organisations of the UNFCCC and play a key role in the process. The GEF has been in existence since 1991 and was named as the entity responsible for administering UNFCCC funds earmarked to help developing countries. The IPCC helps establish the scientific base by publishing climate change assessment reports every five years and specialist studies on specific topics.

The Tableau below presents the description of the role of organisations created by COP and CRP.

\(^{671}\) Decision 1/CP.17.
Table 5. Subsidiary and specialist bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subsidiary bodies common to the COP and CMP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)</td>
<td>Advises the COP and CMP on scientific and technical issues which are specific to or shared by them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)</td>
<td>Advises the COP and CMP on improving the effective application of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist bodies created by virtue of the COP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Group of Experts on national communications of non-Annex I Parties (CGE)</td>
<td>Assist the non-Annex I Parties in preparing their national communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG)</td>
<td>Advises the least developed countries on preparing and implementing adaptation plans, among other things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT)</td>
<td>Provides scientific and technical advice to advance the development and transfer of technologies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist body created by virtue of the COP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action of the Convention (AWG-LCA) (closed as from end of 2012)</td>
<td>Spearheads the process allowing the integral, effective and on-going application of the Convention by concerted action from now until 2012 and beyond, with a view to adopting a “agreed result” ratified in Doha in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist body created by virtue of the ADP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)</td>
<td>Prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties, which should enter into force no later than 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist bodies of the CMP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM Executive Board</td>
<td>Ensures the effective implementation and correct operation of the clean development mechanism (CDM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory Committee of the Joint Implementation (JISC)</td>
<td>Spearheads the implementation and verification of the Joint Implementation (JI) in the countries referred to in Annex I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Committee</td>
<td>Is responsible for guaranteeing compliance with commitments and supports the Parties finding it difficult to comply with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. This committee includes a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the new commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) (closed since end of 2012)</td>
<td>Supports the process for making commitments for the post-2012 period by Annex I Parties that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as adopted in 2012 in Doha.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sheet 6. The Parties to the Convention and the Protocol

Figure 10. The Parties included in Annex I (October 2015)

Notes:
1a. Countries which have signed, but not ratified, the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
1b. Countries withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol having ratified it.
2. Countries listed in Annex I of the Convention that have not committed to a second period.
3. The European Community is itself a Party included in Annexes I and II of the UNFCCC.
4. As listed in the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol for Annex B.
5. Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered into force on 28 June 2002, in accordance with Decision 26/CP.7.

Name in bold: member (or associate member) countries of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF)
Figure 11. UN Member countries or Parties to the UNFCCC not included in Annex I (October 2015)

Notes:
1. Apart from Bahrain, these countries are all members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).

Name in bold: Member (or associated member) country of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF)
Sheet 7. The regional groups and the main negotiation coalitions

The climate change negotiations process revolves around regional groups and negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are derived from the official United Nations classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests. During negotiations, the countries usually speak on their own behalf or on behalf of a negotiation coalition.

United Nations Regional Groups

The regional groups do not necessarily share the same interests in relation to the negotiations on climate change. The members of the Bureau are elected from regional groups and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

The regional groups are Africa, Asia and the Pacific Region (including Japan), Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC, from the Spanish) and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG). “The others” are Australia, Canada, the United States, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.

The African Group

The African Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation coalition. It has 54 members, all of whom share a variety of causes for concern, such as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the fight against poverty. The Group currently makes joint statements, mainly on questions relating to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity-building and financing.

Negotiation coalitions

AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States)

AOSIS is an ad hoc lobbying group which gives a voice to the majority of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) during negotiations at the United Nations. It has 44 members that share their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, especially the rise in sea levels which is threatening the very existence of several islands. Most AOSIS countries also belong to the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China) and nine are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC). Bahrain is the only SIDS member of the United Nations which does not belong to AOSIS; conversely, the Cook Islands and Niue belong to AOSIS but are not SIDS members of the United Nations.

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673. Ibid.
Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

The group of LDC comprises 48 countries among the least developed (34 in Africa, thirteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean)\(^\text{674}\). They defend their interests jointly with the United Nations, especially in relation to climate change. They share considerations about their vulnerability and their need for support in planning their adaptation. The UNFCCC also recognises the special needs of the LDC, which are the least capable of facing up to the impacts of climate change.

Group of 77 and China (G-77/China)

The G-77/China comprises 133 developing countries and China\(^\text{675}\) which together would account for 85% of the population of the Planet\(^\text{676}\). China is an associate member rather than a full member of the G-77. The G-77/China supports in particular the economic interests of its members in miscellaneous questions within the United Nations. The G-77/China member countries can sometimes adopt diverging positions during the climate change negotiations, which they then defend via another negotiation coalition or regional group\(^\text{677}\).

European Union

The European Union is a political and economic union of 28 member countries. It is represented by the European Union, which is a Party to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol\(^\text{678}\), but which has no voting right distinct from that of individual countries. Despite some differences, they often adopt a common position and speak with a single voice during climate change negotiations.

Umbrella Group

The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the European Union and which has been formed in the context of climate change negotiations. It has emerged from the JUSSCANNZ\(^\text{679}\) group and is active in all the UN forums despite the group not always comprising the same countries. Although informal, the list normally includes Australia, Canada, the United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine (other countries are added periodically, depending on the topics addressed).

\(^{674}\) http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs.

\(^{675}\) http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html.

\(^{676}\) See for example http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/213_149_130854955925976208-G77_China%20statement%20ADP2-10%20opening%20plenary.pdf.

\(^{677}\) http://unfccc.int/6343.php.

\(^{678}\) Initially as the European Economic Community

\(^{679}\) JUSSCANNZ is the acronym for “Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand”.
**BASIC**

BASIC is a group of countries made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the Copenhagen Conference (COP 15, December 2009). After the meeting, BASIC published a series of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, in particular a second commitment period for developed countries by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol and scaled-up financing for the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to share its positions and to develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important emerging countries and large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor in international climate negotiations.

**Coalition for Rainforest Nations**

This coalition started to take shape in 2005 under the initiative of Papua New Guinea. Its goal is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. The composition of this coalition has varied over time. It currently includes 53 countries from Africa, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, Asia and Oceania. Its members do not always speak with the same voice and the Coalition for Rainforest nations can make a statement on behalf of certain among them only.

**Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**

The Environmental Integrity Group was formed in 2002 by OECD members which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Mexico and the Republic of Korea. It has subsequently been joined by Monaco and Liechtenstein. Mexico and South Korea are rare OECD members that are not included in Annex I (see Sheet 6). Member countries are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.

**Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)**

CACAM groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I countries with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The reason is that the UNFCCC does not define the term

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683. Ibid.
“developing country” clearly and that these countries do not view themselves as developing countries despite their exclusion from Annex I of the Convention. The CACAM countries rarely take a common stance on other issues.

**Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from Spanish)**

ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation to promote cooperation in these areas between the socialist countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated by the United States. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, representing a hub of five countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on a goal of restricting global warming to 1 to 1.5°C compared with pre-industrial levels and on the principle whereby the developed countries must take a lead partner role in the global effort to combat climate change.

**Cartagena Dialogue**

The Cartagena Dialogue is an informal group created during the COP 16 in Cancún in 2010. This “alliance of progressive countries” brings together some thirty industrialised and developing countries working to establish a comprehensive and legally-binding regime within the UNFCCC. The aim of the dialogue is to openly discuss the reasons behind each country’s position and to explore the areas in which convergence and reinforcement of shared action could emerge. The members commit, nationally, to becoming or remaining low-carbon. Although the group is informal, there are members from the European Union, the Group of LDC’s, African Group, APEID countries and the Umbrella countries. At the third meeting of the Cartagena Dialogue (1-4 April 2014, Majur, Marshall islands), the group discussed ambitious objectives for the new climate agreement that should be signed in 2015.

**Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)**

The Like Minded Group is a spontaneous coalition of countries created during the Bonn Conference on climate change in May 2012. It is part of the G-77/China and aims to reinforce and unify this group. It is made up of several countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active South American Parties, especially Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba. Also called

685. [www.alianzabolivariana.org](http://www.alianzabolivariana.org); and [www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/article](http://www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/article).
“Developing countries with similar views”, this coalition is also found in other international forums, especially the World Trade Organisation. It is a group of States uniting around a very strong central position on major questions for developing countries, mainly equity and respect for the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities\(^{689}\). Note that several large oil producers are found in this group.

**Arab Group**

The Arab Group is made up of 22 member States from the League of Arab States, namely Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Mauritania, Somalia, Palestinian Authority, Djibouti and the Comoros. The contours of this coalition are well defined inasmuch as its members have been accustomed to working together since 1945 as a pressure group towards international institutions under the name of the League of Arab States (commonly called the Arab League). The Arab Group countries are linked together by a certain shared culture, the Arabic language and the Muslim religion. Nevertheless, the Middle-East conflicts cause tension between them.

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Sheet 8. Positions of main countries and negotiation coalitions

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)\(^{690}\)

AOSIS wishes to limit average global warming to below 1.5 °C compared with pre-industrial levels, to minimise the damage and climate change to which the SIDS are especially vulnerable given the rise in sea levels\(^{691}\). To achieve this, the Group is in favour of a legally-binding agreement in Paris. The Alliance asks that the relationship between mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage be defined in the 2015 agreement and that it contains commitments by developed countries to financing. Indeed, AOSIS emphasises the need for adequate, additional and predictable financial support for developing countries in implementing mitigation and adaptation measures. It also believes that a technical and financial system should be introduced to deal with the question of loss and damage. The Group is also in favour of creating an international capacity-building mechanism\(^{692}\). Regarding the INDC, AOSIS considers that they should include mitigation and adaptation commitments and believes that support must be provided to the developing countries in preparing them. Regarding Workstream 2 (WS2) for the pre-2020 period, AOSIS thinks that the developed countries must make an effort to plug the mitigation gap by 2020, but that the possibilities for mitigation must be examined by all the countries, taking account of the support necessary for their implementation in the developing counties. The Group emphasises the importance of making progress with the ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, whereby the Annex B Parties commit to mitigation objectives for the pre-2020 period. AOSIS underlines that a technical, collaborative process focused on solutions is necessary to identify and review the possible options to reduce the mitigation ambition gap.


\(^{691}\) FCCC/SB/2014/MISC.1/Add.1.

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from Spanish)\textsuperscript{693} ALBA is in favour of a 2015 agreement that aims to stabilise global warming at below 1.5°C compared with pre-industrial levels. This should be binding and include a monitoring-assessment process and a revision clause to prevent a possible legal loophole as had been seen in the past. The Group believes that the agreement should be balanced between mitigation, adaptation and implementation means. Among these means, financing is one of the essential themes for ALBA. It deems that additional, predictable financing should be provided by the developed countries to the developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation. The Group is strongly in favour of the principles of sustainable development and believes that only a change in the system towards more sustainable consumption methods can reverse the current trend of GHG accumulation in the atmosphere. It pleads for an ethical approach that is respectful of Mother Earth. The Group underlines that the countries the least responsible for climate change are those that suffer the most from its consequences. It believes that the core of the new agreement on mitigation must be the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and recalls the right of developing countries to seek poverty eradication and sustainable development in priority. The Group believes that the developing country INDC must be uniquely voluntary. In addition, these documents should contain elements on adaptation and the national objectives for development and combating poverty in addition to mitigation commitments. But ALBA is worried about the emphasis placed on the INDC and pleads in favour of a global approach to climate change.

Brazil\textsuperscript{694} Brazil favours the adoption in 2015 of a flexible, dynamic agreement that is easy to revise\textsuperscript{695}, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and taking into account the respective capabilities of Parties, under a goal of global warming limited to 2°C\textsuperscript{696}. Brazil suggests a “concentric differentiation” approach, whereby all the countries would steer themselves gradually towards the highest commitment.

\textsuperscript{693} ALBA: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/211_128_130776296388127605-Discurso%20ALBA%20Apertura%20ADP%20Bonn.pdf.
\textsuperscript{694} Brazil: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/73_99_130602104651393682-BRAZIL%20ADP%20Elements.pdf.
\textsuperscript{695} IISD, 2015.
\textsuperscript{696} Brazil: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/73_99_130602104651393682-BRAZIL%20ADP%20Elements.pdf.
level (mitigation measures at the scale of the domestic economy with absolute level targets). Annex I Parties would start directly with the highest commitment level.

In favour of a balance between adaptation and mitigation, the country warns against any agreement centred on mitigation. It wishes also that the Paris agreement be a departure point for a genuine commitment implementation phase. Brazil believes that the INDC must be a tool for increasing the ambition continuously. It strongly opposes any drop in commitments by the Parties. It proposes a revision process for the INDC every ten years in two five-year phases, with the second phase indicative. In this respect, it seems important to Brazil to anticipate as from now indicative contributions of a second cycle. It proposes that the INDC include, apart from mitigation, adaptation and North-South cooperation elements in terms of financing and development and transfer of technologies. The developing countries should also indicate to what extent they need implementation means to achieve their objectives.

Brazil has championed the voluntary removal of CERU from resulting CDM projects and thus not using them to compensate their emissions in order to increase the demand for these credits and consequently the ambition.

It is also in favour of a system for comparing national communications and biennial reports between the countries and including the civil society in the assessment process.

Committed on the topic of the REDD+, Brazil is so far the only country to have submitted its summary (optional) on how the guarantees relating to the activities of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation are taken into account and complied with.

China emphasises the need to maintain the differentiation between developed and developing countries, which is the basis of the Convention. It insists that any advancement be based on the Bali Plan of Action. It thinks the legal nature of the Paris agreement should be defined once its contents

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697. IISD, 2015.
have been finalised\(^{701}\). The country has underlined the importance that it gives to the progress made during the work of the Workstream on the pre-2020 period (WS2), which complements the discussions that took place under Workstream 1 (WS1) on the post-2020 period. An agreement on the topic of the WS2 could thus, in China’s view, be perceived as a platform towards an efficient agreement in Paris\(^{702}\). According to China, the pre-2020 ambition gap may be eliminated if the Annex I countries reduce their emissions by 40% compared with 1990 and it calls on these countries to make commitments to this effect. It proposes that a process of compliance and respect of mitigation measures by developed countries be set up\(^{703}\). Lastly, it considers that the commitments of developed countries to provide financial, technological and capacity-building support must be as legally-binding as the mitigation commitments.

### Coalition for Rainforest Nations\(^{704}\)

This coalition seeks the inclusion of an REDD+ mechanism as a key component of the 2015 agreement, based on the Warsaw Framework. It considers that the commitments of the 2015 agreement must be to limit global warming to 1.5°C compared with pre-industrial levels. The coalition underlines the role of the use of lands and forests in mitigation and believes that the REDD+ could be an effective solution in plugging the mitigation gap. Its proposes that other sectors dealt with by the Convention benefit from its success and take the REDD+ as a model. Lastly, the Green Climate Fund should, in its opinion, be dedicated partly to the REDD+.

### Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)

The EIG wishes a decision to be made on the common understanding of the commitment of mitigation for the objective of 2°C, its modalities, schedule and structure. It also states its preference for a reform to the subsidies to fossil fuels\(^{705}\). To ensure the environmental integrity of the Convention,

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701. IISD, 2015
702. IISD, 2015c.
703. IISD, 2015.
it seeks the introduction of standards for GHG reduction commitments to avoid double counting and ensure a net drop in emissions or net emissions avoided. Any reduction from exchanges in emission quotas between the Parties would be shared between purchaser and supplier\(^{706}\). The group is also in favour of a system of compliance on the basis of principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and equity as well as common rules of accountability and MRV. It believes that preparing INDC must be a facilitating, non-intrusive and unsanctioned process that would form the basis for international initiatives should the ambition level be insufficient\(^{707}\). In addition, EIG believes that adaptation deserves equal priority with mitigation in the agreement, which should require all Parties to prepare and implement national adaptation plans and strategies. It supports the participation of local and sub-national players in adaptation and gender-sensitive approaches\(^{708}\).

**European Union\(^{709}\)** The European Union (EU) wishes a new agreement to be equitable, global, legally binding and dynamic. It proposes the following structure for the wording: the objectives, a common scheme for accounting and MRV (mainly through the consolidation of current MRV rules), market mechanisms, adaptation, means for implementation, transparency of support, regular evaluation and the adjustment of efforts of mitigation and compliance. It further wishes to include gender equality in the foreword to the agreement and in its objectives\(^{710}\). Conversely, it proposes that the loss and damage does not appear at all\(^{711}\), as this theme could be dealt with in the form of COP decisions\(^{712}\).


\(\text{\textsuperscript{710}}\) IISD, 2015c.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{711}}\) IISD, 2015b.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{712}}\) IISD, 2015c.
The EU sees the INDC as a means of operationalising the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of Parties, inasmuch as each Party can make a commitment depending on its national circumstances, despite the process being common. It feels that these documents must be focused on mitigation, with adaptation and financing being dealt with elsewhere in the 2015 agreement. The EU also stresses the need for transparency of INDCs and the introduction of an MRV and compliance system under a multilateral scheme. It also argues for a continuous and common revision process that would gradually raise the ambition level with a view to achieve the Convention’s objective to limit global warming to 2°C. Regarding its own commitments, it announced last June that raising its ambitions was henceforth only a possible option for the post-2020 period. The EU is also in favour of including a global objective for adaptation, which would be “climate-resilient sustainable development for all the Parties”.

The group underlines that its member countries, that account for 85% of the world population, are threatened by the consequences of climate change on their current development. This group believes that more rapid and instant action is required. The G-77/China insists on a Paris agreement based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, with an objective that complies with Article 2 of the Convention. In addition, the agreement must, in its opinion, give balanced consideration to the six elements of the Durban Platform, namely adaptation and mitigation (that must be given the same importance), financing, development and transfer of technologies, capacity-building and transparency. These various implementation methods


716. IISD, 2015.
Themed sheets must be provided to the developing countries in line with the promises made to them and the developed countries must not shift their responsibility on to them.

Workstream 2 dealing with mitigation commitments of Parties for the pre-2020 period must, according to the G-77/China, be paid the same attention as Workstream 1 covering the post-2020 period. It views plugging the pre-2020 ambition gap as an essential prerequisite for a successful 2015 agreement and as a basis for the next period. The group is concerned over promises not kept by developed countries to lower the emissions by at least 25% to 40% before the end of the decade. It has therefore suggested that a work programme or mechanism specific to WS2 be adopted in Paris which would force developed countries to more specific and gradually increasing targets between 2017 and 2020717 and accelerate their implementation.

It calls also for the ratification of the Doha Amendment by all the Annex I Parties, which would thus have binding GHG emission reduction targets covering all sectors of the economy for the pre-2020 period, i.e. for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. In terms of the financing, the G-77/China considers commitments to achieve 100 billion US dollars a year from 2020 onwards as a “starting point”718.

Group of Least Developed Countries (LDC)719

The LDC Group stresses that the work of scientists and mainly the Structured Expert Dialogue shows that the objective of limiting the temperature rise to 2°C by 2020 is not enough and that the target should be 1.5°C. All the Parties should henceforth increase their ambition level very quickly. For the LDCs, the 2015 agreement should be legally binding and sufficiently ambitious to face up to this challenge. They have proposed that the agreement takes the form of a protocol accompanied by decisions setting out the details and modalities of implementation to allow immediate

718. IISD, 2014b.
It should include the themes of adaptation, mitigation, financing, capacity-building, technology, transparency and loss and damage. Regarding this last theme, that the LDCs wish to see addressed separately, the countries affected by gradual climate phenomena should benefit from compensation. In addition, the LDC Group stresses the importance of the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities that should be recalled in the Paris agreement.

Regarding the INDCs, the LDCs are of the opinion that the contributions must refer to mitigation, exclude adaptation and that a process to be held simultaneously is necessary to deal with implementation. In order that countries select the highest level of ambition possible, the LDCs have proposed a differentiation between developed countries, those in transition, with average income, the most vulnerable and the least developed. They propose for the developed countries absolute emission reduction objectives for the entire economy, with a more flexible approach for the developing countries. The LDCs also seek the creation of a compliance mechanism based on the MRV principles to ensure compliance of Party commitments. In terms of adaptation, the LDC Group has put forward the idea of implementing an international adaptation registry that would be fed by regional adaptation centres. It also requests commitments from the developed countries to provide sufficient means of implementation. They have therefore rung alarm bells over the impossibility of carrying out the National Adaptation Plans of developing countries due to lack of financing. They would wish also that a decision aimed at filling the voids be taken in Paris accentuating technical, financial and institutional aspects to be plugged. In addition, they consider that air and maritime operators should be asked to contribute to the climate financing. Lastly, they would like 50% of the financing dedicated to adaptation to be set aside for the SIDS and LDCs.

721. IISD, 2015.
722. IISD, 2015c, p. 12.
723. IISD, 2015.
725. IISD, 2015.
Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)\textsuperscript{726} AILAC would like the 2015 agreement to reflect the direct existing link between the mitigation and adaptation ambition the loss and damage and the implementation means. The group underlines that a higher mitigation ambition would reduce the needs for adaptation to climate change\textsuperscript{727}. AILAC believes that the Paris agreement should include commitments by Parties to mitigation and adaptation, implementation means, transparency of actions and support. In terms of mitigation, the AILAC countries call for extensive ratification of the Doha Amendment and are in favour of raising the commitment level of Parties under INDC, which would follow on from each other in quick succession, and a predictable scheme. This, they believe, is the most effective way of achieving the long-term goal of the Convention to limit global warming to 2°C. The group also states its preference for setting up a global objective for adaptation and a qualitative objective on the financing. Regarding the loss and damage, the Group has proposed that financial and technical support provided to alleviate the losses and damages be granted not just to States, but also to communities that need them directly. Lastly, it has requested that gender equality be included in the objectives of the Paris agreement.

India\textsuperscript{728} Like many other developing countries, India insists on the application of the principles of the Convention in a manner that prevents them from being reinterpreted. It is also in favour of raising the ambition. It would like to see all gaps between necessary ambition levels and commitments dealt with together, for mitigation, adaptation and implementation means\textsuperscript{729}. It thinks that progress pre-2020 would allow this improved trust to be established between the Parties\textsuperscript{730}. It is also in favour of ambitious, mainly public, financing and


\textsuperscript{729} IISD, 2015c.

deems the funds raised so far by the Green Climate Fund to be far from sufficient\textsuperscript{731}. In addition, the country has called for INDC relating to all elements of the agreement, not just mitigation, with differentiated data for the industrialised countries and the developing countries but identical timetables\textsuperscript{732}. For the Parties not included in Annex I, India considers that the INDC depend on national development priorities and that sufficient financing should be a prerequisite to their submission\textsuperscript{733}. It does not wish too cumbersome an assessment process: it believes that the verification of GHG inventories could be a reference tool, but should not dictate the efforts of Parties. India would also like to see the issue of intellectual property rights addressed.

\textbf{Japan\textsuperscript{734}}

Japan supports the adoption of a simple, sustainable agreement in Paris, applicable to all, based on common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; these should be reinterpreted dynamically. The country in fact thinks that the list contained in the Annexes to the Convention does not reflect the current global realities. Regarding the contents of the agreement, it should contain the obligation for Parties to submit their INDC, centred around mitigation, which would undergo an ex ante consultation process and an ex post review. The country suggests that the ambition level is different based on country capabilities: the developed Parties will be strongly encourage to submit GHG emission reduction targets for their economy as a whole, whereas the developing countries with low emissions could settle for qualitative commitments. With the exception of INDCs from the most vulnerable countries like the LDCs, the INDC should not contain conditional targets. Lastly, the predicted contributions set nationally should, according to Japan, be contained in a separate document with no legal value. In the medium term, the country supports the objective of 50% reduction in global emissions by 2050. To achieve this, the developed countries could reduce their GHG emissions at this time by 80% compared with the 1990 level\textsuperscript{735}.

\textsuperscript{731} IISD, 2015.

\textsuperscript{732} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{733} IISD, 2014b.

\textsuperscript{734} Japan: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/106_99_1
30577729021556446-ADP_submission_October_2014.pdf.

\textsuperscript{735} Japan: https:// unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/
pdf/adp_japan_workstream_1_and_2_20130910.pdf.
Regarding adaptation and the implementation means, Japan believes that they should be included in the 2015 agreement, but in the form of (non-binding) decisions of the COP. The Parties would be encouraged to include adaptation in their national strategies and programmes.

The LMDC countries support equitable access of countries to sustainable development and the protection of Mother Earth. Their position in resembles that of the G-77/China. They seek a Paris agreement that maintains the objective of the Convention and complies with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The six key elements of the Durban Platform (mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies and transparency of measures and support) must, in the group’s eyes, feature in balanced fashion in the agreement. Underlining the national efforts made by its members to deal with mitigation and ambition issues, along with the loss and damage caused by climate disasters, it demands more commitments by the developed countries to both the mitigation ambition level and to additional and predictable financing, transfer of technologies and capacity-building in favour of developing countries. In this sense, it states its disappointment on sight of INDC of developed Parties that focus on mitigation only. It also wishes loss and damage to be enhanced through a separate chapter in the Paris agreement, separated from the chapter on adaptation and accompanied by a compensation regime. As for the pre-2020 ambition, LMDC considers that it must be based essentially on the Bali Action Plan. It underlines that the ambition gap does not just relate to the GHG reduction commitments but also to adaptation, financing, capacity-building, technology (mainly through the question of intellectual property rights) and equitable access to sustainable development. Taking the view that it is vital to prevent the pre-2020 ambition gap being carried forward to the next period, it asks the developed countries to fix GHG emission reduction targets of at least 40% by 2020.

737. IISD, 2015.
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)\textsuperscript{738} The OPEC countries emphasise the need to consider the potential negative impacts of response measures on the economies of developing countries. As oil exporters, they are in the front line in this respect. These countries also highlight the importance of being able to adapt, mainly by diversifying their economy, but also by increasing investment and the transfer of technologies. The group underlines in this respect the possibilities offered by carbon sequestration and storage, among other things.

OPEC also insists on the fact that economic and social development and the eradication of poverty are priorities in developing countries. Henceforth, the differentiation made in the Convention between the Parties should not be questioned.

Overall, OPEC is in favour of raising the ambition of the developed countries for the pre-2020 period, in terms of mitigation, adaptation and implementation means.

Russia\textsuperscript{739} Russia is in favour of adopting a legally-binding agreement including the participation of all countries, especially large emissions countries, that compensates for the weaknesses of Kyoto Protocol whilst taking into consideration its positive aspects and accomplishments. This agreement must also consider scientific, ecological, economic and political aspects in order to have a solid base for a fair settlement of climatic stakes in the long term. The commitments of developed and developing countries can be differentiated but must be the subject of a single international legal instrument. Russia does not agree to the distinction of countries as operated by the 1992 Convention – which it deems obsolete. Thus, it asks that the contributions of Parties be based on their respective levels of social and economic development. Similarly, it thinks that all countries that have the capability should contribute to the measures for capacity-building, transfer of technologies and financing for the benefit of countries that need them. It supports a ten-year commitment period and emphasises the preparation of commitments by the Parties as it does not agree to a top-down approach. It also requests the inclusion of the land use and forestry sector in the accounting of mitigation commitments of Parties.


Saudi Arabia

For the 2015 agreement, Saudi Arabia is emphasising the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities. It would like to see equal importance given to adaptation and mitigation. In addition, it considers that the economic and social consequences of response measures must be dealt with in the future agreement. Given its dependence on hydrocarbon exports, Saudi Arabia must adapt to the response measures as well as to climate change. In terms of the form of the Paris agreement, Saudi Arabia sees no need for an “objectives” section, as Article 2 of the Convention is sufficient, nor for a “compliance” section. In addition, it is of the opinion that the INDC, that should contain both mitigation and adaptation elements, should not be legally binding and that the assessment should be the fruit of a national process.

South Africa

South Africa pleads for a global mitigation objective based on the current goal of warming limited to 2°C and for global adaptation and financing objectives. For this country, the Paris agreement must contain individual legally binding commitments, based on criteria agreed at the international level. In terms of mitigation, the objective for the developed countries would be to reduce their emissions rapidly by 2030 and have a zero emission objective in 2050. The adaptation objective should be both quantitative and qualitative. Regarding transparency, the country believes that the burden imposed on the developing countries in terms of MRV must not be too heavy. It also seeks a Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage that is fully functional. In addition, it defends since Warsaw an increase in implementation means for non-Annex I Parties and emphasises the need to achieve at least 100 billion US dollars of climate financing by 2020. South Africa feels that the support must be balanced between adaptation and mitigation.
Similarly, the INDC must contain elements for both mitigation and adaptation and implementation measures. The country believes that they must figure provisionally in an annex to the Paris agreement. It believes that the equity and relevance of INDC and the adequacy of their financial components should be assessed by a technical committee in 2016, with a final inclusion in the agreement in 2017.

The African Group deems it essential that the Paris agreement contains references to the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and the respective capabilities of Parties. It favours a balance between adaptation and mitigation and seeks a temperature increase goal of no more than 1.5°C at the end of the century. In addition, the African Group is seeking a differentiated scheme based on multilateral rules. Regarding the question of mitigation, it believes that increasing the ambition for the pre-2020 period is a priority. To achieve this, it thinks that the developed countries must lead by example whilst accelerating the mobilisation of 100 billion US dollars annually for climate financing to which they have committed, that the Bali Action Plan for transparency is implemented and that a far more ambitious agenda is raised for the pre-2020 period. Regarding adaptation, the African Group pleads for a global adaptation objective. It is also of the opinion, just like the G-77/China, that loss and damage constitutes an essential element in the new agreement, through a mechanism that is strongly supported and backed by the developed countries. In addition, the developing countries must, in its view, benefit from adequate support from developed countries in this matter (the 100 billion pledged should also serve for this focal area). The group also highlights the need for the population of African countries to access energy and calls on a global partnership and ambitious programme to accelerate access to renewable energies. International actions should be taken in terms of demand and supply to allow fast and substantial implementation and plug the access deficit by 2030. The Green Climate Fund especially is invited to support this initiative.

750. IISD, 2014b.
Regarding the financial issues that are of primordial importance for the African Group, the new agreement should rely on all operational entities of the Convention’s financial mechanism, namely, the SCCF, LDCF, GCF, GEF, including the Adaptation Fund, even if this is guided by the COP/CMP of the Kyoto Protocol.

**United States**

The United States seeks a new categorisation of Parties taking into account changes in their emissions and their economic development. It also believes that the Cancún Agreements should serve as a basis for the negotiations rather than the Bali Action Plan. The United States calls for ministers to become more involved to take political decisions in order to highlight the level of ambition and underscores the need for transparency and imputability *ex ante* and *ex post* of commitments made. It is also in favour of an bottom-up approach combined with a consultation process that it views as a guarantee of the ambition that must be achieved. For the form of the agreement, it proposes that decisions be adopted on the operational details of the 2015 agreement so that it captures only the essential elements in order to facilitate the revision of decisions in the future.

On the issue of financing, the United States insists on adequate environments for private investments that developing countries must create in order to attract financial support. Elsewhere they sustain the progressive elimination of subsidies for fossil fuels.

Regarding mitigation, it considers that all the Parties should produce a period inventory of GHG before their post-2020 contribution, which should be reviewed using a unique system. It would nevertheless have a certain flexibility to take into account the respective capabilities of Parties and encourage them towards making progress. It underlines the importance of transparency and thinks that the monitoring-assessment system should be in place without fail during the

COP 21. It also suggests an end date for initial INDC of 2025 in order to encourage the ambition (rather than 2030). Lastly, the United States acknowledges the need to include adaptation as a key component of the 2015 agreement in order to advance the scheduling and national action for adaptation through the NAP.

Sheet 9. UNFCCC side discussion forums

Numerous events addressing the issue of climate change and organised outside UNFCCC have taken place or will take place this year. They include the United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development Goals, the Petersberg Climate Dialogue, the G7 and G20 summits, the Business and Climate Summit and the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment. The main encounters in 2015, listed by date, are described below.

15th African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN)

Date and place: 2–6 March 2015, Cairo, Egypt
Participants: 54 countries from the African continent are members of the AMCEN.
The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment was set up in 1985 to boost cooperation between African countries on the economic, technical and scientific activities aimed at halting environmental degradation on the continent and meeting the food and power needs of its population. The theme of the 2015 conference was: “Managing Africa’s Natural Capital for Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication.” Various topics were discussed and analysed during this conference, mainly managing Africa’s natural capital for sustainable development and the eliminating poverty, the strategy for combating the illegal trade in species of wild flora and fauna and the preparations of the African continent for the 2015 climate agreement.

Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction

Date and place: 14–18 March 2015, Sendai, Japan
Participants: UN member States, UN institutions and NGOs.
The aim of this conference was to define a post-2015 action framework to anticipate disasters and boost the resilience of nations faced with disasters, as the Hyogo Framework for Action: “Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disaster” was reaching its end. This had been defining the international agenda for this topic for ten years. This year’s conference set up the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.

Conference of Declaration during the World Mayors Summit on Climate – “Towards COP 21”\textsuperscript{761}

\textit{Date and place:} 26 March 2015, Paris, France.

\textit{Participants:} 32 mayors or representatives of large cities from the 28 European Union countries.

Assembled on the initiative of Mrs Anne Hidalgo, Mayor of Paris, her counterparts from major European cities met before the COP 21 to assess their commitments towards combating climate change and launch a common initiative of “green” public purchasing. These elected representatives, who represent more than sixty million inhabitants and 2,000 billion euros of GDP, adopted a common declaration at the end of this event whereby they recognise the massive contribution of cities to global warming. They commit to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 40\% by 2030, to increase the share of renewable energies significantly and continue their efforts to reduce power consumption.

Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF)\textsuperscript{762}

\textit{Dates and place:} 19-20 April, Washington, USA, 18-19 July, Luxembourg, 29-30 September 2095, New York, USA. A final summit is scheduled in November, with the date and place yet to be fixed.

\textit{Participants:} sixteen countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States) and the European Union.

This Forum, held for the first time in 2009, unites the representatives of seventeen economic heavyweights that between them produce 80\% of global greenhouse gas emissions. It aims to promote discussions between the developed and developing countries on the issues of renewable energies and lowering greenhouse gas emissions and to mobilise the necessary political will to succeed with the annual climate negotiations. During the session in April, the delegates addressed the question of the rendering of accounts and of ambition, not without discussing mitigation and adaptation. The July session dealt with the themes of adaptation, mitigation, transparency and financing.

\textsuperscript{761} ADP: http://www.ville-developpement.org/component/docman?task=doc_download&gid=648 et Ville de Paris: http://sendgrid.com/wf/webmail?rp=ZTI1bGQzTnNaWF1wWlhKZmFXUTZNVEl6TkN4MWMyVnIYmxrT2pJMU5qVTTBmUWV5snVaWGR6YkdWMGRHVnIYmxrSWpvaU5UZ3lPVEkyT0NJc0ltNWxkM05zWlhSMFpYSmZkWE5y2w5cFpDSTZOVEn6tmpZeU5qYzJNemw5.

\textsuperscript{762} http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org.
Sixth Petersberg Dialogue\textsuperscript{763}

*Dates and place:* 17-19 May 2015, Berlin, Germany  
*Participants:* 35 countries representative of the diversity of negotiating groups to the UNFCCC represented at ministerial level, the co-chairman of the ADP, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and representatives of the United Nations Secretary General.

The Petersberg Dialogue, initiated by German Chancellor Mrs Merkel in 2010, aims to contribute to moving high-level political negotiations on climate forwards. The purpose of the 2015 meeting was to prepare for the COP in Paris.

Business and Climate Summit\textsuperscript{764,765}

*Dates and place:* 20-21 May 2015, Paris, France  
*Participants:* Two thousand international economic and political policymakers and investors.

During this world summit held in the UNESCO premises, the businesses committed to lead the transition towards a low-carbon economy that is resilient to climate change. Hailed as a major initiative in mobilising the private sector, mainly by Mr Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, the event was an opportunity for economic leaders attending the conference to launch calls to political policymakers to encourage private investment in combating climate change. They are requesting especially the introduction of robust and efficient carbon price mechanisms, the establishment of an alliance between businesses and governments and the use of public funds to mobilise more private funds in low-carbon assets, mainly in the developing countries.

Mediterranean Climate Conference (MEDCOP 21)\textsuperscript{766}

*Dates and place:* 4-5 June 2015, Marseille, France  
*Participants:* Two thousand representatives of the civil society, NGO and associations, universities and research centres, central and local government and economic players in Mediterranean countries.

This Mediterranean civil society Forum culminated in a declaration whereby the delegates recognise in particular the urgency of collective mobilisation against climate change and the definition of a shared strategy in combating and adapting


\textsuperscript{764} Business & Climate Summit.

\textsuperscript{765} http://www.businessclimatesummit.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/20150521_Business-Climate-Summit-Communiqu%C3%A9-de-presse.pdf.

\textsuperscript{766} http://www.medcop21.com.
to this change. They also identify 27 concrete solutions, including holding an annual MEDCOP, creating an exchange and project platform, setting up farmer/consumer partnerships and creating a Mediterranean meta-cluster for the building sector - and 133 good practices in combating climate change and adaptation.

**G7 Summit**

*Date and place:* 7-8 June 2015, Elmau, Germany.

*Participants:* the seven member countries are: United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada.\(^{767}\)

This group of seven of the most developed countries in the world meets annually to discuss economic questions and international issues such as combating climate change. Climate and energy were among the key issues in the discussions at the last meeting of the G7.\(^{768}\) On this occasion, the leaders of the most powerful economies in the world recognised that climate protection was necessary to achieve sustainable growth in the long term. They also confirmed their determination to reach an agreement as an outcome of the COP 21 in Paris that is legally binding, applicable to all the Parties, ambitious, robust, inclusive and a dynamic reflection of the national circumstances of Parties. The goal of limiting global warming to 2°C was restated and the G7 proposes to adopt the upper range of the IPCC recommendation by fixing the goal of lowering global emissions from 40% to 70% by 2050 compared with 2010. The group of the most developed countries also recalled that it supports the objective of mobilising 100 billion US dollars of annual climate financing by 2020, taken from a series of public and private sources, and the goal of the operationalisation of the GCF in 2015. It also indicated, among other things, a wish for the climate assurances to cover 400 million people in the most vulnerable developing countries by 2020 and accelerate the access by Africa to renewable energies.

**High-level event on climate change - United Nations**\(^{769}\)

*Date and place:* 29 June 2015, New York, USA

*Participants:* Policymakers from UN member countries, representatives of miscellaneous United Nations agencies, UNFCCC Secretariat, private sector, civil society and academic institutes.

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767. Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014 and therefore the group, which was the G8 with Russia, is currently the G7.


The President of the United Nations General Assembly organised this event in order to maintain a strong political dynamic with a view to achieving an ambitious agreement on climate. On this occasion, the delegates invited the Heads of Government and the Ministers to give political guidelines to their negotiators to achieve a successful agreement in Paris. They were also delighted that many countries – mainly the largest emitters - and stakeholders had made growing commitments to reducing their GHG emissions. They called, among other things, for an acceleration in the development of clean technologies and the potential for adaptation in restoring degraded lands. The role of religious leaders and the civil society was also underlined, among other themes addressed.

**Third International Conference on Financing for Development**

*Date and place:* 13-16 July 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

*Participants:* UN member countries, international financing institutions, United Nations institutions, regional organisations, private sector, civil society, local authorities and academic institutions.

The aim of the conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, was to assess the progress accomplished in implementing the Monterrey Consensus (220) and the Doha Declaration (2008). It also had to look into new questions, especially changes in the landscape of cooperation, the interrelations between the various sources of development financing and the synergies between the financing goals of the three sustainable development dimensions (economic growth, social equity and environment). This conference finally allowed the adoption of the Addis Ababa Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, that deals with the timetable of events for post-2015.

**Informal ministerial consultations**

*Date and place:* 20-21 July and 6-7 September 2015, Paris, France

*Participants:* delegation from some forty to sixty countries including some thirty to forty ministers.

The informal ministerial consultations were organised by the future President of the COP 21, Laurent Fabius, the French Foreign Minister. The first took place on 20-21 July. They addressed the question of the general balance of the future Paris agreement, its ambition level and the level of differentiation between the Parties that should be adopted. The second informal ministerial consultations, on 6-7 September, related to the implementation means (financing, transfer of technologies and capacity-building) and to adaptation to climatic disorders and the question of loss and damage.

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United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development Goals

Date and place: 25-27 September 2015, New York, USA

Participants: Over 160 Heads of State and Government and ministers.

The UN General Assembly devoted its seventieth session to defining Sustainable Development Goals, with the intention of replacing the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Following this summit, the General Assembly adopted unanimously the “2030 Sustainable Development Agenda”. This contains especially the seventeen sustainable development objectives (SDG) that count a total of 169 targets. See in this respect box 9.

Plenary meeting of the World Bank and IMF assemblies

Dates and place: 9-11 October 2015, Lima, Peru.

Participants: Governmental officers of member countries of the World Bank Group and the IMF.

The Board of Governors of the World Bank Group and the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been meeting once a year since 1946 to discuss the work of their respective institutions. Other players and observers also attend and many seminars take place on the fringes of these Assemblies. This is therefore an ideal forum for formal and informal consultations. During last October’s plenary meeting, the delegates mainly discussed how to release private investment in renewable energies and the topic of sustainable cities. The Development Committee called on the World Bank to increase its technical and financial support to assist the countries in assessing the climate risks and the opportunities in this field, to tackle the factors of climate change and strengthen the resilience. The IMF, for its part, presented its assessment of the macro-economic implications of climate change, as a contribution to the successful progress of the COP 21. The International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF Board of Governors also called for structural reforms to promote environmentally-friendly economic growth of benefit to all, among other things. It also called for making the most of the drop in oil prices for new reforms involving taxes on energy and inefficient energy subsidies.

Pre-COP 21

Date and place: 8-10 November 2015, Paris, France

Participants: Ministers and representatives of key countries (normally forty to fifty), Executive Secretary of UNFCCC, NGO, etc.

The pre-COP are political meetings organised behind closed doors intended to prepare for the Conference of the Parties.

G20 Summit

*Date and place:* 15-16 November 2015, Antalya, Turkey

*Participants:*

- Member countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union.
- Countries invited to the 2015 Summit: Spain as a permanent guest, Malaysia as President of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Zimbabwe as President of the African Union, Senegal as representative of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Azerbaijan and Singapore

This group of nineteen of the most developed countries in the world and the European Union meets annually to facilitate world cooperation and discuss questions that are mainly economic but which also relate to global issues such as development, energy and climate finance. The G20 members recognised in 2013 that climate change was going to have a significant impact on the world economy and committed to full implementation of the outcome of Cancún, Durban and Doha. They also confirmed support for the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund. In 2014, the G20 leader summit was held in Brisban, Australia under the theme of growth and mainly addressed the theme of growth and resilience. This year’s Summit which will be held in Antalya, Turkey just before COP 21. The theme of climate change should find itself on the agenda.

Meeting of the Heads of State for the opening of the COP 21

*Date and place:* 30 November 2015, Paris, France.

*Participants:* At least eighty Heads of State and Government are expected.

The future French Presidency of the COP 21 has invited the Heads of State and Government to attend the opening of the 21st Conference of the Parties. It thus hopes to give major political impetus to the negotiation process from Day One. At least eighty Heads of State and Government should be attending, including the President of the United States and the Chinese, Indian, Canadian, Brazilian, South African and European leaders.

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776. https://g20.org/about-g20/g20-members.
Sheet 10. Basic information on the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms

To allow Annex B countries a certain flexibility and lower the cost of reducing GHG emissions, three market mechanisms have been included in the Kyoto Protocol: joint implementation (JI), the clean development mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading see Tableau 6).

**Joint implementation (JI)**

Under JI, two Annex I Parties can trade emission reduction units (ERU) from projects to reduce GHG emissions or to build up the carbon sinks\textsuperscript{779}. There are two tracks for participating in the JI projects\textsuperscript{780}, depending on whether a Party satisfies or does not satisfy all the eligibility criteria, mainly involving the holding of a national inventory:

Track 1 applies if both Parties comply with all the criteria. In this case, State negotiates with State and the credits (ERU) are subtracted from the number of assigned amount units? (AAU) granted initially to the country hosting the project.

Track 2 applies if one Party does not comply fully with all the criteria. The project then proceeds under the same process as the one set up for the CDM. An independent auditor must validate the project and satisfy himself as to the number of GHG emissions actually avoided. The allocation of credits (ERU) generated by the project is governed by the JI Supervisory Committee.

The JI Supervisory Committee operates under the authority of the CMP. It is responsible for checking the reductions in GHG emissions coming from JI projects carried out under Track 2 and must also account for these activities in an annual report submitted to the CMP\textsuperscript{781}. During CMP-2, the Parties adopted the internal regulations of the Supervisory Committee and the forms for the description of the JI project as proposed by the Supervisory Committee in its annual report. In addition, in respect of guidelines, the Parties decided to adjust the thresholds for small JI projects in line with the revised thresholds for small-scale projects under the CDM\textsuperscript{782}.

**Clean development mechanism (CDM)**

The CDM allows an Annex I Party to obtain certified emission reductions (CER) by performing projects to reduce GHG emissions or build up the carbon sinks in the territory of a non-Annex I Party\textsuperscript{783}.

\textsuperscript{779} By virtue of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol,
\textsuperscript{780} Decision 9/CMP.1.
\textsuperscript{781} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{782} The thresholds for activities of small-scale projects under the CDM were revised in Decision 1/CMP.2.
\textsuperscript{783} By virtue of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol,
To be eligible for the CMD, a project must meet the principle of additionality, i.e. it must lead to a reduction in GHG emissions which would not have occurred without it. A “baseline scenario” - a business-as-usual situation - has to be defined, therefore, so that the additionality of a project can be assessed. The CER calculation must also take account of leaks, i.e. the net variation in GHG emissions produced outside the scope of a project, but which is nevertheless attributable to the project784.

The procedures and rules governing the CDM were laid out in the Kyoto Protocol before being defined more precisely by the Marrakesh Accords at the COP-7 in 2001. The CDM Executive Board is the body responsible for supervising the CDM and must submit recommendations to the CPM785. For this purpose, it submits an annual report containing information on the progress made from Executive Board actions for the implementation and correct operation of the CDM.

The CDM, operational since 2001? (this date must be confirmed given that the Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005), has seen rapid changes. More than 7,560 CDM projects had been registered by September 2014 and more than 1.5 million CER had been issued786.

GHG emission trading (and emission trading systems)

GHG emission trading, as a Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanism, provides for GHG emission trading by the national governments of Annex B Parties between themselves in order to achieve their mitigation targets more easily. Following a market logic, a country can choose to reduce its own GHG emissions or purchase some from elsewhere. The GHG emissions are therefore reduced where they cost the least, which makes the reduction efforts all the more effective.

The three flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol form “emission trading systems”. These systems, which together form the carbon market, have seen major expansion, although this has slowed in recent years, mainly because of the economic recession and the lack of demand for carbon credits. The carbon market is made up of regulated and voluntary market systems:

- **the regulated market** has come about thanks to “cap-and-trade systems”, the result of national, regional or international regulations;
- **the voluntary market** results from speculation in the value of reduction credits or the demand by consumers or companies that want to offset their GHG emissions. The so-called “voluntary” market runs on the fringes of the regulated market. It does not rely on the legal obligations of participating entities to generate the demand. Purchasers of reduction credits are either speculators anticipating an increase in the value of credits in the future or businesses seeking to comply with voluntary commitments or businesses and consumers wishing to offset their GHG emissions.

---

785. Decision 17/CP.7.
The voluntary markets account for a small share of the carbon market, but is growing rapidly: 123.4 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent were traded in 2008, double the volume of transactions on the voluntary market in 2007\(^{787}\). In 2009, 107 million tonnes of CO\(_2\)eq. were traded on the voluntary market. This drop over 2008 can be partly explained by the recent financial crisis. 131 million tonnes of equivalent carbon dioxide were traded in 2010, about 100 million in 2011 and 2012 and 76 million in 2013\(^{788}\). The value of these transactions in 2013 diminished by 28% compared with 2012 to reach 379 million US dollars. This is partly due to changes in the Californian carbon market system and a drop in demand from the private sector\(^{789}\).

The global market is also compartmentalised over and beyond the division between the regulated market and the voluntary market, due to the fact that the cap-and-trade systems are not fungible. Indeed, each market is virtually independent. The prices of different carbon units vary according to supply and demand in the various market segments.

### Table 6. Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Parties involved</th>
<th>Transaction unit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emissions trading (Article 17)</td>
<td>Between the Annex B Parties</td>
<td>AAU Assigned Amount Unit</td>
<td>Allocation of AAU based on the GHG emission reduction objective published in Annex B and market trading.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RMU Removal Unit</td>
<td>Allocation of the RMU based on Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) for the sequestration of GHG and trading within a market system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint implementation (JI) (Article 6)</td>
<td>Between the Parties included in Annex I</td>
<td>ERU Emission Reduction Unit</td>
<td>Issuing of an ERU to finance an activity to reduce GHG emissions in another Annex I Party, in the 2008-2012 period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tCER Temporary CER</td>
<td>Issuing of a tCER, valid until the end of a given commitment period, for an afforestation and reforestation activity under the CDM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICER Long-term CER</td>
<td>Issuing of an ICER, valid until the end of a given commitment period, for a reforestation activity under the CDM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{787}\) Hamilton, *et coll.*, 2009  
\(^{788}\) Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014.  
\(^{789}\) Ibid.
Sheet 11. UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol document listings

Table 7. UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol document listings and description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision x/CP.x</td>
<td>COP decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision x/CMP.x</td>
<td>CMP decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/AWGLCA/x</td>
<td>AWG-LCA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/CP/x</td>
<td>COP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/KP/CMP/x</td>
<td>CMP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/KP/AWG/x</td>
<td>AWG-KP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SBI/x</td>
<td>SBI preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SBSTA/x</td>
<td>SBSTA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SB/x</td>
<td>Preparatory document or provisional or current agenda of the two subsidiary bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCF/x</td>
<td>Preparatory document of the Green Climate Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/ARR/x</td>
<td>Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory (from 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/TRR/x</td>
<td>Report of the technical review of the biennial report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/WEB/IRI/x</td>
<td>Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory/Document published on the Web only (listing used until 2004 inclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/ASR/x</td>
<td>GHG inventory annual status report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/WEB/SAI/x</td>
<td>GHG inventory summary and assessment report/Document published on the Web only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/COM/x</td>
<td>National communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/DPR/x</td>
<td>Demonstrable Progress Report (Demonstrable Progress Report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/IDR.x</td>
<td>In-depth Review (In-Depth Review)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM EB-x</td>
<td>CDM Executive Board Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMSN/IGO/x</td>
<td>Document submitted by intergovernmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMSN/NGO/x</td>
<td>Document submitted by non-governmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/TP/x</td>
<td>Technical document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Add.x</td>
<td>Text added to a document presented previously (Addendum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Amend.x</td>
<td>Amendment to a text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Corr.x</td>
<td>Correction of a text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/CRP.x</td>
<td>Conference Room Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/INF.x</td>
<td>Information series containing general information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/L.x</td>
<td>Limited distribution document: Draft report or text (limited document)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/MISC.x</td>
<td>Miscellaneous documents: Points of view of Parties and observers; list of participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Rev.x</td>
<td>Text revision which supersedes the text published previously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-paper</td>
<td>Internal, unofficial document to facilitate the negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
- x indicates a serial number.
- For the Green Climate Fund documents (GCF/x), see: www.gcfund.org/documents/in-session-documents.html.

Source: http://unfccc.int/2644.
Sheet 12. Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

The IPCC was created in 1988 to provide policymakers with regular assessments of the climate situation, in order to understand better changes in the climate, the risk and consequences of climate change and any adaptation and mitigation strategies. Since 1990, the IPPC has been publishing every five to six years an Assessment Report of the climate made up of observations from three working groups. The first group takes an inventory of scientific research into changes in the climate. The second assesses the consequences of climate upheavals in miscellaneous sectors and attempts to propose adaptation solutions. The third covers the mitigation of the effects of human activity on the climate.

The Fifth IPCC Assessment Report, published in 2013 and 2014, represents the most comprehensive assessment to date and is based on several thousand scientific and archived climate studies. Its observations are based on more efficient systems than previously, enabling more in-depth understanding and analyses than in previous reports.

Working group I: The physical science basis (published in September 2013)

This section presents the major observations with a higher level of confidence than the previous reports, mainly in terms of the role of human activities in climate change. Thus, “It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.” Note that these observations depend on four different mitigation scenarios (Representation Concentration Pathways - RCP). The four RCP contain “one mitigation scenario leading to a very low forcing level (RCP2.6), two stabilisation scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6) and one scenario with very high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5)”.

Other key observations include:

- “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal”.
- “Since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased”

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• “Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiative forcing\textsuperscript{795}, observed warming and understanding of the climate system”.

• “New GHG emissions will imply continued warming”.

• “Limiting climate change will require \textit{substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions}”.

• “Global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st century is \textit{likely to exceed 1.5°C} relative to 1850 to 1900 for all RCP scenarios except the most ambitious\textsuperscript{796}. \textit{It is likely to exceed 2°C} according to the mitigation scenarios where the radiative forcing has not reached its maximum towards 2100.

• In all the envisaged mitigation scenarios, except for the most ambitious, “\textit{warming will continue beyond 2100}”.

• “Most aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO\textsubscript{2} are stopped”.

\textbf{Working group II: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (published in March 2014)\textsuperscript{797}}

This section reviews the potential and adaptation limits to climate change by taking into account impacts noted and future risks of climate change along with the vulnerability of human and natural systems. It emphasises the possible risks of climate change and the principles to be followed for efficient adaptation. It includes a regional atlas that underlines the observations for each continent. The main global observations include\textsuperscript{798}:

• “\textit{Increasing magnitudes of warming increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and irreversible impacts}”

• \textit{Changes in climate have already caused “impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans”}. Evidence of these impacts has increased since the last IPCC Assessment Report.

\textsuperscript{795} Radiative forcing is “\textit{the change in energy flux caused by a driver and is calculated at the tropopause or at the top of the atmosphere}”. The surface will be warmed when the radiative forcing is positive See: www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_brochure_fr.pdf.

\textsuperscript{796} The mitigation scenarios used by IPCC are called \textit{Representation Concentration Pathways} (RCP) The four RCP contain one mitigation scenario leading to a very low forcing level (RCP2.6), two stabilisation scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6) and one scenario with very high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5)”. The RCP can therefore represent a whole range of climate policies for the 21st century. See: www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_brochure_fr.pdf.

\textsuperscript{797} Working group II: www.climatechange2014.org.

• Without sufficient mitigation, these changes pose huge risks for human health, food security and economic development.

• The impacts of recent extreme climate events “highlight the serious vulnerability and exposure” of certain natural and human systems to the current climate variability, whilst major uncertainties exist over responses to these systems in the future.

• With rising sea levels, the world’s coastal communities “will increasingly experience adverse impacts such as submergence, coastal flooding and coastal erosion”.

• An increasing number of land and fresh water species worldwide face a high risk of extinction.

• Immediate mitigation measures are essential to avoid hazardous climate change; early action will earn more time for us to adapt to the impacts.

• Adaptation measures are also essential, but there are limits and some risks will be inevitable.

• “Many key risks constitute particular challenges for the least developed countries [...], given their limited ability to cope”.

This report notes that adaptation is starting to be incorporated in certain scheduling processes and that adaptation experience is accumulating in all regions.

Working group III: Mitigation of Climate Change (published in April 2014)\textsuperscript{799}

This section is linked to the global UNFCCC goal\textsuperscript{800}. It presents the changes in GHG emissions up to the present day and possible trajectories until 2100 using different mitigation scenarios. It assesses the cross-cutting and sectoral mitigation measures, the needs of such measures and the climate finance issues. The key observations of this section include\textsuperscript{801}:

• Despite a growing number of mitigation policies, total anthropogenic GHG emissions “were the highest in human history from 2000 to 2010”.

• “About half of cumulative anthropogenic CO\textsubscript{2} emissions between 1750 and 2010 have occurred in the last forty years”.

• “Economic and population growth continue to be the most important drivers of increases in carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion”.

\textsuperscript{799} Working group III: www.mitigation2014.org.

\textsuperscript{800} Convention objective (Article 2): “stabilisation, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.

• “Mitigation scenarios in which it is likely that the temperature change caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions can be kept to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels are characterised by atmospheric concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm CO\textsubscript{2}eq” (compared with 396 ppm in 2013 globally\textsuperscript{802}). These scenarios require a large-scale transition in the power supply sector, which is currently a major source of GHG emissions.

• “Baseline scenarios, those without additional mitigation, results in global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7°C to 4.8 °C compared with pre-industrial levels”.

• International cooperation is required to reduce the GHG emissions effectively along with new forms of investment.

• “Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sector, along with the public sector, can play an important role in financing mitigation”.

Synthesis Report\textsuperscript{803}

This report for policymakers incorporates and summarises the observations of the three working groups and two special reports on renewable energy (2011) and extreme event risk management (2012).

What is the importance of the Fifth IPPC Report for the Paris negotiations and beyond?

The IPCC observations will feed the negotiations in Paris this year, mainly in terms of the mitigation commitments by the Parties to remedy the pre-2020 ambition gap (1 p 26)\textsuperscript{804} and under the new 2015 agreement (Section 2 p. 29). The Fifth IPCC Report is also viewed as an essential contribution to the 2013-2015 review (Section 8, p. 107).

In 1995, the Second IPCC Report had provided the scientific knowledge base necessary for the Kyoto Protocol negotiations (1997). Can the Fifth Report stimulate, through the ADP, a sufficiently ambitious new agreement to plug the gap between the current emissions trajectory and the one required to limit the rise in temperatures below 2°C (see Section A p. 29)? How will the Parties make the most of this Report to intensify their efforts in implementing mitigation and adaptation measures and in granting financial and technological support for these measures (see Sections d, p. 42 and f, p. 52)? How should the various sectoral and regional issues be managed through the NAMA (section a, p. 82) and also the national adaptation plans (section b. p. 96)?


\textsuperscript{803}. http://www.ipcc-syr.nl.

### Sheet 13. Abbreviations and acronyms

#### Abbreviations and acronyms French – English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Français</th>
<th>Anglais</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Groupe de travail spécial sur la plate-forme de Durban pour une action renforcée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AILAC</td>
<td>Alliance indépendante de l’Amérique latine et les Caraïbes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIE</td>
<td>Agence internationale de l’énergie (<a href="http://www.iea.org">www.iea.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND</td>
<td>Autorité nationale désignée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEID</td>
<td>Alliance des petits États insulaires en développement (<a href="http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis">www.sidsnet.org/aosis</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Brésil, Afrique du Sud, Inde et Chine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAI</td>
<td>Consultation et analyse internationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACAM</td>
<td>Asie centrale, Caucase, Albanie et Moldavie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDB</td>
<td>Convention sur la diversité biologique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCNUCC</td>
<td>Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Cadre pour les diverses démarches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CdP</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties à la convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Communauté économique européenne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseil exécutif du MDP</td>
<td>Conseil exécutif du mécanisme pour un développement propre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Comité exécutif de la technologie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDN</td>
<td>Contributions prévues déterminées au niveau national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Comité permanent du financement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Comité préparatoire intergouvernemental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Conférence des parties agissant comme réunion des parties à l’accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRP</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties agissant comme Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Centre et réseau des technologies du climat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Français</td>
<td>Anglais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAC Comité de supervision de l’application conjointe</td>
<td>Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC Captage et stockage du dioxyde de carbone dans les formations géologiques</td>
<td>Carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological formations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR Dispositif d’allocation des ressources</td>
<td>Resources Allocation Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFM Démarches non fondées sur le marché</td>
<td>Non-market-based approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue de la CCNUCC</td>
<td>Dialogue sur l’action de coopération à long terme pour faire face aux changements climatiques à travers l’amélioration de la mise en application de la Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI Droits de propriété intellectuelle</td>
<td>Intellectual Property Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSE Dialogue structuré entre experts</td>
<td>Structured Expert Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI Évaluation et examen au niveau international</td>
<td>International assessment and review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EET Équipe d’experts techniques</td>
<td>Team of Technical Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD Entités operationnelles désignées</td>
<td>Designated Operational Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA Fonds pour l’adaptation</td>
<td>Adaptation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEM Fonds pour l’environnement mondial (<a href="http://www.gefweb.org">www.gefweb.org</a>)</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNUF Forum des Nations Unies sur les forêts</td>
<td>United Nations Forum on Forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonds pour les PMA</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP Fonds vert pour le climat</td>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GETT Groupe consultatif d’experts des communications nationales des Parties non visées à l’Annexe I</td>
<td>Consultative Group of Experts on non-Annex I national communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE Groupe consultatif d’experts des communications nationales des Parties non visées à l’Annexe I</td>
<td>Consultative Group of Experts on non-Annex I national communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSCC Fonds spécial pour les changements climatiques</td>
<td>Special Climate Change Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-77/Chine Groupe des 77 et de la Chine (<a href="http://www.G-77.org">www.G-77.org</a>)</td>
<td>Group of 77 and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-77/Chine Groupe des 77 et de la Chine (<a href="http://www.G-77.org">www.G-77.org</a>)</td>
<td>Group of 77 and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEPMA Groupe d’experts sur les pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>Least Developed Country Expert Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GES Gaz à effet de serre</td>
<td>Greenhouse gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GETT Groupe d’experts sur le transfert de technologies</td>
<td>Expert Group on Technology Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIE Groupe d’intégrité environnementale</td>
<td>Environmental Integrity Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIEC Groupe d’experts intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat (<a href="http://www.ipcc.ch">www.ipcc.ch</a>)</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Français</td>
<td>Anglais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRULAC (de l’espagnol)</td>
<td>Groupe régional de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTS-ACV</td>
<td>Groupe de travail spécial de l’action concertée à long terme au titre de la Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTS-PK</td>
<td>Groupe de travail spécial sur les nouveaux engagements pour les Parties visées à l’Annexe I au titre du Protocole de Kyoto</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIDD</td>
<td>Institut international du développement durable</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAN</td>
<td>Mesures d’atténuation appropriées au niveau national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>Mécanisme pour un développement propre (cdm.unfccc.int)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Mécanisme indépendant de redressement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNV</td>
<td>Mesurable, notifiable et vérifiable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Mise en œuvre conjointe (ji.unfccc.int)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMM</td>
<td>Nouveau mécanisme de marché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>Niveaux de référence</td>
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<td>NRE</td>
<td>Niveaux de référence des émissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OACI</td>
<td>Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCDE</td>
<td>Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMI</td>
<td>Organisation maritime internationale</td>
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<td>OMM</td>
<td>Organisation météorologique mondiale</td>
</tr>
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<td>ONG</td>
<td>Organisation non-gouvernementale</td>
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<td>OPEP</td>
<td>Organisation des pays exportateurs de pétrole</td>
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<td>OQLRE</td>
<td>Objectifs quantifiés de limitation et de réduction des émissions</td>
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<td>OS</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCST</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de conseil scientifique et technologique</td>
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<td>OSMÉ</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de mise en œuvre</td>
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<td>PANA</td>
<td>Programme d’action national aux fins de l’adaptation</td>
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<td>PCCD</td>
<td>Polluants climatiques à courte durée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Français</td>
<td>Anglais</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEID Petits États insulaires en développement (<a href="http://www.sidsnet.org">www.sidsnet.org</a>)</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States SIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PET Processus d’examen technique</td>
<td>Technical examination process TEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIB Produit intérieur brut</td>
<td>Gross domestic product GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK Protocole de Kyoto</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol KP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMA Pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries LDCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA Plans nationaux d’adaptation</td>
<td>National Adaptation Plans NAPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ppm Parties par million (volume/poids)</td>
<td>Parts per million (volume/weight) ppm</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRP Potentiel de réchauffement de la planète</td>
<td>Global warming potential GWP</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTN Programme de travail de Nairobi sur les incidences des changements</td>
<td>Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climatiques et la vulnérabilité et l’adaptation à ces changements</td>
<td>climate change NWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D Recherche et développement</td>
<td>Research and development R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBA Rapports biennaux actualisés</td>
<td>Biennial Update Reports BUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMD Responsabilités communes mais différenciées</td>
<td>Common But Differentiated Responsibilities CBDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD Réduction des émissions découlant du déboisement et de la</td>
<td>Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation REDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dégradation des forêts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RET Réunion d’experts techniques</td>
<td>Technical Expert Meeting TEM</td>
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<td>RIT Relevé international des transactions</td>
<td>International Transaction Log ITL</td>
</tr>
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<td>SA1 Secteur d’activité 1 Workstream 1</td>
<td>Workstream 1 WS1</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA2 Secteur d’activité 2 Workstream 2</td>
<td>Workstream 2 WS2</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDFIC Stratégies de développement à faible intensité de carbone</td>
<td>Low-emission development strategies LEDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOC Système mondial d’observation du climat</td>
<td>Global Climate Observing System GCOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOT Système mondial d’observation terrestre</td>
<td>Global Terrestrial Observing System GTOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNSF Système National de surveillance des Forêts</td>
<td>National Forest Monitoring Systems NFMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE Union européenne European Union EU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIE Unité indépendante d’évaluation Independent Evaluation Unit IEU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UII Unité indépendante d’intégrité Independent Integrity Unit IIU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UQA Unité de quantité attribuée Assigned Amount Unit AAU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URCE Unité de réduction certifiée des émissions Certified Emission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction CER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URCE-T URCE temporaire Temporary Certified Emission Reduction tCER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URE Unité de réduction des émissions Emission Reduction Unit ERU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTCATF Utilisation des terres, changement d’affectation des terres et</td>
<td>Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry LULUCF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forêsterie</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>French</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAU</td>
<td>Assigned Amount Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AILAC</td>
<td>Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOSIS</td>
<td>Alliance of Small Island States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWG-KP</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWG-LCA</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUR</td>
<td>Biennial Update Reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACAM</td>
<td>Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova Group</td>
</tr>
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<td>CBD</td>
<td>Convention on Biological Diversity</td>
</tr>
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<td>CBDR</td>
<td>Common But Differentiated Responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Carbon capture and storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Certified Emission Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGE</td>
<td>Consultative Group of Experts on non-Annex I national communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMP ou COP/MOP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCN</td>
<td>Climate Technology Centre and Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Designated national authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Designated Operational Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglais</td>
<td>Français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert Group on Technology Transfer</td>
<td>Groupe d’experts sur le transfert de technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Integrity Group</td>
<td>Groupe d’intégrité environnementale</td>
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<td>Emission Reduction Unit</td>
<td>Unité de réduction des émissions</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Union européenne</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union allowances</td>
<td>Quota de la Communauté européenne</td>
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<td>Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism</td>
<td>Conseil exécutif du mécanisme pour un développement propre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Framework for various approaches</td>
<td>Cadre pour les diverses démarches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group of 77 and China</td>
<td>Groupe des 77 et de la Chine (<a href="http://www.G-77.org">www.G-77.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Climate Observing System</td>
<td>Système mondial d’observation du climat (<a href="http://www.wmo.ch/web/gcos/gcoshome.html">www.wmo.ch/web/gcos/gcoshome.html</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
<td>Produit intérieur brut</td>
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<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
<td>Fonds pour l’environnement mondial (<a href="http://www.gefweb.org">www.gefweb.org</a>)</td>
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<td>Greenhouse gas</td>
<td>Gaz à effet de serre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries</td>
<td>Groupe régional de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes</td>
</tr>
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<td>Global Terrestrial Observing System</td>
<td>Système mondial d’observation terrestre (<a href="http://www.fao.org/gtos">www.fao.org/gtos</a>)</td>
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<td>Global Warming Potential</td>
<td>Potentiel de réchauffement de la planète</td>
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<td>Independent Assessment Report</td>
<td>Rapport d’évaluation indépendant</td>
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<td>International assessment and review</td>
<td>Évaluation et examen au niveau international</td>
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<td>International Consultation and Analysis</td>
<td>Consultation et analyse internationale</td>
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<td>International Civil Aviation Organisation</td>
<td>Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Evaluation Unit</td>
<td>Unité Indépendante d’évaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Institute for Sustainable Development</td>
<td>Institut international du développement durable</td>
</tr>
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<td>Independent Integrity Unit</td>
<td>Unité Indépendante d’Intégrité</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intended Nationally Determined Contributions</td>
<td>Contributions prévues déterminées au niveau national</td>
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<td>International Energy Agency</td>
<td>Agence internationale de l’énergie (<a href="http://www.iea.org">www.iea.org</a>)</td>
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<td>Anglais</td>
<td>Français</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>IETA International Emissions Trading Association</td>
<td>Association internationale du marché des émissions (<a href="http://www.ieta.org">www.ieta.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMO International Maritime Organisation</td>
<td>Organisation maritime internationale</td>
</tr>
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<td>IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
<td>Groupe d’experts intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat (<a href="http://www.ipcc.ch">www.ipcc.ch</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPR Intellectual Property Rights</td>
<td>Droits de propriété intellectuelle</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRM Independent Redress Mechanism</td>
<td>Mécanisme indépendant de redressement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITL International Transaction Log</td>
<td>Relevé international des transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI Joint Implementation</td>
<td>Mise en œuvre conjointe (ji.unfccc.int)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JISC Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee</td>
<td>Comité de supervision de l’application conjointe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSS-CANNZ Japan, US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand</td>
<td>Groupe du JUSSCANNZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>KP Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>Protocole de Kyoto</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEDS Low-emission development strategies</td>
<td>Stratégies de développement à faible intensité de carbone</td>
</tr>
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<td>LDCs Least Developed Countries</td>
<td>Pays les moins avancés</td>
</tr>
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<td>LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund</td>
<td>Fonds pour les pays les moins avancés</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEG Least Developed Country Expert Group</td>
<td>Groupe d’experts sur les pays les moins avancés</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMDC Like Minded Developing Countries (Like Minded Group)</td>
<td>Groupe d’États ayant la même optique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry</td>
<td>Utilisation des terres, changement d’affectation des terres et forêterie</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRV Measurable, reportable and verifiable</td>
<td>Mesurable, notifiable et vérifiable</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</td>
<td>Mesures d’atténuation appropriées au niveau national</td>
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<td>NAPS National Adaptation Plan</td>
<td>Plans nationaux d’adaptation</td>
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<td>NAPA National Adaptation Programme of Action</td>
<td>Programme d’action national aux fins de l’adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFMS National Forest Monitoring Systems</td>
<td>Système national de surveillance des forêts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Non-governmental organisation</td>
<td>Organisation non-gouvernementale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA Non-market-based approaches</td>
<td>Démarches non fondées sur le marché</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWP Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change</td>
<td>Programme de travail de Nairobi sur les incidences des changements climatiques et la vulnérabilité et l’adaptation à ces changements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglais</td>
<td>Français</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
<td>Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
<td>Organisation de pays exportateurs de pétrole</td>
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<tr>
<td>ppm Parts per million (volume/weight)</td>
<td>Parties par million (volume/poids)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMDC (ou LMG) Like Minded Developing Countries</td>
<td>Groupe d’États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSF Private Sector Facility (of the GCF)</td>
<td>Facilité pour le secteur privé (du FVC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>QELRO Quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives</td>
<td>Objectifs chiffrés de limitation et de réduction des émissions</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF Resources Allocation Framework</td>
<td>Dispositif d’allocation des ressources</td>
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<td>REDD Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation</td>
<td>Réduction des émissions découlant du déboisement et de la dégradation des forêts</td>
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<td>RGGI Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative</td>
<td>Initiative régionale sur les gaz à effet de serre (<a href="http://www.rggi.org">www.rggi.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RL Reference Levels</td>
<td>Niveaux de référence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REL Reference Emission Levels</td>
<td>Niveaux de référence des émissions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SB Subsidiary Body</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de mise en œuvre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de conseil scientifique et technologique</td>
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<td>SCCF Special Climate Change Fund</td>
<td>Fonds spécial pour les changements climatiques</td>
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<td>SCF Standing Committee on Finance</td>
<td>Comité permanent du financement</td>
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<td>SED Structured Expert Dialogue</td>
<td>Dialogue structuré entre experts</td>
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<td>SIDS Small Island Developing States</td>
<td>Petits États insulaires en développement (<a href="http://www.sidsnet.org">www.sidsnet.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCPPs Short-lived Climate-forcing Pollutants</td>
<td>Polluants climatiques à courte durée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tCER Temporary Certified Emission Reduction</td>
<td>Unité de réduction certifiée des émissions temporaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC Technology Executive Committee</td>
<td>Comité exécutif des technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEM Technical Expert Meeting</td>
<td>Réunion d’experts techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEP Technical examination process</td>
<td>Processus d’examen technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTE Team of Technical Experts</td>
<td>Équipe d’experts techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>French</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC Dialogue</td>
<td>Dialogue sur l’action de coopération à long terme pour faire face aux changements climatiques à travers l’amélioration de la mise en application de la convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFF United Nations Forum on Forests</td>
<td>Forum des Nations Unies sur les forêts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEOG Western Europe and Others Group</td>
<td>Groupe de l’Europe de l’Ouest et des autres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO World Meteorological Organisation</td>
<td>Organisation météorologique mondiale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS1 Workstream 1</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS2 Workstream 2</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité 2</td>
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### Sheet 14. Lexicon

**French – English**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Français</th>
<th>Anglais</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accord juridiquement contraignant</td>
<td>Legally binding agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atténuation</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branche coercitive</td>
<td>Enforcement branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branche facilitatrice</td>
<td>Facilitative branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captage et stockage du carbone</td>
<td>Carbon capture and storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre d’information sur les technologies</td>
<td>Technology clearing house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de contrôle de respect des dispositions</td>
<td>Compliance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de surveillance de la MOC</td>
<td>JI Supervisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité exécutif du MDP</td>
<td>CDM Executive Committee</td>
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<td>Communication nationale</td>
<td>National communication</td>
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<td>Conséquences néfastes</td>
<td>Adverse effects</td>
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<td>Contribution prévue déterminée au niveau national</td>
<td>Intended Nationally Determined Contribution</td>
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<td>Consultation et analyse internationales</td>
<td>International Consultation and Analysis</td>
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<td>Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critères d’admissibilité</td>
<td>Eligibility criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Échange international de droits d’émissions</td>
<td>International emissions trading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonds vert pour le climat</td>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe d’États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)</td>
<td>Like Minded Group (or Like Minded Developing Countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe d’experts intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat</td>
<td>International panel of experts on climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe parapluie (ou Groupe chapeau ou Groupe de l’ombrelle)</td>
<td>Umbrella Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventaire</td>
<td>Inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignes directrices</td>
<td>Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mécanisme de projets</td>
<td>Project-based mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mécanisme de flexibilité</td>
<td>Flexibility mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mécanisme pour un développement propre</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesurable, notifiable et vérifiable</td>
<td>Measurable, reportable and verifiable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesures de riposte</td>
<td>Response measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesures d’atténuation appropriées au niveau national</td>
<td>Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mise en œuvre conjointe</td>
<td>Joint implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noir de carbone</td>
<td>Carbon black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de conseil scientifique et technologique</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de mise en œuvre</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pertes et préjudices</td>
<td>Loss and damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plafond d’émissions</td>
<td>Emissions cap</td>
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<tr>
<td>Français</td>
<td>Anglais</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plan d’action structurel d’observance</td>
<td>Compliance action plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potentiel de réchauffement global</td>
<td>Global warming potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principe d’addition</td>
<td>Additionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocole de Kyoto</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantité attribuée</td>
<td>Assigned Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapport biennal actualisé</td>
<td>Biennial update report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renforcement des capacités</td>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsabilités communes mais différenciées</td>
<td>Common but differentiated responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scénario de référence</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secteur d’activité 1 ou 2</td>
<td>Workstream 1 or 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Système de conformité</td>
<td>Compliance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Système national d’inventaire</td>
<td>National inventory system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfert de technologies</td>
<td>Technology transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation des terres, changement d’affectation des terres et forêsterie</td>
<td>Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**English – French**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anglais</th>
<th>Français</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additionality</td>
<td>Additionnalité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adverse effects</td>
<td>Conséquences néfastes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Amount</td>
<td>Quantité attribuée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Scénario de référence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biennial update report</td>
<td>Rapport biennal actualisé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
<td>Renforcement des capacités</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon black</td>
<td>Noir de carbone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon capture and storage</td>
<td>Captage et stockage du carbone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM Executive Committee</td>
<td>Comité exécutif du MDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
<td>Mécanisme pour un développement propre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common but differentiated responsibilities</td>
<td>Responsabilités communes mais différenciées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance action plan</td>
<td>Plan d’action structurel d’observance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Committee</td>
<td>Comité de contrôle de respect des dispositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance System</td>
<td>Système de conformité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility criteria</td>
<td>Critères d’admissibilité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emissions cap</td>
<td>Plafond d’émissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement branch</td>
<td>Branche coercitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitative branch</td>
<td>Branche facilitatrice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility mechanism</td>
<td>Mécanisme de flexibilité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global warming potential</td>
<td>Potentiel de réchauffement global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
<td>Fonds vert pour le climat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidlines</td>
<td>Lignes directrices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended Nationally Determined Contribution</td>
<td>Contribution prévue déterminée au niveau national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglais</td>
<td>Français</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International emissions trading</td>
<td>Échange international de droits d’émissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Consultation and Analysis</td>
<td>Consultation et analyse internationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International panel of experts on climate change</td>
<td>Groupe d’experts intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory</td>
<td>Inventaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint implementation</td>
<td>Mise en œuvre conjointe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI Supervisory Committee</td>
<td>Comité de surveillance de la MOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>Protocole de Kyoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry</td>
<td>Utilisation des terres, changement d’affectation des terres et forsterie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legally binding agreement</td>
<td>Accord juridiquement contraignant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like Minded Group (or Like Minded Developing Countries)</td>
<td>Groupe d’États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Atténuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National communication</td>
<td>Communication nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National inventory system</td>
<td>Système national d’inventaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</td>
<td>Mesures d’atténuation appropriées au niveau national</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Organe subsidiaire de conseil scientifique et technologique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology clearing house</td>
<td>Centre d’information sur les technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology transfer</td>
<td>Transfert de technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbrella Group</td>
<td>Groupe parapluie (ou Groupe chapeau ou Groupe de l’ombrelle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
<td>Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workstream 1 or 2</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité 1 ou 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sheet 15. Thematic glossary

**Additionality**
Characterises the GHG emission reductions generated by the compensatory projects must be greater that the emissions which would have occurred without these projects. The goal of environmental additionality is to demonstrate that a project produces actual, measurable, additional and long-term GHG reductions.

**Adaptation**
Ability of a system to adjust its mechanisms, processes and structure to climate change. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned; it can occur in response to or in advance of a change in conditions.

**Hot air**
Due to their industrial recession in the 1990s, certain Annex B countries to the Kyoto Protocol (like Russia and Ukraine) received higher emission limitation targets than their total amount of emissions without taking any measures for domestic reduction. This quota surplus (hot air) could potentially be sold to other countries via flexibility mechanisms.

**Improvement in greenhouse gas removals**
Calculated improvement of greenhouse gas removals between a baseline scenario and a project. The removal designates the penetration of greenhouse gases in a living organism that assimilates these gases, thereby allowing the disappearance of the removed greenhouse gases.

**Annex I**
Annex I is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. It quotes forty developed countries and countries with economies in transition that have made commitments to stabilise the greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels.

**Annex II**
Annex II is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. It identifies 24 developed countries (including in Annex I) that have agreed to provide financial and technological aid to developing countries to combat climate change.

**Annex B**
Annex B is attached to the Kyoto Protocol. It identifies 38 developed countries and countries with economies in transition that have made commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the period 2008-2012.

**Anthropogenic**
Greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities are called anthropogenic when they do not come from natural emissions. These are additional emissions which can be considered as pollution.

**Mitigation**
Human intervention to reduce the sources of greenhouse gases or reinforce the sinks of greenhouse gases, either by extending the surface area or by improving their removal capacity.

**Afforestation**
Action of planting trees on land that has had no forest cover for a certain number of years.

**Carbon dioxide capture and storage**
The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other than the atmosphere. This process designates the separation of CO₂ from flue gases or from processing fossil fuels to produce CO₂-rich fractions and long-term storage underground in exhausted oil and gas reservoirs, coal seams and saline aquifers.

**Carbon neutrality**
Objective of no longer emitting GHG, or more realistically, action of investing in one or more projects that will avoid producing an equivalent quantity of GHG than generated by the entity seeking carbon neutrality.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Climate change</strong></th>
<th>Climate variations that are attributed directly or indirectly to human activities, altering the composition of the atmosphere, and which are added to the natural variability of the climate note during comparable periods.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fossil fuel</strong></td>
<td>Natural gas, petroleum, coal or any solid, liquid or gaseous fuel derived from these materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supplementarity</strong></td>
<td>In the context of the UNFCCC, supplementarity refers to the option available to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to introduce, in addition to the Kyoto mechanisms, suitable domestic policies, energy-related or otherwise, to fulfil the GHG emission reduction objectives in the long term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compliance</strong></td>
<td>Obligation whereby the emitter is required to comply with his objectives of GHG emission reductions. The verification of compliance with the commitments and mandatory objectives is an essential factor in a mandatory emission reduction system. Compliance includes the verification modalities, the organisation responsible for verifying the compliance and the possible sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Synonym:</em> obligation compliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business-as-usual</strong></td>
<td>Greenhouse gases resulting from general trends in an economy with no emission control policy. This reference is used to estimate the effectiveness of policies and measures undertaken to combat greenhouse gas emissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compensatory credits</strong></td>
<td>Emission allowances representing a tonne of sequestered or removed equivalent CO₂, given to the promoter of a compensatory credit project to reduce GHG emissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Woodland clearance</strong></td>
<td>Conversion of forest to non-forest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Synonym:</em> Deforestation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emission right</strong></td>
<td>Any emission right symbolises the reduction of GHG emissions by one metric tonne of equivalent carbon dioxide, i.e. an emission unit, an emission quota or a compensatory credit. These rights can be traded inside international or national carbon trading systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greenhouse gas emission</strong></td>
<td>Total mass of a GHG which is released into the atmosphere during a given period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CO₂ equivalent</strong></td>
<td>The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO₂) that would cause the same amount of radiative forcing as a given mixture of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>NOTE 1:</em> The CO₂ equivalent is calculated using the mass of a given GHG multiplied by its global warming potential.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>NOTE 2:</em> Annex B lists global warming potentials established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greenhouse gas emission or removal factor</strong></td>
<td>Factor reporting the activity data on the GHG emissions or absorption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>NOTE:</em> A greenhouse gas emission or removal factor can include an oxidation factor.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fungibility</strong></td>
<td>Quality of what is consumed through use and which can be replaced by other similar products. In the context of the carbon market, fungibility makes no distinction between the categories of units and considers them all identical (one AAU would therefore be equivalent to a JI project unit and also to a unit resulting from an internal measurement of energy efficiency).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Carbon leakage

Part of GHG emission reductions in Annex B countries that may be offset by an increase in emissions in non-constrained countries above their baseline levels. This can occur through (i) relocation of energy-intensive production units in non-constrained regions; (ii) increased consumption of fossil fuels in these regions through decline in the international price of oil and gas triggered by lower demand for these energies; and (iii) changes in revenues (thus in energy demand) due to improved economic conditions.

NOTE: The term also refers to the situation in which a carbon capture activity (tree planting, for example) on one piece of land inadvertently, directly or indirectly, triggers an activity, which in whole or part, counteracts the carbon effects of the initial activity.

Greenhouse gases (GHG)

Gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that remove and re-emit the infrared radiation. They help maintain the heat in the Earth’s atmosphere. These gases are produced by both natural and anthropogenic processes. The main gases are water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), dinitrogen oxide (N₂O), the chlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), nitrogen trifluoride (NF₃), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆).

Energy intensity

Ratio of energy consumption to economic or physical output. At the national level, energy intensity is the ratio of total domestic consumption or final energy consumption to Gross Domestic Product or physical output.

GHG inventory

Assessment that measures the GHG emissions from activities of an entity (country, business, municipality, etc.). This assessment is calculated in relation to a reference year.

Carbon market

Name for a group of greenhouse gas emissions trading and transaction mechanisms. The carbon market designates both the voluntary market for the voluntary compensation of GHG emissions and the regulated markets that make the regulated emitters compliant.

Voluntary market

Carbon credits trading mechanism not linked to national or international regulations.

Materiality

An item of information, an error or an inaccuracy are normally considered as material if they can influence people building on them. This concept comes into play when verifying project data and embodies the idea that there is a threshold beyond which the search for other potential errors is not longer justified in terms of time, money or the efforts required. Thus, if the error found generates a difference in the emission reductions of the project which is below the set threshold, this error is viewed as negligible or, in other words, immaterial.

Clean development mechanism (CDM)

Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12). It assumes the implementation of emission reduction or avoidance projects in the developing countries. The CDM projects require at least three partners: the developing country (project host), the private investor (project manager) and the Annex B country from which the private investor comes.
Joint implementation (JI)  
Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12). This mechanism is used by the governments of developed countries and countries with economies in transition, and their companies, to finance greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in the other developed countries and countries with economies in transition (mainly the Eastern European countries and Russia). In return, these States receive emission credits that they can sell or deduct from their own national efforts.

Baseline  
This is a historical level used to calculate subsequent changes in greenhouse gas emissions. This level is determined micro-economically or macro-economically. It is of crucial importance in determining the additionality level of reductions resulting from joint initiative projects or those implemented under the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint Implementation.

Carbon black  
Carbon black, also known as furnace black or lamp black, is an amorphous form of the carbon produced by industrial activity. It is a climate forcer (has a warming effect on the climate) that has only been of interest to the scientific community for a few years.

Global warming potential (GWP) or planet warming potential (PWP)  
Index describing the radiation characteristics of greenhouse gases. The GWP or PWP represents the combined effect of the time these gases remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing outgoing infrared radiation. This index approximates the time-integrated warming effect of a unit mass of a given greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, relative to that of CO₂.

NOTE: The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change contain planet warming potential tables.

Greenhouse gas programme  
Voluntary or mandatory, international, national or sub-national system or plan which records, counts or manages the emissions, removals, greenhouse gas emission reductions or improvements in greenhouse gas removals.

Carbon sink  
Any process, activity or mechanism, natural or artificial, that removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere (for example, trees, plants and oceans).

Reforestation  
Planting of forests on lands that had previously contained forests but have been converted to other uses.

Additional reductions  
See Additionality

Greenhouse gas emission reduction  
Calculated drop in GHG emissions between the baseline scenario emissions and the actual emissions avoided by a project.

Reduction in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)  
International issue of the post-2012 climate regime on the financial provisions and the transfer of technology under the reduction plan for emissions caused by deforestation and forest degradation. This issue also includes the protection and sustainable management of forests and the promotion of forest carbon stocks in the developing countries resulting, for example, from adapted silvicultural practices or plantings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Greenhouse gas reservoir | Physical unit or biosphere, geosphere or hydrosphere component capable of storing or accumulating a GHG removed from the atmosphere by a greenhouse gas sink or a GHG captured at its source.  
NOTE 1: The total mass of carbon contained in a GHG reservoir at a given moment can be called reservoir carbon stock.  
NOTE 2: A GHG reservoir can transfer GHG to another reservoir.  
NOTE 3: Collecting a GHG at its source before it enters the atmosphere and stoking the GHG collected in a GHG reservoir can be called GHG capture and storage. |
| Baseline scenario | Hypothetical reference case that represents in the best possible way the conditions that would be the most likely in the absence of the greenhouse gas project.  
NOTE: The baseline scenario coincides with the GHG project chronology. |
| Sequestration | Action of removing the carbon from the atmosphere. CO₂ sequestration projects can participate in two distinct and sometimes complementary ways to carbon sequestration: (i) by extracting the carbonic gas from the atmosphere and storing it as over- and underground biomass; (ii) by producing additional renewable biomass where the waste-to-energy conversion can avoid the recourse to fossil fuels. |
| Greenhouse gas source | Physical unit or process releasing a GHG into the atmosphere. |
| Affected greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir | GHG source, sink or reservoir influenced by the activity of a project through modifications to the supply and demand of the market regarding its associated products or service or through physical movement.  
NOTE 1: Unlike the associated GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are linked physically to a GHG project, the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are linked to a GHG project by changes caused by market supply and demand.  
NOTE 2: An affected GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found off the project site.  
NOTE 3: The reductions in emissions or the increases in GHG removals attributable to the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are commonly called "leaks". |
| Controlled greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir | A GHG source, sink or reservoir that operates under the guidance or influence of an author of a greenhouse gas project proposal through financial, political, management or other instruments.  
NOTE: A controlled GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found on the project site. |
| Associated greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir | A GHG source, sink or reservoir with material or energy flows entering or exiting the project or which are contained within it.  
NOTE 1: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found upstream or downstream of the project and can be located on or off the project site.  
NOTE 2: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir can also include activities relating to the design, construction or declassification of a project. |
Standard of performance

Simplified approach of additionality and the baseline scenario. Rather than seeking to prove the additionality and to determine the baseline scenario for each project, the standard of performance is an approximate evaluation that establishes a generic baseline scenario as a quantitative standard of performance. Any project where the emissions are below this predefined standard is considered as additional.

Monitoring

Continuous or periodic assessment of emissions and removals of GHG or other GHG-related data.

Emission cap-and-trade system

System that assigns rights to companies for their greenhouse gas emissions based on governmental environmental objectives. Compensatory credits issued thanks to a GHG reduction project can also be traded in this system.

Tonne of carbon equivalent

See equivalent CO₂

Removal unit

Unit issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and which covers the net removal by carbon sinks of GHG from Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) activities.

Emission unit

Under the cap-and-trade system, an emission unit designates a right of emission generated by the government according to the declared GHG emissions verified by the companies. A right of emission relates to the authorisation to emit 1 tCO₂eq.

Assigned amount units (AAU)

Units issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in their national register. The amount assigned is calculated according to emissions of the base year and quantified emission reduction commitments. This quantity is expressed as a percentage.

Certified emission reduction (CER)

Certified emission reductions (CER) are emission credits obtained through CDM projects. These credits can be applied directly to fulfil the quantified commitments of Annex B countries.

Note: the acronym UCRE for Certified units of emissions reduction is also used.

Emission reduction units (ERU)

These are units converted from an assigned amount unit (AAU) or a removal unit and handed to the project participant under joint implementation activities.

Target user

Person or organisation identified by those in charge declaring information relating to greenhouse gases and which relies on this information to take decisions.

NOTE 1: The target user can be the customer, the responsible party, the administrators of the GHG programme, regulators, the financial community or other stakeholders involved such as local authorities, ministerial departments or non-governmental organisations.

NOTE 2: The level of assurance is used to determine the accuracy a validator or verifier gives to his validation or verification plan to detect any errors, omissions or false declarations.

NOTE 3: There are two assurance levels (reasonable or limited) that result in validation or verification reports that are formulated differently. See ISO 14064-3: 2006 A.2.3.2 for sample validation and verification reports.
Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry (LULUCF)

Land use and their changes (forest, agriculture, natural areas, etc.) have a significant influence on carbon storage (sink) and methane (CH₄) releases and therefore on climate change. They contribute to the anthropogenic emissions taken into account by the Kyoto Protocol. The problem of land and forest use goes hand in hand with the concerns of two other conventions: biodiversity and desertification.

Vulnerability

Vulnerability defines to what extent a system can be degraded or damaged by climate change. It depends not just on the sensitivity but also on the adaptability of the system to new climatic conditions.
Bibliography


ENERGIES 2050 was born with the certainty that the development trajectories of our societies are not inevitable and that they can be changed for the better. As an informal network since 2007, and as a French non-profit and non-governmental organisation working exclusively in the general interest since 2011, ENERGIES 2050 contributes relentlessly to the transformation of our societies for a more humane, plural and united future.

Gathering members and partners from more than fifty nationalities, ENERGIES 2050 works in France and internationally to set up a new, positive and inclusive development model and to convert constraints into opportunities for action. As a collective adventure in the quest for better ways of living together, ENERGIES 2050 has committed to the Great Transition, including the energy transition, sustainable cities and regions and the shift towards a more humane, plural and united society, bringing peace and respecting the common goods of humanity.

ENERGIES 2050 breaks its activities down into five complementary areas:

- Executing demonstrative and repeatable implementation projects accompanied by technical studies and research actions to show the possibilities;
- Organising or attending meetings and conferences in order to expand the opportunities for exchanges and discussions;
- Publishing research results to pool and share knowledge;
- Educating, training and building the capacities so that each individual can understand, know and act;
- Communicating to the greatest number to inform, mobilise and unit the desire to act.

ENERGIES 2050 is active in the following topics: eco-development and sustainable development; climate, environment and energy policy; energy transition; development of renewable energy sources; responsible and sustainable tourism; buildings and the construction sector; challenges and opportunities in rural and urban areas; sustainable cities; natural resources and the common goods of humanity; ecological and environmental economics; responsible business dynamics and corporate performance; low-carbon development strategies; gender; environmental education; social dynamics; behaviour change and citizen action; and the social solidarity economy.

ENERGIES 2050’s activities are part of an on-going vision for solidarity and equity. ENERGIES 2050 argues for all world citizens to participate in setting up a new, shared development model, to be designed together.

ENERGIES 2050’s actions and research simultaneously take place at the local level - as the anchorage point for implementing and testing new approaches - and at world level, since the idea is to share and multiply successful experiences, whilst learning from mistakes made along the way.
The **Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable** (IFDD - Institute of the Francophonie for Sustainable Development) is a subsidiary body of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF - International Organization of the Francophonie) headquartered in Quebec City, Canada.

Originally named **Institut de l’Énergie des Pays ayant en commun l’usage du Français** (IEPF - Energy Institute of Countries with French as a common language), the IFDD was founded in 1988 following the 11th Summit of the Francophonie held in Quebec City in 1987. It was created following the global energy crises from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. In 1996, the Institute took the resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 as the major guide for its action and became the **Institut de l’énergie et de l’environnement de la Francophonie** (Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World). And in 2013, following the Rio+20 Conference, it was renamed **Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable**.

Its mission is to contribute to:

- Training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- Support for development players in initiatives to prepare and implement sustainable development programmes;
- The promotion of the sustainable development approach in French-speaking countries;
- The development of partnerships in the various economic and social development sectors, mainly environment and energy, for sustainable development.

The action of the IFDD falls within mission D “Sustainable development, economy and solidarity” and Strategic Objective 7 “Contributing to the development and implementation of the post-2015 development agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals”, of the Francophonie’s strategic framework.

In particular, the Institute is assuming, in partnership with other units of the OIF, the leadership of the implementation of the following two initiatives contained in the OIF’s 2015-2018 programme:

- To increase the capacity of targeted countries to develop and implement regional, national and local sustainable development strategies that are inclusive, participatory and results-oriented;
- Strengthen the capacity of Francophone players to actively participate in international negotiations and decisions on the economy, the environment and sustainable development, as well as in their implementation.

www.ifdd.francophonie.org
The Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF - International Organization of the Francophonie) is an institution founded on sharing a language - French - and common values. It has to date fifty-seven member States and governments and twenty-three observers. With members spread across all five continents, it accounts for more than a third of the member States of the United Nations.

The OIF supports its member States in preparing or consolidating their policies and carries out multilateral cooperation actions under four-year programmes, in accordance with the major missions set out by the Summit of the Francophonie: promoting the French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; promoting peace, democracy and human rights; supporting education, training, higher education and research; developing cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity.

57 member States and governments:
- Albania
- Principality of Andorra
- Armenia
- Kingdom of Belgium
- Benin
- Bulgaria
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cambodia
- Cameroon
- Canada
- Canada-Quebec
- Cape Verde
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Comoros
- Congo
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Cyprus
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- Djibouti
- Dominica
- Egypt
- Equatorial Guinea
- France
- Gabon
- Ghana
- Greece
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Haiti
- Laos
- Lebanon
- Luxembourg
- Macedonia (FYR)
- Madagascar
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Moldavia
- Principality of Monaco
- Morocco
- Niger
- Qatar
- Romania
- Rwanda
- Saint Lucia
- São Tomé and Príncipe
- Senegal
- Seychelles
- Switzerland
- Togo
- Tunisia
- Vanuatu
- Vietnam
- Wallonia-Brussels Federation.

23 observers:
- Austria
- Bosnia Herzegovina
- Costa Rica
- Croatia
- Czech Republic
- Dominican Republic
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Hungary
- Kosovo
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Mexico
- Montenegro
- Mozambique
- Poland
- Serbia
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Thailand
- Ukraine
- United Arab Emirates
- Uruguay
Guide to Negotiations assessment form – COP 21 and CMP 11 on climate change

To assist us in improving the next versions of the *Guide to Negotiations*, we should be grateful if you would assess this version on a scale of 1 to 4, adding your comments below.

1 = highly satisfactory   2 = satisfactory   3 = rather unsatisfactory   4 = highly unsatisfactory

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Please forward the form to one of the addresses below:

**Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD)**

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Quebec City (Quebec) G1K 4A1, Canada  
Fax: +1 418 692-5644  
E-mail: ifdd@francophonie.org
The agreement expected in Paris this year, that will be negotiated during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in November-December 2015, is crucially important to the progress of climate negotiations. Fruit of a process started in 2011 with the launch of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, it holds out hope for considerable boosting of measures taken to face up to climate change.

The Paris agreement will plot the road map for the post-2020 period. To achieve this, it could capitalise on the voluntary commitments of the Parties, which figure in the nationally-determined forecast contributions that have been submitted in vast numbers during 2015. At the same time, the COP 21 will be a chance to start - without waiting for 2020 - plugging the gap between the commitments made by the countries and the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that are really necessary to prevent global warming from reaching perilous levels.

Aimed at helping delegates to understand better the challenges of the COP 21, this guide provides a historical perspective (Part I) and an analysis of the main negotiation issues based on the latest negotiation texts and countries’ stances on these issues (Part II). Boxes and themed sheets provide the reader with all the keys to the negotiations. Although this publication is intended especially for negotiators from member countries of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF), it should also be a useful tool for all other delegates.