Background Analysis

For the Lima COP-20 negotiations

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change
COP 20 – CMP10

Lima, Peru, 1st – 12th December 2014
Background Analysis
For the Climate Negotiations on the eve of the Warsaw Conference

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This background analysis aims to foster understanding of the climate negotiations.
It was written with three objectives in mind:

• Help the widest possible public to understand what is at stake in these negotiations by trying as much as possible to avoid using any technical jargon
• Describe the process, its evolution, the subjects under discussion and the challenges, as well as sticking points
• Clarify the possible points of convergence and the options that could help the process to move forward

This background analysis includes a glossary of acronyms and concepts of the climate negotiations.
French and Spanish versions of this document are also available.
Summary - The 4th cycle of climate negotiations will be decisive

Following the confirmation of climate change in 1985, the first report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) led to an international treaty that was adopted by all countries. The Rio Conference that was held in 1992 recognises climate change, and calls upon countries to act according to their responsibilities and abilities. Following the realisation that there was insufficient commitment to the fight against climate change, the Kyoto Protocol marked progress by setting commitments for developed countries to cut their emissions for the period 1990-2012. But this was without the participation of the United States.

Very unequal commitments made by countries for the period to 2020

The following negotiation cycle was marked by considerable difficulties: the commitments made by developed countries for the period of 2013-2020 were significantly too low to impact climate change. And many countries began to disengage from the Kyoto Protocol by refusing the legally binding aspects that it implies. These countries include Japan, Russia and New Zealand. Canada quite simply left the Kyoto Protocol and adopted the same position as the United States. With 2020 fast approaching, the 4th cycle of negotiations is now starting.
But also significant progress

Nevertheless the recent period has shown decisive progress:
• The successive IPCC reports succeeded in gaining recognition for a joint objective: that of remaining below a 2°C increase in temperature compared with the level of the pre-industrial period, as anything above this limit would compromise the ability to feed the global population that is expected to reach 9.5 billion by 2050.
• In recent years countries have reached agreement that this is necessary. This also has a deep impact on the terms of the negotiation, as it has been proven essential that all countries contribute to the fight against climate change. Rich and poor alike. Obviously in variable proportions.
• The question of the very nature of development is therefore posed. It will become necessary to overcome and solve the historically inherited inequalities. Funding the fight against climate change for developing countries has therefore become a central issue.

A methodological change

The higher stakes have implied a change in negotiation method, and have mobilised the Heads of State and Governments. This was the objective of the summit that was organised by Mr Ban Ki Moon on 23rd September last in New York.

The timeline that follows will be very tight:
• Define the political framework for setting greenhouse gas emissions’ levels for countries in coherence with the objective of stabilising climate at below 2°C, and the way in which efforts should be shared at the Lima conference that is due to take place in early December.
• Convince all countries to establish their contribution by Spring 2015.
• Then, and this is the most challenging, adjust the countries’ commitments in the course of the negotiations over the 6 following months, so that they will be equitably shared.
• Reach the Paris conference in December 2015 with the possibility of concluding a political agreement that includes all countries for the 2020-2030 period.
30 years after first understanding the process of climate change, the negotiations are getting down to the nitty gritty. If countries fail to achieve sufficient levels of commitment, climate change will reach a level where it can no longer be controlled. In addition to this, international relations have seriously deteriorated in recent years, whereas the joint economic and financial crises have led to a reduction in financial support for developing countries.

It is therefore necessary to successfully negotiate with 193 countries in a short time frame and a political and economic context that is particularly challenging. Successfully negotiating this new series implies making progress on 3 fronts:

• The Intergovernmental negotiations must include commitments that are not only high, but that will effectively also be respected. It will therefore be necessary to negotiate commitments and contributions made by countries that are equitable, transparent in their implementation, and that consolidate the agreements reached in the negotiations by regulations that respect international law.

• Mobilising through action all levels: States, companies, Local Authorities, citizens. In short, getting humanity to step up to the plate, and use energy more efficiently, encouraging the use of renewable energies rather than fossil fuels, generalising recycling and protecting forests... All of these choices and positive actions affect humanity as a whole. In terms of reducing negative impacts, and especially in terms of job-creation, spending cuts, social cohesion, access to development... Showing how the fight against climate change can prove beneficial will be a determining factor in involving all countries in committing to an ambitious agreement that includes them all.

• Given the importance of the negotiations, it is essential that all citizens become involved. Without their support, political leaders would not have the mandate to take major decisions. The involvement of citizens is all the more important if concrete actions are to be implemented. It is essential not
only to help everyone to understand the decisive nature of what is at stake, but first and foremost to provide everyone with the guarantees of acceptable living conditions for themselves and their families. The Paris conference should be the first climate conference that addresses people as individuals.

It is essential to make progress on the two first points in order to raise the level of the international negotiations. We are standing with our backs to the wall, and it is not possible to put off the deadline. In effect, while countries are busy arguing, the climate is getting worse. And irreversibly so.

**Expectations of the Lima conference**

The 20th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will be held in Lima in Peru from 1st to 12th December 2014. It will be decisive for the success of the agreement in 2015 on the post-2020 period. The latter will be the outcome of the next two years’ preparation and intense negotiations, first in Lima and subsequently in Paris.

The Lima conference will set the global framework, a timeline, and a first solid structure, and reach agreement on the text for the future Accord. It will also be necessary to strengthen trust, as this has been deeply shaken since the Copenhagen conference in 2009, as well as moving forward on the questions of equity and solidarity, so that all countries can progress towards a new development model.

What this means is thinking about what could constitute a successful negotiation, how to achieve it, and how to move beyond the current deadlock.
The main subjects that are on the Lima Conference agenda:
• The structure and contents of a new agreement
• The nature, contents and timeline for contributions by countries
• Funding
• How to develop existing initiatives

In the months before the Paris Conference it will be important to avoid the negotiation getting bogged down. The negotiations are increasingly complex as time goes on, and could therefore become less and less clear to anyone who is not part of the inner circle of negotiators. This means that there is a risk of public opinion becoming weaker at a time when decisive choices need to be made.

Two things can be observed since the new cycle of negotiations began:
• “Time is not on your side”. This was the observation made by Mr Ban Ki Moon, as the climate continues to get worse. The last report by the IPCC was quite clear: climate change is unequivocal and anthropic in nature. The impacts are already making themselves felt in many parts of the world: floods in Europe and the Middle East, drought in Australia, extreme climate events in Asia and the United States. But to remain below the 2°C warming compared with the pre-industrial period is still feasible if we take immediate action.

• And in spite of this, the gap between the path for reducing global emissions and the commitments made to cut emissions is increasing; this will make it all the more difficult for mitigation after 2020 and will increase adaptation costs. It is essential to succeed in reaching a highly ambitious agreement to which all countries are prepared to commit within the framework of the United Nations, so that we can stabilise the climate.

• What is at stake is not merely the signature of an agreement between States, it is getting all of humankind to step up; States, companies, Local Authorities and civil society, right
down to each and every citizen. This awareness of the need to act at different levels is something that has already been accepted: the climate challenge can not be resolved without people understanding what is at stake, without their becoming involved, the emergence of initiatives at all levels and by all actors of civil society. The General Secretary of the United Nations, Mr Ban Ki Moon sent out a clear signal, stating: “everyone should step up and take climate action”. “Pon tu parte”¹ is the slogan of the Lima Conference; this underlines the importance of individual action and citizens’ commitment as being decisive in successful negotiations.

¹ “Do your bit”
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1 / A NEW NEGOTIATION GROUNDED IN STRONGER SCIENTIFIC DATA

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published their 5th evaluation report (AR5) that presents the most recent scientific data on physics and the consequences of climate change, its impacts on possible scenarios and actions that should be taken by governments.

It is accepted by all States, and clearly shows that the objective defined by the Rio Convention requires that we limit global warming to 2°C compared with the preindustrial level. Much stronger actions are required to achieve this than those of current policies.

1.1 / THE SCIENTIFIC FRAMEWORK: EVERYONE MUST RECOGNISE HOW URGENT THE SITUATION HAS BECOME

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL OF EXPERTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC)

The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) jointly created this panel in 1988; the IPCC’s mandate is to evaluate in a methodical and objective manner all scientific, technical and socio-economic information that is available on the question of climate change. This information is drawn from studies that are carried out by multidisciplinary international bodies, and published in scientific reviews. By clearly drawing on aspects on which the scientific community agrees, the IPCC’s work aims to identify the causes and consequences of climate change...
1.2 / THE OBSERVATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS AND CLIMATE

Anthropic causes of global warming

- The IPCC now estimates as “extremely probable” (with a probability superior to 95%\(^2\)) that the rise in the earth’s temperature that has been recorded since the middle of the 20th century is essentially due to the accumulation of greenhouse gas caused by human activity, mainly from the use of fossil fuels.

- There was an increase in emissions of 2.2% per annum between 2000 and 2010, as opposed to 0.4% on average over the three previous decades. If this rhythm were to continue, the threshold of 2°C rise in global temperature would be reached by 2030.

The main conclusion of the 1st volume of the IPCC 5th assessment report

Volume 1 “Climate change 2013: the physical science basis” of the 5th IPCC report was published in September 2013. It details the scientific progress made on climate change. The main findings show that:

- The mean global temperature rise (land and oceans) increased by 0.85°C between 1880 and 2012

- Although global warming between 1998 and 2012 is less than between 1951 and 2012, the first decade of the 21st century was the warmest since 1850. The period from 1983-2012 was probably the warmest in 1400 years. The ten hottest years since 1850 have been since 1997

- The mean rise in sea levels was of 0.19 metres in the period from 1901-2010. It is increasingly rapid: in the period from 1993-2010, the rise in sea levels was double that of 1901-2010.
Between 1971 and 2010 oceans warmed to a depth of 700m. The temperature of the initial 75m rose by an average of 0.11°C on average per decade.

Salinity levels show that the evaporation and precipitation have become modified with a more uneven distribution.

Various analyses published in recent months confirm the observations of the IPCC\(^3\).

### 1.3 / THE SCENARIOS DEVELOPED FOR 2100 AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

**A rise in temperature of between 0.3°C and 4.8°C by the year 2100**

The IPCC has defined 4 scenarios that differ on the basis of the greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere that would lead to a rise in temperature of between 0.3°C and 4.8°C compared with the 1986-2005 average.

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1. The report by the World Bank “Turn down the heat” draws attention to the fact that the current objectives on emissions’ cuts would lead to a critical level for both people and planet of a 4°C rise in temperature.
2. The “Report on the gap between needs and the perspectives of emission cuts” by the UNDP highlights that by reacting now it is possible to bridge the gap between the objectives and commitments by 2020. But in order to reach the objective of 2°C, the emissions should not exceed 44 Gt eq-CO2 by 2020, in order to enable the new cuts that are required (40 Gt eq-CO2 by 2025, 35 by 2030 and by 2050). The overall global greenhouse gas emissions in 2010, which is the last year for which statistics are available, had already reached 50.1 Gt eq-CO2. According to this trend, the emissions could therefore reach 59 Gt eq-CO2 by 2020, which is 1 Gt eq-CO2 in excess of what the 2012 report predicted on the gap between the needs and the cut in emissions.
3. The Global Risk Report 2013 published by the Global Economic Forum demonstrates that the rise in greenhouse gas emissions is one of the five main risks facing global economy and is a factor that is multiplies and aggravates all other risks.
The scenarios for emissions in the 5th IPCC report

The IPCC adopted a clearer method of evaluating the possible climate evolutions in the 5th report. They are more closely linked to the level of action required to limit global warming.

The scenarios laid out in the 4th IPCC report define the potential evolutions on the basis of socio-economic factors that take the different choices of energy used into account as well as the trends in globalisation. The resulting levels of GHG are themselves used as entry data in the climate simulation models. This approach was based on scenarios defined in the 1990s that did not include recent changes at global level (especially the rise of the emerging countries). In the 5th report new scenarios have taken these evolutions in the global context into account, and the new method has been based on the following logic. Climate change is caused by substances and natural and anthropic processes that impact the Earth’s energy balance. This variation in energy is called radiative forcing and is expressed in Watts per m². It constitutes the scope around which the new scenarios have been defined by the IPCC. Therefore, rather that being based on the definition of possible future scenarios that depend on innumerable parameters to predict the reaction to climate, the scenarios have defined four potential evolutionary profiles of the concentration of GHG, called the Representative Concentration Pathways, RCP:

- The RCP2.6 scenario (radiative forcing of 2.6 W/m²), the concentration of GHG reaches a maximum of 490 ppm and then falls before 2100
- The RCP4.5 scenario (radiative forcing of 4.5 W/m²), situates GHG concentration that stabilises after 2100 (at 660 ppm)
- The RCP6 scenario (radiative forcing of 6.0 W/m²), stabilises after 2100 (at 850 ppm)
- For the so-called RCP8.5 scenario (radiative forcing of 8.5 W/m²), the pathway includes emissions that continue to rise (superior to 1370 ppm in 2100)

The impact of these pathways on climate in terms of GHG concentrations was evaluated by the IPCC and results in the following mean Earth surface temperature rises:

- For the period of 2081- 2100, the lowest pathway (RCP2.6) gives a temperature rise of between 0.3 and 1.7°C, with an average of 1°C
- The 4.5 W/m² scenario leads to a spread of between 1.1 and 2.6 °C (with an average of 1.8°C)
- The 6.0 W/m² scenario produces a temperature rise of 1.4 and 3.1°C (with an average of 2.2°C)
Conclusions:
The RCP 2.6 is the only one that is compatible with the objective of limiting global warming to 2°C above the pre-industrial level. This requires extremely strong actions to reduce emissions to a level that is well below that of current policies.

The most pessimistic scenario shows temperatures that could rise by 4.8°C (+5.5 compared with the pre-industrial level), where heat-waves would become increasingly frequent, the rise of sea level could reach almost a metre by 2100 and 3 metres by 2300. These increases are far more dramatic that those outlined in the previous report.

The gap in the mean temperature rise between the most optimistic and the

• The highest scenario (RCP8.5) leads to an increase of between 2.6°C and 4.8 °C (with an average of 3.7°C). 

The issue of limiting the rise in temperature to an acceptable level remains: 2°C or 1.5°C as requested by the most vulnerable and African countries. The Secretariat’s texts have retained both options. The IPCC report appears to indicate – without saying it too openly – that the scenarios will not achieve the result of climate stabilisation event at 1.5°C. And sadly so.

According to the last IPCC report, we need to cut emissions to zero by 2100 (or even have negative emissions, that’s to say when carbon sequestration is higher than emissions).

**Figure 2.** Evolution of global mean temperature for the four RCP scenarios compared with the mean for the period 1986-2005 in probable temperature increase ranges for the 2081-2100 period. (Source: IPCC AR5, 2013).

For each scenario the range of mean temperatures corresponds to the margin of scientific error generated by the difficulty of predicting climate and overall complex, interdependent processes that govern it.

5 They could become twice or three times as common.
most pessimistic scenarios is 2.7°C. To grasp the extent of the upheavals hidden behind this figure, the reader needs to bear in mind that difference in mean temperature between the last ice age and the current mean temperature is only 6°C. There are significant variations in climate in the course of the year, often of up to 60°C between the coldest winter and hottest summer days. Climate change thus results in variations of several degrees in annual mean temperature.

1.4 / THE IMPACTS OF THESE SCENARIOS

Extreme weather events will happen more often and become more intense
According to the IPCC, extreme weather events – drought, torrential rainfall and tropical cyclones – will become more frequent and intense.6

Rise in sea levels
One of the consequences of this rise in temperature is the rise in sea levels, with a mean increase of between 26 and 98cms by 2100 as opposed to 18-59cms estimated by the IPCC in 2007.

Food insecurity: agriculture, fisheries, water scarcity
Climate change will have major impacts on food security, and will aggravate poverty in Africa and Latin America, with reduced crop yields in agriculture, loss of marine biodiversity and water scarcity:
• Crop yields of major crops could be reduced by 2% per decade if no real effort is made to adapt; and in order to meet global food requirements it would need to increase by 14% per decade
• Extinction of marine species, especially in the tropics will have a knock-on effect on local fisheries that many families rely on for their food
• Water scarcity in Africa, Asia and Australia.

Impacts on health
Food insecurity coupled with the increase in diseases linked to water and food contamination and the increase in heat waves will have negative impacts on health, especially in developing countries7.

Loss of biodiversity
Climate change will lead to the extinction of many species that are unable to adapt to the rapid changes to ecosystems and move to more

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6 “With global warming, we expect to see wet regions become wetter, and dry ones drier, even if there will be some exceptions” Thomas Stocker
7 The geography of diseases is expected to change, especially in Africa
suitable climates, both on land and in the sea. The acidification of oceans has already had a major effect on marine ecosystems in Polar regions, as well as those of coral reefs. Trees will also suffer from increased mortality.

**New development models**

Limiting the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere to 450 ppm in order to remain below the 2°C rise in temperature implies cutting global emissions by between 40 and 70% by 2050, and bringing them to “close to zero” by 2100. This kind of reduction requires changes in all sectors: energy, agriculture/forestry, industry, transport and construction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current emissions per sector</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy production</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and forestry</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>6%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**1.5 / THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE**

**The main conclusions of the 2nd volume of the 5th IPCC report**

The 2nd volume of the 5th IPCC report that was presented in March 2014 illustrates the impacts linked to climate change, both now and in years to come, as well as strategies for adaptation.

Many different impacts have already been observed:

- The increase in mean temperature, with an increase in the number of hot days and nights, and the reduction in the number of cold days and nights as well as heat-waves that are increasingly frequent and intense:
  - The increase in the frequency of extreme weather events and the intensification of heavy rainfall.

The IPCC underlines some of the following future impacts of the global rise in temperature:

- Slowing down of global economic growth
- Impaired food security and health impacts
- An increase in social and economic inequalities
- Economic losses for whole populations linked to flooding or other

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8 Heat-waves, storms, floods, drought
extreme weather events. The IPCC has broken down these impacts on a regional and “thematic” basis:

**By region**
- Most regions of the world will undergo increasingly heavy rainy episodes
- Wet regions will become increasingly wet, and inversely, dry ones more dry
- The increase in periods of drought and their intensity will affect access to drinking water in all regions of the world that already suffer from drought
- There will be increasingly frequent flooding in certain regions due to the changes in the rainfall cycle and the accelerated melting of glaciers. Low altitude and coastal regions will be under increased risk of flooding due to the rise in sea levels.

**Health impacts**
- There will be a rise in the number of heat-related illnesses and deaths as well as due to storms or flooding
- Changes in the way the way diseases spread at global level.

**Food security**
- A lesser availability of food will result from the decreased access to water and the increase in extreme external phenomena will affect poor rural communities. There will be an increased risk of malnutrition in the poorest regions
- Changes to both quality and quantity of global food production will have the direct impacts on the price of food and food security in many regions.

**Ecosystems**
- The increase in temperature will lead to “tipping points” for many ecosystems that are currently under threat, and could cause them to go beyond their critical threshold and cause irreversible change.

**Increased inequality**
- Social and economic inequalities will become more marked, both between regions of the world and within countries
- The economic cost of a temperature rise of over 2.5°C would represent between 0.2 and 2% of global GDP.
- Many costs as well as a loss of income will also be linked to the erosion of biodiversity and degradation of ecosystems
- Migration and the increased risk of conflict due to the impacts of climate change will increase and result in greater poverty in some regions of the world
The main conclusions of the 3rd volume of the 5th IPCC report.

The 3rd volume of the 5th IPCC report was presented in April 2014 in Berlin. It deals with greenhouse gas emissions and presents the solutions for mitigation that would considerably reduce them. It aims to provide a tool for supporting governmental decision-making, and evaluates the current situations and possible scenarios based on societal choices made, as well as the potential options and solutions to remain within the framework of 2°C.

The main point is that the IPCC demonstrates that it is indeed possible to contain global warming to below 2°C, compared with the preindustrial level. Once this limit has been overstepped it will no longer be possible to control the impacts of climate change; they will reach a dramatic level and become extremely costly.

In a scenario with no action taken, global growth would vary according to the models, from between 1.6 to 3% per annum. This growth would be reduced by 0.06% if strong decisions were taken to fight climate change. But the positive impacts of these decisions would prove less costly for adaptation in terms of healthcare or energy efficiency costs, and would ultimately prove beneficial for countries’ development. Over and above this overall evaluation, the reason it is difficult to act stems from that fact that those that stand to gain from the implementation of these actions are different from those who would lose out (particularly in the case of economic activities linked to the use of fossil fuel, certain industrial processes, deforestation and some agricultural practice.

The key observations are that:

Greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO2 have risen increasingly rapidly, especially over the last ten years:

- The IPCC states that the cost of failure to take action or of tardy action will be very high, and that
- strategies developed by 2030 will prove decisive in nature
- Global adaptation costs could reach 70 – 100 billion dollars a year.
• Since 1990, global levels of GHG emissions have increased by 31%. This increase has been higher in recent years than over the previous 30 years. (1.3% between 1970-2000)
• Between 2000 and 2010, 10 countries alone accounted for 70% of the global GHG emissions
• 75% of the increase was due to energy production and industrial activities
• If we follow the current trend, the 2°C increase will have been reached by 2030

Only a substantial and immediate reduction to our emissions (the most ambitious scenario), would allow us to remain within the 2°C framework:
• Total cumulative emissions should not exceed a range of between 1,000 and 1,300 gigatons of carbon between now and 2100
• Global emissions need to be cut by between 40% and 70% by 2050 and brought down to a level "close to zero" by the end of the century.

One way of reaching this objective is to urgently change the energy production model, converting essentially to renewable energies, as this is the only way that would allow development without GHG emissions at global level to occur\textsuperscript{14}. Concentrating on renewable energies would ensure universal access to clean energy in exchange for an investment of 80 billion dollars by 3030. These investments would allow us to stop developing energy practice that is both dangerous for peoples' health and the environment, and that are used where electricity is unavailable, especially in developing countries (especially where wood is used for heating purposes).

It is triply indispensible to make massive progress in energy efficiency: to reduce the amount of investment in production, cut consumer spending, and of course reduce GHG emissions and pollution and risks of all kinds.

This implies prioritising deep modifications to our energy systems by:
• A major increase in investments in renewable energies in the pre-2029 period
• Cut fossil fuel use (oil and coal) by 30 million dollars/year i.e. 20% between 2010 and 2029
• Progressively but totally stop using fossil energy, particularly coal which is still continuing to rise
• The IPCC has observed the possible limited use of nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage (CCS) provide alternative solutions, but have limited potential\textsuperscript{15}
• Geo-engineering is questionable, given the potential risks for the environment and as it has not yet proven it is effective on a large scale. There needs to be both political and social involvement at all levels,
as well as strong international cooperation to bring about life-style changes.

The IPCC also examines another key sector in terms of GHG emissions reduction: cities are responsible for 70% of GHG emissions. According to predictions, urban areas are set to triple by 2030. It is therefore essential to change the way they are managed and organised in order to limit GHG emissions; particularly through ambitious construction and transport policies. The IPCC emphasizes the fact that many policies and measures are possible in these fields, as they show much potential for improvement.

The report states that if we continue on the current path, emissions from transport, that are currently responsible for 25% of the world’s GHG could double by 2050. Strong policies would help to reduce these emissions by 40%.

The construction industry also represents a high potential for cutting emissions: strict measures would help curb the doubling of emissions linked to this sector.

Industry also has much potential for mitigation according to the report, especially through improved recycling measures and more efficient use of energy.

The report further underlines that the increase in emissions is linked to importing goods into developed countries.

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14 According to the IPCC, the potential for renewable energies could cover all countries’ needs.
15 Nuclear energy, due to the high associated costs and risks and CCS, has not proven viable on a large scale mean that for the moment it remains more theoretical than practical to implement.
16 According to the most recent estimates of the IAE, the number of private cars is expected to triple at global level by 2050 and reach a figure of 2 billion vehicles. Truck transport is expected to double, and air transport to multiply fourfold.
17 It is possible to cut heating by between 50 and 90%.
1.6 / THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE OBSERVATIONS: HOW TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE?

The IPCC’s observations are unequivocal: it is possible for us to remain below the 2°C that is the objective of the Convention, but only on condition we take immediate, ambitious action and achieve total cooperation between States to reduce GHG emissions and attenuate the impacts of climate change that are already happening.

The report does not allow for any deviation from the policy: any lukewarm attitude based on scientific uncertainties is no longer acceptable. Science legitimises these actions by examining facts, describing impacts both short and long term, as well as by providing the ideas for concrete solutions.

We should also bear in mind that controversy is the motor of science: including research hypotheses, even when they represent minority views, and building it into research programmes that allow knowledge to progress. Many experts, based on scientific procedures, can now draw their conclusions. Facts have been checked, causes and consequences identified that substantiate and justify the need to take action. We know that knowledge will continue to progress in years to come that will help us gain a better understanding of both the mechanism of climate change and the actions we need to take to reduce the impacts and to adapt.

This is the overall background of the body of science. We now need to speed things up and commit as soon as possible and create fresh opportunities, as it is still possible to do so.
The three essential pillars of a new agreement: appropriation, action and negotiation

In order to follow the path recommended by the IPCC, we need to reach an agreement on how to get there, and on a vision of how to share the efforts we need to make, as well as their very nature, and on the means of implementation.

We need to move forward on 3 separate fronts in the new cycle of negotiations:

- Enable everyone to understand climate change and assimilate the essential changes we need to make to the way we live as individuals, as well as supporting actions and the knowledge of results achieved. We need to move forward quickly and support strong, explicit political mandates at both national and international level to achieve them.
- Support actions at all levels: States, companies, Local Authorities, civil society and the community at large by establishing the requisite instruments and public policies. But we also need to integrate the results of these actions by getting the population as a whole to take action, commit and evaluate results. This approach corresponds to the broadening of the concept of governance that was so powerfully present at the “Summit of solutions” organised by Mr. Ban Ki Moon. It is therefore essential to mobilise private sector funding as well as that of banks.
- Intensify international negotiations on the basis of the following priorities:
  - Agree on a shared political framework for all countries
  - Mobilise funding and technologies that open new paths of development, especially for the least developed countries
  - Pool the contributions of all countries
  - Check the coherence of the contributions for the period 2020-
2030 compared with IPCC projections for 2050, in order to guarantee good living conditions and social cohesion and peace for humankind.

- Establish rules for respecting political commitments at international level. La note de décryptage va donc aborder ces trois axes dans cet ordre. Donc dans une logique ascendante. (bottom-up).

The background analysis will therefore cover these three major pillars in this order using a bottom-up logic.

We can see the progressive lack of interest in the negotiations that is displayed by both the media and the public at large, especially after the disappointing failure of the Copenhagen Conference. The feeling that no major progress is possible has led to mistrust of the United Nations framework of negotiations, and worse still, to a clear lack of interest in the climate change stakes. The proof of this is that there is an increasingly low presence of international media, civil society, economic actors and academic institutions at the international conferences; they have become the almost exclusive domain of civil servants from the various ministries and diplomats. This is true even if the Secretariat of the UNFCCC is pushing for opening the sessions up as broadly as possible to “observers”. It is far from sure that the publication of the new IPCC report will succeed in changing this phenomenon.

On the other hand, even more than the increasing rise in “climate scepticism”, we are witnessing something far more serious, that of the emergence of “climate pessimism”. This has been seriously supported by the predictions of negotiation failure, and the discouragement that has resulted from the open inability to identify with the cuts recommended by the IPCC. This pessimism is all the more dangerous as it cancels out actions and leads people to think that it is already too late to save the situation. Yet the more time we lose, the more unbearable and irreversible the human and environmental dramas will become.

Yet we will only be able to succeed in meeting the challenge of a transition to new development models in both developed and developing countries if we have the agreement and support of society as a whole. Public debate has not yet been sufficiently engaged to deliver a clear mandate to political leaders. This leads to their difficulty to commit to clear positions on energy and climate policy, as they are afraid of being rejected by the public.

And as the climate negotiations are stalling and time is of the essence, we need to mobilise all our power of action, and build concrete initiatives. This awareness stems from a realisation that the difficulties encountered in the international negotiations will be resolved by the
impetus of people at grassroots level and local initiatives that have been understood at country level. Sessions dedicated to showcasing, sharing and disseminating existing practice from all over the world, and groups of experts are making progress on these subjects, parallel to the usual negotiations. This practice was first initiated at the Warsaw conference. The 2014 sessions in Bonn include workshops run by thematic experts on key sectors for cutting emissions such as: energy efficiency, renewable energies, cities, transport, GHG other than CO2, carbon capture and storage. These exchanges will demonstrate the benefits of actions that have been implemented, and that are tangible at economic, social and environmental level. They will help in determining the margins for manoeuver of both countries and sectors. This is essential, as the negotiations have spent far too long grounded in the idea that the fight against climate change went against economic interests as well as those of countries as a whole.

Many countries’ negotiators have received instructions to minimise their countries commitments to mitigating emissions and financial contributions.

• Yet many actions have essentially positive economic and social impacts in the context of current increasing energy and raw material costs. The negotiations should be based on induced benefits if they are to make progress
• Secondly, commitments and investments made in every country benefit everyone, as planetary climate as a whole is improved.

2.1 / PERSONAL COMMITMENT

Transposing progress in the fight against climate change to an evolutionary lifestyle for all, and that can be understood by everyone

No strong decision can be taken by political leaders without the clear support of the people. Although public opinion has a clear understanding of the dangers of climate change in all countries, this has not yet been accompanied by a clear vision of the evolution of life-styles in the future. Thus daily behaviour has not changed much. But without the support of the man in the street, no political mandate can exist. We still need to make decisive progress in terms of communication, although the increased complexity of the negotiations makes them appear more obscure. And the rise in the need to cut emissions shows how important it is to make this kind of progress in the next two years. This is an indispensible condition if we are to conclude an ambitious agreement in Paris, especially if its application is then to prove effective.
**Understanding the stakes through public opinion and accepting the changes to life styles**

Thus far, the issue of climate has remained beyond the grasp of the man in the street. The climate negotiations have become unintelligible for those not in the know. And they are perceived as yet another constraint by households in what is already a difficult context in the developed countries that are affected by the economic crisis as well as in developing countries where people’s daily lives are precarious. In this context we need to achieve greater support.

**2.1.1 / Assimilation and acceptance of actions at all levels**

**Move beyond a negative vision of the future**

The question of climate change has still not been fully appropriated by people. The situation is very worrying, and there is no great difference in this between countries:

- People are beginning to realise that climate change is happening, sometime on the basis of their own observations
- Images broadcast by the media are starting to hit home, but people's awareness of climate change is more emotional than precise
- The rational appropriation of the idea has now become widely generalised in educational programmes for youth, but is totally insufficient for older generations
- Knowledge of the potential solutions for cutting greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change at a technical level is very uneven
- The involvement of people and economic actors is not simplified by the lack of explanation of economic and operational performance of technologies and implementation of actions
- There is a lack of explanations, debate, and therefore of visibility of the future evolution of lifestyle in every country if we are to effectively cut global emissions by 2050 in accordance with the IPCC recommendations

It is obvious that countries are not sufficiently committed to the Rio Convention (and to article 6) in terms of information, training, and appropriation.
2.1.2 / Popular support as a condition for political commitment

The consequences are essential to re-launch the international negotiations:

- People are unable to adjust the choice they make when buying things or their daily behaviour to take climate change into consideration; this frequently includes people who are deeply aware of the seriousness of the situation
- There is a lack of any explicit mandate expressing this as a priority for political leaders, with expectations expressed about improving living conditions, access to work and education
- This lack of any clear demands has an impact on the climate negotiations in terms of the fears of high commitments that might be made, even if they are considered necessary, that might lead to public opinion rejecting the implementation of policies.

Under these circumstances, climate negotiations will fail to get widespread support of people or a strong commitment from political leaders, as citizens will not have the proof that their lifestyles would prove satisfactory for them or their children in a world where a high level of reductions in emissions was required.

Provide proof by providing a comprehensible explanation of the evolution of living conditions, using public policies and backed up by credible data

The fact that the issue of climate change has not been sufficiently appropriated by people is essentially due to the fact that the aspects on which people are supposed to act remain too general. In order to help the climate change negotiations to progress, we do not just need to make a bigger effort in terms of education and information than ever before, and scale it up to the level that is really required, we also need to transpose the action in concrete day-to-day terms for families all over the world. It is essential that everyone identify with this effort, and that everyone believes that it will enable us all to have satisfactory living conditions. This would be made possible by making progress accessible in every country, that would avoid the damage and conflicts that would result from the aggravation of climate change.

If people are to believe in the possibility that to have a successful future in 2050, they need to be able to project themselves into the future, imagine their life-styles not so much in terms of figures and constraints but in terms of the answers for meeting their essential needs, the impacts on their consumption patterns, access to mobility, and relations with others on a daily basis.
This implies making progress in the following areas:

- The precise description of technical, energy and collective organisational solutions and individual behaviour that will enable pathways for emissions’ reductions
- This description needs to be closely linked to peoples’ lives, be it food, domestic comfort, transport, health, everyday consumption or leisure activities... (and include consumption of industrial goods, agricultural production services, travel and exchanges...)
- It needs to be validated by the quantification of energy and food consumption as well as greenhouse gas emissions and impacts on family income
- This description of life styles should be linked to all countries’ realities, both in cities and rural areas.

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**THE “OUR LIFE 21” PROJECT**

This project was started by the French association (NGO) Dossiers en Débats pour le Développement Durable (4D). It aims to describe what a successful future of the world where global warming is limited to below 2°C by 2050, would look like. A first exercise that involved dividing French emissions by 4 by 2050 was carried out via a pathway that projected the lives of 8 real-life families. The writing process was inclusive, immersive and empathetic, but it was based on a very precise quantification of energy consumption and emissions of the families, and coherent with national scenarios. The same exercise is now being carried out with 40 families in 8 different countries. Following that of France, the exercise now includes Germany and the United States for the developed countries, China and India for the emerging countries, and Peru, Algeria and Senegal for the developing countries. The results will be published for the Paris Conference in 2015.

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The underlying idea is to stimulate people’s desire to discover what a different development model would look like, and especially to encourage them to implement it. In other words, the negotiations need to focus on the heart of peoples’ lifestyles and daily concerns.
2.1.3 / Promising everyone a successful future

It is now time to go out and meet with people and jointly build the scenario for the kind of life they wish to have, one that will take their daily preoccupations into account.

This implies being able to show that fulfilling personal lifestyles, successful individual lives are a possibility that includes access to goods and services. Individual commitment to the common good will only prove acceptable if it is linked to the promise of a fulfilling personal life that is richer than that of the present. Failure to do so would undermine all our democratic progress. This is the new, essential component of sustainable development.

Sustainable development therefore needs to clearly state and include the opportunity for opening new windows for humankind to expand, and that is compatible with the identified constraints. Let us bear in mind that we all have the possibility of accessing a greater number of people, thanks to information and communication technologies, as well as greater knowledge and cultural expression than any previous generation. New paths are opening before our eyes. Communication, cultural creativity and access to others all constitute infinite goods upon which we can build cultural dynamics and fascinating lives. We still need to build a new imagination, one that leaves behind the dreams built on advertising and excessive consumption.

Sustainable development in the 21st century will consist of shifting from a predatory society that feeds upon the planet, to a society of relationships, one that treads lightly and opens up fresh perspectives of personal enrichment through human relations, knowledge and personal expression.

2.2 / ALL HUMANKIND NEEDS TO ACT

This is the second decisive pillar of the new negotiation cycle. It can only be successful if considerable work is done on the previous one.

2.2.1 / Build the convergence of concrete actions and the international negotiations

The success of the negotiations in the coming year, as well as their subsequent finalisation will lead to two paths converging:

• That of diplomatic negotiations within the United Nations framework, based on national priorities and positions defined in the context of
international relations

• And that of the implementation of “climate development” actions in all countries and by all actors. This corresponds to a “bottom up” approach, and will need to be grounded in systems of strengthened cooperation. It will involve harmonising the standards for action (MRV regulations\textsuperscript{18}) for all countries that are beneficiaries of international aid, and for developed countries financial contributions. Major progress on this second path should build a growing dynamic of the chances of succeeding in the international negotiations.

Over and above a text of an international agreement, the essential aspect is the reality of cutting greenhouse gas emissions that will be the result of concrete actions taken by all actors.

2.2.2 / The Summit of Solutions organised by Mr. Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations

The General Secretary of the United Nations launched an initiative in December 2012, aimed at bringing Heads of States, Ministers, companies, financiers and civil society representatives together to accelerate actions to fight climate change. This “Summit of Solutions” took place on 23\textsuperscript{rd} September in New York. The various actors were all asked to announce important measures to cut emissions and move forward in their political mobilisation to achieve a strong legal agreement in 2015. This initiative brought together some 80 Heads of State and governments, as well as ministers who intervened to put forward their proposals and commitments to help raise the level of international ambitions at the start of these major international negotiations.

8 priority sectors were identified: agriculture, cities, energy, forests, pollutants, transport, funding/investments and resilience.

Agriculture

If we are to be able to feed the 9.5 billion inhabitants of the planet in 2050, agricultural production needs to increase 60% over the next 35 years. But climate change will impact the supplies of healthy, nutritional food at reasonable prices to people and the increasing demands. Global warming of the planet is already affecting production and yields of essential crops. Furthermore, approximately 1/4 of the GHG emissions are linked to land use. It is therefore crucial to develop more sustainable agricultural practice. Yet agriculture has not been taken into consideration until this new cycle of climate negotiations. The actions that need to be taken are both linked to mitigation and adaptation. This is a particularly important aspect for developing countries.

\textsuperscript{18} This aspect will be considered on page 69
Energy
Almost 70% of global GHG emissions are from cities; they therefore play a key role in cutting emissions, as the number of urban dwellers will increase strongly in the coming decades. Many cities are already fighting climate change that will put increased pressure on water supplies, sanitation and sewage systems, transport systems and infrastructure. It is essential to have clear objectives for cutting GHG, linked to viable strategies, capacity strengthening and tangible investments as well as increasing the capacities and resilience of cities. Urban policies also link mitigation of emissions and adaptation to climate change.

Cities
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Forests
Forests and the services that they provide are crucial to sustainable development and people’s well-being. In spite of the efforts to stop deforestation, approximately 13 million hectares of forest continue to be destroyed each year, contributing to 10% of GHG emissions. Approximately 2 billion hectares of forest and degraded land need to be restored. These actions will contribute to poverty reduction, to security rights and a livelihood for indigenous peoples and local communities, as well as to strengthening their food security.

Finance
Committing to a low-carbon development strategy that is climate change resilient requires investments of several hundreds of billions of US$ each year. If we are to achieve this, governments and key financial actors need to commit to a massive increase in both private and public investments to confront climate change. The issue is that of improved mobilisation of private investments and banks, given the budgetary constraints of many countries.

Short lived climate pollutants
It is essential to reduce the production and emissions caused by short-lived climate pollutants (methane HFC, carbon black), but that are highly active, if we are to avoid a rise in temperature. These climate
pollutants are emitted by various sectors (refuse, oil and gas production, agriculture, solid fuel cookers etc...). They are also harmful to human health, agriculture and ecosystems. The climate coalition and pure air are one of the initiatives that target these pollutants, with multiple sectorial actions. It is also essential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that have a long life span.

**Resilience, adaptation and risk-reduction**
Climate change increases the frequency and the impact of natural disasters and the vulnerability of many countries and communities around the world. The risks linked to climate change hit people directly as well as impacting trade, financial systems and institutions. We need to make progress in our ability to adapt and our resilience to climate change. Mobilising the insurance sector will also be essential.

**Transport**
In 2009, transport accounted for ¼ of all GHG, and was responsible for 20% of all energy consumption. The trend could be for energy and GG emissions to increase by 50% in this sector by 2030 and over 80% by 2050, compared with 2009, in terms of the increase in the number of vehicles at global level. Priorities need to be on how to manage mobility, improve energy efficiency, replace oil-based fuel by electricity for vehicles that travel short distances, and by gas for longer distances, as well as promoting the use of bicycles, improve interoperability and systems of collective transport. This required deep change in public and private transport systems, and it is essential that we succeed in this area.

**2.2.3 / A positive agenda for a general shift to action**

**A two-way movement: top-down and bottom-up**
One lesson can be learnt from the last 20 years of fighting climate change: actors’ focus on the impressive diplomatic process resulted in failing to clearly outline the kind of actions that need to be taken, and therefore also failed to highlight their economic benefits. The difficulties of the negotiation mean we need to rethink this approach.

But we should not believe that just because of the difficulties encountered by the international negotiations that the issue of climate change could be more easily resolved by concrete hands-on actions alone. In effect, technological progress, the transparency with which information is exchanged; the dynamics of costs, the mobilisation of public opinion and progress of developing countries all need a framework, rules that have been defined at international level and international sources of funding.

It is therefore necessary to move both top-down (descending actions: this is essential for creating a legal framework and converging actions
between countries) and bottom up (ascending actions: because these transitions of modes of production and consumption need strong territorial grounding, and to be appropriated by people). These two approaches are complementary and mutually strengthen one another.

This summit was especially marked by the commitments of other economic and territorial actors more than by that of States. The latter will do this in the framework of the Green Climate Fund and the Lima and Paris Conferences. During the Summit, private investors committed to changing 100 billion US$-worth of investments by the end of 2015 from carbon-intensive to low-carbon ones.

160 subnational institutions, regions, cities...also committed to shifting 50 billion US-worth of investments that are currently in fossil fuels to renewable energies in the next 5 years.

Major banks have committed to issuing green bonds of a value of 30 billion US$.

The development banks, including the AFD, will provide support of .....billion by 2020 to developing countries.

**Prioritising action**

As of now, we need to begin energy transitions and lifestyle changes that will enable us to follow the reduction pathways that are needed. A stronger dynamic is still needed to help action to progress in all countries and sectors, to support people in their actions, and ensure that the process is perceived as credible by the economic benefits it provides, as well as demonstrating that States are making commitments. And thus, facilitating the ability to reach an internationally ambitious agreement in 2015. This is a process that would lead to even greater involvement of economic actors, public authorities and citizens.

We therefore need to move forward with “a positive agenda” to solve the climate question, one that is coherent with a temperature rise of below 2°C. The groundwork will be based on concrete actions, and everyone will be encouraged to act and contribute to an overall action to stop climate change. Without waiting for the negotiation process for the post 2020 period to be concluded, actions will be strengthened that will allow progress to be made and thus increase ambitions between now and 2020. This will make it possible to achieve a level of commitment for the 20320-2030 period that is coherent with requisite changes to the emissions pathways.
The UN Global Pulse initiative

In May, the UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki Moon launched the Big Data Climate Challenge to stimulate action against climate change and innovations before the Climate Summit of 23rd September 2014 where the winning projects were to be presented.

At the launch of the Big Data Climate Challenge, the UN spokesman, Mr. Stéphane Dujarrac declared: “The Global Pulse initiative and the Secretary General’s support team for climate change are calling for the best ideas based on data collection to prove their impacts on climate change,”. He added: “This initiative will allow the public to understand how Big Data (massive data collection) can provide us with precious information that will help strengthen resilience and limit emissions”.

The Climate Summit presents a turning point in the question of climate change, and marks a general shift towards action. The Big Data Climate Challenge will strengthen arguments in favour of steps that need to be taken to confront climate change; it will be based on the masses of data collection on what is being done throughout the whole world. The processing and analysis of this data will enable us to enlarge the range of solutions and will highlight the economic dimension of climate change as well as the benefits achieved.

Sharing successful initiatives

Technical experts met in March, June and October 2014 in Bonn, in the framework of the ADP on energy efficiency actions, land use, carbon capture and storage, valorisation of renewable energies in favour of sustainable cities and greenhouse gas other than CO2. The outcomes of this decisively important work and how it can help move forward on the positive agenda will be presented on page 69.

2.2.4 / Strengthening strategies and national action plans

The difficulties encountered by the international negotiations on climate change have led to the strengthening of operational dynamics, and to countries adopting national development strategies for fighting climate change. The present challenge is to open the door to a low-carbon development model that associates mitigation, adaptation and socio-economic development, environmental protection and the fight against poverty.
Some sectors of the new low-carbon economy are organising; this is happening in many different developing and developed countries. Most industrialised countries have designed scenarios for cutting their emissions, and are making progress on how to cut back on emissions in different sectors, as well as the requisite investments and economic and social benefits that will be produced by these changes. Actors are gaining an increasingly acute, quantified insight into the risks linked to the impacts of climate change, and are taking steps to protect people.

**In developing countries**

Developing countries need financial, technical and technological support to redirect their production and consumption. They need this firstly to identify and design their low-carbon, resilient development strategies, and at a later stage, for the investments needed to implement them. This requires an important amount of preparatory work and capacity strengthening, particularly in African countries that do not have the necessary skills in project design and institutional organisation.

But actions that have been supported by international funds have been especially beneficial to emerging countries since the Kyoto Protocol was signed. The methods proposed hitherto were not adapted to the least developed countries. These countries consider that these strategies provide an opportunity to engage in a new development pathway at a time when the trend is that of rising energy costs. Some countries, such as Gabon, Morocco and Kenya have launched the preparation of national “climate and development” strategies, based on the pioneering countries’ models like those of Mexico, Indonesia and Mauritius. These initiatives correspond to both national goals and global preoccupations.

These new perspectives have not been taken up by developing countries in an even way. As they have no need to make commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, some developing countries have been shy about committing to mitigation actions, for fear of becoming involved in an internationally quantitative commitment that could become binding. This point of view has been strengthened by the delay that has occurred in industrialised countries in meeting their own commitments. For the least developed countries, the most urgent thing is to gain access to economic and social development. Building “climate” strategies in developing countries can run into important obstacles, even if climate has become a serious preoccupation in these countries, due to the major impacts of climate change. The main issues will be played out on the perception of the benefits to national strategies.
2.2.5 / Progression of territorial initiatives

Parallel to the international negotiations between States, regional initiatives as well as those of local authorities and the private sector and those of NGOs are making progress. Many examples exist that would have been unimaginable as little as two years ago:

• Cities and regions of the world have become networked (ICLEI\(^{19}\), CGLU\(^{20}\), NRG4SD\(^{21}\), R20\(^{22}\) in particular) and have progressively strengthened their exchange, sharing tools and developing actions. In 2010, before the Cancún Conference, local governments adopted the Mexico Pact that committed them to calculating and certifying the GHG reductions of their territories, using methodologies adapted by the UN and creating an international climate register. One year later in Durban, the meeting in Africa adopted a Charter for adaptation that supports a strategic, integrated vision.

• California and China have increased their commitments to cutting emissions. 7 cities and provinces in China are currently experimenting with cutting their emissions with a view to establishing a national carbon exchange and credit platform. This involves a system of registration and supervision.

• The movement for the preservation of forests is now supported by big banking private investment funds and networks that distribute consumer goods...

However these initiatives are still unevenly spread across the world. Even if some major cities that have strong decision-making powers and influence are leading the way, this is not something with which all territories are yet able to engage. The involvement of socio-economic actors and democratic processes in integrated decision-making processes at territorial level is essential to the effective implementation of such initiatives.

Concrete examples of actions that can be implemented at local level allow people to grasp the physical dimensions and to ground this transition in everyday reality. This transition is currently perceived by citizens as something very distant. These initiatives need to be showcased to demonstrate what lifestyle and behavioural changes we can make, and how they can be disseminated and scaled up. These changes demonstrate a level of awareness of local actors of the absolute need to take immediate action, without waiting for the

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\(^{19}\) International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives

\(^{20}\) Cités et gouvernements locaux unis

\(^{21}\) Network of Regional Governements for Sustainable Development

\(^{22}\) Regional groups during the G20.
international agreements to produce results at the top. Alternative development models do exist. They bring together economic resilience, energy independence, prevention and risk management, social, as well as territorial balance.

**THE DECLARATION OF NANTES**

The representatives of over twenty global networks that include “almost all” cities and local authorities of all five continents committed in September 2013 to “mobilising the necessary funding in their local budgets to implement low-carbon actions”. The Declaration of Nantes constitutes a roadmap for Local Governments for the 2013-2015 period.

**2.2.6 / The growing role of the rise of the civil society movement**

International institutions need to take the ability of civil society to contribute to decision-making into account, as well as its role as a relay, and the contribution it makes to effective implementation at territorial level in companies and in terms of personal behaviour. This is the key to making progress in terms of reaching a higher level of culture, solidarity and civilisation.

Establishing a strengthened international power requires the symmetrical consolidation of counter powers. Creating spaces for public dialogue and debate is the means of meeting this expectation in a democratic way. This implies that conflicts need to be played out, collective choices made, and we need to protect ourselves from being dominated by any one group of interests. Improved recognition of the role of non-State actors would help transparency and the democratisation of international organisations to progress. Also their freedom from national issues provides them with a great deal of legitimacy on issues of general interest; civil society also provides much hands-on expertise. This interaction of territories and multi-actor forums still needs to find its place in the new architecture of global governance.

Global citizenship that fully blends both global and local collective planetary obligations is part of a shared concept of human rights that are the extension of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2.2.7 / Provide the proof that new pathways of development will benefit everyone

The implications of this for all citizens are that there must be a shared vision of where people want to go. In order to achieve this, everyone needs to be in possession of the means of understanding what is currently at stake and have the means of rising to the challenge at their own level, of becoming involved in this change process thanks to their effective participation in the decision-making process. In order to achieve this kind of involvement of all people, we need to build a promise to people, a vision of what successful life might actually be like in this new context. However both media interest as well as that of the man in the street have fallen a lot since the Copenhagen Conference. We need to reverse this trend and motivate people to act, because the solutions exist and practice shows that they can work.

The concrete involvement of Local Authorities, companies, NGOs, people at large and indeed all citizens of our planet could provide a fresh impetus in re-launching the negotiations. This impetus needs to be bottom-up, if it is to resonate right up to the spheres of decision-making. Understanding what is at stake, training and capacity strengthening, particularly for civil society in developing countries, are determining factors. The operational success of the next agreement will obviously be proportionate to the number of people involved. Many alternative experiences are emerging throughout the world; they are pragmatic and show what is possible to achieve.

What is at stake is to build a shared vision of a new development model that can be adapted to the specificities of all countries, meet the challenges of the 21st century, and reduce inequalities. This means proving to everyone in all countries that other paths effectively exist, and that they are favourable to everyone. The objective for the years to come is therefore to build low-carbon, resilient development strategies that are adapted to all developing country, particularly in Africa, irrespective of the countries’ starting point.
2.2.8 / Progress in a new energy transition

The energy transition in developed countries

The current development model is based on the use of fossil fuels. As well as generating GHG, they do not allow the poorest countries to achieve sustainable development or have access to energy for all, given the increasing energy costs. So to commit to low-carbon development that is resilient to climate change implies a shift away from fossil fuel and placing an emphasis on renewable energy alternatives.

The difficulties with funding show how necessary it is to take the evolution of energy costs into account. In spite of the financial and economic crisis (with a global slowing of economic growth), the price of a barrel of oil still remains around 100$. It is paradoxical that very little space has been dedicated to energy savings and the development of renewable energies in the negotiations. This could, without a doubt prove to be by far the main source of funding for the fight against climate change.

Energy plays a central role in the potential cuts in emissions in all countries, as well as in development: access for all to energy, improved energy efficiency, support for renewable energies.

The advanced level of the industrialised countries in the energy transition will prove decisive for all countries through the knock-on effects. This appears to be all the more essential, as most of their energy production will need to be renewed in the next thirty years. The energy transition will prove beneficial to the environment as well as the economy, as it will reduce costs and develop employment.

It will take massive investment to achieve a general shift to action in developed countries in terms of their energy transition as well as their urban and transport policies.

In the countries that are most advanced in this energy transition many jobs have been created, such as in Germany, where 380,000 jobs have been created in the field of renewable energies.

The energy transition in developing countries

Developing countries will also require financial and technological support if they are to progress on the same road of low-carbon models centred on renewable energies, and shift away from fossil fuels. Developing countries, however, have considerable resources in term so renewable energies. This is particularly true of Latin America and Africa.
Coordinated progress towards energy transition will massively develop the market for high-performance equipment, which will in turn lead to reduced costs, be it for vehicles, machine tools, household equipment or equipment related to renewable energies. So this process will also prove beneficial to developing countries.

States can leverage their energy transition in different ways, particularly by cutting tax subsidies for fossil fuels. Another important issue in the years to come is that of the role played by coal: it is the most polluting of all fossil fuels, and the level of global consumption has increased over recent years as it is a cheap source of energy.

**Nuclear energy and greenhouse gas emissions**

Many countries perceived the development of nuclear energy as a means of cutting greenhouse gas emissions, such as China, India, France, South Korea and Great Britain as well as the United States. But there is increasing doubt following the Fukushima accident. This accident has had three impacts:

- Countries that were already reticent about the use of nuclear energy accelerated their disengagement (Germany, Switzerland). Other countries that were planning to commit to nuclear energy gave up the idea in the face of the hostility of public opinion (Italy).

- The cost of the kWh of nuclear energy is increasing rapidly, as investments need to be made to stand up to any kind of dysfunction on the nuclear sites, whatever their cause: natural catastrophe, industrial accident... as well as the chronic underestimation of the maintenance costs and the downstream treatment costs of spent nuclear fuel. This is all happening at a time when most of the global nuclear energy power stations are around 30 years old, with a life expectancy of about 40 years. This age could be extended if important investments were to be made to renew components. But the scope of the expenditure could compromise the economic interest of the continued exploitation of the old nuclear power stations, given that we do not know for how long they could continue to be safely run.

- Nuclear development has now considerably slowed down. The low level of industrial orders is contributing to increased costs in an industry that does not have the cost benefit of large-scale production of reactors.
3 / Recent evolution of the negotiation

3.1 / THE NEED FOR A “SHARED VISION” FROM BALI TO DURBAN

The IPCC work has progressively called upon States to heed the need for a shared vision of long-term climate objectives. The 3rd IPCC report clearly stated the need to halve greenhouse gas emissions.

The “chapeaur” of the Bali Action Plan included the need for this “shared vision” and long-term concerted action in order to achieve the objective of the Rio Convention. The Bali Conference in 2007 that launched the negotiations for the post-2012 period established a non-exhaustive list of subjects that should be included, as both developed and developing countries had stated their opposition in Bali to quantified objectives, fearing that their development perspectives would be blocked.

The 4th IPCC report introduced an additional element with a more precise analysis of the consequences of climate change on global agricultural production. It drew the conclusion that the temperature rise needed to be contained to under 2°C. This fact, as well as the observation of the increasing gravity of climate disasters, especially in developing countries, resulted in progressively modifying countries’ positions.

THE AIM TO CUT EMISSIONS IN THE CANCÚN ACCORD

“Further recognizes that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to science, and as documented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and that Parties should take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, consistent with science and on the basis of equity; also recognizes the need to consider, in the context of the first review, as referred to in paragraph 138 below, strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge, including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5 °C.”
his shared vision states in agreement with the principles of the Rio Convention:
• The need to use scientific conclusions to establish objectives for countries
• Shared but differentiated responsibilities of countries based on the historic responsibility of developed countries for the level of concentration of GHG that already exists in the atmosphere
• The need to simultaneously mitigate emissions and adapt to climate change that already exists
• Coherence with the priority objective for countries to eradicate poverty
• Access to financial and technological support for developing countries.

It was during the conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun that the need for a big reduction in greenhouse gas was included in the shared vision. This means that the climate negotiations now need to decide on the future evolution of climate for this century.

The Durban Platform concluded this evolution by declining this shared vision on which all countries agreed to terms in three points that form the basis of the new negotiations:

Warming should not exceed 2°C. In order to do so, the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere needs to be stabilised very quickly, with a reduction in annual global emissions before 2020, and a halving of global emissions by 2050. This needs to be 85-95% for industrialised countries.
• To achieve this all countries need to participate in the fight against global warming and reduce or impact the path of their emissions. This obviously needs to take their level of development into account.
• This implies moving forward collectively on a new development path and considerably reducing the consumption of fossil fuel and other sources of greenhouse gas emissions.

This constitutes fundamental progress, of which the political impacts have not yet been fully explained. It implies not only agreeing on an objective of stabilising global climate, which is something that concerns all countries, but also to build a shared vision of successful development that is accessible to all countries. Successful negotiations for developing countries will involve precise proposals that reconcile access to development for their countries and mobilise international funding and extended access to the necessary technologies.

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23 However the objective of 2°C is considered insufficient by the SIDS countries (the Alliance of Small Island States that are particularly under threat from rising sea levels). They are calling for a temperature stabilised at less than 1.5°C compared with the pre-industrial level.
### 3.2 / COMMITMENTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

The Kyoto Protocol was signed in December 1997 and took effect in February 2005, following ratification by Russia.24

#### ANNEXE 1 COUNTRIES’ COMMITMENTS TO REDUCTIONS25

The Kyoto Protocol is part of the implementation of the Rio Convention, its principles and institutions; it committed the developed Parties (Annexe 1) to individual, legally binding objectives of reduction and limiting of their greenhouse gas emissions. The idea, justified by the principle of historical responsibility, was for industrialised countries to make specific, binding commitments.

However only the Parties of the Convention who also became Parties of the Protocol (by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession) are bound by these commitments. The individual commitments of the Annexe 1 Parties are listed and quantified in Annexe B of the Protocol. These objectives constitute a total reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of about 5% compared with the 1990 levels for the period of commitment from 2008-2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>21,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>+ 15,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>+ 25,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>+ 13,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>12,5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>+ 27,0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.2.1 / But the Kyoto Protocol didn’t reach the expected efficiency by 2012, because:

**The United States refused to ratify it**

In 2001, the United States refused to ratify the Protocol.26 They were then followed by Australia.

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24 “On the 90th day after which at least 55 Parties of the Convention, including the Annexe 1 Parties who, in 1990 accounted for at least 55% of the CO2 emissions of this group had registered their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

25 The calculation of the objectives of these EU countries is the result of the ventilation of the European objective -8% between Member States based on their past environmental performance and their future development needs.

26 The American Senate refused to ratify the Treaty by 95 votes to 0.
Other countries failed to meet the commitments they had made in the Kyoto Protocol framework

The results of certain other Annexe 1 countries were disappointing, especially in the case of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland.

Even if countries met their objectives for the first period

• The 15 countries of the European Union that respected their Kyoto commitments\(^{27}\) (-8% compared with the 1990 level), thanks to some exemplary countries like Germany and the UK, and that used carbon credits and the Clean Development Mechanism
• The ex-USSR countries that met their commitments essentially because of the closing down of industrial production after the fall of communism. Russian, the Ukrainian and Belorussian emissions were very much reduced. The same can be said for the new member States of the European Union whose emissions fell considerably: Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonian and Latvia.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

In January 2001, George W. Bush announced that he refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol for 3 reasons:

• He doubted the scientific reality of climate change
• He believed that the fight against climate change was contrary to the economic interests of the USA and American life-style
• He refused to sign a legally binding treaty within the United Nations framework that included sanctions. This refusal has been a constant attitude of American diplomacy for over half a century, whereby the USA refuses to sign any legally binding international treaties.

In 2005, in Montreal, the United States finally agreed to participate in the post-Kyoto negotiations to reach a new international agreement for 2020.

At Copenhagen, in 2009 during the next round of negotiations on countries’ commitments for the post-2012 period, and in spite of the commitment that had been made by President Obama, the United States did not make the expected comeback that would have unblocked the international agreement. Nor did they make any national “compensatory” commitment, given the refusal by the Republican majority in Congress to adopt a law on climate and energy, although the American commitment to cut emissions by 17% (between 2005 and 2020) was part of the Copenhagen

\(^{27}\) At the end of 2007, the 27 Member State European Union had a 9.3% drop in emissions, due to the recent admission of the Central European countries.
Accords, and was supposed to have been passed by a vote by Congress. A reduction of the nature of a mere 3.7% compared with the 1990 level would have been a landmark. If it had become law, this objective of mitigation would have represented a binding agreement at national level and would in turn have encouraged the emerging countries to likewise commit and strengthened the commitments of industrialised countries that were already actively involved, boosted the confidence of developing countries, and increased the efficiency of the flexibility mechanisms by supporting the value of carbon.

At Cancún in 2010, the United States made no new national commitment. This caused the emerging countries to refuse to commit to any objectives for mitigating their emissions compared with other developing countries, as they did not wish to be considered any differently from them, in the name of shared but differentiated responsibility, and given that the United States was attempting to impose conditions that they were not themselves prepared to respect, and that were therefore contrary to the idea of equity.

### 3.2.2 / A quantified objective and flexibility mechanisms

The objective of the Protocol was to provide a legally binding instrument to incite action to be taken more effectively, as this was not yet the case. It was conceived as a complement to the Convention.

In order to meet the objectives, the so-called flexibility mechanisms were established as a complement to the commitments made. Countries could use them as well as the policies and measures introduced at national level. These flexibility mechanisms are negotiable permits, the Clean Development Mechanism, and the Joint Implementation.

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**Negotiable permits**

This system of emissions’ permits aims to encourage the improvement of the most polluting and least efficient production systems. Efforts are rewarded by the possibility of selling the excess produced by those who exceed their commitments. Those who are behind their targets can buy them to avoid being penalised. Several markets for emissions’ permits have been created for companies, groups of companies or between States. This includes the European permit exchange scheme that has been operating since 2005.
The Clean Development Mechanism

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) aims to support industrialised countries in meeting their objectives of cutting emissions and investing in projects in developing countries. The CDM thus enables countries or companies in the developed world that need to cut their emissions to invest in developing countries and benefit from the emission credits thus obtained. These rights can be saved or exchanged and shared between the foreign investor and the host country. At the same time they contribute to the economic development of the developing countries that are most respectful of the environment. In practice this involves large industrial projects that have been of most benefit to the emerging countries. The least developed countries have hardly had any access, even though they should be the main beneficiaries. This is due to the lack of ability to design projects, given the high level of administrative complexity of the regulations of the mechanism and small scale of their projects.

Joint Implementation

Joint Implementation aims to reduce GHG emissions in transition countries such as the Eastern European countries and the ex-URSS, by projects that are essentially of an industrial nature. These projects can generate emission credits similar to those of the CDM.

The Kyoto Protocol had also created the Adaptation Fund to finance the adaptation programmes of developing countries. It is partly funded by 2% paid in by the investments from the Clean Development Mechanism.

3.2.3 / Legally binding commitments

A Protocol that includes legally binding constraints means establishing sanctions for failure to respect commitments made. Supervision of the respect of commitments made in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol is supposed to be carried out by a “Compliance Committee”.

In the case of failure to comply with the objectives set, the Annexe 1 Parties had 100 days following the final inventory examination by experts of annual emissions to report any failure to comply with their obligations. If, at the end of this period, the emissions of a Party were still superior to the designated quantity, the difference was to be carried over to the second Kyoto Protocol period, with a penalty of 30%. It is forbidden to sell these emissions and a plan of action that lays out the details of measures to be taken to guarantee that this objective will be met in the course of the subsequent period must be established.

For the first period of commitment, a definitive inventory of the
emissions of each country was planned for 2014. Countries would have until May 2015 to conform with their commitments if needs be. However countries that knew that they had overstepped on the first period of commitment signed up for the 2012-2020 period outside the Kyoto Protocol framework. This includes Canada, Japan and New Zealand. They will therefore not be liable to the sanctions applicable for having carried over their emission reductions from one period to the next. In clear language, the legally binding framework of the Kyoto Protocol has failed to work.

3.3 / THE SECOND COMMITMENT PERIOD OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

The Durban Conference that took place in December 2011 validated the launch of a second period of commitment starting 1st January 2013, and confirmed the Doha amendment.

The Annexe B countries of the Kyoto Protocol of the first period then had to declare whether or not they were signing up for the second period:

- The European Union, Australia, Belorussia, Croatia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Switzerland and the Ukraine confirmed their participation in the second period. But given the general break-down of the process and in spite of their conviction and support for an agreement that is the only legally binding instrument that includes solidarity in the process, these countries have made what are generally speaking weak commitments, and have linked all increases in the objectives to similar commitments made by other countries.

- Japan, Russia and New Zealand remained Parties of the Kyoto Protocol but refused to make new binding commitments for the second period on the grounds that they represent just a small part of the countries that emit greenhouse gas. This situation can be explained by the fact that the developed countries were so far behind on meeting their objectives that they did not wish to make further commitments that they would be unable to respect.

- Canada joined the United States in totally leaving the Protocol.

3.3.1 / Objectives for the 2013-2020 period of commitment

The length of the second period and the level of commitments

The second period of commitment was set at 8 years, from January 2013 to December 2020. The Kyoto Protocol is now playing a "transitional" role: it enables some countries to remain within a legally binding framework as this forces the other industrialised countries to stick to
a certain level of pledge, thus avoiding totally falling into “pledge and review” that has a lesser legal force. The end of the second period of commitment to the Protocol will be concomitant to the implementation of the next agreement.

**GHG emissions cuts for the second period of commitment to the Kyoto Protocol**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Base year</th>
<th>Commitment linked to the year of reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichtenstein</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The levels pledged and adopted by countries in Doha aimed for a global reduction in emissions for these countries compared with the base year (generally 1990; c.f. chart above). This in reality corresponds to an additional overall reduction for the Annexe B countries compared with the last statistics of about 2%. The difference between this and the pledged amounts can be explained by the choice of base year. 1990 is the base year for all the Annexe B countries (apart from Australia, c.f. chart 2). However since then most countries have cut their emissions by meeting or even exceeding their pledges for the first period. We therefore need to reduce the emission cuts made in the first period to evaluate the progress that countries still need to make in the second period.

The European Union’s situation is a special one. In effect, the European objectives for the first period were based on European membership of 15 States (-18%), and subsequently on 27 States (including the new member States of Eastern Europe for the 2nd commitment period (-20%). They thus benefit from the considerable fall in emissions in the Eastern European countries compared with the level of 1990 (which
remains the base year). At the end of 2013 the European Union had reduced its emissions by 19.2% compared with 1990. Europe has therefore already almost succeeded in reaching their pledged level of cuts of -20% for 2020.

3.3.2 / Legal continuity for the second commitment period

The amendment of the Protocol was presented to the Kyoto Protocol Parties for acceptance in December 2012. The Doha amendment came into effect 90 days after having been accepted by 144 countries - three quarters of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol.

**THE AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW**

The instruments for accepting or approving a treaty have the same legal impact as that of ratification. They therefore express a State’s consent to be bound by the said treaty. In this practice, certain States prefer the process of acceptance and approval in cases where their national constitutional law does not require ratification by the Head of State.

[Art. 2, par. 1, al. b) and art. 14, par. 2, 1969 Convention of Vienna on the Law of Treaties]

The term “amendment” designates official modifications to a treaty that concern all or parts of the treaty. These modifications are made in accordance with the same scope and modalities as those of the initial drafting of the said treaty. Many multilateral treaties specify the conditions that must be met for amendments to be adopted. In the absence of such measures, amendments require the agreement of all parties.

[Art. 9, 1969 Convention of Vienna on the Law of Treaties].

Thus far, there have been only 18 ratifications of the amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. 144 are required for the amendment to enter into force.

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30 These countries jointly intend meeting the EU objectives.
31 Emissions for the 2008-2010 period validated by the UNFCCC
32 Source : European Environment Agency.
Countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol amendment for the second commitment period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>13 Nov 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>14 Aug 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2 June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>23 Sept 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>5 Sept 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>23 Sept 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>30 Sept 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>11 April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>7 April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5 Sept 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>5 Sept 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia</td>
<td>19 Feb 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>27 Dec 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>12 June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>24 Sept 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>23 Sept 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3 Feb 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>26 April 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The European Union, that was the main partner in the pledges for the 2013-2020 period of the follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol, has still not ratified the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. They effectively require the ratifications of the 28 member States to do this.

3.3.3 / The use of flexibility mechanisms for the second commitment period

Most developing countries were clearly in favour of limiting their use to the countries that had made binding pledges for the second period. This would have the effect of excluding the developed countries that had failed to commit for the second period but that nevertheless remained within the Kyoto Protocol framework (Japan, Russia and New Zealand), and that wished to have access to these mechanisms. Europe raised its voice in support of this, emphasizing that extended use of these mechanisms would increase the demand for emissions quotas that are traded on the market, and would thus increase the currently very low price of carbon. Finally the agreement limited their use to those countries that have adopted quantified objectives for the second period of the Kyoto Protocol.

The management of excess quotas

The issue of how to manage excess emission quotas that some countries have accumulated gave rise to tensions, as it is liable to undermine environmental integrity for the second period. The possibility of trading the excess Kyoto permits would have allowed those countries that bought them to easily meet their targets for the second period of emission cuts in pure “accounting” terms, without have to actually cut their emissions.
European countries only reached a last-minute agreement on this subject, as Poland expressed its desire to carry over its surplus in the second period.

The definition of commitments for cutting emissions for the first period of the Kyoto Protocol took place in 1997, with the base year set at 1990. At this time the ex-URSS countries and Eastern Europe had agreed to a very low level, a mere stabilisation of their emissions. This proved not to be in phase with the evolution of the greenhouse gas emissions, as the fall of communism led to a serious economic recession and a drop of between 30 and 40% in emissions in these countries, compared with the level in 1990. These countries have since outperformed their objectives for the first period, thus accumulating a surplus of excess quotas per country at the end of the first commitment period in 2012.

**AUU surplus by country at the end of the first commitment period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>AUU surplus quotas (in Mt eq CO2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5 873.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union of 27 ³³</td>
<td>4 123.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2 593.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>429.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia³⁶</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichtenstein</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>13139.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: “Carry-over of AAUs from CP1 to CP2 – Future implications for the climate regime”, September 2012.*

The text that was adopted in Doha authorised a very limited use of these excess quotas during the second commitment period; the Annexe B countries of the Protocol that have signed up for the second period can carry over a maximum of 2% of the AUUs that they had received for the initial period.
When the text was adopted, Australia, the European Union, Japan, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland desisted from using any excess quotas from the first commitment period. This left very little possibility for those countries that had excess quotas, but that were not participating in the second period to trade them.

The difficulties encountered in Doha to reach agreement on the question of hot air

A clause that measures impacts ensures that countries may not increase their emissions compared with the 2008-2010 period. But Belorussia, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine were counting on making pledges that would enable them to increase the emissions to avoid limiting their economic growth. These countries strongly objected to this amendment and this in spite of immediate protests by Russia, whose objection was not taken into account by the Qatari CoP President.

At the Warsaw conference, Japan announced that it was reneging on its pledge to cut emissions by 25% by 2020 compared with the 1990 level; the new declared pledge was 3.8% compared with the 2005, which is the equivalent of 3% compared with 1990.

And Australia announced that it was abandoning its planned carbon tax.

The fight against climate change therefore moved into the second commitment period with a major contradiction: on one hand, some countries were affirming the need for urgent action to be taken by all countries, and on the other, the inability to bring all countries together in a single agreement of generalised commitments. Given this situation, a transitional solution has been found that involves a double process for developed countries: “free” pledges in the framework of the Convention, and legally binding agreements within the Kyoto Protocol.

It is obvious that the growing disparity of effective paths of industrialised countries and the weakness of the pledges has led to many criticisms:

• Firstly from scientists, NGOs and the media
• Secondly this does not incite emerging or developing countries to take action
• The quality of pledges made by the developing countries has not been enough to build political trust before moving into the fresh talks.

33 The AUU surplus for the EU-27 is the aggregation of those of the EU-15. In terms of the 1997 talks, this high figure is partially the result of Eastern European countries joining the EU, as they had accumulated a lot of emission quotas. Poland alone holds 751.5 Mt eq CO2.

34 Croatia intends meeting its pledge for the 2nd period jointly with the EU.
3.3.4 / The need to re-examine the level of pledges for 2020

A decision on the level of pledges by developed countries for the second commitment period was introduced into the final text in Durban. This was all the more important as the countries had finally started to announce minimum pledges compared with what had previously been stated. This was on the eve of the closing of the Conference. The difficulties linked to the low price of carbon in the Clean Development Mechanism contributed to increasing the sense of frustration with the Kyoto Protocol that was becoming increasingly restricted in its scope. The developed countries, starting with the European Union, have refused to see their commitments undermined. This is especially true as it would implicitly undermine the process of the Durban Platform. Some countries such as Australia argue that it is now the 2015 agreement that will provide the requisite framework for increased pledges and bring countries together. But the fact remains that the Kyoto Protocol remains the only legally binding instrument. Developing countries reject the idea of abandoning the Kyoto Protocol and fear the creation of an agreement that might certainly be global, but that would fail to guarantee that commitments made would be respected. This is all the more true as this agreement would bring all countries together, on the basis of their respective levels of development and responsibilities and on the basis of the forms and levels of commitments that have yet to be defined.

THE REVISION PROCESS OF THE DOHA DECISION

At the European Union’s suggestion, the Doha Decision invited the developed countries to decide on a new objective for 2020 that would align the greenhouse gas emissions cuts of 25-40% below the 1990 level by 2020. Several of those countries that made pledges for the second period explicitly communicated their agreement to make greater mitigating efforts than those previously decided. Thus the European Union will probably increase its commitment for 2015 by -20 to -25 or even -30% in the framework of the revision that was adopted in Doha. This could lead to other countries following suit, which would auger well for the 2015 CoP.
4 / Contributions by all in a single agreement

The Durban Conference in 2011 launched a negotiation process for a new international agreement.

On the basis of a shared vision, the Durban Accords led to:
- The recognition of the **urgent need for all countries** to face up to the serious, often violent and potentially irreversible threat posed by climate change.
- The launch of a **preparatory process for an agreement to be reached in 2015** on the post-2020 period. This was a major breakthrough.
- **The need to increase the level of actions for reducing countries’ emissions** in order to bridge the very important gaps between developed countries’ pledges that had been made in Cancún, the profiles of evolution of global emissions, and the objectives that need to be reached on the basis of what the scientific reports of the IPCC state.

**In the framework of the Durban Platform two parallel negotiations have taken place:**

- **Activity sector 1: The aims of the 2015 agreement.** Discussions have taken the form of open consultations on the contents and elements to be included in the 2015 agreement, including on adaptation, mitigation, technology, funding, capacity strengthening and transparency.
- **Activity sector 2: Aims until 2020.** In the course of the open consultations, countries examined the path they should follow. Various workshops were organised on the lessons learnt for relevant experience of other multilateral agreements on the environment, and on the levels to aim for by 2020, urbanisation, and the role played by governments in facilitating measures relative to climate in cities.
4.1 / THE DELICATE POLITICAL ISSUE OF DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN THE SITUATIONS OF COUNTRIES

The IPCC has reaffirmed the fact that action needs to be both collective and solidarity-based. This implies moving beyond the existing categorisation of countries of the Rio Convention, of industrialised countries (Annexe 1) and developing countries (those outside Annexe 1).

The Rio Convention established two categories of countries:
- Annexe 1 countries, i.e. OECD member States, the ex-URSS and ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe. It is worth noting that this list does not include countries with a high level of emissions per capita including the oil-producing countries.
- Non-Annexe 1 countries, i.e. developing countries.

This categorisation of countries is based on the situation in 1990, when countries now qualified as emerging had not yet gained impetus; it was taken up as such in the Kyoto Protocol for the 1990-2012 period.

The main divergence between countries on keeping global warming to below 2°C, generalising the shift to taking action, reaching a new agreement in the multilateral framework of the United Nations with shared rules on how to respect pledges made by countries, is actually based on the way in which efforts should be shared by countries, rather than the objective per se. There are two points of view:

- **The next agreement should not just be a rewrite or a reinterpretation of the Convention.** Developing countries and emerging countries would like to see an agreement that includes the themes of the Bali Action Plan: mitigation, adaptation, funding, technology; capacity strengthening, transparency of actions and support. And this should be in accordance with the principles of the Convention) shared but differentiated responsibility, equity and historical responsibility. They consequently are requesting that the next agreement maintain the dichotomy of developing countries/developed countries and the obligation of financial support for the latter.

- **The next agreement should reflect new, shared responsibilities:** Many developed countries, including the United States are requesting that the principles reflect the current and future circumstances and capacity of countries in a dynamic, evolutionary way. All countries’ efforts should not just be determined by their historical level of
emissions, but also by the current and predictable levels. The binary approach of “developed/developing countries” is rejected as the basis for any future agreement, as it is considered out-dated. Furthermore, they believe that mitigation should lie at the heart of this agreement and that financial and technological support should be aimed at the most vulnerable countries.

- The most vulnerable countries are insisting on the need for the emerging countries to commit more.

The two key elements of the Convention that focus on equity are essentially the “shared but differentiated responsibility” and “the right to development” as defined by the levels of wealth and GHG emissions.

- But since the signature of the Rio Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, the geopolitical situation has changed. Globalisation has enabled new economic and political powers to emerge, and the old leaders need to accept and work with new actors. No one country can now lead the negotiations and determine the path they should take.

- Today’s reality corresponds to a breakdown of countries according to developed countries, emerging countries that have captured most of the industrial production, oil- and other raw materials-producing countries, countries in an intermediate situation, the least developed countries and countries that are characterised by their extreme vulnerability to climate change. This results in the creation of new “sub-groups” of countries involved in the climate talks that correspond to these different situations.

The negotiations are now faltering on the way in which to share pledges and contributions between countries, due to the lack of clear progress on the criteria of what constitutes equity.

The next agreement needs to find a balance between taking this new configuration into account, and the respect of equity and solidarity. This political step needs to be taken as of the Lima meeting.
4.2 / COUNTRIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS, THE BACKBONE OF THE NEW TALKS

4.2.1 / Countries’ commitments or contributions

The idea of commitments was thus far applied to the industrialised countries involved in the Kyoto Protocol. As the Durban Platform extended the need for action in the framework of a future agreement to all countries, the key question of a new agreement on the treatment of the 3 types of developed countries (Annexe 1), the emerging countries and other developing countries was brought up at the Warsaw Conference. At Warsaw, the developed countries refused to commit to quantified pledges as long as the emerging countries did not clearly become involved in the process. Finally, there was a compromise that enabled all countries to be included; but this was at the cost of a loss of the legal strength of the formulation compared with the terms included in the Durban Platform. The final ADP text included the fact that all countries were to make “contributions“ by the end of March 2015. These “contributions” that still need to be precisely defined, are at the heart of the next agreement of which they are the corner stone.

There are still many diverging views on the nature of these contributions, and as to whether they concern:

• Merely the contributions on the mitigation measures Or also those on adaptation
• On international funds that should be mobilised
• On technology transfers
• Or on the means of strengthening capacities...?

If they were to cover all of these aspects, they would then include all the terms of the Bali Action Plan. To what extent do the contributions include a quantification of the means and expected outcomes or proposals that are of a more qualitative kind? Contents would obviously differ from one type of country to another.

It would also be necessary to decide on the rules governing transparency of content, registration in the framework of the preparation of the agreement, the follow-up process and verification.

Another decisive aspect is that of support for the least developed and most vulnerable countries in determining their contribution.

Progressing on these issues will be the central topic on the agenda for the Lima Conference.

As long as this question has not been resolved, it will prove all the more
difficult to move forward on the other aspects of the agreement. Discussion on these principles then leads to a discussion on what the countries’ contributions should be. Lima is where the elements of the next agreement will be determined.

4.2.2 / Contents to be included in the contributions

Even if all countries recognise the need for this agreement to be applicable to all, they do not interpret the meaning of this formulation in the same way:

• For some, universal participation is linked to identical kinds of pledges
• For others, this idea of uniformity of applicability is unacceptable. Applicability for them implies differentiation in implementation based on the principles of the Convention and universality does not imply uniformity.

For some countries, the concept of equity, which is a central principle of the agreement and its acceptance, implies that a global aggregated objective is essential; it would then be shared according to criteria; whereas other countries believe that equity means that pledges should be made on the basis of contributions determined at national level in a bottom-up process.

The co-chairs of the ADP have adopted an empirical approach based on countries’ voluntary contributions that they will each decide. It is essential that the Lima Conference learn lessons from this approach. There will then be a countdown while the countries submit their contributions before next spring.

One of the proposals is to agree to an equitable and flexible classification composed of:

• Absolute objectives for the reduction of the overall economy of the developed countries
• And sectorial or activity-based objectives, as well as the possible results for developing countries.

China is requesting that developing countries be able to choose between objectives that are linked to intensity of low-carbon emission strategies and mitigation plans and projects.
In all probability, the most difficult issue in this aspect of the negotiations in the coming months is the status of the big emerging countries. Will they continue to be considered as developing counties and benefit from flexibility? The developed countries are requesting that they present quantified objectives for all their economies, just like them.

Discussions in recent months have shown that China, India, South Africa and Brazil, whose levels of development and types of energy systems are very different, now hold relatively different positions.

The Secretariat\(^{36}\) has drawn up a list of what these elements would be; it is based on countries’ proposals.

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**Proposals on how to draft and adopt the contributions**

**America, New Zealand and the Umbrella Group** propose to:

- Define the process under which contributions will be evaluated
- Present the elements of an agreement that would be acceptable in a “draft text”.
- Include the figures for pledges in a separate document of the agreement; the political modalities of this are yet to be confirmed
- The United States have proposed that countries submit their objectives for emissions cuts by mid-2015 so that they can be evaluated 4 months before CoP21 (which will leave little time to do this).

**Australia** is also proposing national commitments and international rules.

**The European Union** has proposed combining top-down and bottom-up approaches that include:

- Clarification on what is expected of the Parties for 2015 with a solid “draft text” that reflects the views of the Parties and deals with the key issues.
- A mechanism that allows revision/strengthening of objectives until 2020 and beyond
- Strategic options to be presented to the Ministers at the Lima Conference
- Rapid implementation of actions on the ground
- Registration of quantified objectives in the agreement in December 2015.

**Switzerland** and the Environmental Integrity Group proposed a hybrid approach:

- A consultative phase that would include the compilation of pledges and the comparison of these with the 2°C objective, and cooperation in dealing with any gaps

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• Capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund
• A “draft text” for deciding on objectives and contributions per country that would be in phase with
• the principle of shared but differentiated responsibility
• More efficient instruments than those that currently exist for adaptation, shared rules and a joint MRV system.

**The Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** propose a hybrid solution with:

• A legally binding agreement with short periods of commitment that can be revised
• Quantifiable and non-quantifiable criteria (such as the historical responsibility, sustainable future and vulnerability of countries)
• Adequate means of implementation that can be planned, a mechanism for sanctions and conformity that takes the specific situation of the least developed countries into account.

**The AOSIS group of developing Island States** proposes:

• A process that includes stages
• A global initiative that would strengthen actions in terms of energy efficiency and renewable energies.

**The Africa Group** is requesting:

• Information on the views of all the Parties that meet the principles of the Convention
• An agreement on mitigation, adaptation as well as financial and technological support.

**The BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China)**
These emerging countries are insisting on an agreement in the framework of the Convention that includes:

• The exhaustive and balanced decision taken in Durban
• Contributions to be registered that include the means of implementation

**Brazil** has presented a proposal (previously submitted in 1997) on contributions based on emissions as well as the historical responsibility for the rise in temperature. The objectives would thus be determined in 2015 on the basis of this method. They do not wish to include quantified objectives at this stage of the negotiations.

**The Rain forest** coalition is requesting:

• That REDD+ be included, as well as reference to marine and coastal ecosystems in the negotiation texts
• That the experts’ work on concrete actions to reduce the gap of the pre-2020 period and that open a window to the Green Fund be taken into account.
4.2.3 / How to ensure that the largest possible number of countries register their contributions?

There is a risk that a highly technical process would translate into excluding the least developed countries and lead to a radicalisation that would in turn block the negotiations, as was the case in Copenhagen.

The ADP meetings in June and October demonstrated that the vast majority of countries were preparing their contributions: the developed countries, the emerging countries and many middle income countries. But this is not the case of many of the less developed countries, due to lack of technical capacities, staff or financial means. Furthermore the financial support promised after the Warsaw Conference is slow in being released (by the Global Environmental Fund, the developed countries and the international donors). But the timeline is now very tight to be able to make a submission to the Secretariat before next spring.

It is important to emphasize the importance of making the most of the many studies and research that has been carried out in recent years, and whose results need to be used for preparing the pledges.

The three possible cases

• Funds are rapidly released and enable countries to individually prepare their contributions as soon as the Lima Conference is over.
• Countries in the same sub-region that share the same issues could work together. This is what 14 of the 18 countries of the Caribbean zone have done. Should such groups be created, this should receive international support during the Lima Conference.
• It is also probable that certain countries will not succeed in registering their pledges by next spring. This would then need to be done by next summer.

4.3 / SUCCESSIVE ENLARGEMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Actual commitment to all countries making pledges marks significant progress in an international negotiation that has been going on for 25 years. This enlargement extends beyond the number and nature of the countries involved; it also applies to the sectors and instruments that are being used. Objectively, the seriousness of climate change is leading to a centripetal process that successively integrates new sectors and instruments.

Given the differences in what is at stake, and the countries’ capacities, countries appear to be working towards a situation whereby their expected contribution embraces all the possibilities for actions that the countries wish to see included.
**THE SUCCESSIVE ENLARGEMENT OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS**

The main enlargements concerns:

### Sectors and activities

#### The fight against deforestation

In 2005, in Montreal, the need to limit deforestation was recognised.

#### Adaptation

In Nairobi in 2006 the decision was taken to support adaptation to climate change in developing countries.

#### Technology transfers

These were discarded straight after the Rio Conference in 1992. They were reintroduced as an essential element in the fight against climate change at the Bali Conference in 2007.

#### Agriculture

This sector had not been included due to the difficulty in assessing and quantifying the actions involved; it was reintroduced at the Durban Conference in 2011. This is an essential element for over 2 billion inhabitants especially in the poorest countries.

### The instruments

#### Carbon finance

The flexibility mechanisms were introduced during the Kyoto Conference in 1997.

#### New international methods of fund-raising

Thus far, the desire to extend the scope that was included in Copenhagen (2009) has not had any concrete results through the suggested methods: taxation of air and maritime transport, or that on financial transactions.

#### Taking the economic benefits of actions into account

This decisive element is again being emphasized. It was a major aspect of the Stern report in 2007, but sadly has been insufficiently used.

#### Mobilisation of all categories of actors

The negotiations were for a long time confined to States; they now are attempting to involve all categories of actor: Local Authorities, NGOs, banks... Mr. Ban Ki Moon’s Summit in September is the translation of this enlargement.
4.4 / THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE LIMA CONFERENCE

Ever since the “Bali Action Plan”, the climate talks have focused on five key components that are again at the heart of the discussions. Each of these will be developed further on in this background analysis.

Mitigation

• Since the Kyoto Protocol, the heart of the negotiation has focused on the overall commitments and concrete actions of all the developed countries. This requires reaching agreement on the level of progress of countries, whatever the nature (overall figure, commitments to energy efficiency, or sectorial).

• Actions by the developing countries that have been supported and made possible by technology and funding. These actions aim to impact the emissions pathways of the countries compared with progress in their development.

• Establishing actions that concern land use, changes to land use and forestry (LULUCF) that concern deforestation, degradation of forests, the sustainable management and increase of carbon storage of forests and agricultural land.

• Added to this are cooperative sectorial approaches that are sometimes of an international nature.

Adaptation

Adaptation actions aim to both help prevent risks and reduce the negative impacts of climate change on people, equipment and the environment. Taking it into account means running into four kinds of difficulties: the impossibility of understanding the issue itself and therefore of defining the criteria to be taken into account, the big differences in what is at stake from one country to another, and at local level, the difficulty to make economic estimates, as well as the need to take populations’ vulnerability into account; because the poorer the people, the greater the human cost, and the greater the difficulty for them to face up to catastrophes.

Technology

The question of access to technology for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation is written into the Rio Convention, but was not developed in the Kyoto Protocol. It was reintroduced in the Bali Action
Plan to support mitigation and adaptation for developing countries. It is easy to implement when it is a question of training on technologies that are widely used. It runs into difficulties when it involves trademarks that are still covered by intellectual property rights by the companies that developed them.

**Funding**

Access to international funding is decisive for supporting mitigation and adaptation actions for developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol helped to make progress on this question (flexibility mechanisms, especially the Clean Development Mechanism, funding for the Adaptation Fund, mobilisation of the Global Environment Fund and other international funds). Although decisive progress has been made on access to international funding and the governance of these funds, the mobilisation of the funding announced at the Copenhagen Conference is slow to materialise; this is essentially the result of the current serious economic crisis. Mr. Ban Ki Moon’s Summit of Solutions marked a step forward by the massive mobilisation of the banking sector.

**Transparency and comparability of commitments**

This is a crosscutting element compared with the 4 previous ones mentioned; it has been progressively introduced. The need for transparency refers both to the effective contributions made by developed countries in favour of developing countries (including their additional nature), and the efficiency of the use of the international funding by the developing countries receiving the funds, in terms of the efficiency of their actions against climate change (mitigation and adaptation). Protocols have progressively been established: the actions and the funding need to be measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV). This is also essential in determining the comparability of commitments and the contributions made by countries as well as for guaranteeing the comparability and equity in sharing the efforts made.

Progress in the negotiations on these 5 components has been carried out by a working group that was established in the context of the Durban Platform for reinforced action (ADP) since the end of 2011.
4.5 / THE QUESTION OF FUNDING

The question of the nature of the contributions of developing countries involves the issue of funding. It is very difficult to progress on this question in the current economic and financial crisis.

The major issues of funding

For the developing countries, a timeline needs to be established for funding, that will guarantee greater visibility and the way in which the developed countries will manage to transfer the 100 billion US$ announced in Copenhagen by 2020. They also request that the developed countries commit to at least 70 billion US$ by 2016.

4.6 / THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE NEXT AGREEMENT

It will then be necessary to resolve another very tricky question, that of the legal nature of the commitments made by countries (whether or not they should be legally binding under international law). On the eve of the Lima Conference the situation is paradoxical.

• A very solid political basis has been built over the years: there is agreement on the seriousness of climate change, the need to respect the objective of limiting warming to below 2°C, the need to halve global emissions by 2050, the involvement of all countries, the enlargement of the sectors, activities and instruments that need to be mobilised...

• And even the extreme difficulty of finalising a high quality negotiation in a very short timeframe by 2050.

However the experience of past negotiations has shown that the greater the deadlock, the more the sticking points increase, and the more the discussions become technical and complex. And this leads to the negotiators being unable to sort out all the different threads.

4.7 / THE NEGOTIATION TIMELINE IN THE RUN UP TO THE PARIS CONFERENCE

In Warsaw, the countries decided to present their national pledges for the post 2020 period by March 2015. The decision taken in Warsaw proposes an ascending approach whereby all countries define the nature and extent of their contribution, but without immediately being able to evaluate whether this will meet the 2°C objective or not. We need to
avoid finding ourselves confronted by last-minute announcements that it would ultimately be difficult to evaluate in terms of compatibility with the climate objective, as there would not be sufficient time to increase the level of commitments that would need to be made before December 2015.

All countries are invited to reach agreement at the Lima Conference on the approach to the negotiation, and the contents of the contributions to be made by the end of March 2015.
The Warsaw Conference drew up the following agenda for stages to come including:

- Hold technical sessions to increase pledges during the successive negotiations meetings in 2014
- Formalise the timeline, the contents of the contributions to be made by countries to the UNFCCC that are in coherence with the Durban Platform and the negotiation method validated at the Lima Conference
- Submit countries’ proposed contributions by the 31st March 2015
- Prepare a draft negotiation text for the Paris Conference that takes the countries’ contributions submitted to the UNFCCC into account
- Negotiate between countries to guarantee that the accumulation of pledges and contributions is coherent with an emissions’ pathway of containing global warming to below 2°C
- Conclude the political phase of the negotiations in December 2015 at CoP21 in Paris. The two key difficulties that this presents are:
  - The clear definition of the contents of contributions
  - The support that developing countries will receive to help them prepare their contributions.
Following the sessions held in 2014, the Secretariat proposed that the Lima Conference discuss the following timeline:
5 / Technical aspects of the negotiation

5.1 / ADAPTATION

The unanimous recognition of the importance of adaptation
The need for adaptation is borne above all by the most vulnerable countries (including Island States, countries with low-lying coastlines and arid countries, particularly those of the Sahel). For these countries, adaptation must be a priority in the new 2015 agreement and must be achieved by allocating funds.

5.1.1 / The adaptation framework of Cancún
In Cancún, it was reaffirmed that adaptation was a major challenge. In order to achieve these principles, under the auspices of the Convention, the Cancún Adaptation Framework created an Adaptation Committee responsible for improving the definition, implementation and funding of adaptation actions and plans in the countries, particularly thanks to international cooperation centres.

ADAPTATION FRAMEWORK OBJECTIVES

This framework aims to favour, develop, improve and increase:
• Introduction of NAPA plans, programmes and actions in LDCs
• Technical and economic assessments of different adaptation options
• Cooperation, particularly regarding migration and relocating populations
• Technology transfer and capacity building for adaptation and resilience to climate change
• Inclusion of players at all levels: local, regional, national and international.
Support for Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

A second decision concerns the process which allows least developed countries to create and implement National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), based on the experience of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), that have a long-term perspective. These NAPAs aim to strengthen resilience by improving the ability to adapt, assessing how risks evolve and considering appropriate solutions.

In order to favour transparency, recording and disseminating best practices, countries are urged to provide information, particularly regarding support given and received for adaptation, progress made, lessons learned and obstacles encountered. In addition, the lack of funding over the last 8 years for national adaptation programmes of action in LDCs must be resolved.

In order to do this, countries are encouraged to establish regional centres. Cancún also called for the creation of an International Centre, located in a developing country, to coordinate and develop studies on adaptation.

In operational terms, guidelines were defined in Durban, to support the creation and implementation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs).

To date, 48 LDCs have finalized their NAPA, aimed at identifying and assessing the repercussions and impacts of climate change in their country and identifying measures that could be deployed as well as the funding required. A decision was adopted on supporting the creation and implementation of these national adaptation programmes.

5.1.2 / Adaptation actions

The request for support by developing countries for adaptation actions raises two questions: How does one define an adaptation action? Which actions need to be funded? The actions that need to be carried out differ greatly from country to country. This makes it difficult to create a uniform nomenclature of fundable actions. Although some organisational actions will be easy to introduce at low cost through support for preparation and training, others will be very expensive and the financial returns will not be predictable in terms of the economic outlook. In addition, in order for organisational, regulatory and behavioural measures to be effective, much progress needs to be made to educate and involve populations. Furthermore, the different actions that must be introduced do not only lead to countries being exposed to risks, but also depend on their level of development, geographical conditions and their kind of economic activity. In fact, adaptation actions cover extremely diverse aspects:
Knowledge
- Systematic observation of climate phenomena
- Education, training, awareness raising, particularly aimed at women and young people
- Research- development, dissemination and transfer of adaptation technologies
- Consideration of indigenous and ancestral knowledge
- Assessment of impacts, vulnerability and costs and benefits of adaptation.

Organisation
- Strengthening legal, administrative and institutional frameworks at national and local levels, as well as coordination structures and focal points
- Land-use planning which takes into account economic, environmental and social issues and poverty reduction
- Strengthening information gathering and the ability to plan
- Assessing, managing and sharing risks for prevention, rescue and reconstruction.

Operations
- Implementation of adaptation actions at local, regional and national levels
- Changing agricultural practices, careful management of water resources, protection of coasts, adaptation for buildings and protection of natural resources...
- Implementation of NAPAs (National Adaptation Programmes of Action), application of measures proposed in national communications.

Disagreements remain regarding the definition of vulnerability and thus in the area of applying adaptation. As a result, Saudi Arabia is calling for a definition extending to compensation for the adverse effects of mitigation measures. Other countries, such as those in the EU, want to limit the scope of adaptation to the impacts of climate change.

5.1.3 / The Adaptation Committee

In Bali, it was decided that an Adaptation Committee would be created under the aegis of the Convention in order to promote the implementation of adaptation actions. In Durban, the composition of the Committee, whose mission it is to support actions through technical and financial support, was approved. The five large regional groups of the world\(^37\) will be represented amongst the 16 members chosen by

\(^37\) In the UN sense of the term, the 5 large regional groups are: African States, Asian States, Eastern European States, South American and Caribbean States; Western European States and other States.
The CoP, as well as those from particularly vulnerable countries (small Island States, least developed countries). The Committee will be open to observers – researchers, NGOs, local governments – and will work with regional agencies.

- The Committee has many priorities:
- Accumulating experiences and understanding vulnerabilities, particularly regarding the impacts on the availability of water resources and actions for preserving and restoring ecosystems
- Assessing loss and damages suffered by countries through an international insurance mechanism (discussed in Doha).

### 5.1.4 / Funding for adaptation

One observation must be made: the issue of adaptation is of greater interest to beneficiary countries than donor countries. Developed countries are more motivated to fund mitigation actions in developing countries than those for adaptation. This can be explained by the fact that mitigation actions contribute to reducing climate change, no matter where they are carried out. As for adaptation, it is the expression of social concerns of requesting countries.

**Funding for adaptation: sources and beneficiaries**

It is vital that developed countries provide additional and predictable financial and technological support, as well as long-term capacity building for adaptation. This funding must be first directed towards countries that are particularly vulnerable and those with the most pressing needs. At the moment no definition of these terms has been adopted and no figures have been established. A preliminary estimate of financial needs is vital to move forward. The possibility of funding for adaptation through an auction of allocated emissions quotas is still pending.

**Funding for the Adaptation fund**

The Adaptation Fund established under the Kyoto Protocol has become operational after having lacked funding (to support NAPAs) for a considerable amount of time. The first two projects accepted are: a project in Senegal concerning coastal erosion and a project in Honduras to improve the provision of water to the poorest households.

At the moment, only UN organisations and multilateral banks have access to the Fund’s resources. A decision has yet to be made on how to facilitate access to the Adaptation Fund, enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol. The following options remain pending: the possibility of a levy for adaptation on new market mechanisms to be created, an increase in the levy on the Clean Development Mechanism to above 2%, as well
as increasing its scope to other mechanisms. The establishment of an Adaptation Framework should go in this direction.

At the outset of the Warsaw Conference, developing countries were even more concerned by the fact that the Adaptation Fund was no longer able to fund the projects submitted by developing countries. In order to “save” the Fund, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Finland, France and Norway filled its coffers with 100 million dollars.

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The decision adopted in Warsaw

- A reminder that planning for adaptation should be based on nationally defined priorities
- Drafting of technical directives for the NAPA process and introduction of global NAPA support programme for LDCs welcomed
- Call on developed countries, United Nations organisations, specialized institutions and others to strengthen financial and technical support for NAPAs and their request to provide information on the response to this invitation to the Secretariat by March 26th 2014
- Call on Parties and relevant organisations to provide information by March 26th 2014 on their experience regarding the application of directives on NAPAs, to be compiled in a document presented at the SBI meeting in June
- Decision made to continue taking stock of and if necessary, reviewing initial NAP guidelines at CoP 20.
The cost of adaptation for the African continent is currently estimated to be between 7 and 15 billion dollars a year. According to estimates, even if global warming does not exceed 2°C, it will cost 35 billion dollars a year by 2040 and 200 billion dollars a year by 2070. This figure could reach 350 billion dollars if there is a surge in emissions.

5.1.5 / A mechanism for loss and damages

During negotiations by AOSIS countries, the idea of establishing a mechanism responsible for “reparations” due to developing countries from developed countries for “loss and damages” linked to climate change was introduced. Since 2010 this issue has been the subject of a work programme. In Doha, there was strong disagreement between the poorest countries and the United States, who fear the court cases such a mechanism could create. Concrete progress can only be made on this issue if an assessment on the economic costs of adaptation and damages is made. The very nature of this device will also have to be determined, a device which will be included either in the existing adaptation mechanism (Adaptation Fund and Adaptation Committee), or in an additional mechanism.

5.1.6 / Adaptation in the 2015 agreement

Developing countries are requesting that adaptation not be side lined in the new agreement, and that it be effectively linked to funding. They are requesting NAPAs constitute the basis for support for adaptation and the means for implementation. In addition, they have called for a compensation device to be created for loss and damages.

Adaptation should feature in the 2015 agreement. The Co-Chair put forward guiding questions on long-term and collective aspects of adaptation, commitments and contributions, institutional provisions and cooperation and coordination.

Developing countries have called for a global goal on adaptation to be defined, based on an estimate of needs resulting from emissions’ trajectory scenarios. This proposal was rejected by developed countries (Australia, Norway, South Korea and the United States), who emphasised the technical difficulty in aggregating adaptation needs because there is no common definition.
COUNTRY POSITIONS

The Africa Group is calling for a global adaptation target resulting from calculating the effects of the probable change in global temperatures, according to the level of commitments made by countries to reduce emissions. As a result, insufficient mitigation commitments should lead to an increase in financial support for adaptation.

AOSIS countries highlighted the fact that adaptation measures are country and territory-specific. They are calling for a definition to be made regarding the relationship between mitigation, adaptation, loss and damages in the 2015 agreement.

Brazil is concerned that a global target will freeze requests and needs.

Australia has suggested having a global adaptation target which shows a commitment to reduce vulnerability to climate change and which links adaptation ambitions to means of implementation.

EU prefers an “normative target.”

Switzerland has proposed increasing resilience, adaptation capacity building and including this in national strategies.

India has called for understanding and for systems of common measures.

Ethiopia has expressed concern at the idea of a “common” methodology for assessing adaptation, pointing out that there are differences between national situations.

Sudan has underlined the need to assess country needs for financial support.

In addition, countries have rejected the option of a global adaptation target, arguing that adaptation measures are localised or that setting such a target and common methodologies for an adaptation assessment framework would be difficult to achieve by CoP21. The alternative would thus consist of a shared commitment rather than a global target.
Most countries agree on the need to avoid creating new mechanisms. Existing institutional mechanisms need to be used by improving them. One of the major issues at the Lima conference will therefore focus on:

- Taking adaptation actions into account in national contributions, in addition to mitigation actions
- How to take adaptation into consideration given the wildly different local situations. Different proposals on how to improve existing devices have been put forward:
  - Mexico has suggested including local and social skills in cooperation structures, highlighting the need for methodologies, operational knowledge and the participation of stakeholders
  - The Philippines has proposed that an adaptation register should be created in order to share best practices
  - Tuvalu has called for a review mechanism to be included in order to assess whether funding corresponds to adaptation needs and has called for a process which would ensure the human rights of people displaced by climate change are respected.

5.2 / TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

Technology transfers and intellectual property rights (IPR) are particularly at the heart of preoccupations of the emerging countries; they perceive technology transfers as a lever to development and an indispensible condition for implementing mitigation and adaptation actions. The EU and South Africa have called for the identification of specific mitigation and adaptation actions in order to link them to the right technological solutions; this was done in order to identify the exact technological needs of the developing countries.

China has identified three elements of the 2015 agreement on technology:

- The design of quantifiable, comparable and transparent plans in the developed countries, aimed at supporting the development and transfer of technology to developing countries
- The development or strengthening of endogenous technologies, supported by the developed countries
- Establish global research and development processes.
THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM

In 2010, CoP16 established a Technology Mechanism under the auspices of the Convention. This was tasked with improved identification of countries’ technological needs, encouraging the development of research programmes and international cooperation for transfers.

This mechanism has two key components: an executive committee for technology and a centre that is in charge of a technology network.

- The Technology Executive Committee is charged with supporting research, development and dissemination of technologies that can help low-carbon development and that meet the adaptation needs. It is the “technical branch” of the Technology Mechanism, and its role is to analyse, advise and make recommendations.
- The Climate Technology Centre and Network is more operational, facilitating the operational implementation and coordination of networks and initiatives on technologies at international, regional and sectorial levels.

In Doha, the UNDP was designated as the host and executive centre for technology for a 5-year period. The Consultative Committee was charged with defining the operational modalities of how the Centre and Network would operate. The CTCN is now able to respond to requests for support made by developing countries (expressed through the designated national authorities).

Most countries are calling for strengthening of existing institutions, but some wish to see this integrated in a new agreement, whereas other would like this to remain within the framework of the Conference decision. The AOSIS countries are requesting coordination between the technology centres and the introduction of a specific programme for them. The same applies for the inclusion of the strategic Poznan Programme into the technology Mechanism.

The proposals presented by the developing countries that have been turned down by the developed countries include: the establishment of a service for technology transfer within the Green Climate Fund, a work programme on technology support and the organisation of a workshop on IPRs.

Finally the recurrent issue that will almost certainly not be solved in the upcoming sessions is the on-going one of intellectual property rights, with the proposal by the Arab group of an international mechanism for IPRs, or perhaps a programme of subsidies to help pay for these rights.
5.3 / CAPACITY STRENGTHENING

Diverging views remain on the need to strengthen capacities. Some countries are arguing in favour of the implementation of new programmes: an international mechanism for capacity strengthening funded by the GCF, with an evaluation mechanism (the Arab group), the constitution of a Committee for strengthening capacities (Middle-income countries and Africa group). And others prefer to concentrate on improving and strengthening existing mechanisms.

In concrete terms, one urgent question is on the table: that of the ability of developing countries to draft their contribution by spring 2015 as decided during the Warsaw Conference. Although it is clear that this is an obligation for the developed and emerging countries, and that many middle-income countries will also manage to do so, many of the developing countries, and particularly the least developed and most vulnerable countries will not manage to do so in the given timeframe, unless they receive support. This should take the form of both capacity strengthening of ministries and relevant academic structures, and providing support through international expertise and funding. UNDP, WEF and the EU (with a considerable contribution from Germany) have committed funds.

This will be one of the most important points to be decided during the Lima conference. There will then only be a few months left to draft contributions.

THE CAPACITY BUILDING COMMITTEE

This Committee in the new framework agreement would be in charge of the follow-up and evaluation of the efficiency of capacity strengthening activities. It would be aimed at improving the coherence of efforts made by existing institutions, and examining their efficiency, including the lack of adequate funding and geographical distribution of projects.

5.4 / TRANSPARENCY OF THE ACTION AND SUPPORT

It is essential to build trust in the future agreement, and this requires ensuring transparency and comparability of efforts made.

The key principles of the “MRV” process have progressively been drawn up since the Bali Conference. They include:

• Measures of the results of actions (essentially the emissions cuts compared with the evolution of what they would have been, had the
There are in fact two types of MRV mechanisms: those that relate to the donor countries and those that relate to the recipients. These have two objectives in terms of transparency:

- Concerning support provided by developed to developing countries, including on flexibility mechanisms, with specific regulations for follow-up
- On actions implemented by assisted countries, their efficiency, as well as regulations that have been specifically adapted.

It is obvious that coordinated progress on these kinds of actions is still required to finalise the agreement on MRV regulations.

These MRV principles apply to international support. Countries are opposed to any extension that would have included the verification of the efficiency of their actions undertaken using their own national funds; that would have been a breach of their national sovereignty. But certain countries are requesting that this transparency be linked to a control mechanism. There is one very sensitive issue:

China and the United States have thus far refused any such control. The United States is proposing a strengthened, evolutionary MRV system that would be applicable to all Parties, and that would include reports, experts' reviews and exchange between the Parties.

Tracking national policies is the responsibility of national emissions' inventories that are supposed to be carried out by countries at regular intervals. These structures have been strengthened by recent decisions.

For the Paris CoP in 2015, only commitments and structures are supposed to be announced, not the details. In effect, the actions to which MRV will apply will depend on the contents of the pledges and commitments presented by countries.

But this doesn’t mean that the next stage will be easy. It involves agreeing
on the modalities of implementation: establishing a joint system for MRV, on methodologies, obligations to declare, review and evaluate. There is the choice between either a system based on the current differentiation between categories of countries, or a system based on identical criteria that is flexible and adaptable to the countries’ situations and capacities.

As far as the accounting system for the measures is concerned, discussions have focused on including changes to soil use and market mechanisms that have thus far been managed under the Kyoto Protocol. Some countries wish to use the systems developed under the Protocol, others do not (the United States in particular). The main difficulty is that of a double count between the country that has implemented the action and that has funded it and included it under its emissions’ cuts.

The evaluation and scrutiny of the system is creating differences of the rate at which the evaluation should occur. Some countries are refusing the idea of international evaluation that would start in 2015; other are requesting it take place ex ante, before the Paris Conference, with another one of a periodic nature programmed for contributions and financial support.

We are witnessing a progressive strengthening of the rules governing inventories and transparent communication by countries on their progress. This year will be the first where the biannual reports of industrial and other countries will be available. The rules governing these biannual reports will be revised in Lima.

The BASIC countries proposals

**South Africa is proposing:**
- An ex ante process
- An ex post process with a 10-year commitment period with mid-term “reviews”, the possibility of adjustments at any time and “harmonised” registration of new commitments throughout the period.

**China is proposing:**
- An ex post process that would evaluate the emission reductions of the developed countries and the challenges and needs of developing countries.

**Brazil is refusing mid-term scrutiny and is proposing:**
- A scrutiny that could use global temperatures or the emissions levels as a reference, noting that the use of several different years and parameters as base reference could complicate revision.
5.5 / THE REDD+ MECHANISM

The creation of REDD+ was one of the main elements of progress in the climate talks. Discussion is now centred on how to implement it. Many pledges, including by the European Union have proposed the objective of halving tropical deforestation by 2020 as well as the global stabilisation of forests as of 2030. One of the current preoccupations is the low value of carbon that is limiting the ability to fund REDD+.

At the BP20 in Lima the development of an information system on the provision of safeguard clauses as well as a more general information platform on REDD+ is due to be studied. Discussions on the non-market approaches are also being undertaken in the framework of the subsidiary body of the scientific and technological council.

The REDD mechanism is mainly defined by four criteria:
- The field of application (the types of actions recognised and that can be supported and taken into account)
- The reference scenario of the evolution of forest cover
- The scale of application (national or sub-national)
- The nature of sources of funding.

4 criteria determine the conditions for transfers of funds.

Developing countries are encouraged with the technical and financial support of industrialised countries to develop:
- An action plan or national strategy
- A reference level for national forest emissions
- A national tracking system that is transparent and robust, including the possibility to develop regional monitoring at an intermediary stage
- An information system with inbuilt “safeguards” whose aim is to avoid inefficient programmes that simply “displace” forestation can be introduced, i.e. the risk that benefits of protecting forests in a given place not be compensated by deforestation in another.
Norway has already spent 1.7 billion US$ on supporting the development of REDD+, and is in favour of an independent international process of verification of emissions cuts linked to non-deforestation. But Brazil has expressed its reticence to creating this kind of entity, as it prefers a national verification process.

After seven years of political and technical negotiations on REDD+, the Warsaw Conference marked major progress with several decisions that provide a framework for implementing REDD+ actions, especially:

• The work programme on finance based on results reaffirms that funding can be of various kinds: public, private, bilateral, multilateral as well as alternative sources of funding such as approaches that include adaptation and mitigation. This work programme restates that before being funded, REDD+ actions must be duly measured, notified and verified (MRV), and that the beneficiary countries must provide updated information as to how the safeguard clauses decided at the Cancun CoP have been respected. Precise information on annual results, actions, funds received, and the report on the respect of the safeguard clauses will be submitted every two years by all countries that join the mechanism. They will also be responsible for uploading information on the REDD+ web platform that has now been included in the UNFCCC website (http://unfccc.int/REDD)

5.6 / THE WORK PROGRAMME ON AGRICULTURE

Opposition to including agriculture in the climate negotiations were finally overcome in Durban. The key issues are:

• Adaptation to climate change to avoid water shortages and other impacts
• Increase in carbon storage in soil that requires considerable modification in farming techniques
• A reduction in methane emission release into the atmosphere that is produced by agricultural waste and livestock farming.

Major changes to agriculture are required according to the experts:

• Stop leaving the soil bare after harvesting, and encourage mixed cropping and agroforestry especially in tropical countries, in order to stop water evaporation
• Both improve food on developing countries and reduce excess meat consumption that leads to massive methane emissions
• Reduce the needs for ammonia-based fertilisers by integrating leguminous crops into the farming cycle, so that they absorb nitrogen from the air and fix it in the soil

38 This is a particularly delicate sector: emissions as well as absorption of greenhouse gas by agriculture are less well-known than for other sectors. They concern not only CO2, but also N2O, and most especially methane. The emissions content of agriculture varies greatly from one area to another and requires a regionalised approach.
• Generalise the methanisation of agricultural and urban waste, as this implies a double benefit: methane production can be used to heat or produce electricity, and enable the production of organically rich soil amendments that can be used to replace fertilizers.

• Provide organisational support to farmers; this is all the more essential as economic conditions vary greatly according to climate and territory. Taking agriculture into account also impacts food security and the eradication of poverty, and has a clear link with the Rio Convention on desertification.

But there is deep divergence between developing and developed countries as to how agriculture should be considered; this also holds true for diverging views between emerging and developing countries, where there is disagreement on the opening of markets in the framework of trade negotiations:

• The developing countries fear that there will be increased pressure on their family farming without helping them to adapt, whereas their agricultural exports will decline.

• The developed countries are now very flexible on the approach to alternative energy, and adaptation of this sector that is a high source of emissions. Progress on this issue will be decisive in Lima, as biomass represents one third of greenhouse gas emissions.

5.7 / A WORK PROGRAMME ON EDUCATION

Based on article 6 of the Convention, States are called upon to promote public participation, drafting and implementation of educational and awareness-raising programmes, public access to information as well as training of scientific, technical and management staff. They also need to increase their cooperation of exchanging educational and training support material.

The Parties had adopted the New Delhi Work Programme in 2002. In 2007, in Bali, it was extended, by insisting on communication with the public at large. To no avail. A new programme was launched in Doha in 2012. It includes the following points:

• Education, especially of youth and women

• Training of experts (scientists, journalists, teachers, leaders of public opinion...)

• Public awareness-raising

• Access to information

• Public participation

• International and regional cooperation that creates synergies between the three Rio Conventions (climate change, biological diversity and the fight against desertification)
This programme is scheduled to run until 2020 with an intermediate review after CoP21 in 2016. Education, training and awareness-raising are very key issues for co-operation between developing countries. Thirty States, essential African, Latin American and SIDS have just issued a call for including education in the future Accord. This was made in a submission to the ADP.

5.8 / WORK AIMING TO HELP RAISE COMMITMENTS BY 2020 AND BEYOND

On one hand, the industrialised countries need to increase the commitments they have made to cut emissions for the 2013-2020 period. On the other, if the developing countries that have not yet had to make any formal commitment to mitigate were to do so, they could implement national level mitigation measures (NANAs), and receive support from the developed countries. Because all countries need to act to stabilise climate for the post-2020 period, the work launched by the Warsaw Conference to increase the level of commitments, will facilitate the next talks.

Discussions in Warsaw therefore centred on concrete actions that could be taken to increase commitments by highlighting the advantages of the benefits of mitigation in the various sectors of activity.

5.8.1 / The work of the ADP sectorial contact groups

The work process:
- Identify the actions that support increased commitment during the technical experts’ meetings
- Draft a work plan for the actions to be undertaken by CoP20 that increase the level of commitments for the 2013-2020 period.

Some proposals that have already been made, without arriving at a consensus:
- The main concrete proposal was made by the SIDS countries, who wished to see the introduction of a process based on renewable energies and energy efficiency
- Jordan, supported by India and Cuba have proposed a work programme to cover all the elements of the Bali Plan of Action to increase the level of commitments by 2020. (Decision 1/CP.19 to continue the implementation of the ADP)
- A proposal was made by China, the Philippines and Dominica to examine whether the funding and technologies provided by the
developed countries match. This was turned down by the EU
• India proposed a “revised mechanism in Lima” to evaluate the challenges that need to be overcome and the means of encouraging developed countries to increase their levels of commitment to mitigation before 2020.
• Peru proposed a 2-phase time-line:
  - Identify the opportunities that have a high mitigation potential
  - Define policies that enable this potential for mitigation to be exploited
  - Take action and cooperate to implement the policies that have been identified.

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**Technical meetings that took place in 2014:**
• Renewable energies (March)
• Energy efficiency (March)
• Sustainable cities (June)
• Land management (June)
• Long-term climate pollutants (October)
• Carbon capture and storage (October)

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**Focus on the workshop on renewable energies**

**Session 1 - Policies, practice and technologies: the global situation.**

The possibilities provided by renewable energies in terms of mitigation were underlined. We also need to make the concrete results of these very diverse possibilities more visible.

The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) stated that RE represents 18% of the global energy market; it also underlined that establishing RE can be motivated by:
• Increased access to energy
• Cost-reduction possibilities
• Reduced levels of subsidies
• Job creation and employment
• Health benefits

C.f.: “Remap 2030”, a roadmap drafted by IRENA that analyses the way in which the market segment of RE could be doubled by 2030.

The United States are aiming to generate 80% of their electricity from an overall range of clean energy sources and accelerating the use of renewable energies.

China spoke about the geographical imbalance in adopting REs in different
countries; it also underlined the challenges that RE sources pose in terms of non-continuous supplies such as wind farms and solar. It called for improved technical and financial co-operation to increase the introduction of REs.

Kenya described the Kenyan political and legal ER framework, and emphasized the fact that there are obstacles to the implementation of REs as well as the advantages provided by their implementation. The latter are especially true for improved health, income generation and job creation as well as mitigating climate change, savings made on foreign currencies and increased energy security.

The Marshall Islands underlined the fact that the RE sector is a winning one at all levels for the SIDS in the Pacific area, as it reduces the dependence on fossil fuels.

The main challenges facing the introduction of RE are:

• The lack of affordable finance
• Threats to the sustainability of the network
• Insufficient national planning capacities
• Installation and maintenance of the infrastructure
• And working through the different donor priorities

This indicates the importance of bilateral co-operation, especially on a South-South cross-border basis for developing RE and successful models in rolling out REs.

**Session 2 – Implementing actions: funding, technology transfer and capacity strengthening**

Renewable energies are increasingly competitive.

The challenges are:

• The slow commitment of traditional investors who are slow to mobilise the requisite funding
• National policies are variable and the uncertainty as to the regulations are the main brakes on fresh investment
• Private sector investors frequently believe that the risks linked to investment in renewable energies are higher than in other sectors.

Hence the importance of concerted action and partnerships

**Session 3: Exploring the way forward**

This session examined the options in terms of policies and measures that support RE and the way that international organisation and Non-State actors could support countries in establishing frameworks and policies to strengthen hands-on actions and improve the next stages of the process.
THE WORKSHOP ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY

**Policies, practice and technologies: the global situation**

The importance of the solidity of the political framework, the participation of stakeholders and the co-ordination chain between all actors at all levels was underlined, as well as the need to strengthen institutional capacities.

Japan emphasized the efforts being made by industry in Japan to reduce energy consumption, especially the success of labelling campaigns. They drew attention to the need to reduce energy consumption in all areas, including transport.

Singapore described their country’s objective of greening 80% of their buildings by 2030 as well as the planned introduction of the Green Mark system for evaluating the impact of the ecological footprint of their buildings.

Denmark spoke of the major improvements that have been made in the field of EE and underlined the role of building regulations and voluntary EE agreements that have been agreed with industry; they may be liable for tax breaks on the CO2 tax if it is introduced. They also highlighted the need for a range of measures.

India pointed out their increased demand for energy and has made early investment in EE, due to the high cost of energy. They emphasized the regulations introduced by the government to overcome failures in the market in terms of implementation in the construction industry and industrial sectors.

The challenges that were highlighted:

- Difficulty in foreseeing the results of investments in energy efficiency
- The need to carry out objective comparative studies
- Improve human and institutional capacities
- Implementation and follow-up of performance
- High initial costs in many EE technologies

The International Energy Agency (IEA) presented a series of political recommendations on EE and identified six key areas for action:

- Minimal norms of energy efficiency for new equipment
- Information and awareness-raising for households and small companies
- The need to designate a body that will be responsible for EE and capacity strengthening
- Mobilise funds
- Improve access to data
- And develop the best technologies
The International Partnership on EE co-operation (IPEEC) was presented, emphasizing the fact that it is a forum for discussing policies, practice and technologies that contribute to EE. IPEEC can support the UNFCCC especially through creating links between the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and contributions to energy efficiency.

In the discussion, countries’ experiences were discussed:
- Incentives aimed at encouraging EE
- The use of indicators that allow carbon intensity to be compared with overall energy intensity
- Obstacles to EE, such as market failure
- Create a dedicated register for EEAs in the context of the UNFCCC that would help build understanding of the options on offer
- Standardise activities carried out in the EE framework, especially through the International Standards Organisation
- Funding private sector building renovation
- North-South and South-South co-operation.

THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING ON “URBAN ENVIRONMENT”

The objective of this meeting was to discuss strategies and means for mobilising sustainable urban development. This major challenge was emphasized in the last IPCC report (WGIII). It deals with human population, infrastructure and land use planning, and highlighted the need for coherence between institutional plans, governance mechanisms and financial resources and the objectives of urban mitigation and adaptation.

Session 1: Multiply the efforts to raise funding, technology transfer and capacity strengthening to support sustainable infrastructure

The speakers emphasized the possibilities of intelligent infrastructure that can increase efficiency and resilience of systems at a low cost. Doing this implies making progress on:
- Promoting the right kind of investments
- Setting a price for carbon
- Political support that facilitates taking the decision to switch to a green economy.

Examples of actions and policies in different countries were presented that prove that there are an increasing number of initiatives everywhere in the world:

...
Taking climate resilience into account in the city of Kampala in Uganda shows how aspects linked to climate change can be included in all infrastructure projects.

- The transformation of public transport in Bogota by shifting from diesel fuel to electrical/hybrid transport.
- A system of disaster management in the Province of Cebu in the Philippines.
- The programme of limiting and exchanging carbon quotas in Tokyo emphasizes the importance of collecting data and analysis, building local alliances and capacities in local government.

Several possibilities call for greater exploration:
- Improve ways to take national and sub-national actions into account in the UNFCCC process.
- Encourage energy efficiency of buildings.
- Mobilise funding to support the solvability of cities.
- Reduce travel through improved job localisation linked to habitat.
- Develop more robust political tools.

Session II: The way forward
Different possibilities were mentioned, including the solvability of cities, the importance of leadership, the possibilities of creating markets through horizontal cooperation between cities.

### THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING ON "LAND USE"

**Session 1- Policies, practice and technologies – the state of the world**
The importance of local level reactions and building of meaningful databases to illustrate land use and highlight integrated approaches were all mentioned.

The initiatives presented by various countries:
- The Woodland Carbon Code in the UK to establish new forests and help the UK meet its climate objectives.
- Measures implemented in Brazil to improve the supervision of forests and implementation of laws, land use planning and sustainable forestry management. They have enabled a reduction in deforestation to be made, as well as improving agricultural management.
- The labour policy developed with stakeholders in New Zealand...
to improve the management of local impacts, measure and verify emission cuts.

- The implementation of institutional and political frameworks to cut emissions due to deforestation in Mexico.

Discussions included
- Integrating climate actions into development objectives
- Public participation
- The need for global management approaches to sustainable land use compared with market-based approaches
- The links between forestry, agriculture, bioenergy and food security
- Illegal logging
- The rules for LULUCF accounting in the MDF framework.

**Session 2 - Implementation of actions: funding, technologies and capacity strengthening:**

The speakers emphasized the need for public/private partnerships to improve access to resources and encourage innovative models of sustainable land use.

An approach based on the concept of “intelligent landscapes” was presented. It aims to take different levels into account and identify the diversity of uses and needs and engage all stakeholders.

Thanks to the experience gained through many initiatives, the critical elements required to succeed in projects and the preservation of environmental integrity were underlined:
- The evaluations of the specific needs of all countries
- The need for high-level participation and coordination
- Take the interconnectedness of different activities linked to land use into account
- The role of governments in preventing negative impacts of large-scale foreign investment (acquisition of land).

**Session 3 – The way forward**

The IPCC report underlined the importance of agriculture, forestry and land use in cutting emissions as well as adapting to climate change. They represent 25% of the GHG emissions, and are the main source of emissions in many countries.

- This therefore constitutes a major field; all the more so as it is linked to issues of food security.
Ideas for new technical meetings proposed by countries:
• Buildings
• Transport
• Non-polluting technologies that use fossil fuels
• Response measures
• Feed-in tariffs for renewable energies
• Carbon pricing
• Sustainable consumption

It will be necessary to see how the questions proposed by the technical work groups link to those on technology networks, and if they could provide the grounds for a decision based on quantified results that would overcome the ambition gap.
6 / Funding

The issue of international funding for the fight against climate change will be central to achieving an agreement in 2015, as well as for many developing countries.

6.1 / FUNDING IN THE COPENHAGEN ACCORDS

The Copenhagen Accords foresaw the mobilisation of funds for the 2010-2012 period known as “Fast start” funds. They specified that they would then to scale up by 2020 to reach 100 billion US$. But the Accord failed to specify how they would be raised, or if they would be public, private or new sources of funding. This mobilisation of 100 billion US$ per year as of 2020 was agreed in 2009, but ran into difficulties due to the deepening economic crisis and budget difficulties that are affecting the USA and developed countries. In this context, no agreement has been reached on the means of mobilising such a sum.

During the Warsaw Conference, the developing countries requested pledges and a timeline from then to 2020 as well as for the post-2020 period. A decision was taken that the developed countries should publish their efforts every two years until 2020 and that technical workshops should be held on how to increase funding.

Adaptation Fund funds are drying up as they are mainly linked to money taken from the Green Climate Fund that was set up at institutional level that will not become operational until late 2014. The issue of funding is indeed acute, but it is not operational for lack of funding. It has become crucial to make progress and set the developing countries on a good emissions’ pathway. The developing countries reminded others that it is compulsory for the developed countries to provide resources under Article 4.7 of the Convention (funding and transfer of technologies), and as such, constitutes a condition for their adaptation and implementation of mitigation actions.

39 (Fast start) for capacity strengthening.
This programme aims to help developed countries to raise the 100 billion US$ needed for mitigation by 2020 from public, private and other sources. Transparent implementation by the developing countries will then follow, using the UNFCCC to highlight the technical work of the G20 and the UN High Level Consultative Group on funding for the fight against climate change. The High Level Consultative Group on funding for the fight against climate change has accepted the fact that in the current period of crisis, it is difficult to raise funding. For the moment attempts to identify fresh sources of international funding have not succeeded (tax on financial transactions and air and maritime transport taxes).

Countries’ positions on funding
Developing countries are requesting increased, new, additional funding. According to them, the main source of funding has not been public. Developing countries are requesting that the level of funding be proportionate to the identified needs. Many developing or emerging countries, including Brazil, have expressed a categorical refusal to make commitments as long as the promises that were made in Copenhagen have not been met.

Developed countries wish to base the agreement for 2015 on improving the existing institutions. Some of them are requesting that the developing countries decide what they can do with their existing resources, and what they could do with additional resources (USA). New Zealand is requesting that the richest developing countries start making financial contributions, according to the principle of equity and their respective capacities. They underline the importance of South-South cooperation, and the fact that the funding should be granted to the least developed countries. Private funding should also be privileged for emerging and middle-income countries. They also emphasize the importance of associating public and private investments, and the need to create an environment that encourages financial flows.

Most countries agree on the need to make the Green Climate Fund the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, together with the GEF. Half of these funds will be dedicated to adaptation. The Africa Group is requesting an overall objective for adaptation including all sources, with a medium term of 60-80 billion US$ per year by 2016, and a strategy to gear up to 600 billion US$ by 2030.

• Most countries agree on the need for the Green Climate Fund to
become a pillar of the regime, and the EU has expressed its agreement on there being a 50/50 balance between mitigation and adaptation. The Africa group is requesting a medium-term objective of 60 to 80 billion US$ by 2016, as well as a strategy for reaching 600 billion US$ by 2030

- In order to ensure predictable financial resources, developing countries have requested a “a funding agenda”, with intermediate stages that allow 100 billion US$ to be reached by 2020 and the way in which different kinds of funding will be shared
- AILAC is proposing an objective for medium-term funding of 70 billion US$ in 2016 and a or the initial capitalisation of the GCF of at least 50 billion US$
- The LDCs and SIDS are requesting initial mobilisation of 15 billion US$ for the GCF
- But many developed countries have rejected the idea of quantified objectives and underline the fact that funding is a means of implementing the objective of fighting climate change and not an objective in itself. They have also underlined the fact that funding should only be made available to the most vulnerable developing countries, this excluding the emerging countries de facto, starting with China.

In order to guarantee rules that are both transparent and robust, SIDS is proposing:
- An ex ante forecast based on the financial objectives linked to timelines
- Ex post reports
- Lessons learnt from existing mechanisms.

6.2 / THE FUNDING OF THE POST-2020 REGIME

The CoP adopted a decision in Warsaw on the work programme on long-term funding
That:
- Underlines how urgent it is to implement commitments of funding and technology transfer in the framework of the Convention
- Recognises the commitments made by developed countries to mobilise 100 billion US$ each year until 2020 and the importance of clarifying the amount of financial support required
- Recognises the commitments and pledges made by developed countries since the Doha Conference
- Requests that the Parties establish favourable institutional conditions
for investment

• Encourages the developed countries to guarantee the continuity of public fund-raising and increasingly to use fast start finance based on a variety of public, private and other sources of funding
• Calls on the developed countries to channel an important part of new multilateral funding for adaptation into the Green Climate Fund
• Requests the developed countries to prepare their biannual submissions on their approaches and decisions aimed at increasing their funds for climate for the 2014-2020 period, including information on the qualitative and quantitative aspects.

The co-presidents of the group on finance have decided to base discussions on the next agreement for the 2020-2030 period; this has been denounced by the developing countries, who fear that the fund-raising for the 2013-2020 period might be scrapped.

The heart of the discussion has progressively focussed on the implementation of the Green Climate Fund and how the developed countries should pay into it.

6.3 / THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND

The Green Climate Fund was a decision taken in Copenhagen in 2009, and officially created as part of the Cancún Accords in 2010. Its objective is to finance the transition to a low-carbon development model that is resilient to climate change in developing countries.

In 2012 the Green Fund Committee decided to locate the Secretariat in Songdo in South Korea. The choice of this country reflects the fact that this country has moved from the status of a poor country to that of the fifteenth global economic power in the space of fifty years. This decision symbolises the Green Fund’s connection between development and developed countries.

THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND

Drawing down funds from the developed countries and a complement that can be provided by other public actors (development banks), and private funding, the Green Fund’s vocation is to be the main channel for multilateral funding for the fight against climate change, and coordinate different sources of funding. It will have various financial instruments at its disposal (donations, loans, soft loans…) and will enable customised funding according to the needs of specific projects, to be made.

...
It aims to be a financial instrument under the Convention and will become operational by the Lima Conference. The pilot phase was jointly under the auspices of the World Bank, the UNFCCC and the WEF, and ended in October 2013. An independent secretariat, as well as the directives on the priority actions, programme, policies and criteria for admission have all been defined. The question remains as to which aspects could fall under the auspices of this Fund, with some countries requesting a REDD+ chapter, as well as one for technology or losses and claims. This new climate fund’s aims are to:

- Fund research that provides improved perception and understanding of future impacts of climate change
- Improve adaptation of infrastructure
- Help people to better manage future change
- Encourage local actions that predict future risks
- Fund new technologies and infrastructure to reduce GHG emissions.

The Green Fund should:

- Be well balanced between adaptation and mitigation
- Use vulnerable developing countries’ immediate needs as its starting point for allocating funding for adaptation
- Ensure that all developing countries have access.

6.3.1 / The exemplary role of the Green Climate Fund

The role of the Green Climate Fund reaches far beyond its own ability to mobilise funds. It especially defines the new rules for international funding. Its modalities are aimed at also being applied to the different bilateral and multilateral funds.

The governance of the funds

Until now, the rules on access to international funds were organised under the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, involving the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The principle adopted was that it was the donor countries that decide on their own on the allocation of funding.

The Green Climate Fund has a Board of 24 members that is composed of half representatives of donor countries, and half of beneficiaries. This constitutes a major innovation.
The principle of direct access

Those countries requesting the funds determine the nature of the actions. In the framework of a jointly defined objective, they are responsible for its use. This is the principle of direct access. In the case of most international funding, it is the international institutions that decide on their own on the themes and criteria that determine access to funding.

Decentralisation of access to funding

The following principles have been decided:

- The multilateral or bilateral development banks and public banks will be accredited to examine the projects and pay out according to the rules that have been defined for the GDF
- Funding can be from public or private sources
- Support can take the form of donations, loans, soft loans, combining different financial resources.

The decentralised nature of the GCF is essential to avoid reproducing the extremely complex administration of the existing international funds and the long timeframe involved in agreeing and releasing them. This decentralisation also enables improved management of the funds, as it is easier to control them. This is also due to the implementation of the MRV rules (for measuring, registering and verifying).

6.3.2 / The operational implementation of the GCF

The operational implementation of the GCF has been delayed, as it was necessary to agree on a roadmap for implementation and on the way emerging countries and the private sector would participate in funding the fight against climate change, as requested by the developed countries.

This delay in turn pushed back the donor countries’ contributions to the Fund to the second semester of 2014. But the GCF will become fully operational by the Lima conference.

The Fund would support the first projects based on a thematic approach to guarantee a balance between funding adaptation and mitigation.

This operational implementation is essential to encourage countries to make their pledges in line with the agreement for CoP21. This is a priority to provide impetus to the new climate regime that will be the outcome in 2015.

It will then be necessary to rationalise the approval criteria that exist in the various institutions and ensure that the means of implementation are coordinated with the accredited banks.

40 decision 4/CP.19 – FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1
The following contributions were announced at the Summit of Solutions on 23rd September

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (En millions US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Republic</td>
<td>40</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6.3.3 / Drawing down funds for the GCF

The process of drawing down funds began in June 2014.

The initial conference to capitalise the Fund will take place in Berlin on the 19th and 20th of November. It will confirm and complete the pledges made before Lima.

These pledges have been followed by those of Sweden (55 million €), the Netherlands (100 million €), the United States (3 million US$), and Japan (1.5 million US$). These pledges were made during the G20 meeting in Brisbane.

6.3.4 / The place of funding issues in the next agreement

Developing countries are asking for pledges of funding to be linked to overall and individual objectives and to be included in a specific paragraph in the new agreement with the same legal strength as the other aspects of the agreement. And some developed countries are calling for the contrary, and rejecting the idea of including pre-2020 objectives and the details of the funding procedures in the new agreement on the pretext that it is impossible to have such long-term visibility for their budgets.

This essential issue is linked to the legally binding nature of the next agreement.

At any rate, the progress in mobilising funds will be decisive in finalising the agreement. In order to progress, ministerial meetings will be convened on long-term funding every year until 2020.

6.3.5 / Highlighting the economic benefits of the actions in the negotiations

The contents of the Stern report were too isolated to have helped people to grasp the concept of the changes that climate change represents. Many people, including some of the negotiators, believe it represents a source of additional expense and loss of economic competitiveness.

The economic benefits of improved energy efficiency through mitigation
have never been sufficiently considered as an advantage. Obviously the economic crisis and the erratic changes in oil prices have complicated matters further. But as long as the fight against climate change is perceived as a liability more than as an opportunity, it will remain difficult to get people to shift their positions.

It is therefore important to develop precise, quantified work on what these transformations represent in concrete terms, both from an economic and a social point of view. It is essential to put figures on the investments and cost-saving that energy transition represent, in order to demonstrate that it is in fact beneficial to commit to a low carbon development model.

The developed countries in particular need to commit quickly to this transition, especially as much of their energy infrastructure dates back to the first oil crisis, and now needs to be replaced. This will be one of the decisive aspects to conclude a successful agreement at CoP21 in Paris.

6.3.6 / New market mechanism

As the negotiation is progressing in successive stages:

• A new mechanism for exchanges between countries has been planned, in order to facilitate compensation and the impacts of commitments between countries on a paid basis: encourage the best to improve by being paid to do so.

• In addition to this, other ideas are being examined: mobilising infranational and economic actors and possible mechanisms in addition to those of the market.
7 / The key issue in the new cycle of negotiations: the countries’ proposed pledges

The recognition by all countries of the need to limit climate change to below 2°C has led to the need to involve all countries in the fight against global warming. This aspect is included in the Durban Platform, and now needs to be implemented to enable an agreement to be reached at the CoP in Paris in December 2015.

The High Level Ministerial Dialogue was jointly chaired by Mrs. Marcin Korolec of Poland, and Mr Manuel Pulgar-Vidal of Peru.

7.1 / UNIVERSAL CONTRIBUTIONS BASED ON SOLIDARITY

Such shared determination on the part of all countries is a totally new aspect in the history of international relations.

Thus far, all global issues - hunger, development, major epidemics... - have been challenges that countries have tried to solve by themselves in their national frameworks, sometimes supported by cooperation funding, but without there being any real, permanent solidarity between countries. But we can note the following important change that has occurred in recent decades: the sum of national interests does not add up to the general interest of humanity as whole, as we need to confront global challenges. It will not be possible to solve the challenge of climate change without a global concerted approach of solidarity. In effect, before the accumulation of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere since the middle of the 19th...
century, climate was pretty stable, and regulated by natural cycles. The change that is now occurring is due to human activity, and the evolution in each country is not only the result of that country’s policies – no matter how efficient they might be – but of the choices made and actions of all countries. Therefore the policy of any given country to stabilise their climate cannot provide guaranteed outcomes unless other countries simultaneously also take proportionate steps. A chain of solidarity must therefore be applied right across every single plot of land and territory. Climate change constitutes the first case of compulsory solidarity in the history of humankind. This solidarity needs to be a fundamental principle, both at international level and within each country.

As the emissions’ pathways of the developed countries tend to diverge, it has become increasingly difficult to get converging pledges in a short timeframe. We therefore need to take the long view for the negotiation, and now focus on sharing these commitments and the progress that needs to made, in order to reach the IPCC’s objectives of at least halving global emissions by 2050.

Signing up for this long-term commitment should in no way lead to putting action off to a later date. Each sequence of action now needs to be broken down into phases: 2020, and 2030, so that progress can be measured against objectives, and renegotiated for the subsequent sequence if insufficient progress has been made. We therefore need to adopt a time-line that is agreed by all countries.

### 7.1.1 / Principles for contributions

Different factors have aggravated the disparities in pledges made by developed countries over the last fifteen or so years: Firstly the incoherence of the initial commitments agreed in Kyoto, followed by that of the inequality of the real efforts made by countries, and especially recently, the different commitments that made the gaps between countries even greater during the negotiations for the second period (2012-2020); this has led to an even greater need for equity and comparability in the way efforts are shared, with the need to reduce emissions growing ever greater, as shown by the IPCC. Furthermore, the 194 countries of the planet will now all be involved; this translates into increased diversity. Greater equity is therefore a condition for a successful negotiation.

It will only be possible to reach an ambitious agreement that brings all countries together and is accepted by everyone for the post-2020 period, if there is a basis of shared values.

**Solidarity** is the only way to resolve the global challenge of climate change; it must also include access to development.
**Equity** in both the way mitigation efforts are shared and also the funding that will prove indispensable for countries to commit. The respect of this principle conditions the success of an agreement for 2020. India and other countries have made explicit mention of this.

A *regular process* of revision is part of the future agreement. And provides everyone with the *guarantee* that their own efforts will not be isolated or in vain, and that all countries will be involved and respect their commitments.

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**The Convention states that the Parties act on the basis of equity**

The notion of equity has been inadequately defined and is grounded in the following principles:

- Shared but differentiated responsibilities of countries
- Developed countries to take the lead
- Full consideration of the needs of developing countries to be taken into account, particularly those that are most vulnerable to climate change
- The principle of precaution applied to risks
- Take economic situations into account, as well as the economic capacities of all
- The right of all to sustainable development

**“Shared but differentiated responsibilities” Article 4.7 of the Convention:**

“The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties”.

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**7.1.2 / Equity in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol**

The principle of equity is enshrined in article 3.1 of the Rio Convention. It was laid out in detail in the Brazilian proposal of 1997. These principles strongly inspire those of India and Brazil in particular. Equity has been at the heart of the negotiations ever since they first began; yet it has only been a reality in the concrete application of the Kyoto Protocol. In effect, the Kyoto Protocol makes the difference between categories of countries, and sets emission cuts for the thirty or so States that are listed in Annexe 1. This is a unique legal case.
This “legal distinction” that is aimed at correcting historical, social and economic inequalities, different stages of development and situations of specific vulnerability is based on the principle of equity. Even if the industrialised countries are historically the main emitters of GHG, it is the developing countries, especially the poorest that are suffering the worst impacts. It is therefore equitable that the industrialised countries be responsible for making most efforts. Also within the Annexe 1 countries, the efforts are attributed according to the national levels of emission.

A concept without a shared definition
Yet even if these principles guarantee an ambitious appreciation of equity, they are not free of contradictions, such as the right to development, and the need to cut emissions. Thus far discussions have not included criteria for sharing commitments, emissions cuts, and access to funding that are just, and acceptable to all countries.

Equity in the sharing of commitments
A new typology is currently emerging between developed countries with a growing gap between their objectives in emissions’ cuts, and developing countries whose situations differ. Two categories of countries are no longer enough. The rise to power of the emerging countries, the oil-producing countries or the middle-income countries has changed things. It involves setting differentiated objectives for developing countries, leading to technological and financial support that is more targeted to help the most vulnerable and poorest countries. It is therefore necessary to shift from a system where all countries are included in a single list, to one where different criteria are applied to the different levels of development. Furthermore, the notion of equity should be consistent, and should be included in a long-term perspective, one of converging development, which is a far broader issue than that of the climate talks. The key point of the Lima Conference will be to define the contents of the pledges made by countries and to decide on a timeline for examining pledges and contributions at the same time in order to ensure that equity is respected.

THE PROPOSAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union is proposing to develop a flexible, evolutionary approach to equity that will take changes in responsibilities and countries’ capacities into account. It rejects the idea of any strict, definitive mathematical application of sharing of responsibilities. The method of sharing should also take evolutions into account, in order to avoid a new binary situation that would soon become obsolete.
7.2 / PLANNED CONTRIBUTIONS DECIDED AT NATIONAL LEVEL (INDC)

The Warsaw Conference defined the conditions for implementing the Durban post 2020 agreement. The formulation of “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” – INDC – was agreed. The contributions agreed in Warsaw will be applicable to all countries. Obviously, the nature and the extent of these pledges will vary from country to country, given their emissions, their level of development and their means...

In like manner, it will be necessary to reach consensus on how these contributions will be decided at country level. The perspective of pledges and contributions should help bring about the requisite agreement of all countries, and be broad, flexible and evolutionary.

The pledges and contributions of countries will obviously differ, depending on whether it is a developing, emerging or developed country, both in terms of the legal nature and the degree of intensity.

The approach that has been taken by the negotiation is very pragmatic. Firstly, it is up to countries to propose their contributions. Then there will be a negotiation to check that the sum of these contributions corresponds to the need to stabilise climate.

In a nutshell therefore there is a shift from:

• A descending approach, where States set the objectives. They are then responsible for deciding on how to implement them

• To an ascending approach: stimulate all actors – economic, territorial, research – to testify on the margins for manoeuvre as well as on the economic and social benefits produced. With States making pledges and contributions to increase climate objectives and the decisive motor of growth that will finally be capable of convincing society as a whole to act.

What now needs to be done is to link these initiatives, amplify and disseminate them so that more actors can appropriate them according to their specific context. It is essential to exchange and share the actions that have been implemented, as well as their results and tangible advantages, be they economic, social or environmental.

If States do not make the effort to quantify the reductions that are possible, in the current state of crisis, they will find it very difficult to announce the figures without knowing what these figures imply.

In concrete terms, this leads to three different situations:

• Pledges made by the developed countries that cover the whole of their economy. From this point of view, it will not differ greatly from their pledges in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol.

• Pledges presented by the emerging countries that also need to achieve results for their overall economy.
• Pledges by the developing countries that are aimed at impacting their emissions’ pathways, and are based on actions for sectors or branches depending on their capacities. These least developed countries will be all the more interested in making pledges, as their contributions to the 2015 agreement will open the door to international funding and technology transfers.

Building a system of pledges and contributions that are proportionate and founded on objective principles and factors

Countries’ contributions are grounded in many different factors:
• The level of development
• Population density and demographic evolution
• The characteristics of the country’s climate
• The importance of the mining of raw materials and energy in the country’s economy, especially as export industries
• National energy characteristics
• Technological capacities
• The potential and forms of agriculture
• The importance of forests and, where applicable, their degradation
• Income disparities and specific social situations
• The impacts of and vulnerability to climate change...

The complexity of these factors obviously makes it impossible to define countries’ contributions on the basis of simple calculations.

This process could use the latest IPCC report, the final summary of which was presented in Copenhagen on October 31st 2014.

7.2.1 / Contents of the INCDs

Countries charged the Co-Chairs to prepare a note presenting the Parties’ points of view on pledges, in order to prepare a decision for the Lima conference on the information that should be included in the INCDs.

The issue of differentiating levels of efforts to be made by countries is clearly posed. China requested comparable contributions between developed countries (including financial support) and for developing countries contributions that ensure progression towards sustainable development.

Countries need to clearly explicit the actions that they intend implementing, the nature of their commitments, and the means of implementing them as well as planned follow-up.
Discussions have concretely focused on the ADPs. This explains the desire by countries to include certain issues (loss and damage, compensatory measures, market approaches and REDD+) in the implementation bodies for ADP, in order to progress on the rules of the future agreement.

**Countries’ positions**

- The Africa group is requesting information from the developed countries on support for adaptation measure, including the type and scale of the support, the mechanism for action and that the developed countries should provide information on the adaptation process decided at national level.
- China is requesting that the developed countries provide advance information on absolute, quantified and comparable objectives on emissions’ cuts, as well as their planned financial and technical pledges to developing countries. The developing countries would provide voluntary information on their contributions covering their proposed mitigation and adaptation measures, their financial and technological needs and challenges they are facing.
- The United States are favourable to a period of consultation that includes the presentation of pledges during their first quarter of 2015, the compilation of communications by the Secretariat, the presentation of their INCDs on a country-by-country basis, as well as a discussion based on these presentations, bilateral consultations outside the formal process, the scrutiny of pledges made by the Parties, and the finalisation of the process in 2015.
- Norway is requesting that countries decide what information they wish to include, and has turned down the idea of a list of predefined data.

With the Lima Conference approaching, there is still no sign of what the agreement could be, with degrees and kinds of pledges and commitments that differ from one country to the next, and that are included in a legally binding agreement.
THE DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAY

This project was aimed at examining what countries’ pathways might be in 2050, in a way that would satisfy the recognised commitment by all to stabilise climate and limit global warming to below 2°C. This process needs to be described for both energy and other greenhouse gas emitting sectors, as well as the economic conditions of implementation.

The project will associate the academic institutions of many countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This project demonstrates the genuine possibility of halving the greenhouse gas emissions at global level, on condition action is taken promptly.

7.2.2 / Support for mitigation actions in developing countries

NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) were proposed at the CoP in Bali in 2007, and have been the means of enlarging the support to developing countries compared with the only other possibility, the Clean Development Mechanism, proposed under the Kyoto Protocol agreement. This aims to start actions that fight climate change and progress towards low-carbon development that is resilient to climate change.

This tool enables the identification of strategic projects in the fight against climate change that are either being implemented or planned in the developing countries, and recognise them in the framework of the Convention as well as providing them with technical or financial support or institutional capacity building from the developed countries. Projects have been registered, and a register established, with corresponding funds from different multilateral and bilateral sources.

The implementation of such a tool has however been slowed down by several factors, particularly in the least developed countries:

- There is no clear understanding of the NAMA concept in the UNFCCC framework
- The institutional and organisational capacities required to draft the projects to fight climate change are all too often not present in the least developed countries
- The implementation of financial and technological support on the part of the developed countries has often been slow to materialise; this has

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42 In January 2013, of the Least Developed Countries, only Ethiopia and Mali submitted NAMAs to the UNFCCC Secretariat.
considerably slowed down the commitment of the developing countries.

The register was introduced in 2013. The Warsaw accords also recognised NAMAs registered by companies. In June 2014, 28 NAMAs were supported to the tune of 5 billion US$;

As of now, the concept of INCD will include NAMAs; this further extends the field covered by these actions in developing countries.

Drafting INCDs in the developing countries

Drafting INCDs could use the studies and preparatory work of programmes and projects from the various existing international frameworks: NAMAs, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, industrial projects... but in order for countries to qualify, INCDs need to make use of existing work, complete it, and most importantly quantify the impact on their emissions' pathways. This will require a high level of expertise and capacity carried out by developed countries or international institutions.

It is therefore worrying that many of the least developed countries will run into difficulties in drafting their INCDs in the requisite timeframe. And especially as the drafting of INCDs will provide the basis for being part of the 2015 agreement and gaining access to much of the funding and technology transfers. This also indicates the risk that many countries, being unable to present their INCDs could find themselves in an isolated position, and unable to be part of the 2015 agreement.

The idea of collective drafting

An original approach has been taken by 14 of the 18 Caribbean zone countries who, given their shared concerns, have chosen to collectively draft their INCDs.

This approach might be taken up by other countries to ensure their INCDs get drafted, for example by the regional West, Central or East African organisations. To do this, the countries need to determine the shared work at ministerial level during the Lima Conference, and immediately request the necessary international funds.

7.2.3 - The field covered by the INCDs

Following the Warsaw Conference, countries discussed the field of application of the INCDs; there were two different positions:

• Those countries that feel that the INCDs should essentially cover mitigation and those that proposed an overall objective for each country, with each country responsible for deciding on the activities to be carried out
• Countries that wished to include the following 5 essential elements in the contributions: mitigation, adaptation, capacity strengthening, funding and transparency of implementation.
Over a period of several months, the discussion was clarified:
• All contributions were to include mitigation actions
• All countries wishing to do so could include adaptation actions
• Developed countries will have to provide details on their financial and technological transfer support
• International funds, especially from the Green Climate Fund, will cover both mitigation and adaptation.

It will then remain necessary to determine if these elements should be considered in like manner: if some are quantified or not, if the information that has got to be provided and evaluation will be the same or different according to the nature of the action and the country in question.

In addition to this, it has been clearly stated that the level of contributions in terms of mitigation should be guided by the objective of limiting temperature rise to 2°C. It has yet to be decided if those concerning adaptation will be linked to the specific circumstances of countries and costs that need to be borne.

7.3 / FIRST COMMITMENTS PROPOSED

FOCUS ON THE SINO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 12TH NOVEMBER

This is a very important agreement, as between them, these two countries alone account for 45% of global emissions (although the per capita emissions are very unequal).

President Obama and President Xi Jinping committed to cutting their emissions in the following ways:
• The United States will implement cuts of between 26 and 28 % between 2005 and 2025;
• China has committed to cutting emissions as of 2030; this represents reducing the use of coal by over 40%, given the current growth rate of China.

This agreement, falling just one month before the Lima Conference, provides a clear signal of China’s will to facilitate the negotiations. Together with the European Union, it launches the movement of expressing commitment and making pledges. Even if these pledges will need to change in the course of the negotiations to guarantee that climate change will be contained at below 2°C.

The following efforts need to be taken into account in considering China’s efforts:
• China’s per capita emissions are now greater than those of the European Union
• It is especially important to take the fact that China now accounts for a very important part of global industrial production into consideration, and also that those countries that import China’s products do not include these emissions in their own national figures.
• China will multiply its GDP by 2.4 between 2005 and 2020; under these circumstances a 45% improvement of its carbon intensity during this period – even though it is considerable – will not suffice to cut emissions. The peak of Chinese emissions will therefore take place between 2020 and 2030.
• China makes massive use of coal. It will no doubt progressively replace it with other energies: renewables, nuclear and natural gas.

THE NEW CLIMATE-ENERGY PACKET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union has agreed to set the following objective for 2030:
• A 40% cut in domestic greenhouse gas emissions between 1990 and 2030
• A reduction in energy intensity of 207%
• Increase the proportion of renewable energy supplies by 27% in the same timeframe.

This European commitment has met with some opposition within the European Union, especially from Poland, who is very highly dependent on coal mining.

7.4 / THE TIME-LINE FOR DRAFTING INCDS

It will be decisive for the success of CoP21 to respect the time-line.
• Firstly, agree on the contents of these contributions at the Lima CoP.
• Parties that are able to do so, should submit the INCDs before the 31st March 2015, with additional time allowed for the least developed countries. This is a very short time-line if the contributions are to include the planned quantified resulting emissions’ cuts.
• Precise technical work will be done on the implementation after the Paris agreement to finalise this and will be ratified by countries before 2020.

The “draft text” mentions essential options that will constitute the heart of the discussions in Lima:
• The time-line for reviewing pledges and commitments
• Especially the ulterior process that will ensure a balanced agreement.
7.5 / THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT OF COMMITMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

There have also been differences over the question of the INCDs, as to the different sequences and steps: communication, scrutiny, modification, registration of the INCDs, scrutiny and ulterior adjustments that are possible. The Parties have not managed to reach an agreement on the steps or their order.

For the moment, only a few countries have announced their time-line: the European Union and the United States intend registering their INCDs in the course of the first quarter of 2015, as well as China. Other developing countries will need support to prepare the INCDs.

The rules of comparability of pledges

It is crucial to move forward on the rules for comparison and the monitoring of pledges and contributions before the Paris Conference is held. Thus far, countries have used different concepts, instruments of measure and verification. This has made it impossible to evaluate the efforts made by the different countries. And this in turn means that everyone has minimised their efforts, as they did not understand what others were doing. If countries are convinced that they are not alone in making pledges, and that their commitments will be transparent and monitored, they will then be less reticent in making ambitious commitments to the new agreement. Countries will then need to readjust their actions and pledges according to a timeline that is shared by them all.

7.6 / THE DRAFT TEXT PREPARING LIMA

The brief draft text that was published on the 11th of November based on the three negotiation sessions held in 2014, showed great progress. It includes both a solid political base that is the result of the agreement by all countries to ensure that climate change will be limited to less than 2°C, and the involvement of everyone as a result of this, as well as the great difficulty of sharing the progress of mitigation that needs to be carried out by the 194 countries, and the means that are required to make it happen, be it support for adaptation, capacity strengthening, access to technologies, transparency on the support or on the actions. One new aspect is that this text insists on the identification of benefits of the fight against climate change.

The “non-paper” that was published at the same time as the draft text provides a relatively advanced basis for drafting, and proposes some clear options. It explicitly mentions the way in which the objective of temperature, the level of quantified proposed pledges and contributions as well as the support provided in terms of funding and technology transfers all need to be articulated.
Nevertheless the meetings that took place in March, June and October have not managed to come up with a detailed content on what to include in CPDNs apart from stating that they all need to include mitigation, and specify the expected outcomes in terms of results. This aspect will need to be worked on in Lima.

7.7 / CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR RESPECTING COMMITMENTS

Without any guarantee of mutual respect of commitments made, trust will not be built, and countries will tend to adopt isolated positions, distrust, and limit themselves to their own immediate national interests. Countries are therefore mindful of the fact that building a framework of trust depends on creating mechanisms that guarantee transparency and comparability of efforts, that include verification, that funding and the mitigation of emissions are effectively respected.

If trust is not built, and everyone convinced that we all stand to gain by commitment, countries will not create the mechanisms that will guarantee the pledges are respected (and this includes an effective form of sanctions). Given past difficulties on financial pledges and without the guarantees that countries will keep their promises, trust cannot be achieved. It is therefore essential to build a values-based process, grounded in a shared vision of what is at stake and on a legal framework that is clear in terms of the respect of commitments.

7.8 / PARLIAMENTARY VOTE

The commitments that lie at the heart of a new agreement must be voted through parliament to legitimise the process and provide the best guarantees of respect of pledges made. This is an essential issue, as it commits not only States but even more so, society as a whole. For we need to be clear: without a ratification process by parliaments, society will not take action, and the objectives will clearly not be met. In other words, it would be a failure.
After presenting their pledges and contributions and the negotiation in Paris on the coherence with the climate objectives outlined in the IPCC report, countries will need to reach an agreement on the legal nature of the commitments made in the framework of the 2015 agreement, and whether or not they should be legally binding. This question was last posed when the Durban Platform was drafted, and has not been considered since then.

Although countries have given their agreement to take part in a joint process, they are far from having reached any consensus on the legal form of the next agreement. Some countries, especially the developing countries are requesting that all aspects of the agreement have the same legal value, in line with the Kyoto Protocol. These countries are requesting that commitments in terms of mitigation for the developed countries not be the only ones to be of a binding nature, but that the pledges of funds, technology and capacity strengthening as well as support for adaptation should also be of a legally binding nature.

Finally the question of differentiation also influences the definition and the scope of the legal commitments. One option could be for all countries to present legally binding commitments that would take national circumstances into account, especially for developing countries. All these elements are such that they will influence the legal form of the 2015 agreement. However although all the States that are Parties in the UNFCCC have agreed to launch a joint process, the legal form of the next agreement is far from consensual.

The Durban Decision was sufficiently vague to allow for many different legal options as the the form of the 2015 agreement:

“Decides the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force at the twenty-first session of the conference of Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020”.

**The legal form of the agreement:** The formulation “another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” is something new. It can encompass the idea of a legally binding treaty or a treaty with simple legal decisions formally adopted by the CoP. This therefore poses the question of the ratification or not by national parliaments and therefore of the democratic strength. Over and above the issue of the legally binding nature or not of the decisions that the instrument will include, it is the plurality of choice that will be an issue in the ratification of the agreement by national parliaments (this is not the case for the CoP decisions).

**The legal form of the commitments included in the agreement:** If the agreement is not legally binding, nor will the pledges that it contains. In the case of a legally binding agreement, the commitments need to be strong and precise enough to prove effective. However the issue of effective respect remains for the parties to the agreement, as well as of their pledges and the consequences of a failure to respect them.

**The normative nature of the contents of the pledges in the agreement:** There is no specification as to whether the commitments will be on limiting emissions or only on the organisation of the transparency of the measures. The mandate of the Durban Platform negotiation does not specify the nature of the pledges as such. On the scope of the pledges, the fact that there may be differentiation between parties could lead to developing binding commitments for only some Parties: the fact that the agreement applies to all Parties does not imply a uniform, symmetrical application.

**The Procedures and institutions to guarantee the respect of commitments made:** Apart from one reference to the “transparency of the measures”, nothing has been decided on the need for Parties to report on the implementation of their actions.

**This leaves the question of what should be registered as part of the agreement and the existing institutions or not:** Should they be considered legally in the new agreement, or in the decisions taken by the CoP?

The developing countries are, for the most part, in favour of including all elements and the existing institutions – such as the Adaptation Committee, the GCF, the LEG, the CET, the CTCN and the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage – in the new agreement.

It was suggested that the technical elements of the implementation of the agreement should be included in the CoP decisions, similar to Marrakesh.
A third proposal is to group all the elements of the agreement, and then develop certain points in the CoP decisions. Japan has pleaded for testing these elements according to sustainability criteria: those that do not require regular revision/modification could be included in the binding agreement. Those that are not sustainable and require regular updating could be included in decisions. The United States has proposed three elements for the Paris agreement: an agreement that includes basic aspects; the CoP decisions that flesh out details, and ulterior decisions on the implementation of the agreement.

Long-term solidarity between territories and all social classes implies radical change to the concept of national sovereignty and State obligations. Fair access to Commons such as climate, biodiversity and mineral resources for example, is the condition for peace in the world; it implies the need to establish regulatory systems that reach beyond the limits of States. And especially that of creating a framework that obliges countries to respect their commitments.
Conclusion: the dawn of a new vision of the world

These observations lead us to a new vision of the world. The nature of these future evolutions remains uncertain. It is difficult to commit to a road as yet not clearly defined. But the current model is no longer tenable or sustainable. We need to take advantage of the upheavals to commit to a new model of civilisation that can provide success where others have failed: offer perspectives of successful lives to the greatest possible number of people, irrespective of where they are born on our planet, their environment or country. This is the condition for peace. We should all be able to imagine a future that is desirable, respectful of our fellow humans, and the ecosystems that surround us, in a world that we have a unique opportunity to create. It is a huge challenge. It is more than clear that there is no other habitable planet anywhere near at hand! And the perspectives it offers can only be an improvement on what humankind is currently facing should we fail to take action.

What is at stake for the years to come is to guarantee the equity of access for all peoples to a development path that we still need to invent; one that is capable of reconciling the respect of all peoples’ needs and those of future generations, as well as protecting our planet and its resources. It is essential that we build trust between countries and within our societies, if we are to start bringing about the major changes that need to be made.

We therefore need to show that other ways are possible and indeed favourable to all. And thereby to achieve what has thus far not been part of the model of previous centuries: enable all inhabitants of our planet to live and meet their fundamental needs through improved sharing and the optimal use of resources. This can only be done if all actors are encouraged to take action, at all levels in the converging modes of development.