24th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

2 to 14 December 2018
Katowice, Poland
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A few words from the Director of the IFDD

The French-speaking States and Governments, stakeholders in the Paris Agreement, are making every effort to convert their nationally determined contributions into national measures and programmes to combat climate change. The implementation of the Paris Agreement is very topical and the French-speaking actors are also busy in executing mitigation and adaptation initiatives based on national priorities and their particular situation.

The recent IPCC report on 18 October 2018 revealed that compliance with the commitments made under the Paris Agreement would put us on the path of a global warming temperature of 3°C at the end of the century. This trend that is so far from the goals of the Paris Agreement has disastrous consequences for mankind and its environment.

Emissions need to be reduced immediately and drastically before 2030, as suggested by the IPCC experts. In this respect, the various Parties to the Paris Agreement are invited to raise the ambition of their national contributions in order to target a maximum rise in temperature to 1.5°C, which would reduce the risks and effects of climate change significantly.

Since the Paris Agreement entered into force in November 2016, it has become urgent for Parties to adopt the guidelines for its implementation (Paris Agreement Rules), especially relating to mitigation, communications on adaptation, transparency framework of measures and support and greenhouse gas inventories, in biennial and national reports. But, it is crucial that emission-reducing, adaptation and climate-resilience enhancing actions are increased, to avoid chaos for present and future generations.

The 24th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 24), scheduled for 2-14 December in Katowice, Poland, is an opportunity for the Parties to adopt measures to realign climate action in the countries, for full implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The high-level segment, the ministerial segment and the Talanoa Dialogue, scheduled on the fringes of the negotiating sessions, are a chance for policymakers and various climate actors to harmonise the different positions, towards the adoption of a regulation for the Paris Agreement in Katowice and the raising of the emission reduction ambition.

The French-speaking policymakers and delegates attending COP 24 will bring their contributions to this international negotiating process that is increasingly complex, in a context marked by an urgent need for action.
As in previous years, the *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF-International Organisation of the Francophonie), through its subsidiary body, the *Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable* (IFDD - Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development) will make its presence felt alongside French-speaking delegates. The Institute has arranged in particular a preparatory workshop for negotiators on 1 December 2018 and a ministerial consultation on 10 December 2018 in Katowice. In addition, a French-speaking pavilion (no. 23) has been set up on the COP 24 site so that member States and Governments can hold parallel events on French-speaking climate action and discuss the challenges facing the climate issues. It is the pavilion for all French-speakers!

Readers, the Institute makes this Guide to the Negotiations available to provide you with relevant information on the state of negotiations and the issues of COP 24, some of which are mentioned above. Its production has been made possible through the mobilisation of the French-speaking expertise and of our partners, especially ENERGIES 2050, who we thank most warmly.

The Institute is also producing an online application for the Guide to the Negotiations, which includes several functionalities and is available on Android and iOS.

Pleasant reading and my best wishes for successful negotiations in Katowice!

Jean-Pierre Ndoutoum
Editorial

Composition and methodological elements

The Guide to the Negotiations and the Summary for policymakers is enhanced year on year and goes beyond the climate change negotiating structure. This is strengthened under the current international climate action which, following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, is aiming categorically to set up a decompartmentalised multi-actor and multi-sector momentum. Experts from the academic world, public or private figures and representatives of civil society organisations or international institutions – they are all increasingly using the dynamic and analytical content of issues presented in the Guide and the Summary as an independent and updated source of information about the negotiations.

Once again this year, IFDD has sought to break new ground by encouraging access to information to readers with varying degrees of knowledge about the negotiation process – whether they have in-depth knowledge or knowledge of a specific topic or are first-time attendees. The aim is for each individual to browse the Guide and access the information he needs based on his priorities and the time he can give to it. Summary boxes support the descriptions and detailed analyses of the various questions addressed in the negotiations wherever possible. The notion addressed can thus be grasped immediately and the negotiation issues understood.

The 2018 edition of the Guide is once more benefiting from input from a group of authors comprising eminent members from different French-speaking countries who have been involved in the climate negotiations for many years. Their involvement in the negotiating chamber as well as in implementing policies and measures resulting from climate agreements places this collective work in a concrete and dynamic vision. A Review Committee comprising personalities selected also for their expertise has been set up to strive for the highest possible quality. We are hopeful that the various contributions will make the analyses even more relevant and useful for readers. We ask them to share their assessment and suggestions with us by filling in the form at the end of the guide.

Climate change is a universal issue where the effects are globally felt more and more by an increasing proportion of the world population. More than ever there is still an urgent need for action and the negotiations, even if they are still the remit of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), must not remain within the restricted enclave of specialists. This Guide to the Negotiations and its accompanying Summary for Policymakers augment the firm commitment to give every reader the keys to understand and act.

This Guide to the Negotiations and its accompanying Summary for Policymakers were updated on 15 October 2018. Updating boxes along with modifications in the Guide’s narrative have been added subsequently to take into account the
various documents published after this date. These include the joint concept note from the presiding officers of the APA, SBI and SBSTA and the associated addenda relating to the different items of the Paris Agreement work programme.

Presentation of the contents of the Guide

Part I puts into perspective the main issues of the current negotiations, with special attention paid to the elements making up the Paris Agreement Implementation Guidelines. This includes the cross-cutting issues relating to the permanent subsidiary bodies as well as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) and more especially a certain number of themed issues such as questions on the nationally determined contributions (NDC), mechanisms of the Paris Agreement, financing, adaptation, technology, capacity-building and transparency. Other central issues are also addressed to offer an up-to-date view to the readers. This includes the Talanoa Dialogue that will reach its conclusion in Katowice. Other recent developments cover, for example, agriculture – or gender-related issues and also the dynamics to encourage the involvement of non-Party stakeholders, all of which should boost the collective ambition and support the implementation of the Paris Agreement at all levels.

Part II sets out the progress made in negotiations between COP23 and COP24 (Section II.A), focusing on the sessions of the permanent subsidiary bodies (Section II.A.1) and the APA (Section II.A.2). This part also deciphers succinctly the Paris Agreement and the operational modalities emerging from Decision 1/CP.21 (Section II.B).

Part II provides a general conceptual framework for all elements discussed in this document, so that the reader can understand the global architecture of the negotiations. In this respect, a brief history of international climate negotiations is presented (Section III.A) since the adoption of the UNFCCC up to the Katowice Conference. The main cycles that led to the adoption of the Paris Agreement are emphasised especially, along with the conferences held since then. A description of the structure of the Convention and of its main bodies and ad hoc groups (Section III.B) rounds out this historical framework. Lastly, a presentation of the main negotiating groups and their positions (Section III.C) introduces the stakeholders in the negotiations and their views on the talks.

The authors have attempted to offer a global and analytical presentation of the issues for each part. The main outlook of COP24 within each section is presented regarding the execution and operationalisation of major issues. Readers are referred to other sections of the Guide and to the source documents throughout the text so that they can broaden their understanding of a topic if they so wish.

Terminology sheets relating to the French and equivalent English vocabulary and the abbreviations and acronyms commonly used during the negotiations are annexed. Note that only the official nomenclatures are quoted when reference is made to the documents from the negotiations. These nomenclatures, designed to
make reading easier, can also be used to find the documents referred to on the UNFCCC website very easily\textsuperscript{1}. A table has been added in an annex to this Guide so that each individual can understand this naming convention\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} https://unfccc.int/documents.
\textsuperscript{2} See A.2. : Nomenclature for documents from the negotiations.
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Part I.
Issues and positions

The first two sections of this Guide provide a general overview of the organisation of the current negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, hereinafter referred to as “Convention”), its permanent subsidiary bodies (Section I.1), as well as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (Section I.2). To make it easier to read the guide, as well as to observe and participate in the negotiations on implementing the Paris Agreement, a summary table can be found at the end of this first sub-section. This sets out the negotiating issues with respect to the general topic and the mandated bodies, so as to address them. This Guide will cover most of these themes in more detail. This table thus also cross-references the matching sections.

I.1. Issues related to the permanent subsidiary bodies

The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention. It also serves as the meeting for the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and to the Paris Agreement (CMA). Under the Convention, two permanent subsidiary bodies have been established: the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), which also serve the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The permanent subsidiary bodies usually meet twice a year during ordinary sessions, once with the COP, and another time at the headquarters of the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn.3

3. For further information on the structure of the Convention, the role and mandate of its main bodies and ad hoc groups, see Section III.B.
The “Bureau” leads the work of the COP, CMP and CMA. The Bureau is composed of eleven delegate members who are elected by the five regional groups from the United Nations system and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (see also Section III.C). The Bureau also includes the COP President, six Vice Presidents, the presiding officers of the SBI and SBSTA, as well as a rapporteur. The Convention Secretariat provides organisational support and technical expertise to the negotiations and institutions of the Convention without being integrated into a programme\(^5\) (for further information on the role and mandate of the main bodies and ad hoc working groups that have been set up, see Section III.B).

\(^4\) © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 Figures updated as at 15 October 2018.

\(^5\) https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/the-big-picture/what-are-bodies.
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)

The SBI agenda is structured around the main pillars of the implementation of the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement: transparency, mitigation, adaptation, technology, capacity-building and finance. The organisation of intergovernmental meetings and other administrative, financial and institutional issues are negotiated also under the SBI. The SBI is increasingly involved in coordinating the work of bodies and specialised entities in the topics of its mandate, such as the Adaptation Committee, the Standing Committee on Finance and the Technology Mechanism. The agenda for its 49th session, held jointly with COP24, is available in the annex to this Guide (A.6).

Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)

The SBSTA provides information and advice on the scientific and technological issues related to the Convention, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. The following areas in particular are negotiated under this body: impacts, vulnerability and adaptation of climate change, technology transfer and development, preparation and communication of GHG inventories, scientific observation and research and methodological issues. The SBSTA is also a body that liaises with other organisations providing climate expertise, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The agenda for its 49th session, held jointly with COP24, is available in the annex to this Guide (A.6).

Note also that the SBI and SBSTA handle certain issues together, in particular: the vulnerability of developing countries to climate change, response measures, technology mechanism, Adaptation Committee, REDD+ process and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.

I.2. Issues relating to the Ad Hoc Working Groups (AWG) and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)


Creation and mandate

By adopting the Paris Agreement, the Conference of the Parties (COP) also decided to run a major programme of work accompanying it, consolidated via Decision 1/CP.21. This decision set up the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement

Under the provisions included in Decision 1/CP.21 and making up the work programme of the Paris Agreement.

This process is the most important round of climate change negotiations in the various bodies that have been mandated to make the Paris Agreement operational. As such, it determines the future of the fight against the effects and consequences of climate change, especially for the most vulnerable countries, including the Least Developed Countries (LDC) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

With the Paris Agreement, for the first time, the Parties agreed on the goal to keep collectively the rise in global temperature “well below” 2°C by 2100, and to strive for 1.5°C, thus a common mitigation goal, as well as an overall adaptation goal yet to be determined. Furthermore, the Parties have agreed to collaborate and work together to make available support, transfers and various other forms of cooperation, be they financial, technical, technological or capacity-building. This cooperation aims to provide a more effective response to climate change, via mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, deforestation, land degradation, etc. in a transparent, changing and sustainable framework (a more in-depth description of the Paris Agreement is available in Section II.B).

**Mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)**

- Prepare the entry into force of the Paris Agreement (completed on 4 November 2016);
- Prepare and convene the first Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA); CMA 1 commenced in Marrakech in November 2016 and is continuing in annual sessions until its tasks are completed (at the end of 2018 at the latest, at the same time as COP24);
- Prepare draft decisions that the CMA needs to adopt at the end of its first session (CMA 1.3 which meets in Katowice in December 2018 is meant to finalise this work).

The APA is mainly guided by the work programme elements mandated by Decision 1/CP.21. It must develop further the provisions of the Paris Agreement and prepare the implementation of its components, especially regarding:

- The goal;
- Mitigation;
- Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC);
- Adaptation;
- Loss and damage;
- Financing;

8. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 7.
• Technologies;
• Capacity-building;
• Transparency;
• Global stocktake;
• etc.

This work was conducted and should be completed via the negotiating sessions of the APA, as well as of the SBI and SBSTA. Several bodies set up under the Convention have also been mandated to contribute to the implementation of the work programme to prepare for the implementation and operationalisation of the Paris Agreement. These bodies are the Adaptation Committee, Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Technology Executive Committee (TEC), Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) and Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage.

**Work method**

To navigate the complex negotiations and reach the planned decisions within a tight timeframe, the APA has adopted a work method based on two pillars: close coordination among the various negotiating groups as well as with subsidiary bodies and drawing up negotiating tools to make it easier to read very long informal notes.

When the working group was established, a work mode had to be found that fulfilled the needs of a significant number of Parties for planning the negotiations within a minimum number of formal and informal groups. In particular, this related to accommodating delegations in small groups and preventing the discussion of similar or related subjects (such as financing, technology and transparency) at the same time in different groups, as the negotiators, who usually specialise in a topic, cannot attend more than one meeting at a time.

The Parties accepted the proposal of the APA joint presiding officers to continue their work in a single contact group that has to consider the six substantial agenda items (see Annex A.6), to address fundamental questions, review progress accomplished, determine the way forward and review the draft conclusions.

In the fifth part of the first APA session (APA 1.5, April-May 2018) in Bonn, the presidents of the group provided a preliminary concept note to facilitate the continuation of the negotiations. It was written in cooperation with the SBI and SBSTA presidents. This was repeated prior to the additional negotiating session in Bangkok (September 2018). These concept notes include a brief presentation of the status of the negotiations and also a few proposals on how to achieve the objective of the meetings: produce a negotiating text for COP24. At the end of the Bangkok session, the APA co-presidents received the mandate to draw up a joint concept note with the SBI and SBSTA presiding officers on progress on issues related to the
work programme of the Paris Agreement. The presidents of the three bodies also obtained the mandate to develop text proposals and identify options for progress. This joint concept note, with the text proposals based on the annexed informal notes, was published on 15 October 2018.\(^9\)

Furthermore, a platform providing an overview of the updated status of the negotiations for the various articles of the Paris Agreement and the provisions of Decision 1/CP.21 was established.\(^10\) During the Bangkok session, a compilation of all of the informal texts and draft decisions was also published several times on this platform. The objective was to offer a general overview of the progress of the texts that will be part of the package of decisions to operationalise the Paris Agreement. The end of the Bangkok session saw the publication of a document that compiles the texts negotiated under the APA, but also under the SBI and SBSTA.\(^11\) This document has 307 pages, which shows that the text needs to be reduced and streamlined to obtain a solid negotiating text that shows clear options for the text, especially as some sections are not very fleshed out as yet.

The first version of the aforementioned tools offers a structure for following the negotiations, without structuring the informal note, and thus does not predefine any result. The Parties welcomed these tools during the intersession negotiation from in April-May 2018. This work method was therefore pursued and the tools were thus updated prior to the additional Bangkok session.

During the April-May and September 2018 interim sessions, the APA joint presiding officers also convened meetings of heads of delegation to resolve a few key points and move the negotiations forward. To this end, a few joint negotiation sessions were held. In their joint concept note, the presiding officers highlight their wish to continue to apply these organisational approaches of joint consultation or assessment plenary meetings, as well as bilateral meetings with different groups of Parties, including at heads of delegation level.\(^12\)

### I.2.2. Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)

With the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016, a few days before COP22 (Marrakech, 6-17 November 2016), the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1) was held at the same time as COP22. Given the rapid and early entry into force of the Paris Agreement, it was decided that CMA 1 would be extended until December 2018, with three sub-sessions in 2016, 2017 and 2018, at the same time as the COP sessions, to improve the chances of reaching a conclusion on the issues which should be decided on during CMA 1. At the same time as COP23

\(^9\) APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
\(^10\) Available [online] https://unfccc.int/node/28798/.
\(^11\) UNFCCC, 2018b
\(^12\) APA, SBSTA, SBI, 2018b.
(November 2017), the second part of the first session of the CMA (CMA 1.2) focused on reviewing progress on the implementation of the work programme established by virtue of the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{13}.

CMA 1.3 in Katowice is thus extremely important, as it will mark the culmination of the “transition” COP in Marrakech and Bonn, by forming the first decision-making COP for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The objective is to adopt a package of decisions that constitute the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement, to enable the implementation of the key aspects of the Agreement, especially: the NDC, transparency, cooperation mechanisms, climate finance, mechanisms for capacity-building and technology transfer and adaptation (see Figure 2 below). Moreover, the political phase of the facilitative dialogue, which was renamed the Talanoa Dialogue after the Fijian COP23, is taking place at the same time as CMA 1.3, with a meeting of high-level political representatives.

\textsuperscript{13} Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 10
Breakdown of the negotiation issues between the bodies

To adopt the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement, the negotiations during COP24 will focus on the aforementioned points. Beyond the APA, the agendas of the subsidiary bodies also deal with issues directly or indirectly relating to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement. The next figure summarises the breakdown of themes between these various negotiating bodies.
To facilitate the participation in the negotiations on various issues relating to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement, the next table summarises the items on the agenda of the various bodies, grouped together based on their related themes. 

15. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
16. This table was drawn up based on the previous edition of this Guide (OIF/IFDD, 2017), Earth Negotiations Bulletins of the sessions since COP 23 (IISD, 2017a, IISD, 2018b and IISD, 2018c), on Decision 1/CP.21, as well as the decisions and informal notes published at the time this Guide was prepared.
### Summary table of the negotiation issues at Katowice

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<td>Cooperation mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guidance on cooperative approaches</td>
<td>SBSTA 11(a)</td>
<td>Art. 6.2</td>
<td>The cooperative approaches offer countries the possibility of cooperating voluntarily in implementing mitigation activities via internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMO) whilst promoting sustainable development and environmental integrity. The ITMO transaction based on mitigation activities will take place in an accounting system yet to be defined, which must ensure compliance with the provisions of the transparency framework (Art. 13). The main issue to negotiate is the degree of international monitoring of the approaches and the scope of the guidance.</td>
<td>I.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism referred to in Article 6.4</td>
<td>SBSTA 11(b)</td>
<td>Art. 6.4</td>
<td>The mechanism of Article 6.4 is meant to contribute to mitigation efforts and support sustainable development, resulting in certified emission reductions under the supervision of the UNFCCC. The emission reductions must be real, measurable and long-term. Decision I/CP.21 also recommends compliance with the principle of additionality in developing the rules, modalities and procedures of the mechanism and to build on the experience acquired with the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms. The mechanism aims to mitigate the emissions globally whilst avoiding double counting, as most Parties now make mitigation contributions under their NDC.</td>
<td>Section I.3</td>
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17. Indicative selections based on the issues addressed in the Guide and that match the agenda items of the Katowice sessions (December 2018). For further information: see the detailed agendas in the Annex (A6).
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<tr>
<th><strong>Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches</strong></th>
<th>SBSTA 11(c)</th>
<th>Arts. 6.8 and 6.9</th>
<th>Non-market approaches do not allow the transfer of mitigation outcomes. Due to the lack of a common understanding of non-market approaches, a general framework and work programme are developed. Some Parties consider that the framework should facilitate the identification of synergistic approaches and guarantee that the Parties assess them. Other Parties consider that the framework should serve capacity-building. The framework could also be used to map and record the needs in terms of financing and capacity-building of Parties to adapt them to existing instruments.</th>
<th>Section I.3</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Review of the modalities and procedures of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)</strong></td>
<td>SBSTA 8(a)</td>
<td>Art. 6 (indirect)</td>
<td>The CDM reform is important given the role of the CDM in providing information for Article 6. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the role of designated national authorities (DNA) is evolving. At COP23, proposals on transparency and environmental integrity, as well as on strengthening the CDM were put forward, but were not retained in the final decision.</td>
<td>Section I.3</td>
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**Issues relating to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)**

| **New guidelines concerning the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21** | APA 3 | Art. 4 | This negotiation theme concerns the development of guidelines on formulating NDC. The main issues to be decided concern the structure of the guidelines, the scope of the NDC, as well as a potential differentiation of characteristics to be respected, based on the level of development of countries. Another point of debate is whether these issues about the nature of NDC should be discussed under this agenda item of APA, or elsewhere in the negotiations. | Sections I.5 and I.11 |
| **NDC characteristics** | APA 3(a) | Art. 4.2 | This negotiation issue involves striking a balance between the NDC of the Parties, based on a self-determined approach via the bottom-up dynamic of the Paris Agreement, whilst finding the means to compare contributions, or to aggregate the information they contain, to assess better the implementation of the individual and global objectives. | Sections I.5 and I.11 |
## Issues and positions

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<td>Information meant to facilitate the clarity, transparency and understanding of the NDC</td>
<td>APA 3(b)</td>
<td>Art. 4.8</td>
<td>This issue is closely linked to the transparency framework and cooperation mechanisms. Two main issues are to be highlighted in this framework: the financial aspect, as more information to communicate means a more costly process for States, and at the same time, the effect of strengthened transparency which can also increase the pressure on States and encourage them to make more ambitious commitments at the next round of communication/review of the NDC.</td>
<td>Sections I.5 and I.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC accounting, referred to in paragraph 31</td>
<td>APA 3(c)</td>
<td>Art. 4.13</td>
<td>The Paris Agreement asks that Parties account for their NDC to promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and coherence. NDC accounting is also a key issue for market cooperation approaches, to avoid the double counting of emissions and to preserve the integrity of the market. The accounting facilitates the comparability and the review of progress made, just as it requires national contributions to be harmonised to a certain extent.</td>
<td>Sections I.5 and I.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common timetable for the NDC</td>
<td>SBI 5</td>
<td>Art. 4.10</td>
<td>These discussions mainly concern the timetable and frequency of NDC communication. For the moment, the intention is for the Parties with an NDC whose implementation timetable is spread over five years to communicate a new contribution in 2020 and that the Parties whose NDC is based on a ten-year timetable update their contributions in 2020. It is important to harmonise the NDC timetables to facilitate the accounting of NDC and monitor the achievement of the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement (Art. 2).</td>
<td>Sections I.5 and I.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modalities and procedures for the public NDC registry</td>
<td>SBI 6</td>
<td>Art. 4.12</td>
<td>Under this negotiation theme, the modalities for researching and compiling information are discussed. For the moment, the Convention Secretariat has drawn up an interim NDC registry. There is also question of merging the registries on adaptation and mitigation communications.</td>
<td>Sections I.5 and I.11</td>
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<td>Ambition and assessment of commitments</td>
<td>Section</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Talanoa Dialogue</strong>&lt;br&gt;COP presidency&lt;br&gt;Arts. 4.1 and 4.8</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.21 provides for a facilitative dialogue in 2018 that aims to assess the efforts deployed by the Parties to reach the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement. This facilitative dialogue was renamed the “Talanoa Dialogue” and was launched by the Fiji presidency at COP23. This dialogue is taking place all throughout 2018, with a preparatory and a political phase. It aims to promote climate ambition and action, whilst formulating and updating the NDC. The experiences from the Talanoa Dialogue will also be important for planning the first Global Stocktake in 2023.</td>
<td>I.12</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Global stocktake</strong>&lt;br&gt;APA 6&lt;br&gt;Art. 14</td>
<td>Under the Paris Agreement, the Parties will assess their commitments and progress every five years to increase the ambition of the NDC and also the support provided for implementation and international cooperation to respond to the effects of climate change. The Global Stocktake must thus incorporate the issues of mitigation, adaptation and implementation and support resources in a comprehensive and balanced manner. The first Global Stocktake is planned for 2023 and will be held every five years thereafter. How to manage the process will be decided during the negotiations. Within this framework, it must be decided which information from which Parties and organisations will be collected to inform the Global Stocktake. Likewise, the modalities of the process, such as the duration, form and participation must be developed.</td>
<td>Sections I.6 and II.B</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Modalities and procedures to ensure the effective operation of the committee responsible for the Mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement</strong>&lt;br&gt;APA 7&lt;br&gt;Art. 15.2</td>
<td>The Paris Agreement set up a bottom-up regime based on the voluntary contributions of countries (especially via the NDC). A Mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance with the provisions of the Agreement was set up with a facilitating committee of experts that works in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner. The negotiations are henceforth focused on the work of this committee, prescriptive and voluntary elements, the possibilities of referring a case to the committee and the actions and results of the work of this committee.</td>
<td>Sections I.6 and II.B</td>
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<td>Reporting and review concerning the Annex I Parties</td>
<td>SBI 3</td>
<td>(indirect)</td>
<td>This point concerns the status of the submission and review of the seventh national communications and the third biennial reports of the Annex I Parties of the Convention.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting and review concerning non-Annex I Parties</td>
<td>SBI 4</td>
<td>(indirect)</td>
<td>This point concerns the reporting of non-Annex I Parties, and more specifically: a) the information used in national communications; b) the terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from non-Annex I Parties; c) the provision of financial and technical support; d) reports on the technical analysis of updated biennial reports of non-Annex I countries and e) the review of the modalities and guidance for international consultation and analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Continuation of efforts toward the 1.5°C</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Research and systematic observation</td>
<td>SBSTA 6</td>
<td>Art. 2; Art. 4.7; Art. 7.7c, Art. 10.5; Art. 14</td>
<td>The promotion of systemic observation and research is rooted in the Convention. The Paris Agreement calls for an urgent and effective response to the effects of climate change, based on the best available scientific knowledge. Under this agenda item, the discussion will include the assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (e.g., the recent publication of the special report on the 1.5°C target), as well as the annual research dialogue. The tenth research dialogue was held in May 2018 to discuss the science-policy interface in support of action under the Paris Agreement.</td>
<td>See Section I.4 concerning the last IPCC report on the 1.5°C</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Technology development and transfer</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Technology mechanism</td>
<td>SBI 14</td>
<td>Art. 10.3</td>
<td>The technology mechanism was drawn up in 2010 to accelerate and improve the development and transfer of climate technologies. Under this mechanism, two bodies work together: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The latter will also directly serve the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This point concerns the review of the mechanism.</td>
<td>Section 1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Scope and modalities of the periodic review of the technology mechanism</strong></td>
<td>SBSTA 14(a)</td>
<td>Art. 10.3</td>
<td>The Parties decided that the technology mechanism will be strengthened and that the TEC and CTCN will support the implementation of the Paris Agreement. In this context, there is a periodic assessment of the performance of the mechanism to adopt conclusions at COP24 to determine how the mechanism can serve the implementation of the Paris Agreement.</td>
<td>Section 1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of the implementation of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)</strong></td>
<td>SBSTA 14(b)</td>
<td>Art. 10.3</td>
<td>External consultants evaluated the CTCN, and recommendations were formulated to improve its effectiveness to adopt a decision at COP24.</td>
<td>Section 1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Technology Framework</strong></td>
<td>SBSTA 5(a)</td>
<td>Art. 10.4</td>
<td>The Paris Agreement established a Technology Framework that will guide the technology mechanism by promoting and facilitating enhanced action in technology development and transfer. The main stake is underlying and does not appear in the informal texts: the issue of intellectual property rights, which is dividing developed and developing countries, and which is also blocking the commitment of the private sector in transferring technologies.</td>
<td>Section 1.7</td>
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### Capacity-building

| **Affairs concerning capacity-building under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol** | SBI 16 (indirect) | Art. 11 | The capacity-building frameworks, which were first created under the Convention and then transferred to serve the Kyoto Protocol, aim to fulfil the needs, conditions and priorities of countries with transition and developing economies. The draft decision prepared for COP24 on this point invites the PCCB and the Durban Forum to align their subjects. | Section 1.8 |
| **Durban Forum** | SBI (indirect) | Art. 11 | The Durban Forum is an annual event held under the SBSTA that brings together various stakeholders to exchange experiences, best practices and lessons learned in capacity-building in developing countries and for mitigation of and adaptation to the effects of climate change. | Section 1.8 |
**Issues and positions**

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<td>Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB)</td>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Art. 11 (indirect)</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.21 established the PCCB to respond to current and emerging needs in implementing capacity-building in developing countries to improve capacity-building efforts, including by enhancing the coherence and coordination of the different activities. To this end, the PCCB is implementing a work programme between 2016 and 2020.</td>
<td>Section I.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)</td>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Art.13 (indirect)</td>
<td>Decision I/CP.21 created the CBIT to build institutional and technical capacity to respond to the requests for transparency operationalised under Art. 13 of the Paris Agreement in the pre – and post-2020 periods.</td>
<td>Section I.11</td>
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<td><strong>Adaptation</strong></td>
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<td>Guidance for adaptation communication, especially integrated in the NDC</td>
<td>APA 4</td>
<td>Art.7.10-11</td>
<td>Article 7.10 of the Paris Agreement provides that the Parties submit adaptation communications to provide information on the priorities, plans and actions, their implementation, as well as support needs. In the negotiations, a quantitative and qualitative definition of the adaptation goals is sought, incorporating the fact that the increased role of adaptation in the implementation of the Paris Agreement can mobilise additional resources. Specifically, this concerns deciding whether adaptation communication will be part of the NDC or not. There is also the issue of financial resources for preparing the communication. On this point, developing countries insist that the burden of reporting be lightened, whilst developed countries highlight the voluntary character of this communication.</td>
<td>Section I.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modalities and procedures for the public registry on adaptation communications</td>
<td>SBI 7</td>
<td>Art.7.12</td>
<td>On this point, the question involves knowing whether this registry could be merged with the NDC public registry, or if specific regulations need to be adopted.</td>
<td>Section I.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact of the implementation of the response measures</td>
<td>SBSTA 9 and SBI 17</td>
<td>Art. 4.15</td>
<td>Article 4.15 of the Paris Agreement asks that the Agreement be implemented incorporating the needs of the Parties, especially the economies that are the most affected by the impacts of the response measures. This is a response to fears that the mitigation policies of developed countries could have negative effects on developing countries which are heavily dependent on fossil fuel exports. A forum on the implementation of response measures was established at the Cancún COP in 2010 with a work programme. The question now is to know what role the forum and its work programme will play to serve the implementation of the Paris Agreement.</td>
<td>Sections I.10 and I.5</td>
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<td>Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change</td>
<td>SBSTA Transversal issue</td>
<td>The Nairobi Work Programme is a knowledge hub in partnership with 350 organisations, established in 2005. This work programme is addressed to developing countries in particular, including LDC and SIDS. The programme aims to enhance cooperation and capacities regarding the impact of climate change, vulnerability and the adaptation responses to use.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report of the Adaptation Committee</td>
<td>SBSTA 3, SBI 11 Art. 7.3, 7.14</td>
<td>The Adaptation Committee is part of the Cancún Adaptation Framework that aims to enhance the implementation of adaptation measures under the Convention in a more coherent manner. Via Decision 1/CP.21, the Committee was mandated to develop the modalities for evaluating the adaptation efforts of developing countries, to review the adaptation efforts under the Convention, and develop methodologies to evaluate the adaptation needs of developing countries. Likewise, the Adaptation Committee leads the technical examination process on adaptation (TEP-A).</td>
<td>Section I.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issues concerning the least developed countries (LDC)</td>
<td>SBI 12 Transversal issue</td>
<td>The Least Developed Countries Experts Group (LEG) was established in 2001. Its current mandate is to provide technical guidance and support to LDC in formulating and implementing national adaptation programmes (NAP) and national adaptation programmes of action (NAPA). The LEG also provides support to LDC to enhance their access to the GCF. This point is jointly approached with the report of the Adaptation Committee.</td>
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<td>National adaptation plans (NAP)</td>
<td>SBI 13</td>
<td>Art.7.9(b)</td>
<td>COP22 saw a reaffirmation of the importance of NAP and other adaptation planning measures under the Paris Agreement, particularly for developing countries. The ties with the NDC, adaptation communications, Global Stocktake, and transparency framework have not been clarified yet. Developing countries would like to facilitate the modalities for accessing the programme to prepare the GCF for the NAP, whilst several developed countries do not want to discuss the modalities for accessing the GCF under this agenda item.</td>
<td>Section 1.10</td>
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### Financing

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<td>Modalities for the accounting of public financial resources</td>
<td>SBSTA 12</td>
<td>Art. 9.7</td>
<td>This item involves determining how developed country Parties report on their financial support. The main issue is to determine what type of funding is to be counted as a new and additional contribution from the developed countries. The developed countries would like to continue to produce climate financing reports with different methodologies in different countries, whilst developing countries would like an approach involving detailed regulations that use the concept of “grant equivalence” for loans and the inclusion of loss and damage. The use of this accounting approach can lead to a significant reduction in the sums to report. According to an Oxfam study, if solely the grant equivalents provided are counted, the climate funding provided by developed countries is between 16 and 21 billion euros for the 2015-2016 period. The developed countries reported financial support of 48 billion euros during the same period. These issues are thus extremely conflictual and will be a key question in Katowice.</td>
<td>Section 1.9</td>
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18. See the discussions in Oxfam, 2018.
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<th>Issues related to climate funding: identification of the information to provide</th>
<th>SBI 15</th>
<th>Art. 9.5</th>
<th>Under this point, the forward-looking information on the availability of financial resources are to be determined on what the developed country Parties will be required to communicate biennially. The developed countries would like to avoid forward-looking reporting, whilst developing countries would like long-term reporting.</th>
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<td>Adaptation Fund</td>
<td>APA 8(a)</td>
<td>Art. 9 (indirect)</td>
<td>At COP22, the Parties decided that the Adaptation Fund would serve the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This thus involves determining the institutional arrangements and modalities, as well as the relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the Agreement on this point. The key questions that are currently being negotiated are the composition of the Council, the levy under the mechanisms of Art. 6, and the transition period so that the Fund effectively serves the Agreement.</td>
<td>Section I.9</td>
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</table>
| Various issues besides the Adaptation Fund | APA 8(b) | Miscellaneous | Under this item, the subjects considered as "missing" (other miscellaneous subjects) are addressed in the negotiations by a few Parties. However, the discussions are significantly influenced by the discussions around climate funding. The following items are currently being addressed for inclusion in the negotiations:  
- The implementation of a new quantified target of collective funding  
- The introductory guidance of the CMA for the operations bodies of the financial mechanism  
- The introductory guidance of the CMA for the Fund for the least developed countries and for the Special Climate Change Fund  
- The CMA guidance for adjusting existing NDC  
- The modalities for biennial communication on the provision of public financial resources to developing countries (continuation of the discussion on Art. 9.5) | Section I.9 |
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<td><strong>Transparency</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Modalities, procedures and guidance for the transparency framework for action and support</td>
<td>APA 5</td>
<td>Art. 13</td>
<td>The transparency framework aims to “build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation”, whilst granting flexibility to countries with different capacities. Transparent support can pressure donors into mobilising additional resources. The transparency of mitigation measures also puts pressure on countries to increase their ambition and take concrete measures when the NDC are reviewed. Making the transparency framework operational is a transversal measure which will also directly impact all of the other mechanisms of the Paris Agreement.</td>
<td>Section I.11</td>
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<td><strong>Role of non-state actors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP)</td>
<td>SBSTA 8</td>
<td>Transversal issue</td>
<td>This platform was established at COP23 to strengthen knowledge, technologies, practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous peoples (LCIP) regarding climate change and also to facilitate experience sharing and enhance the engagement of LCIP in the UNFCCC process. A draft text was drawn up for review and adoption at COP24 to move the operationalisation of the platform forward. A main issue to be resolved¹⁹ is the role of state sovereignty concerning indigenous peoples, as there are unresolved debates on the need to specify that the Platform and its activities may not, under any circumstances, be interpreted as authorising any effort to impinge on national sovereignty.</td>
<td>Section I.13</td>
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¹⁹. IISD, 2018b.
| Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) | SBI 19 | Art. 12 | Enhancing the information and public participation on climate change is a key issue to garner public support for climate policies. Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) contributes to the implementation of Article 6 of the Convention, which also concerns this subject. A draft decision on how to enhance action with a view to implementing the Paris Agreement within this framework was drawn up for consideration and adoption in Katowice. |
| Gender and gender equality | Gender and climate change | SBI 18 | Transversal issue | The issue of gender is recognised as a transversal question to be considered in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC secretariat was mandated to draw up a technical report on the entry points to incorporate gender considerations in the workstreams of the UNFCCC, which will be submitted for consideration at COP24. |
| Agriculture and Forests | Koronia joint work on agriculture | SBI 9 and SBSTA 7 | (indirect) | The "Koronia joint work on agriculture" was adopted at COP23 to support the agricultural transformation via the processes resulting from the Convention and to promote the importance of this sector in climate action. The objective is to support countries by ensuring that agricultural development reaches the three-fold objective of strengthening food security, adapting agriculture to climate change and reducing the sector emissions. During the negotiations, a roadmap was drawn up for the period between the 48th and 53rd sessions of the subsidiary bodies, including workshops of the sessions and workshops in international forums besides the Convention. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Connection with the PA</th>
<th>Agenda item and body</th>
<th>Section of the Guide</th>
<th>Main negotiation issues</th>
<th>Methodological questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of implementation of REDD+ activities in the forest sector by developing countries</td>
<td>SBI</td>
<td>Art. 5 (indirect)</td>
<td>Under this item, the implementation of REDD+ activities was discussed. In its session conclusions in May 2018, the SBI recommended that the COP approve the conclusion of the review of this issue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories for Annex I Parties</td>
<td>SBSTA 10</td>
<td>Art. 13 (indirect)</td>
<td>Continuous revision of the communication guidelines for GHG inventories</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines for the technical review of the information submitted under the Convention on GHG inventories, biennial reports and national communications</td>
<td>SBSTA 10</td>
<td>Art. 13 (indirect)</td>
<td>Continuous review of the guidelines for the information to be communicated under the Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Emissions caused by international aviation and maritime transport</strong></td>
<td>SBSTA 10</td>
<td>(indirect)</td>
<td>Under this agenda item, the contributions of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to global mitigation of emissions are discussed. These two organisations have adopted programmes and goals in this respect. The main issue is to ensure the complementarity of activities under the Convention and international organisations and to avoid the double counting of emission reductions. Furthermore, a persistent question is whether the Convention has the mandate to influence the determination of the reporting or of the operationalisation of the ICAO and IMO programmes.</td>
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<td><strong>Procedural and organisational issues</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperation with other international organisations</strong></td>
<td>SBSTA 14</td>
<td>(indirect)</td>
<td>Consultation with other international organisations such as the IPCC, World Meteorological Organisation, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, UNESCO, FAO and others.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative, financial and institutional issues</strong></td>
<td>SBI 20</td>
<td>(indirect)</td>
<td>The Convention Secretariat is in the process of reviewing and restructuring its services and activities. Furthermore, the budget issues are discussed with the status of the contributions and the effectiveness of the transparency of the budget process.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other matters</strong></td>
<td>SBI 21</td>
<td>(indirect)</td>
<td>Under this item was raised the question of conflicts of interests and the modalities for granting observer status to entities with commercial interests that are contrary to the Convention goals or tools. The issue of the frequency of meetings post-2020 was also addressed, as well as the facilitation of the participation of non-Party stakeholders.</td>
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**Section I.9.9**
I.3. Mechanisms of the Paris Agreement

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides for three mechanisms that give Parties the possibility to cooperate in the implementation of their national contributions:

1. Article 6.2, which introduces cooperative approaches that offer Parties the option of voluntarily exchanging internationally transferred mitigation outcomes and that promotes sustainable development and environmental integrity at the same time. The ITMO transfers will be guided by the accounting guidance that needs to be drawn up under the auspices of the SBSTA to preserve environmental integrity and avoid double counting of mitigation outcomes. This accounting system must be in keeping with the provisions of the transparency framework (Art. 13).

2. Article 6.4 establishes a mechanism to contribute to mitigation efforts and support sustainable development, resulting in certified emissions reductions under the supervision of the Convention. The rules, modalities and procedures are negotiated within the SBSTA and draw inspiration from international experiences with the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms (see Sub-section 1.3.1 below). The emissions reductions must be “real, measurable and long-term”, as well as reductions that are “additional”. This mechanism aims to mitigate emissions globally and to avoid double counting of mitigation activities and their outcomes by ITMO Creating/Emitting and Acquiring/Using Countries, as all countries will now be responsible for targeting mitigation by formulating NDC and reporting on the progress made.

3. Article 6.8 introduces a framework for non-market-based approaches do not allow the transfer of mitigation results. Note that several terms introduced in the two paragraphs have no definition and no history in international negotiations. This is especially true for the term non-market-based approaches, which the text simply specifies should be “integrated, holistic and balanced”.

General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement

In Annex 2 of the joint concept note published in mid-October 2018,21 the SBSTA president, with the APA and SBI presidents, observes that the negotiations concerning Article 6 made significant progress at the Bangkok session and that the options were very detailed. However, he highlights the need to find compromises that can generate support from several negotiating groups.

• Regarding the negotiations on Article 6.2, the options on the international supervision, participation, reporting and review are identified and detailed and links to other negotiation issues are reflected. According to the SBSTA president, the main task will be to focus on the decisional elements for 2018 and develop further the technical work programme for 2019.

21. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018e.
• Regarding the negotiations on the mechanism of Article 6.4, the options were also detailed, and the discussions in Bangkok focused on the key questions of baselines, the principle of additionality, the aspects of the composition of the Supervisory Body, and the transition of the Kyoto mechanisms. For COP24, the Parties must agree on the decisions required so that the mechanism can be an instrument that is available from 2020, including the election of members of the Supervisory Body and the definition of a work programme for 2019.

• Regarding the negotiations on the work programme under Article 6.8, the Parties must identify and focus on the key options revolving around governance issues, as well as the steps and phases of the work programme to enable its implementation from 2019. It is important to have this type of focus on the proposals that may garner broad support, as there are still many options on the table.

I.3.1. Historical summary: the Kyoto market mechanisms in Paris

Market-based mechanisms are not fundamentally new in the Paris Agreement, but the international community has gained experience through market-based mechanisms which it created under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol, and which allow Parties to generate and/or trade emission reduction units, commonly called “carbon credits”. They are the Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

Existing flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms include:

• *International emissions trading* – Countries concerned by the objectives of reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) under the Kyoto Protocol have the possibility of selling their emission rights if they have surpassed their objective, or to buy some, if they cannot reach it.

• *Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)* – This mechanism enables developed countries to reach part of their objectives by purchasing carbon credits (certified emission reduction credits, CER) created by mitigation projects implemented in developing countries. The CDM is a compensation mechanism in which GHG reductions related to projects that are low-carbon compared with a baseline scenario generate CER after verification by accredited audit bodies (1 CER is the equivalent of 1 tonne of CO₂-eq).

*Joint Implementation (JI)* – JI operates on the same principle as the CDM, but concerns the trading of carbon credits (emission reduction units, ERU) between two developed countries, which are generated by projects conducted in one of these countries (the country where the marginal emission abatement cost is more attractive).
Since 2012, the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) reviews the modalities and procedures of the CDM. The last few years, recommendations relative to projects have put the emphasis on aspects linked to environmental integrity, CDM governance and facilitating access to the mechanism for countries that are under-represented or that have benefited little from these mechanisms.

In addition to the existing mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties expressed their opinions on the introduction of new instruments during the Bali Conference (2007). Prior to COP21 in Paris, the negotiations focused on two instruments at the same time:

- **The New Market Mechanism (NMM)**, which aims to create a market system under the central control of the Convention to deliver real net mitigation at the global level; and
- **The Framework for Various Approaches (FVA)**, which enables bilateral initiatives as well as non-market based initiatives that should follow the common principles that have been established.

These negotiations constituted the starting point for establishing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and its resulting mechanisms.

**I.3.2. Common principles of the mechanisms of Article 6**

Article 6.1 provides a general framework for cooperation activities and an umbrella for subsequent provisions. It lists activities relating to mitigation and adaptation. Sustainable development and environmental integrity are defined as targets to be promoted and pursued. Article 6.1 does not impose any restrictions on the market-based approaches. In accordance with Art. 6.1, the cooperative approaches defined in Art. 6.2 are intended to contribute to increased ambition in implementing national contributions. The exact definition of the relationship between the market mechanisms and the NDC will play a key role in the debate on environmental integrity and must culminate in a new definition or improvement in additionality rules compared with the rules from the CDM.

Promoting sustainable development is mentioned as the second general principle of activities planned under Article 6.2. It is also mentioned in paragraphs 6.4 and 6.8, which gives it broader scope in the Paris Agreement than in the Kyoto Protocol. Making this requirement operational without repeating the difficulties encountered in the context of the CDM will be an essential task in the forthcoming negotiations.

The main difference between the mechanisms provided for in paragraphs 6.2 and 6.4 will be the difference in the extent of the regulations for the two mechanisms. Art. 6.4 provides for central governance by the United Nations, via dedicated institutions and processes, whilst Art. 6.2 simply provides for guidance. Nevertheless, both mechanisms have the same principles: they must contribute to greater ambition and demonstrate robust accounting and environmental integrity.
I.3.3. Key issues to be resolved

The technical and political levels of the negotiations on the mechanisms of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement are extremely interdependent, especially concerning issues related to transparency (Article 13), NDC accounting (Article 4.13), and the Global Stocktake (Article 14). Many questions are asked in order to ensure environmental integrity, including for defining additionality of mitigation with respect to political instruments, or for entire sectors.

According to a recent study, 103 Parties refer to market mechanisms in their NDC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Parties</th>
<th>Reference to market instruments in INDC/NDC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Use of international market mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Use of regional market mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Use of national trading systems</td>
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</table>

In the negotiations, several key issues must still be resolved concerning the operationalisation of the cooperative approaches of Article 6, including:

- The role and scope of the supervision of the mechanisms, particularly concerning Article 6.2, for which several Parties do not want any international control;
- The principles for eligibility for participating in the mechanisms, as well as emissions credit accounting;
- The definition and characteristics of the units/credits to trade faced with the large range of NDC which cover several natures and types, and also considering the nature of the registries that are still under negotiation;
- Making the avoidance of double counting operational via the relevant adjustments;
- The scope of the mechanisms, in other words, how activities can be scaled beyond the projects and programmes and include sectoral activities or political instruments;
- The transition of activities, credits, methodologies and institutions of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM);

• The rate and coverage of the tax on the mechanisms (“share of the proceeds”) to finance adaptation;
• The promotion of the co-benefits of sustainable development, preserving the sovereign right of the States to define national sustainable development objectives;
• Making Article 6.8 operational as a climate financing mechanism or as a facilitating mechanism without resources.

I.3.4. Progress between COP23 and COP24

The decisions package formulating the rules to make the Paris Agreement operational – including Article 6 of the Agreement – should be adopted at COP24, as decided by the Parties at COP22. Since this conference in Marrakech, the negotiations have not gone beyond informal consultations on the operationalisation of Article 6 and the sole results were “informal notes” aiming to capture all of the opinions of the parties, without prejudicing the results concerning the outcome of the negotiations.

In order to make progress toward a negotiating text, at the 47th session of the SBSTA (in 2017), the SBSTA president was invited to prepare consolidated informal documents on:

• Draft elements to guide the cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6.2, as negotiated under item 12(a) of the SBSTA agenda;
• Draft elements of the rules, modalities and procedures of the mechanisms referred to in Article 6.4, as negotiated under item 12(b) of the SBSTA agenda;
• Draft elements for a decision option on the work programme on non-market based approaches, referred to in Article 6.8, and whose framework is referred to in Article 6.9, as negotiated under item 12(c) on the SBSTA agenda.

These three informal documents were drawn up by the SBSTA president based on informal notes and previous submissions of the Parties for these agenda items. The three informal texts were favourably received at the 48th session of the SBSTA in May 2018 in Bonn. However, the negotiations did not make significant progress at the Bonn session, mainly due to their strong political ties with climate funding issues. The informal texts were slightly modified to reflect the various positions of the Parties better.

At the interim session in Bangkok, three iterations of the informal notes were published. The Parties structured the three informal notes by identifying the elements of decision, the elements of an initial annex containing the specific regulations to adopt (directives, rules, modalities and procedures; work programme), as well as the elements for a second annex that specifies the activities for a work programme for 2019. The objective of the Parties is thus to adopt the rules that are required for the initial operationalisation of the articles, leaving the more technical and specific questions for subsequent negotiations. A key issue for the negotiations was the development of the regulations of the three articles in a balanced manner, enabling, in particular, progress toward a common understanding of the operationalisation of non-market mechanisms.
I.3.5. Cooperative approaches introduced by Art. 6, para. 2

The positions on the directives for the cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6.2 can be divided into two fundamental positions regarding the scope of the directives to be developed:

- The Parties could either accept to provide detailed guidance that establishes a governance structure ensuring the international monitoring of the cooperative approaches or;
- Opt for the preservation of national prerogatives in a bottom-up approach without international rules for the production and transfer of ITMO.

Furthermore, it is possible to limit the scope of the guidance for regulating ITMO accounting, or to broaden the scope by including guarantees regarding environmental integrity, sustainable development and transparency.

The following paragraphs present the major issues to resolve in the negotiations concerning Art. 6.2, as well as the positions of the negotiating groups.

**Scope of the guidance to be developed**

Delineating the scope of the guidance in Art 6.2 is a crucial issue, as it involves striking a balance between preserving the top-down approach of the PA and environmental integrity in NDC accounting.

In general, the Umbrella Group, Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), as well as the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) would like to limit the degree of international surveillance under Article 6.2, whilst Brazil, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) opt for using international surveillance comparable to that of Art. 6.4.

The LMDC do not accept the international restriction of cooperative approaches and are opposed to any attempts at an international definition of sustainable development, which is considered a national prerogative. They consider that as the cooperative approaches are a tool for the development of NDC and they too should follow a bottom-up approach. AILAC also considers that the definition of sustainable development, the calculation of the baselines and the accounting for cooperative approaches are prerogatives of the sovereign Parties.

Brazil is following an opposite approach by conceptualising the cooperative approaches similar to the emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol. With this in mind, Brazil would like to limit participation in cooperative approaches to Parties that have quantified their NDC, as well as their multi-year absolute emissions budget. The EIG focuses on the quality of the ITMO to represent “real, permanent, additional and verifiable” emission reduction units. The EIG is also requesting the

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establishment of control mechanisms to ensure the promotion of sustainable development and human rights compliance. Likewise, SIDS would like centralised monitoring and proof of net atmospheric benefits, whilst LDC are calling for the protection of human rights and the implementation of sustainable development as per the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). These negotiating groups are concerned about the national or global impacts of a laissez-faire approach to environmental integrity. They fear that NDC accounting could be undermined if the use of the ITMO acquired under Article 6.2 when Parties export mitigation outcomes do not represent real reductions against business-as-usual.

The European Union (EU) and Canada have taken the middle ground with the demand for strengthened reporting requirements on sustainable development and human rights. The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) would also like concerted approaches to be examined to ensure environmental integrity and facilitate the promotion of sustainable development by drawing up a guide on this subject.

The degree of international control of the implementation of Art. 6.2 is also at the heart of the negotiation on governance modalities. The guidance could either establish an “Art. 6.2 body” and/or an ITMO registry under the aegis of the Secretariat, or simply an expert review procedure that may or may not be related to the Art. 13 review procedures.

The Umbrella Group is opposed to approving cooperative approaches via a United Nations body, the establishment of eligibility criteria for approaches, as well as any other form of guiding principles that are binding. New Zealand and Australia are favourable to establishing common reporting tables under the guidance, whilst wanting to limit the guidance to the accounting system, a position also held by Japan. Accounting is considered as the only issue that goes beyond the competencies of the Parties and that can thus be legitimately covered by the guidance

**Definition of ITMO**

To date, there is no consensual definition of what constitutes an “internationally transferred mitigation outcome (ITMO)”, nor its generation, measurement, scope or form. The main issue to be resolved is to agree on the “commoditisation” of the ITMO, to decide on whether these units are negotiable by third parties.

AOSIS and the EIG are in favour of this commoditisation and consider ITMO as “retrospective outcomes” that present real, measurable, additional, verified and permanent emission reductions. Similarly, AILAC suggests establishing verification mechanisms using designated operational entities to audit cooperative approaches.

However, the AGN is opposed to the fungibility of ITMO. The AGN considers that ITMO can only be exchanged between Parties, considering them as “accounting units” that only represent net flows between Parties, reported when the implemen-

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tation of the NDC is demonstrated. In this case, the ITMO would only have value for the acquiring party in the framework of the specific cooperation approach in which they are “created”. It would thus be unnecessary to find an international regulation for defining the ITMO, which the cooperating Parties could negotiate under Art. 6.2.

Likewise, the AGN is calling for the ITMO metric to remain open to cover energy efficiency and renewable energy units also. The LMDC are opposed to any international definition of ITMO and would like the ITMO to cover not only the emission reductions, but also emission avoidance.

The second important question is specifying the measurement unit for the ITMO. Commoditisation would be facilitated if the units were measured in CO₂ eq. However, a few Parties such as the AGN would like to leave this question open, to also be able to trade energy efficiency or renewable energy units under Art. 6.2. Similarly, the LMDC are opposed to any international definition of the ITMO and would like them to cover not only emission reductions, but emission avoidance as well.

The accounting system

Avoiding double counting and accounting for ITMO transfers is at the heart of the guidance for Art. 6.2. Thus, the EU, EIG, AOSIS and LDC are opting for the implementation of a centralised infrastructure that includes an international transaction log to monitor ITMO transfers.

ITMO transfers must be supported by “corresponding adjustments” by the Parties to properly reflect the transfer of rights concerning the mitigation outcomes. There is general consensus that the corresponding adjustments will be made by additions and subtractions and then reported based on the transparency framework of Art. 13. However, the guidance on the corresponding adjustments must still specify the process and the timetable to be followed whilst taking the diversity of the NDC into account.

There are different proposals to determine the basis on which the corresponding adjustments will be applied. The adjustment could thus be based on:

- an emissions budget based on the emissions budget determined in the NDC;
- emissions quantified in the NDC or GHG inventory;
- emissions to reduce within the NDC framework; or
- a buffer registry that records all transfers, starting with zero.

On this point, the EU is advocating the adoption of an common accounting approach that covers the different coverage areas of the NDC. Whilst the EU asks these Parties to establish the “accounting balance” related to actual emissions, the

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LMDCs would like to separate the ITMO transactions from the NDC accounting, opting for the buffer approach. As for Brazil, it would like a budget approach based on NDC permitted emissions\(^\text{28}\).

The corresponding adjustments will then be subject to a periodic and/or ex post review. Regarding the timetable, a corresponding adjustment may be made by the issuing party at the beginning and by the using party at the end. Alternatively, the corresponding adjustment could be required each time there is a transfer between the transferring party and the acquiring party\(^\text{29}\). A solution also must be found for the Parties that have single year NDC, which will not match the reporting cycles of other Parties.

In connection with accounting provisions, there is a debate on the creation and/or transfer of ITMO from the outcomes obtained in the sectors/GHG that are not included in the NDC. Whilst the absence of corresponding adjustments for sectors not covered could lead to the creation of non additional credits and double counting if the sector must be included in the NDC of the country later, imposing corresponding adjustments would penalise the country and weaken the incentives to pursue activities in sectors that are not covered. Canada suggests that ITMO that are created outside of NDC be “locked” until the country integrates the sector in its NDC\(^\text{30}\).

Japan suggests that irrespective of the sector in which the credit is created, the corresponding adjustments should be made. However, the AGN is requesting exceptions for activities outside of the NDC of the transferring Party, or if the units are voluntarily cancelled afterwards. The AGN highlights that sectors are excluded from NDC due to a lack of data and that instead of penalising these sectors, the cooperation under Article 6 should help to improve data availability and to prepare sectors for their integration\(^\text{31}\).

**Participation requirements**

The informal text contains a few prerequisites for participation that reflect the general principles of the cooperative approaches, as well as a few requirements related to the accounting system to be defined (see below).

The requirement to quantify mitigation outcomes in the NDC is currently emerging, which is obviously related to a fungible definition of ITMO and a corresponding adjustment that reflects the quantified targets or inventories. Brazil is putting forward this suggestion, whilst the LMDC and the AGN are opposed to it. The requirement to have a long-term strategy by virtue of achieving the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement is resurfacing as well, as demanded by the EU. The other proposed requirements are compliance with transparency and governance

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provisions, as well as guarantees concerning environmental integrity, human rights protection and avoiding negative social and economic impacts on the creation, transfer and use of ITMO\textsuperscript{32}.

**Environmental integrity and overall mitigation**

Compliance with the principle of environmental integrity is included in Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, and is not challenged by the Parties. However, its definition, operationalisation and the governmental arrangements to establish in this respect are still being negotiated\textsuperscript{33}.

The EU defends a holistic definition of environmental integrity as a systemic issue in the Paris Agreement. The EU considers that environmental integrity refers to the accounting, monitoring, transparency and reporting system of the Paris Agreement, and does not restrict itself to Art. 6. Based on this point of view, environmental integrity is respected when a transfer made under Art. 6.2 does not have a negative impact on the atmosphere, and makes progress toward the objective of the Agreement\textsuperscript{34}. New Zealand highlights the need to have a robust accounting system to ensure environmental integrity. However, Thailand would like to establish minimum criteria for environmental integrity, to enable flexibility and reduce the reporting burden\textsuperscript{35}.

For other Parties such as Canada, environmental integrity is only achieved if Art. 6.2 and 6.4 result in a positive impact on the atmosphere, in the “overall mitigation” of emissions, and promote the enhancement of ambition concerning national targets\textsuperscript{36}. In this sense, respect of the principle of additionality becomes key for the respect of environmental integrity. There thus must be a guarantee that an activity started under Art. 6.2 is implemented beyond the commitments that States have already made, and thus represents “additional” activity that would not be conducted outside of a cooperative approach. This is imperative for the AG. Furthermore, any activity under Art. 6.2 must limit the risks of carbon leakage. Finally, to obtain overall mitigation, the Parties could be required to cancel part of or a certain percentage of the ITMO that have been created\textsuperscript{37}; Thailand is opposed to this.

Beyond the definition of environmental integrity in itself, the scope of application of this principle must be defined as well. The positions diverge on the issue of whether the additionality provisions would cover solely the transfer itself, or also the ITMO transfer or the issuance process. International supervision of environmental integrity is unacceptable for the LMDCs and Japan, but the total

\textsuperscript{32} Michaelowa, A., Greiner, S., 2018.
\textsuperscript{33} ADB, 2018.
\textsuperscript{34} ADB, 2018.
\textsuperscript{35} Obergassel, W., Asche, F., 2017.
\textsuperscript{36} ADB, 2018.
\textsuperscript{37} Michaelowa, A., Greiner, S., 2018.
absence of rules is unacceptable for the EU and AOSIS\textsuperscript{38}. The Arab Group and the LMDCs defend the viewpoint that the Art. 6.2 guidance should be limited to ITMO transfers, and not be broadened to cover the production of mitigation outcomes as well\textsuperscript{39}.

Another principle that has been highlighted in the negotiations is the principle of “complementarity”, which involves introducing restrictions to using market mechanisms to reach national targets. AOSIS is thus calling for the prevention of the “overselling” of ITMO in similar fashion to the AGN, which suggests formulating a limit on the quantity of ITMO that a Party can use to reach its NDC\textsuperscript{40}. Likewise, the AGN is requesting that experts review the environmental integrity and sustainable development reports of Parties. The Parties would be authorised to use ITMO toward their NDC mitigation targets only in the event of a positive review\textsuperscript{41}.

**Promotion of sustainable development**

The issue of sustainable development is less controversial, as there is a large amount of consensus on the sovereign prerogative of defining sustainable development. Most of the proposals of the Parties offer a form of sustainable development reporting. The EU is presenting the reporting suggestion based on the SDG, whilst others mention the sustainable development tool elaborated within the CDM. The EU and Tuvalu are also discussing human rights in this context. Tuvalu demands that the units traded have a certificate ensuring that they have not adversely affected the environment or human rights\textsuperscript{42}.

**Taxation for adaptation**

The informal text also contains the option of introducing a tax on ITMO transfers to support adaptation activities and potentially serve the replenishment of the Adaptation Fund. The Umbrella Group is opposed to taxing transactions by virtue of Art. 6.2, as it would like to use cooperative approaches to establish links between the national emissions trading systems. Conversely, the AGN, LDC and AOSIS support the application of the tax to cooperative approaches.

**Linkages with the other articles of the Paris Agreement**

**Linkage with the transparency framework**

The negotiations on the guidance by virtue of Art 6.2 are related to the negotiations relating to Art. 4.13 (accounting guidance on the mitigation component of NDC)

\textsuperscript{38} Michaelowa, A., Greiner, S., 2018.

\textsuperscript{39} Obergassel, W., Asche, F., 2017.

\textsuperscript{40} Michaelowa, A., Greiner, S., 2018.

\textsuperscript{41} Obergassel, W., Asche, F., 2017.

\textsuperscript{42} Obergassel, W., Asche, F., 2017.
and Art. 13.7 (information to communicate in the transparency framework). The three articles are linked in order to monitor progress in achieving the NDC. Thus the provisions on the parameters that are used to calculate emissions, the creation of a national or international registry to monitor activities and even the provisions aiming to avoid double counting and environmental integrity must be harmonised between these three articles\(^ {43}\). The Umbrella Group opts for transferring all reporting questions to the negotiations on the transparency framework, whilst the AG, South Africa, the EIG and AOSIS would like to introduce additional reporting requirements to guarantee the environmental integrity of cooperative approaches\(^ {44}\).

**Linkage to the Art. 6.4 mechanism**

The question is whether the Art. 6.2 guidance will apply in the same manner to all international credit transfers issued under the mechanism established by Art. 6.4. Some Parties fear that the guidance negotiated under Art. 6.2 may not be as strict as the methodologies accepted under Art. 6.4 and that as such, the application of the Art. 6.2 guidance may lead to a “leak” in the accounting system. Regarding the need to make a corresponding adjustment after transferring credits under Art. 6.4, the AGN and the Arab Group are requesting an exception if the emission reductions are not used for achieving NDC and are withdrawn or cancelled voluntarily instead. As for Brazil, it would like the first transfer from the international registry of the mechanism to a national registry or account to come with a corresponding adjustment\(^ {45}\).

With a view to the transition from the Kyoto Protocol to the new cooperation mechanisms under the Paris Agreement, Brazil and Ukraine consider that all of the CERU or ERU under the Kyoto Protocol should be considered as ITMO.

The EIG links Art. 6.2 to the mitigation processes and schemes implemented outside the Convention process and asks that all of the exported emission reductions, within Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA).

**Structure of the negotiating text**

Following the additional Bangkok session and as part of the preparation for COP24, in the joint concept note with the other group presidents, the SBSTA president is proposing a restructuring and significant streamlining of the informal note. In this version, there is now a section on the special circumstances of LDC and SIDS. At the same time, the sections on the objectives of the guidance to develop and on the adaptation ambition have been removed. Furthermore, the informal note now details more negotiating options in the various sub-chapters and has also reduced the text by streamlining.

\(^ {43}\) Herold, A., 2018.

\(^ {44}\) Michaelowa, A., Greiner, S., 2018.

\(^ {45}\) Michaelowa, A., Greiner, S., 2018.
The structure is as follows:

I. Draft decision of the CMA

II. Annex I: Draft guidance on cooperative approaches
   (i) Principles
   (ii) Special circumstances of LDC and SIDS
   (iii) Definitions
   (iv) ITMO
   (v) Governance
   (vi) Requirements and responsibilities of participation
   (vii) Reporting
   (viii) Corresponding adjustment (including specific guidance)
   (ix) Applicability of this guidance to activities under Article 6.4
   (x) Infrastructure
   (xi) Safeguards
   (xii) Overall mitigation
   (xiii) Share of proceeds for adaptation
   (xiv) Addressing negative social and economic impacts

III. Annex II: draft “work programme” for 2019:
   • Special circumstances of LDC and SIDS
   • ITMO
   • Governance
   • Reporting
   • Corresponding adjustment (including specific guidance)
   • Linkage with Article 6.4
   • Indicative list of intersessional work for the Secretariat

I.3.6. Mitigation mechanism introduced by Art. 6, para. 4

Most of the developed countries are opting for the stringent regulation of the mechanism of Art. 6.4 and are opposed to international regulations for Art. 6.2 at the same time. The Arab Group is opposed to market mechanisms in general, and to specific regulations concerning Art. 6.4 in particular.

Scope of the mechanism and eligible activities

Defining the scope of the mechanism will also determine the type of activity that will be covered, as well as the conditions for participating in the mechanism. The informal text shows a certain continuity of the rules, modalities and procedures of the CDM in the operationalisation of the mechanism, whilst introducing new
potential elements such as the overall mitigation of emissions, enhancement of mitigation ambitions, protection of human rights, support for the countries that are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, as well as safeguards for avoiding double counting.

An important issue in defining the eligibility criteria is the debate on continuing mitigation activities in sectors involving an activity that mitigates the emission of a GHG not included in the NDC of the host Party. Brazil would like to define the scope of Art. 6.4 based on the same model as the CDM, whilst the EU has highlighted that only the activities inside the scope of the NDC should be credited. Conversely, Tuvalu demands that actions outside NDC be credited, with the development of distinct accounting provisions for these cases.

Another important issue to be resolved is the potential eligibility of activities at the sectoral level and/or political instruments beyond CDM-type projects and programmes of activity. Several Parties are in favour of a large range of activities eligible under this mechanism. For the AGN, this mechanism is particularly important for countries that do not have the capacity to build their own cooperative approaches by virtue of Art. 6.2. As such, the AGN considers that the mechanism should include different classes of activities, acknowledging that the rules that apply to these different activities could be developed at different speeds. Likewise, New Zealand suggests planning the development of the rules of the mechanism by starting with projects that include activity programmes and sectoral approaches at a later stage\textsuperscript{46}.

In this context, the Arab Group highlights the possibilities of raising ambition by including mitigation benefits of adaptation actions and economic diversification plans\textsuperscript{47}. In this context, the Supervisory Body could be responsible for cooperating with the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures\textsuperscript{48}.

**Safeguards and principles relating to the activities**

It is already specified in Decision 1/CP.21 that mitigation activities under the mechanism must produce “real, measurable and long-term benefits”. Likewise, the mechanism will serve the promotion of sustainable development. The definition of the objectives of sustainable development is considered as a national prerogative by a number of Parties. However, there will probably be some kind of control of the benefits of activities in terms of sustainable development, potentially based on the CDM sustainable development tool, as well as via reporting and transparency requirements\textsuperscript{49}.

Overall mitigation of emissions could be achieved by automatically cancelling or devaluing a portion of the credits as part of a corresponding adjustment of the host Party. A few Parties defend the viewpoint that any activity under the mechanism

\textsuperscript{46} Obergassel, W., Asche, F., 2017.
\textsuperscript{47} Obergassel, W., Asche, F., 2017.
\textsuperscript{48} ADB, 2018.
\textsuperscript{49} ADB, 2018.
already takes place outside the country’s own efforts and thus constitutes “additional” activity, without the need to develop other mechanisms. Other Parties link global mitigation to compliance with the principle of additionality.

The compliance with the principle of additionality mentioned in Decision 1/CP.21 will probably be one of the most important restrictive factors for the mitigation activities under the mechanism. The concept comes from the CDM and refers to a baseline-and-credit approach in which the credits are issued by estimating the difference compared with business-as-usual. Any activity that is eligible under the mechanism must be an activity that would not have been implemented outside the mechanism and the credits will be issued based on the reductions made compared with a baseline scenario. Although Brazil suggests applying the current CDM methodologies, the EU demands that the baseline scenarios reflect the application of the best available technologies (BAT) instead of the usual scenario.

The overall mitigation of emissions can also be guaranteed by a strict calculation of emission reductions by applying more cautious baselines that are below the baseline scenario, by emission factors that are more conservative by default or by limiting the crediting period for reductions. Japan and New Zealand prefer this option.

The safeguards against double counting may be introduced by applying the Art. 6.2 guidance or by developing new rules.

**Governance of the mechanism**

The CMA will have authority over the mechanisms, which will be led by a Supervisory Body. A few options in the informal text are based on a certain continuation of functions between the CDM Executive Committee, other options introducing alternative models for the composition, and guiding principles. The AGN, for example, suggests using the CDM methodologies and institutions to the extent possible and as much as possible, whilst focusing on the various issues of the CDM, such as the overall mitigation of global emissions and the relationship between credits and the NDC. The EU suggests a governance system that is similar to that of the CDM, with a centralised supervisory body and operational entities that are designated for the verification and certification of emission reductions. Tuvalu is in favour of creating designated national authorities that are responsible for supervising and approving the activities conducted under Art. 6.4, an approach that has already been adopted under the CDM. Japan and New Zealand suggest that the selection of members for the Supervisory Body should be different from that of the CDM and be more representative of the stakeholders. New Zealand considers that

50. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 13d.
51. ADB, 2018.
53. ADB, 2018.
the composition of the CRCP and the Committee of Art. 15 is more appropriate than the composition of the CDM Executive Committee.

Beyond a centralised system with a single executive body, there is also the option of organising a dual management system at the national and international level. Whichever governance system is selected, the Supervisory Body will most likely be responsible for designating operational entities and issuing emission reduction credits based on baseline methodologies and a Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system, as it resembles a CDM. A question that is still open to debate is whether the Supervisory Body could certify and potentially evaluate mitigation programmes outside the Convention. The Supervisory Body will establish and maintain the registry of the mechanism, which could include various accounts for suspended emissions, the holding, transfer, retirement and cancellation of credits and retaining the share of proceeds. Brazil suggests that this registry follows the Art. 6.2 guidance.

The informal text contains a few conditions for the participation of host parties, as well as of parties that transfer or use emission reduction credits. These conditions are linked to the implementation of NDC, the respect of transparency requirements, the achievement of the overall mitigation of emissions and respect of the safeguards and principles of governance. Instead of developing requirements under Article 6.4, the guidance developed for Art. 6.2 could be applied in this respect, in cases where the emission reductions would be used to fulfil the NDC.

Like the CDM, the host Parties would authorise the activities to pursue under the mechanism and would provide explanations to the Supervisory Body on respecting safeguards. The benefits for the host parties include capacity-building, the reduction of long-term emissions and the promotion of sustainable development. As the mechanism is responsible for encouraging and facilitating the participation of the private sector, the informal note also contains options for the participation of other actors which would be submitted for the approval of the host party.

The cycle of mitigation activities resembles that of the CDM. It starts with the design of a project and goes forward with the authorisation by the host party, the validation by the mechanism, the recording in the mechanism, activity monitoring, the verification of emission reductions and concludes with the certification and issuance of a potential voluntary cancellation of issued credits. When certified mitigation outcomes are submitted or transferred, part of the revenue will be kept for administrative expenses and adaptation. The administrator of the registry could potentially transfer part of the revenue to the Adaptation Fund. To achieve the overall mitigation of emissions, a certain percentage of the credits issued could be automatically cancelled.

55. Mechanism to facilitate the implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions, as referred to Article 15 of the Paris Agreement.
57. ADB, 2018.
Transition from the CDM

The transition from the CDM will involve (1) mitigation activities and their potential continuation under the mechanism of Art. 6.4; (2) the eligibility of methodologies and procedures under the mechanism of Art. 6.4; (3) the transition of the national and international CDM institutions to Art. 6.4 and (4) the conversion of CERU into credits under Art. 6.4, or their eligibility for demonstrating progress in the implementation of NDC.

Brazil and the AGN support transitioning the CDM to the mechanism of Art. 6.4, but the EU is opposed to this. The AGN states that the circumstances of African CDM projects should be considered and that an eligibility check should ensure that certain registered CDM activities may be transformed into activities conducted under Art. 6.4 without requiring new validation. The EU demands that no transition be planned, and that all existing and ongoing activities be reassessed. Japan supports this viewpoint, although it does highlight the need to learn and draw upon the various existing approaches. In contrast, New Zealand highlights the differences between the Kyoto and Paris approaches58.

Structure of the negotiating text

Based on the restructuring of the informal note at the Bangkok session, the SBSTA president proposes an informal note that is more streamlined59. The chapters on the objectives of the mechanism were eliminated and the section on principles was streamlined. A chapter on the special circumstances of LDC and SIDS was proposed for Annex I and the work programme for 2019. The option of introducing text regarding the benefits of host Parties was eliminated, as well as the section on adaptation ambition.

The structure is as follows:

I. Draft decision of the CMA

II. Annex I: Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism of Article 6.4

   (i) Principles
   (ii) Definitions
   (iii) The scope of activities
   (iv) Special circumstances of LDC and SIDS
   (v) Role of the CMA
   (vi) Supervisory Body
   (vii) The registry of the mechanism
   (viii) Requirements and responsibilities of the participation of host Parties

59. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018e.
(ix) Requirements and responsibilities of the participation of transferring, acquiring and using Parties
(x) Participation of other actors
(xi) Designated operational entities
(xii) Eligible mitigation activities
(xiii) Cycle of mitigation activities
(xiv) The share of proceeds for administration and adaptation
(xv) Global mitigation of emissions
(xvi) Avoidance of the double counting of emission reductions
(xvii) Safeguards/miscellaneous
(xviii) Transition from the Kyoto Protocol
(xix) Addressing negative social and economic impacts

III. Annex II: draft “work programme” for 2019:
• SBSTA work programme
  – Special circumstances of LDC and SIDS
  – Supervisory Body
  – The registry of the mechanism
  – Requirements and responsibilities of host Parties in a dual system (implemented by the Supervisory Body and the host Party)
  – Designated operational entities
  – Eligible mitigation activities
  – Cycle of mitigation activities
  – Share of proceeds
  – Global mitigation
  – Transition from the Kyoto Protocol
  – Addressing negative social and economic impacts
• An indicative list with intersessional tasks to entrust to the Secretariat as technical preparatory work, including technical papers and technical and financial feasibility studies

I.3.7. The “non-market mechanisms” introduced by Art. 6, para. 8

The negotiations on this article are particularly linked to general climate funding issues, which creates friction in debates revolving around the role of the framework and of the work programme to develop. The informal text still contains a set of different options that would need to be further developed. The proposals apply to three main subjects: non-market approaches as such, their definition and eligibility in the framework; the organisational provisions of the framework which are also called for; as well as the time frame of the work programme itself.
**Definition of non-market approaches**

Besides the fact that they are not related to market outcomes, non-market approaches have objectives such as the promotion of mitigation and adaptation ambitions, the progression and implementation of NDC, and capacity-building. The informal text also includes the promotion of sustainable development, the enhancement of the participation of the non-State and private sectors, as well as the cooperation between institutions and the coordination of different political instruments.

**The scope of the Art. 6.8 framework**

The specific role of the framework is yet to be determined. There are two different concepts of the scope of the framework of non-market approaches. The framework could be of a facilitating nature and identify synergies between programmes or approaches, and ensure that Parties assess them. This is the position of the AGN, which considers that the framework should strengthen the links and synergies within the Convention and avoid duplicating efforts. The EU is also in favour of this “facilitating” approach. The framework could also be used to map and record needs in terms of financing and building the capacity of Parties to respond to these requests with existing instruments, according to a proposal of the LMDCs.

Beyond financing, the LMDCs also consider that the framework should facilitate access to technology transfer and capacity-building, similar to the AGN. Uganda suggests that the framework help Parties in terms of transparent accounting and the transfer of financial support. At the same time, the framework should be flexible to cover a range of mechanisms and actions, and encourage non-transferable and non-negotiable outcomes as well.

**The governance options of the framework**

There are seven options on the negotiating table for the governance provisions, running from creating a dedicated body or committee supervised by the SBSTA or SBI, to decentralised implementation at the international level by different international institutions, or at the national level. This proliferation of options is due to certain Parties highlighting the need to avoid the duplication of efforts, with other Parties suggesting the creation of new bodies. For instance, the AGN is opting for the creation of a specific management entity, whilst New Zealand recommends transferring the process of the technical examination and the technical expert meetings to the Art. 6.8 work programme.

The Parties cooperating under the framework could be forced to report the activities implemented, whilst the potential governance of Art. 6.8 would report to the CMA. The CMA may be mandated to regularly examine these reports and the work programme.

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61. ADB, 2018.
Proposals regarding the work programme

The work programme may be developed via a collective approach and implemented at the international level. A decentralised approach could also be adopted, within which the Parties themselves, or a few international committees such as the Adaptation Committee or others would develop national or sectoral work programmes.

Under a collective approach, workshops, meetings, online activities, as well as the elaboration of technical documents may be mandated. Under a decentralised approach, the activities will be defined by the mandated entities or Parties. However, the negotiations could result in international safeguards in the form of a negative list of activities that would not be eligible as non-market approaches.

The informal text also contains specific proposals on the work activities, including consecutive and independent activities. The first type of activity would be related to the identification of the fields of intervention, in which non-market approaches could be implemented later, whilst the second type of activity concerns the development of tools and the identification of relevant information to be shared. As a component of the framework, Uganda and the Ivory Coast have proposed introducing an adaptation benefit mechanism, a concept developed by the African Development Bank. This mechanism quantifies adaptation benefits based on approved methodologies. The Parties and other actors could then demonstrate the adaptation impacts of commitments and financing instruments.

Structure of the negotiating text

Based on an informal note that was restructured at the Bangkok session, the SBSTA president proposes a text that is streamlined further. The chapters on the objectives and the scope of the general framework for non-market approaches have been combined. The governance options have been structured into two general options, the creation of a new body or not.

The structure is as follows:

I. Draft decision by the CMA (including a shortlist of paragraphs for the preamble and work programme review systems)

II. Annex I: draft decision on the work programme

   (i) Principles
   (ii) Definitions
   (iii) Scope of non-market approaches under the framework
   (iv) Governance of the framework
   (v) Modalities of the work programme
   (vi) Activities of the work programme
   (vii) Reporting

64. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018e.
III. Annex II: “work programme” including the mandates of the SBSTA to develop recommendations for the CMA to adopt in 2019 regarding:

- Governance (in the absence of a decision)
- Modalities of the work programme (in the absence of a decision)
- Activities of the work programme
- Reporting

I.4. Pursuing efforts towards 1.5°C

I.4.1. Evolutions of the debates in the international climate negotiations

By implementing the Paris Agreement, the Parties aim to enhance the global response to the threat of climate change by “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”65.

In this respect, at COP16 in 2010, the Cancún Agreements recognised that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were necessary to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels66. Within the framework of these Agreements, the Parties agreed to periodically review the adequacy of the long-term global goal aiming to hold the increase in global temperature67, realising that in the future, it could be necessary to strengthen this target to 1.5°C, based on the accumulation of scientific knowledge68 (see Figure 5 below), as well as effective efforts that are/will be implemented by all countries in qualitative and quantitative terms. The first review of the long-term overall target, which was held between 2013 and 201569, should consider, in particular, “various matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5°C”70.

The work of this first review, which was led by the two permanent subsidiary bodies, was completed at COP21 in Paris in 2015. The report of the expert dialogue which supported the review specifies that the 2°C limit should be seen as a “defence line”71. It adds that the “guardrail” concept, according to which up to 2°C of warming is considered safe, is inadequate. The report recommends considering the 2°C limit as an upper limit of the increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial levels. It is a line of defence that must be protected, whilst considering that less

65. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2
66. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 4.
68. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 4.
69. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1.
70. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 139.
71. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, Message 5.
warming would be preferable. The report also states that at the time, the scientific literature was much less robust concerning the impact of an increase in global average temperature limited to 1.5°C compared with a rise of 2°C. An upsurge in scientific analysis has since bridged this gap\textsuperscript{72}.

The results of the 2013-2015 review of the overall long-term objective enabled the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), as part of its work that led to the development of the Paris Agreement, to incorporate the state of the science regarding the increase in global average temperature which would be limited to 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels, which resulted from the Cancún Agreements.

In Paris, several developing countries emphasised that it was important for them to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, rather than 2°C, as their populations are dealing with various repercussions of the warming that has already happened. For instance, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America\textsuperscript{73}, Alliance of Small Island States\textsuperscript{74}, Coalition for Rainforest Nations\textsuperscript{75}, African Group\textsuperscript{76} and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group\textsuperscript{77} all made reaching 1.5°C one of their main targets for Paris. The African Group and AILAC have also suggested that an increase of over 1.5°C should involve developed countries offering more funding to developing countries, which would probably be confronted with the most harmful effects of global warming\textsuperscript{78}.

The Paris Agreement, for the first time, defined the objective of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. In Paris, the Parties also recognised that the emissions trajectory for 2030 which resulted from the intended nationally determined contributions (INDC) submitted by the Parties should be reduced by 28% to reach a 2°C target by 2100 and that more data was required to establish a least-cost pathway that enables the achievement of a target of 1.5°C\textsuperscript{79} above pre-industrial levels.

\textbf{I.4.2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)}

However, the task of limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels is massive. In its most recent and 5th assessment report published in 2013-2014, the IPCC highlighted the small proportion of scientific data analysing emission pathways that can limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

\textsuperscript{72} Including the recent publication of a special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on the 1.5°C that offers an overall viewpoint on this issue (see subsection I.4.2 below).

\textsuperscript{73} ALBA, 2015.
\textsuperscript{74} AOSIS, 2015
\textsuperscript{75} Coalition for Rainforest Nations, 2015
\textsuperscript{76} African Group, 2015
\textsuperscript{77} Group of Least Developed Countries, 2014.
\textsuperscript{78} African Group, 2013; IISD, 2015d, p. 5 for AILAC, Mexico and the Dominican Republic
\textsuperscript{79} Decision 1/CP.21, para. 17
above pre-industrial levels. However, the IPCC mentioned three action areas that could limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C:

(i) immediate mitigation action

(ii) rapid implementation of all of the currently available emissions mitigation technologies; and

(iii) development that promotes low-carbon energy demand.

To fill these knowledge gaps, at COP21 the Parties invited the IPCC “to present a special report in 2018 on the consequences of global warming of over 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and the related pathways of the evolution of global greenhouse gas emissions.”

The IPCC accepted this invitation at its 43rd meeting. At the beginning of October 2018 (in Incheon, Republic of Korea), the 48th session of the IPCC, as well as the first joint meeting of the three working groups of the IPCC were held.

The agenda of this first meeting mainly focused on reflections on the special report on the 1.5°C. At the end of its 48th session, the IPCC published the Summary for Policymakers on the Special Report on the 1.5°C, whose complete title is:

“Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.”

The report was drawn up under the scientific leadership of three IPCC working groups which are respectively responsible for the scientific content of climate change (Working Group I), impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (Working Group II) and climate change mitigation (Working Group III). As Hoesung Lee, IPCC President, points out in the press release dated 8 October 2018 stating the approval of the Summary for Policymakers, the Special Report benefited from “more than 6,000 scientific references cited and the dedicated contribution of thousands of expert and government reviewers worldwide.”

The scientific analysis of the IPCC should henceforth play a crucial role in informing political decision makers, supporting the implementation process of the Paris Agreement and increasing the global climate ambition. The challenge for governments is to transition toward pathways that are compatible with warming held at 1.5°C. This is certainly a major challenge at a time when consensus in the scientific literature is that the current political efforts are insufficient. For example, in the latest edition of its Emissions Gap Report, UN Environment stated that the hypothesis of full implementation of current NDC would lead to the depletion of

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80. IPCC, 2014
81. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21
82. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20
84. IPCC, 2018a.
85. IPCC, 2018d.
86. IPCC, 2018c.
80% of the “carbon budget” available for limiting global warming to below 2°C by 2100, a budget that would already be long depleted at this date with a pathway that is compatible with the 1.5°C87. In May 2018, Anne Olhoff, representative of the UNEP DTU Partnership, thus highlighted the current warming scenario of about 3-3.2°C88.

This observed lack of global ambition was reaffirmed by the IPCC, which stated that “Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society89.”

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**IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels**

**Elements constituting the IPCC analysis on global warming of 1.5°C**

In accordance with the decision adopted by the IPCC at the end of its 44th session (Bangkok, 2016), the table of contents of its Special Report is structured as follows90:

- Chapter 1: Framing and Context
- Chapter 2: Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development
- Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5°C global warming on natural and human systems
- Chapter 4: Strengthening and implementing the global response to the threat of climate change
- Chapter 5: Sustainable development, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities
- Throughout the report: case studies, boxes on regional and cross-cutting themes

**FAQs**

The *Summary for Policy Makers*, which is 33 pages long, highlights certain conclusions of the Report, and is structured around four main points91:

- A. Understanding Global Warming of 1.5°C
- B. Projected Climate Change, Potential Impacts and Associated Risks
- C. Emission Pathways and System Transitions Consistent with 1.5°C Global Warming

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87. UN Environment, 2017.
89. IPCC, 2018c.
90. IPCC, 2016, Decision IPCC/XLIV-4.
91. *Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.*
• D. Strengthening the Global Response in the Context of Sustainable Development and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty

The following paragraphs provide an overview of a few of the conclusions that can be drawn from the IPCC analysis. All the documents relating to the analysis of global warming of 1.5°C are available online on the IPCC web portal.92

Global warming of over 1.5°C, potential impacts and associated risks

The consequences of climate change can already be seen and felt. These impacts are mainly in the form of climatic or hydrological phenomena that may be intense or more latent, such as the rise in sea levels, the loss of biodiversity, the salinisation of the seas, the disappearance of glaciers, or longer periods of drought. Several of these phenomena are becoming increasingly common, with the IPCC considering that human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels (with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C). Furthermore, the IPCC highlights the time lag between GHG emissions and impacts on the climate system, specifying that anthropogenic GHG emissions accumulated during the pre-industrial period will continue for centuries or even millennia and will continue to result in other long-term disturbances to the climate system, such as the rise in sea level. With a rise in temperature to 1.5°C, 2°C or more, the risks progressively increase. Based on current trends, there could be a rise of 0.5°C (for cumulative warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels) between 2030 and 2052.

One of the main observations of the IPCC report is that holding the increase of the average global temperature to 1.5°C would already have very noticeable impacts. Significant impacts would affect several regions of the world, especially low-altitude and coastal zones. Overall, the impacts will be more severe in poor and vulnerable regions due to the loss of their livelihoods, food insecurity, population displacements, health impacts and much more. As the Paris Agreement aims to hold the rise in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to continue the action taken to limit it to 1.5°C, the IPCC compared the impacts and their degree of intensity between these two bases (see Figure 4 below).

For example, the probability of ice disappearing from the Arctic Ocean would be once a century if global warming is limited to 1.5°C, as opposed to once every ten years at 2°C. By 2100, heat waves, droughts and floods will be progressively more intense at 2°C. Thus an estimated 14% of the global population would be exposed to severe heat waves at least once every five years, with 1.5°C of warming, as opposed to 37% at 2°C. The rise in sea level would be 10 cm more at 2°C than at 1.5°C, exposing ten million additional people to impacts such as coastal floods or saltwater intrusion in their fields and in potable water reserves. Furthermore, slower warming would give more time to adapt to it. In a 1.5°C scenario, 70 to 90% of coral reefs would vanish, whilst at 2°C, nearly all of them (>99%) would be destroyed.

At 1.5°C, there would also be fewer impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including for the loss and extinction of species. A study conducted on nearly 105,000 species shows that at 2°C of warming, 18% of insects, 16% of plants and 8% of vertebrates in the world would lose over half of their distribution range.

At 1.5°C, the distribution range is reduced by two-thirds for insects and halved for plants and vertebrates. Furthermore, from an economic point of view, the losses increase as the temperatures rise. For example, in the event that warming is limited to 1.5°C, the loss in gross global product (GGP) would be 0.3% in 2100, as opposed to 0.5% at 2°C. The farming and fishing communities would be the most affected; limiting global warming to 1.5°C would thus allow people exposed to poverty and climate-related risks by 2050 to be reduced by several hundreds of millions. Finally, we note that overall, at 1.5°C, most of the adaptation needs are reduced, whilst pursuing this target offers perspectives that are less costly overall in terms of adaptation, mitigation and impacts.

As Hans-Otto Pörtner, co-president of IPCC Working Group II recalls in the press release containing the approval of the Summary for Policymakers, these estimations make it abundantly clear that “[e]very extra bit of warming matters, especially since warming of 1.5°C or higher increases the risk associated with long-lasting or irreversible changes, such as the loss of some ecosystems”. This information should thus encourage governments to take the measures required to reach the most ambitious target of the Paris Agreement, whilst warming of 2°C or more – it being understood that current forecasts point toward 3°C in the scenario with full implementation of the NDC of the Parties to the Paris Agreement – would progressively lead to more severe consequences. Regarding whether it is possible to limit global warming to 1.5°C, the IPCC report does not offer any easy answers. However, it does clarify the options that involve a rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.

**Related pathways of global GHG emissions and systemic transitions, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication efforts**

To embark on an emissions pathway that is compatible with global warming limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, systemic measures must be taken in all sectors, and rapid and far-reaching transitions in certain priority sectors must be made, especially in: regional development, energy, industry, construction, transport and urbanism. In the energy field, non-fossil energy sources should also provide 70 to 85% of electricity production by 2050. Energy-intensive industries should reduce their carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from 75 to 90% by 2050, compared with 2010 levels. The building and transport sectors should transition to clean electricity sources. By the middle of the century, 55 to 75% of the final energy consumed in buildings should be electric, whilst low-carbon energy sources should represent 35 to 65% of the energy supply for transport, as opposed to less than 5% in 2020.

In terms of emission reductions, to reach an emissions balance of zero by mid-century, net global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions must decrease by about 45% by 2030, compared with their 2010 levels. The remaining emissions should thus be compensated by removing CO₂ from the atmosphere. One solution that is under consideration is using negative emission technologies, which may be of two types: (i) natural (trees, soil, natural carbon sinks in the ocean, etc.); (ii) chemical, enabling the direct capture of CO₂ in the atmosphere, and then storing it. The trend-based scenarios considered by the IPCC that limit the warming to under 1.5°C also provide for the removal of atmospheric CO₂ of the magnitude of 100 to 1000 Gt of CO₂ over the course of the century. In other words,
these processes could make it possible to reach net negative emissions to bring global warming to 1.5°C after the emissions peak. Note, however, that these techniques to remove atmospheric CO₂ have yet to be proved on a large scale. The IPCC specifies that they could represent a considerable risk for sustainable development, as they are both costly and potentially dangerous for the environment.

Regarding the actions required to strengthen the global response to climate change in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, the IPCC reconfirms the observation that the current NDC of the Parties to the Paris Agreement lack ambition, which would bring global GHG emissions to a range of between 52-58 Gt eq-CO₂ per year in 2030. This is incompatible with a pathway toward 1.5°C by the end of the century, which would require GHG emissions to be under 35 Gt eq-CO₂ per year by the end of the century, even in a scenario involving a very bold increase of the ambition after 2030. Likewise, in the event of future deployment of negative emissions technologies on a broad scale, to avoid exceeding this limit, global CO₂ emissions must start to diminish well before 2030.

Furthermore, the IPCC highlights that the mitigation options that are compatible with the 1.5°C target are related to several synergies with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). There must be an increase in investments in adaptation, mitigation, innovative political instruments and behavioural changes to make the systemic transitions that are required to reach the 1.5°C target, to limit the risks related to global warming, and to strengthen sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. The IPCC therefore highlights the importance of decompartmentalised and multi-level action, especially by strengthening the climate action capacity of subnational authorities, of civil society, of the private sector, of indigenous peoples and of local communities, in order to support the implementation of ambitious and broader climate actions. International cooperation also continues to be an essential catalyst that can create a favourable environment for global action in the context of sustainable development, especially for developing countries and vulnerable regions.

I.4.3. Conclusions

As specified above, this latest scientific analysis of the IPCC should henceforth play a crucial role in informing policymakers, supporting the process of implementing the Paris Agreement and increasing the global climate ambition, whilst the rules for making the said Agreement operational should be adopted at COP24. In particular, the results of the special IPCC report are to be considered in the political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue conducted in Katowice (see Section I.12), but also, in particular, for the first review cycle of the NDC planned for 2020.

Also note that following the decision adopted at its 47th session (in Paris, France in March 2017), the IPCC pursued the reflections of its future work as part of the Global Stocktake⁹³ referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, which will

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⁹³. IPCC, 2018b.
be conducted starting from 2023, and every five years afterwards. More generally, this most recent IPCC assessment provides many pieces of relevant information which should be used to advise the negotiation process and make progress in terms of the provisions, targets and mechanisms of the Paris Agreement (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 4. Examples of differentiated consequences caused by a temperature increase of 2°C/1.5°C above the pre-industrial era

94. © Guide to the Negotiations of the COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018, according to the IPCC.
Figure 5. Evolution of the Convention target and incorporating the 1.5°C

**EVOLUTION OF THE CONVENTION GOAL AND TAKING 1.5°C INTO ACCOUNT**

### UNFCCC
Stabilise [...] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.

### COP15
To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention [...] we understand, given the scientific opinion whereby the rise in global temperature should be limited to 2°C [...] We request that the implementation of this agreement be assessed by 2015 [...] This would imply planning to boost the long-term objective by taking into account sundry elements provided by scientific work, especially in terms of a rise in temperature of 1.5°C.

### COP16
Recognises moreover that a considerable drop in global greenhouse gas emissions is proving essential according to scientific data [...] to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions in order to contain the rise in the average temperature of the planet below 2°C above pre-industrial levels [...] Recognises also the need to envisage, during the first examination of the long-term objective, enhancing the global long-term objective based on the most certain scientific knowledge, mainly about the worldwide rise in average temperature of 1.5°C.

### COP17/ADP
Noting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and emission change pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

### COP21
Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, it being understood that this will reduce the risks and the effects of climate change considerably.

### COP21+IPCC
Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to present a special report in 2018 on the consequences of global warming of more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and on associated profiles of evolution of global emissions of greenhouse gases.

Encourages scientific centres to review the gaps in data and research during structured dialogue between experts, including by focusing on scenarios that limit warming to below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100 and all regional and local repercussions associated with these scenarios.

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*95. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018*
Figure 6. Provisions, targets and main mechanisms of the Paris Agreement that may be advised by the IPCC assessment on the 1.5°C target

I.5. Issues relating to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)

I.5.1. The NDC: a dynamic at the core of the Paris Agreement

Prior to COP21 in 2015, most of the Parties to the Convention had submitted an Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) in the preparatory processes of the Conference. The Paris Agreement henceforth provides for these INDC to be converted into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), either automatically or via a review process initiated by the States, in which the States communicate their NDC when they submit their instrument of ratification of the
Agreement. Following the entry into force of the Agreement in November 2016, the NDC became binding action plans for the Parties that have ratified the Agreement, that must be transposed into national measures to ensure their implementation.

**Entry into force of the Paris Agreement: the NDC become effective**

In October 2016, the two thresholds (55-55%) required for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement were met, with ratification by 72 Parties representing 56.75% of global emissions. Less than a year after its adoption, the Paris Agreement thus entered into force on 4 November 2016, a few days prior to COP22. For all the Parties that ratified the Agreement and submitted their NDC, the priority has become implementation at the national level to ensure their effectiveness. As of 15 October 2018, 181 Parties have ratified the Paris Agreement and 177 NDC are registered in the provisional registry.

Figure 7. Ratification status of the Paris Agreement and communications of the NDC compared with the number of Parties to the UNFCCC

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96. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22
98. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 21, para. 1
100. http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx (last consulted on 15 October 2018)
I.5.2. The implementation of NDC: a transversal issue blending individual and collective dynamics for full execution

The NDC are the cornerstones of the Paris Agreement, as they are individual contributions of each Party to reach the collective objectives set by the Agreement, especially in terms of mitigation. In this respect, each Party must prepare, communicate and maintain the NDC that it intends to achieve. The Paris Agreement then stipulates that the Parties pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions\textsuperscript{102}. However, the issues related to the NDC go beyond mitigation, with the Agreement indicating that it is incumbent upon Parties to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4 (mitigation), 7 (adaptation), 9 (finance), 10 (technology development and transfer), 11 (capacity-building) and 13 (transparency)\textsuperscript{103}.

At the national level, converting NDC into concrete measures will require considerable efforts from Parties, as well as from all national stakeholders, which vary across different situations with their specific national circumstances. In this regard, the capacities of the countries are considered and reasserted in the Agreement, in accordance with equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and different national contexts\textsuperscript{104}. To fulfil the collective objectives under the Paris Agreement, the NDC process will also be subject to the smooth functioning of international operations, to refine the modalities of achievements and monitoring, and to find the resources to support successful implementation.

An ambition to build collectively, considering different national circumstances

The NDC are the result of an inclusive and participatory process that is unprecedented in the history of the Convention. The INDC reflect a shared understanding of as well as a shared ambition of the fight against climate change and of the sustainable development of our societies. As such, the participation of all States to the Paris Agreements must involve their cooperation to reach the individual and collective objectives, which is just as important.

In terms of mitigation, for example, the Paris Agreement states that the developed countries must continue to take the lead via their NDC, “by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets”\textsuperscript{105}. For developing countries, climate ambition must be incorporated into development goals, which may include adaptation measures with mitigation co-benefits\textsuperscript{106}. They are, however, also encouraged to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{102} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 2.
\textsuperscript{103} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 3
\textsuperscript{104} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2
\textsuperscript{105} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 4.
\textsuperscript{106} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 7.
\end{flushleft}
“enhance their mitigation efforts”\textsuperscript{107}, for low-carbon development. To allow for higher ambition in their actions, support (financial and technical) will be provided to them\textsuperscript{108}, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement.

**Funding continues to be an essential corollary for implementation**

Faced with the funding needs of developing countries, since Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries have committed to mobilising USD100 billion per year until 2020. This amount is henceforth a lower threshold, and by 2025, a new target will need to be set, “taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries”, “in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Agreement” (see Section I.9.8)\textsuperscript{109}.

Article 9 of the Paris Agreement thus specifies that “developed country parties provide financial resources to assist developing country parties”\textsuperscript{110}, but that the latter should still biennially communicate quantitative and qualitative information on funding allocated to developing countries\textsuperscript{111}. Article 9 also specifies that “such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts”\textsuperscript{112}. In addition to developed countries, “other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily”\textsuperscript{113}.

All of these points remain subject to the negotiation processes which must enable progress and thus contribute to strengthening the individual resources for implementing NDC, for successful collective achievement. Furthermore, a set of interconnected mechanisms is planned for monitoring the implementation and enhancement of the ambition of NDC over time, to strive toward achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

**I.5.3. Monitoring the implementation of the objectives and raising the ambition of NDC**

As of 15 October 2018, 181 Parties have ratified the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{114} and 177 NDC have been communicated by the Parties\textsuperscript{115}. Nevertheless, current commitments will not be able to maintain warming “well below 2°C” (not to say 1.5°C) by the end of the century, the goal set by the Paris Agreement. This is what emerged from the *Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined

\textsuperscript{107}. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 4.

\textsuperscript{108}. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 5.

\textsuperscript{109}. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 54.

\textsuperscript{110}. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 1

\textsuperscript{111}. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9 para. 5.

\textsuperscript{112}. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9 para. 3.

\textsuperscript{113}. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9 para. 2.

\textsuperscript{114}. https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification (last consulted on 15 October 2018)

\textsuperscript{115}. http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx (last consulted on 15 October 2018)
contributions\textsuperscript{116}, published by the Secretariat prior to COP 22\textsuperscript{117}, which states that average aggregate GHG emission levels are expected to be higher by 8.7 Gt CO\textsubscript{2} eq and 15.2 Gt CO\textsubscript{2} eq by 2025 and 2030, compared with a scenario consistent with the 2°C pathway.

Other more recent studies\textsuperscript{118} have confirmed this observation. According to UN Environment, the hypothesis of a full implementation of current NDC would lead to the depletion of 80% of the available “carbon budget” by 2030 for holding global warming to under 2°C by 2100\textsuperscript{119}. In a recent speech (in May 2018), Anne Olhoff, representative of the UNEP DTU Partnership, thus highlighted the current warming scenario of about 3-3.2°C\textsuperscript{120}. The last IPCC analysis, which was published in October 2018 and concerns global warming of 1.5°C, confirmed this observation of the lack of ambition of current government commitments for reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement (see Section I.4), adding that “limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society”\textsuperscript{121}.

Enhancing ambition in terms of NDC is thus an essential corollary to reaching long-term objectives, as well as short – and medium-term objectives, especially to reach a peak in GHG emissions during the second half of the century \textit{as soon as possible}\textsuperscript{122}.

In this framework, the monitoring process set up by the Paris Agreement should be a central instrument enabling Parties to enhance the level of ambition. Each Party must communicate and renew its NDC every five years\textsuperscript{123}, with the possibility of adjusting them at any time, provided that it enhances its level of ambition\textsuperscript{124}. This is strengthened by the requirement for the implementation of the NDC to be clear and transparent\textsuperscript{125}. This is at the core of the current process. Thus the enhanced transparency and monitoring mechanism set up by the Paris Agreement (see Section I.11 as well) will be key for monitoring and demonstrating progress made via the process of enhancing the level of ambition to reach the objectives.

\textsuperscript{116} UNFCCC, 2016a.
\textsuperscript{117} This report, which was released in 2016, takes into account all the INDC submitted as of 4 April 2016.
\textsuperscript{118} See, in particular, Climate Interactive, 2018.
\textsuperscript{119} UN Environment, 2017.
\textsuperscript{120} https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4ecc-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1chvcjkc_974354.pdf
\textsuperscript{121} IPCC, 2018c.
\textsuperscript{122} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.
\textsuperscript{123} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 9.
\textsuperscript{124} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 11.
\textsuperscript{125} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 8.
Monitoring the implementation of targets linked to NDC

A set of interconnected articles in the Paris Agreement implements a legal architecture to reach the highest level of ambition in the mitigation targets linked to the NDC. This includes the goals of holding back the increase in the global average temperature in the long term, the relevant mitigation goals, whilst putting pressure on Parties to gradually increase their mitigation goals, in order to collectively reach the levels of ambition of the Paris Agreement. This dynamic should be strengthened by a renewal of the NDC in five-year cycles that are increasingly ambitious and informed by scientific assessments.

The Paris Agreement thus creates two cycles:

- The first cycle commits the Parties to present their NDC when they accede to the Paris Agreement (if they have not already done so via their INDC, or if they would like to modify them). Each future contribution should constitute progress compared with the previous contribution, and also the highest level possible, whilst reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and the respective capacities of each country, in light of the various national contexts. The next communication/review cycle is planned for 2020, and will be held every five years thereafter.

- The second cycle involves a Facilitative Dialogue in 2018 (called the Talanoa Dialogue—see Section I.12)—that aims to make an initial assessment of the efforts made, with monitoring of periodic Global Stocktakes, and an initial assessment in 2023, and with subsequent assessments every five years. For these Global Stocktakes, the Parties will be required to present a report using a shared transparency framework that is to be defined, and support will be provided to developing countries to enable them to fulfil their commitments for the reports to be drawn up.

To provide scientific information for the process, the IPCC was invited to present a special report in 2018 on the consequences of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways (see section I.4). In particular, this report will be used to advise the outcomes of the Talanoa Dialogue in Katowice, as well as the first NDC review cycle in 2020. As for the sixth IPCC evaluation report, it should be finalised in 2021, to be incorporated in and to structure the first Global Stocktake mentioned above.

Due to the deficit of the combined effect of the current NDC, the challenge concerning the ambition is more central than ever, whilst several Parties have already started the process of transposing their NDC at the domestic level. At the

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128. Ratification or equivalent process
129. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.
130. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.
131. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.
same time as these challenges that are incumbent upon the Parties for the implementation on the field, a few key points are still being negotiated, whilst we have already highlighted the interconnection of overall dynamics (from the climate talks) and the means of implementation.

Most of these points must be concluded in Katowice, to be reviewed and adopted by CMA 1. In this sense, the Katowice Conference is a crucial step for finalising several aspects of the NDC work programme.

I.5.4. The continuation of work on NDC and issues for Katowice

Following COP21, discussions on NDC continued during COP22, and then at COP23, under the aegis of sessions of permanent subsidiary bodies and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA), each of which covers themes that are transversal or specific, with respect to the NDC negotiations. As specified above, the draft decisions will need to be submitted to the CMA for review and adoption in Katowice, to constitute the rules for rendering the Paris Agreement operational.

Prior to Katowice, an additional negotiation session was held in Bangkok (4-9 September 2018), during which the subsidiary bodies (SBI 48.2 and SBSTA 48.2) and APA (APA 1.6) met again. At the end of the session, a compilation of 307 pages was published\footnote{UNFCCC, 2018b}, which reports on the status of the negotiations related to the work programme of the Paris Agreement, and offers an overall viewpoint on various elements from the talks under the aegis of the various negotiation bodies.

**General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement**

During the preparation for COP24 and after Bangkok, the SBI and SBSTA presidents and the APA co-presidents continued their effort to streamline the negotiation options for all of the points concerning the work programme of the Paris Agreement. As such, they developed and published a joint concept note\footnote{APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b} in mid-October 2018 that is supplemented by annexes ("addenda") offering new approaches or text options on various negotiating talks. However, these various documents do not prejudge the final results that will be decided on in Katowice, or replace the various documents that the negotiations produce (informal notes, tools, etc.) under the various bodies (SBI, SBSTA, APA).

Regarding NDC, several addenda offer new approaches and options that the reader is invited to consider, especially Addendum 1, on the elements relating to Article 4 of the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 22-35. This addendum is divided into two parts:

134. UNFCCC, 2018b
135. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
(i) Part 136, concerning: Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21 (item 3 on the APA agenda); and

(ii) Part 2137, concerning the: Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement (item 6 on the SBI agenda); Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement (item 5 on the SBI agenda); Impact of the response measures (item 9 on the SBSTA agenda).

Beyond the text options, the documents also highlight key political questions that emerge from the talks, and that should be part of the Katowice conclusions for a successful negotiation session. For example:

• *New guidance in relation to the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21 (item 3 on the APA agenda):* (a) Which of the many pieces of information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDC are in fact necessary for making the Paris Agreement operational? (b) How could these elements be best phrased to fulfil the objectives of clarity, transparency and understanding of NDC, in a manner that nevertheless respects national sovereignty? (c) How could the different accounting concepts being discussed recognise the principles of transparency, accuracy, consistency, comparability, and completeness (TACCC) and the avoidance of double counting? (d) Tracking of progress is also addressed under APA agenda item 5 and, taking this into consideration, what is required for “tracking of progress” under APA agenda item 3?

• *Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement (item 6 on the SBI agenda), which raises the following political/technical issues:* (a) A single registry versus two registries as referred to in Article 4 (para. 12) and Article 7 (para. 12) of the Paris Agreement; (b) Options for developing the registry, an interim registry (with or without changes) or a new registry; (c) The inclusion of a “detailed search function”; (d) The level of detail of the guidance to the secretariat on the design and structure of the registry, to avoid micromanaging.

• *Impact of the response measures (item 9 on the SBSTA agenda), which the Parties have differing views on, with respect to:* (i) The scope of the work programme, including resolving disagreements on whether to include the issue of “international trade and investment, value chain integration, inclusive growth, job creation and poverty reduction”; (ii) Streamlining the text of the detailed work programme, distinguishing clearly between modalities and elements of the detailed work programme; (iii) Explore whether certain issues related to the detailed work programme might be the object of technical follow-up work in 2019 in parallel with the start of the implementation of the forum’s activities; (iv) Consider how the options for governance structure included in the text for this item can help to achieve the objective of the forum.

The following paragraphs provide an overview of the main NDC issues, which are also key points for COP24. Concrete progress on these various issues are

136. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018c.
137. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018d.
key for adopting the rules to render the Paris Agreement operational at the end of
the Katowice Conference, as well as for enhancing the ambition and continuity of
international climate action in the coming years.

**Issues related to the COP**

A major issue that is considered by several observers to be an essential way of
enhancing the level of climate action ambition is the Facilitative Dialogue which
culminates at Katowice, and whose organisation was under the mandate of the
COP. Based on the mandate that came out of COP21, this Facilitative Dialogue –
which was renamed the *Talanoa Dialogue* (for further details, see Section I.12) –
should enable an assessment of progress made and provide information for the
renewal of NDC. This dialogue is composed of two phases: (i) a preparatory
phase which was conducted all throughout 2018, and which culminates at
COP24; and (ii) a political phase which takes place at the same time as COP24
and finalises the processes of the Dialogue. The Dialogue is structured around
three questions: Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?

The preparatory phase combined Parties and other non-Party stakeholders
that not only communicated their views on the issues to the Secretariat, but that also
met within the formal Talanoas (particularly in Bonn in May 2018), strengthened
by the organisation of local, national, regional and international Talanoas on the
initiative of the stakeholders (government and non-state) themselves. The political
phase is to be conducted at the same time as COP24, and must bring together
Heads of States, high-level representatives and other non-Party stakeholders. The
goal is for the political leaders to agree on the means for strengthening climate
action and collective ambition to reach the objectives of the Paris Agreement,
particularly aiming to: (i) take stock of collective efforts to reach the long-term
goals of the Paris Agreement; and (ii) provide guidance to prepare the next
communication/review cycle of NDC.

**Issues related to the APA**

After the first CMA session opened in Marrakech, at the same time as COP22,
talks continued under the aegis of APA, up until the additional Bangkok session
in September 2018, where the sixth part of its first session met (APA 1.6). At the
same time as COP24, the first APA session will reach its climax, and must submit
draft decisions to CMA 1 for review and adoption on all of the items that constitute
its negotiation agenda. The following paragraphs offer an overview of the main
NDC negotiation points.

- Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21
  (item 3 on the APA agenda)

140. https://talanoadialogue.com/events
141. See [online] https://cop23.com.fj/talanoa-dialogue/
c. Development of further guidance on NDC features

d. Development of further guidance for the information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDC

e. Development of guidance for NDC accounting

At the end of the negotiations conducted under the aegis of APA 1.4 (November 2017 in Bonn), an informal note was published by the co-facilitators of item 3 on the APA agenda. This 180-page document published on 13 November 2017 offers a compilation of the communications of the viewpoints of Parties on this negotiation item. The negotiations continued at APA 1.5 (April-May 2018 in Bonn). During the discussions, the Parties agreed on the need to encourage better browsing of the information of the previous informal note, which was considered as too long and repetitive. The co-facilitators thus developed a tool that streamlines the various options that the Parties have highlighted in the communications of their views, as well as during talks, reducing the text to approximately 30 pages. At the end of the negotiation intersession, the Parties welcomed the tool, considering that it was a satisfactory base for continuing talks, without prejudging any particular text option.

To prepare for the Bangkok negotiating session (September 2018, APA 1.6), the APA co-presidents published an additional tool in August 2018, based on the document from APA 1.5 that simply offers a new structure for the elements, guiding questions and proposals to further streamline text elements. This summarises the talks thus far and recognises that the opinions still diverge greatly on the structure of the guidance to be developed; in this respect, a large range of strongly expressed viewpoints were shared during the deliberations on this agenda item, particularly on how to review the issues within the scope of the NDC and differentiation between Parties.

At the end of APA 1.6, the informal consultations did not result in an agreement on a revised version of the tool. Instead, the Parties continued work on the tool published in August by the APA co-presidents, seeking to work out various options that may constitute the base of a draft decision for Katowice. The main opposition was in the characteristics of the NDC: the developing countries highlighted the option of including adaptation efforts as new NDC characteristics; the developed countries specify that item 3 on the agenda explicitly covers the new mitigation guidance. At the end of the session, a revised tool was published, simply aiming to correct an omission in a tool that was previously published.

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143. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 28.
144. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 31.
146. APA, 2018a, pp. 2-27.
148. IISD, 2018c.
149. APA, 2018c.
Structure of the text in the document published at the end of the Bangkok session

In the compilation document published at the end of the Bangkok session\textsuperscript{150}, the elements of texts (35 pages) are organised based on the following structure:

- **NDC features:** (i) identification and list of existing features, (ii) new/additional features, (iii) Guidance/elaboration on features
- **Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding (ICTU):** (i) Objectives, (ii) Capacity of developing countries, (iii) Procedural elements, (iv) Substantive elements.

Note that some elements were slightly restructured after the publication of the joint concept note\textsuperscript{151} of the APA co-presidents. Addendum 1 (Part I) of this note\textsuperscript{152} addresses these elements.

The continuation of negotiations on this negotiation point in Katowice should make it possible to go beyond the general negotiating points to settle the fundamental questions to develop a draft decision that is robust and that has the political consensus of the Parties.

This last point crystallises some tension because it affects the core of the Paris Agreement, via the mitigation component of NDC, and particularly from the viewpoint of transparency and of monitoring the efforts and progress made (see Section I.11 regarding this). As such, the results of these talks will be crucial for strengthening the efforts and monitoring the progress to reach the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement (2°C/1.5°C).

However, other points under the aegis of APA are also decisive in this framework and for future processes related to NDC, particularly:

- **The new guidance on adaptation communication, which is included in the NDC, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement (item 4 on the APA agenda; see Section I.10), whose outcomes after the informal consultations at the end of APA 1.5 were published after the Bangkok session (APA1-6.IN.i4v2\textsuperscript{153});**
- **The modalities, procedures and guidance for the transparency framework for measures and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5 on the agenda, see Section I.11), whose outcomes from the informal consultations at the end of APA 1.5 were published after the Bangkok session (APA1-6.IN.i5\textsuperscript{154});**

\textsuperscript{150} UNFCCC, 2018b, pp. 3-38.
\textsuperscript{151} APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
\textsuperscript{152} APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018c.
\textsuperscript{153} APA, 2018d.
\textsuperscript{154} APA, 2018e.
• The issues relating to the Global Stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement (item 6 on the agenda, see Section I.6), whose outcomes from the informal consultations at the end of APA 1.5 were published after the Bangkok session (APA1.6.IN.i6.v3\textsuperscript{155}); and

• The modalities and procedures aiming to ensure the correct operation of the committee responsible for facilitating the implementation and promotion of the compliance with the provisions referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement (agenda item 7; see Section I.6), whose outcomes from the informal consultations at the end of APA 1.6 were published after the Bangkok session (APA1-6.IN.i7_4\textsuperscript{156}).

Issues related to subsidiary bodies

Some issues related to NDC are being negotiated under the aegis of subsidiary bodies which will also be key elements for the adoption of the rules for rendering the Paris Agreement operational. Discussions have continued on these points since the Bonn session (in November 2017, at the same time as COP23), until SB 48.2 (in Bangkok in September 2018), and will culminate in Katowice (in December 2018, at the same time as COP24).

SBI

Regarding issues related to NDC under the aegis of the SBI, the issues that are addressed mainly concern transparency (see Section I.11), particularly:

• Item 5 on the SBI agenda: Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement for review and adoption by the CMA\textsuperscript{157}, whose outcomes from the informal consultations at the end of APA I.5 were published after the Bangkok session (SBI48.2.IN.i5\textsuperscript{158}).

Note that based on the NDC submitted by Parties (with information to facilitate the clarity, transparency and understanding of these contributions), the Secretariat will prepare a synthesis report in 2020\textsuperscript{159}.

• Items 6 and 7 on the SBSTA agenda relate to public registries.
  – Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement (NDC registry), whose consultation outcomes at the end of APA 1.5 were published after the Bangkok session (SBI48.2.IN.i6\textsuperscript{160});

\textsuperscript{155} APA, 2018f.
\textsuperscript{156} APA, 2018g.
\textsuperscript{157} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 10.
\textsuperscript{158} SBI, 2018a.
\textsuperscript{159} This is the year of the first review of the NDC in the common time frame.
\textsuperscript{160} SBI, 2018b.
– Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement Bangkok (registry for communicating adaptation measures, see Section I.10 as well), whose consultation outcomes at the end of APA 1.5 were published after the Bangkok session (SBI48.2.IN.17161);

Note that there will be unofficial consultations related to COP24, to explore synergies between these two registries, as various groups of Parties have called for162.

Some negotiation items under the aegis of the SBSTA will also be decisive in future processes related to NDC, including ways of enhancing the implementation of training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information so as to enhance actions under the Paris Agreement; a draft decision concerning this163 was finalised at the intersession that was held from April to May 2018.

SBSTA
The issues that the SBSTA handles include questions concerning the cooperation mechanisms established by the Paris Agreement (see Section I.3), and financing via public interventions (see Section I.9), particularly:

4. Questions relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement:
   a. Directives on the cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement;
   b. Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement;
   c. Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement.

5. Procedures for accounting for the financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement.

Some of the negotiation points under the aegis of the SBSTA will also be decisive for the future processes related to the NDC, particularly the points concerning:

• Development and transfer of technologies (see Section I.7),
• Research and systematic observation, and
• The impact of the response measures implemented.

Also note that for all these points, further details and draft decisions have been developed via the addenda of the joint concept note published by the SBI and SBSTA presidents and the APA co-presidents in October 2018.

161. SBI, 2018c.
162. IISD, 2018c, p. 10
I.5.5. Conclusions
At the end of the Bangkok session, the outcomes were published in a 307-page document. Although this document was an initial robust base for the Katowice negotiation, it has yet to work out clear options for several elements, including key questions concerning NDC. In the preparations for COP24 and in accordance with the mandates provided by the Parties, the SBI and SBSTA presidents and the APA co-presidents have continued their effort to streamline negotiating options and published a new joint concept note in the middle of October 2018 \(^{164}\). This new work base could be supplemented with annexes ("addenda") that offer new approaches and text options for all of the points related to the work programme of the Paris Agreement. This new work base could be a point of departure for the Parties to take discussions forward without prejudging the final outcomes that will be decided on at COP24.

The Katowice negotiations agenda is thus intense, and the talks on giving concrete expression to the NDC programme under several aspects will probably be strained. The negotiators thus bear a heavy responsibility and the results of their work will be decisive for efficient operationalisation rules for the Paris Agreement, whilst the NDC are the main means of implementation. Overall, COP24 will be a crucial step in the overall climate action process for enhanced ambition, especially under the Talanoa Dialogue. However, although this process is extremely important, it must not infringe upon the progress of technical negotiations for adopting rules that make the Paris Agreement operational.

From the point of view of the negotiations, the main stake is to reach a set of harmonious and robust decisions that reflect the viewpoint of all of the Parties in terms of operationalising the Agreement. This is a challenge, with much opposition that Parties have reaffirmed to each other in Bangkok, especially regarding issues related to NDC and more specifically relating to mitigation and the predictability of financing, for example, as well as the differentiation in burden sharing in the collective effort to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement \(^{165}\).

I.6. Ambition and sectoral approaches
The ambition under the Paris Agreement must be assessed both in relation to the provisions of the said agreement and its accompanying decision and also through the prism of sundry sectoral initiatives that are established both inside and outside the Convention processes. Commitments by States under the UNFCCC are in fact gradually being strengthened by international cooperative initiatives (ICI) on climate (see also Section I.14), that can be made up of all types of actor – public and private – and take any form of cooperation. Thus the architecture of climate governance is totally redefined in the post-Paris regime.

\(^{164}\) APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
\(^{165}\) IISD, 2018c.
I.6.1. Ambition

The Ambition mechanisms of the Paris Agreement

Like the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement makes no provision for binding provisions such as mandatory quantified reductions in GHG emissions by the Parties.

Nevertheless, apart from the fact that all Parties are involved (both developed and developing countries) through their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), it has the advantage of having encouraged an unprecedented number of non-State actors, whose role and efforts have, for the first time, been recognised explicitly in the decision to adopt the Paris Agreement (see also Section I.13). Thus, despite the lack of precise or specific, pre-established targets, such as provisions relating to carbon rating or the abandoning of fossil energies and their substitution by renewable energies, business sector actors normally, and those involved in renewable energy in particular, have launched ambitious initiatives to contribute effectively to achieved the global objective of the Agreement that should go through this type of measure (see also Section I.4).

The Paris Agreement does, however, make certain provisions through rules, modalities and procedures and transparent guidelines which, applied efficiently, should allow the goal of limiting the increase in temperature to well below 2°C, even 1.5°C, but more importantly contribute to supporting the continuation and enhancement of the ambition of individual and collective efforts to achieve the goal in the long term.

These main mechanisms of the Paris Agreement include:

• The goal of containing the rise in temperatures well below 2°C by the end of the century and striving to limit it to 1.5°C. This ambition is conveyed in practical terms by defining a global greenhouse gas emissions pathway: reaching a peak of emissions as soon as possible and achieving a “balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century”\(^{166}\) in accordance with the best available science\(^{166}\);

• All Parties submit or update a national contribution (known as a “nationally determined contribution” – NDC) every five years. This should always be more ambitious than the previous version and open to revision at any time, provided that this obligation to raise the level of ambition is fulfilled (see also Section I.5);

• The mobilisation goal of USD100 billion per year until 2020 is maintained until 2025 and reinforced in Decision 1/CP.21\(^{167}\); this goal hereafter constitutes a floor for a more ambitious financial target to be achieved in 2025, to assist

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166. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 1.
167. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 53.
the developing countries in implementing their policies, strategies, regulations and action plans and measures to combat climate change in terms of both mitigation and adaptation, to contribute to achieving the goal of the Agreement (see also Section I.9);

- The Parties are invited to communicate, by 2020, to the Convention Secretariat mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies\textsuperscript{168}. These strategies can articulate the aspirations for 2050 and guide the future NDC, which can be perceived in this framework as five year trampolines towards a long-term vision. The long-term strategies can be upscaling documents, adapted over time to the changing circumstances and based on short-term development strategies and action plans. The development of these long-term strategies calls for new, innovative approaches and support for certain developing countries.

- The Agreement allows voluntary cooperation between the Parties in the implementation of their NDC to raise the level of ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity\textsuperscript{169} (see also Section I.3);

- A system for monitoring the implementation and “enhanced” support has been set up, formed by the Transparency Framework\textsuperscript{4}, applicable to all, with flexibilities for developing countries. It should be developed gradually taking into account the knowledge acquired from the current measuring, reporting and verification system (see also Section I.11). It should ensure the transparency of mitigation and adaptation efforts and of financial support (see also Section I.9) and technical support (see also Sections I.7 and I.8) of all Parties;

- A facilitative dialogue organised in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal\textsuperscript{170}. The main purpose of this dialogue, renamed Talanoa Dialogue after COP23 under Fijian presidency, is to bring the Parties to revise the ambition level of their NDC upwards and to strengthen the contribution of non-State actors. Many submissions from Parties and several non-State entities have preceded the meetings organised in this context by the presidency of COP24 at Katowice, where the processes of the Talanoa Dialogue will culminate (see also Section I.12);

- A Global Stocktake every two years from 2023, to assess the collective progress compared with the long-term goals of the Agreement and to decide on measures to remain in phase with them. The Parties will then submit new NDC (from 2020 and every five years subsequently), prepared on the basis of the outcomes of this collective assessment;

\textsuperscript{168} Decision 1/CP.21, para. 35.
\textsuperscript{169} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6 para. 1.
\textsuperscript{170} Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.
• The setting up of a mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance with the provisions of the Agreement. As the Paris Agreement has adopted a top-down approach to establishing individual goals of Parties, multilateral cooperation is essential to achieve the collective goal. Thus, this mechanism will have a decisive role in achieving the goals if the facilitative aspect is effective.

• Implementation and ambition level in the pre-2020 period. For the first time, the Convention recognises officially the role of non-State actors (local governments, private sector, NGO, etc.)\(^{171}\) (see also Section I.13) in implementing climate action that should be taken into account in the Global Stocktake;

• The importance of incentives for emission-reducing activities has been recognised, mainly through tools like the national policies and carbon rating (see also Section I.3).

The ambition of the Agreement and of Decision 1/CP.21 must also be assessed by the fact that the said documents include major provisions such as (\textit{inter alia}):

• The obligation of enhancing support for international cooperation in the domains of mitigation, adaptation, capacity-building and technology transfers;

• The creation of a new technology framework\(^ {172}\) whilst recognising the need to accelerate innovation;

• The enhancement of carbon sinks, especially forests\(^ {173}\), including through REDD+ type measures and approaches combining mitigation and adaptation;

• A global adaptation goal\(^ {174}\) (see also Section I.10) and the need to rebalance financing between mitigation and adaptation is maintained.

• The formal recognition of the problem of loss and damage\(^ {175}\), provided with an appropriate cooperation framework;

• The public nature of actions implemented by the Parties through their NDC\(^ {176}\) as well as actions by non-Party actors\(^ {177}\) and the effect of “reputation” of this transparent publicity that should have a significant impact on the chances of achieving the Agreement goals. This should be enhanced by the public nature of outcomes of these combined actions, mainly through the Global Stocktake;

• A set of provisions and measures for enhanced action in the domains of mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing for enhanced action before 2020\(^ {178}\).

\(^{171}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Chapter V, Non-Party stakeholders.

\(^{172}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10 para. 4.

\(^{173}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 5

\(^{174}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7

\(^{175}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 8

\(^{176}\) In particular via the public NDC register [online] http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx

\(^{177}\) In particular via the NAZCA platform [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/

\(^{178}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Chapter IV, Enhanced action prior to 2020.
The ambition of the Paris Agreement must be assessed not only by taking into account provisions in the Agreement itself and in its accompanying decision, but also depending on progress in the recent negotiations and the dynamism of non-State stakeholders.

**Continuing work, from COP21 to the Bangkok session in September 2018**

Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement at the end of COP21, less than a year was needed for it to enter into force, on 4 November 2016, a few days before COP22 (Marrakech, November 2016). Given the early and particularly rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement, many outside observers of the process expected COP22 to accelerate the development process for modalities, procedures and guidelines and provisions and mechanisms for its effective operationalisation. The major outcomes of the session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) held on the fringes of COP22 include setting 2018 as the deadline for the operationalisation of the Agreement and takes into account certain important questions that are not yet included explicitly in the subsidiary body agendas.

At the end of COP22, the Parties also welcomed the very clear programme of work established in the APA conclusions for each point by December 2018, including, *inter alia*, calls for communications, summaries and technical notes by the Secretariat, workshops and round tables. Note nevertheless that under certain specific APA agenda items, the round tables (and sometimes the negotiating sessions) have only been opened to Parties and observer States, whereas the Paris Agreement recognised and enshrined the important role of non-State actors in combating global warming.

During COP23 and the preceding and subsequent meetings of the subsidiary bodies (SBSTA 47, SBSTA 48 and SBI 47, SBI 48) and the Paris Agreement working group (APA 1.5, APA 1.6), negotiations on agenda items involving ambition-related themes saw significant progress towards adopting decisions during the forthcoming COP24 at Katowice (Poland) in December 2018.

After tricky negotiations on agreeing to discuss certain issues such as modalities for the biennial communication of financial information on the availability of public financial resources for developing countries, the introduction of a new global quantified finance goal, draft decisions accompanied by informal notes dealing with guidelines, rules, modalities and procedures of mechanisms to be set up have been prepared for each theme.

It must, nevertheless, be emphasised, unfortunately, that for all these agenda items (just like other agenda items for the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement), the informal notes issued contain many, oft-diverging options and draft decisions propose carrying certain matters forward to 2019.

The concept notes developed by the presidents of the subsidiary bodies and the co-presidents of the APA published in mid-October 2018 attempted to define the working modes and the priorities at Katowice and to improve the structure of informal notes, by presenting them in a format that could see them adopted as decisions.
The challenge is henceforth to define, in order to adopt a balanced “package” that can take into consideration the concerns of all Parties, whilst ensuring that the matters carried forward to 2019 are concluded within the stipulated timeframes, to the satisfaction of the Parties.

The next paragraphs take stock of this so-called progress, highlighting the key matters to be resolved during COP24:

- **International cooperation mechanisms for the implementation of NDC**

  The formal notes developed by the co-facilitators were the subject of several iterations based on submissions by Parties and group of Parties and on the discussions during negotiating sessions and the results of tables organised to give exchanges more momentum. Thus, at the end of the Bangkok session (September 2018), the co-facilitators issued informal notes on the guidelines for the international transfer of mitigation results, the rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism for mitigation and sustainable development and the work programme for the framework for non-market-based approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (see also Section I.3). These informal notes annexed to a concept note by the presiding officers of the APA and the SBI and SBSTA presidents will serve as a basis for the next negotiations towards adopting a decision on Article 6. But already, the Parties have agreed that certain questions will require additional work, that should be concluded end 2019 at the latest.

- **System for monitoring the implementation and “enhanced” support or the Transparency Framework**

  Significant advances have been noted in the work of the two subsidiary bodies in developing the transparency framework of measures and support post-2020. These have addressed the elements and the sources of information that must be included in this framework. The sessions have been preceded by submissions, summaries and technical notes followed by round tables on target themes (see also Section I.11). During APA 1.6 in Bangkok, the Parties made commendable progress in developing modalities, procedures and guidelines relating to the transparency framework reflected in the Bangkok outcomes. All components of the modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPG) became clearer, including the options representing different viewpoints by Parties. The Parties made progress in developing text proposals to be included in the relevant decision and started to identify the technical monitoring work to be undertake after the adoption of the MPG at Katowice. At the same time, it is important to note that there is still a great deal to be done to fine tune the many remaining options and sub-options for the MPG to be adopted at Katowice.

• **2018 Facilitative Dialogue or Talanoa Dialogue for enhanced and decompartmentalised climate ambition**

Greater clarity in the preparations for the 2018 facilitative dialogue have been noted. This must access progress accomplished collectively in the Paris Agreement goal for long-term emissions and shed light on the preparation of NDC. The COP22 and COP23 presidencies were tasked with conducting consultations on the organisation of this dialogue and to report to COP23. The goal of limiting the rise in temperatures well below 2°C and the wish to strive to limit it to 1.5°C, were reaffirmed. Note that the inclusion of elements in the IPCC report on the impacts of limiting the temperature to 1.5°C (see also Section I.4), that has already identified many possible solutions, will be taken into account in the framework of the Talanoa Dialogue.

• **Global stocktake from 2023**

The advances noted in the structuring of the Talanoa Dialogue could assist the Parties in moving this agenda item forwards. One key result of the APA 1.6 on this item\(^\text{182}\) was the move to a decision-based language, both for the modalities and the sources of contribution for the Global Stocktake. The sources of information distinguish between the various types of information that could be necessary to take a global inventory of suppliers of this information, as one type of information can come from several suppliers. Nevertheless, note that the text still contains many options and sub-options, especially for the Global Stocktake modalities and most importantly for key questions such as: the governance and guidance for conducting the process, the timetable and duration of the global inventory and the material cover of its components.

• **Mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance with the provisions of the Agreement**

Their deliberations at the APA 1.6 have helped the Parties to a better understanding of modalities and procedures for the committee to facilitate the implementation and promote compliance provided for in Article 15 of the Paris Agreement and have clarified certain options currently being negotiation. Adding a text on the systematic problems and its overall move to a decision-type language are noteworthy, making the outcome of Bangkok on this item\(^\text{183}\) a firm milestone on the road to Katowice.

• **Long-term climate financing**

The Secretariat was asked to establish a compilation-summary of biennial communications from developed country Parties on their updated strategies and approaches to increase climate action financing between 2014 and 2020. The Parties also decided that the session workshops on long-term financing of climate action organised in 2017 and 2018, with a view to increasing specific financing for miti-

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ation and adaptation, relate to the experiences and lessons to be learned from formulating projects and programmes from needs defined under processes promoted in the countries, to the role of policies and favourable conditions for financing mitigation and adaptation and to facilitating enhanced access. The question relating to determining, from now, the climate action financing goal for post-2025 is still being discussed and is a major area of disagreement between developed countries and developing countries that could compromise the ambition of developing countries when submitting the next NDC.

- **Relations between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention**

Additional discussions on this agenda item at COP22 have been carried forward to COP24 and recommendations have been made to bring the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) closer together, in order to facilitate the financing of technology action plans established from technological needs assessments (TNA) in developing countries.

Overall, when assessing the ambition through advances in the negotiations, it is clear that much progress has been made technically, but the momentum noted since Paris must be maintained to move the negotiations forward and meet the goal of finalising the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement in 2018. This momentum was boosted by the Marrakech Proclamation for climate action 184, adopted at COP22, restating the commitment of Parties to continue the implementation of fixed goals, for sustained political will alone can finalise and adopt draft decisions and give an assurance that pending matters will be closed at end 2019.

I.6.2. Sectoral approaches

The Bali Action Plan 185 already referred to cooperative approaches and sectoral approaches to enhance mitigation after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This raised tremendous hope for the effective implementation of sectoral approaches under the Convention. The negotiations nevertheless have never achieved consensus due to opposition in principle between the developed and the developing countries; developed countries consider that the implementation of these approaches should not result in their committing to mitigation, thereby raising doubts over the principle of common but differentiated responsibility of the Convention.

To date, and unlike the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, all the Parties to the Paris Agreement must submit an NDC; virtually all NDC have a Mitigation component and some have an Adaptation component based on international

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185. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1
cooperation. In addition, international cooperation in the field of mitigation between the Parties in implementing their NDC is permitted and the Paris Agreement and its accompanying decision recognise and encourage the efforts made by all non-Party entities to face up to and respond to climate change.

Since Lima (2014), the UNFCCC has attempted to make cooperation sectoral actions more visible, more especially those of non-State actors, by inviting them to take stock of these efforts via the portal of non-State actors for climate change. COP21 reinforced the phenomenon by inviting non-Party entities to multiply their efforts and support measures designed to reduce emissions and/or enhance resilience and reduce vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change.

To date, more than 10,200 climate change initiatives have been launched, most of which are sectoral and sub-sectoral approaches involving non-State actors (see also Section I.14). These initiatives are mostly regional or global cooperative initiatives. In addition, to date, initiatives in all the most important sectors are identified, including transport, agriculture and forestry, waste, industry, energy (access to energy, renewable energies, energy efficiency), short-lived climate pollutants or adaptation and resilience, etc. These initiatives are mainly initiated by the public authorities, companies, research actors through innovation, private investors, (public and private) developers of innovative financial instruments, actors in capacity-building (institutional and human).

**Monitoring of climate initiatives through setting up of various global platforms to ensure the publicity and transparency**

Many platforms have been set up to monitor the climate initiatives, like, for example, the Climate Initiatives Platform of the UNEP DTU Partnership, which as at 15 October 2018, lists nearly 250 international-scale initiatives around a certain number of key issues. Without nevertheless providing an exhaustive panorama of initiatives in progress, this platform illustrates their diversity and their significance in numbers; the breakdown is summarised in the next table. Note that the column indicating the number of initiatives takes into account the fact that certain initiatives are cross-cutting and therefore counted within several themes/sub-themes.

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187. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 133-134.
188. 10,213 initiatives as at 15 October 2018 [online] http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/
Table. International climate initiatives listed on the UNEP DTU Partnership Climate Initiatives Platform, by theme and by number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main theme</th>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate finance</td>
<td>Private financing</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional financing</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Cross-cutting (transport)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International maritime transport</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and forestry</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities and regions</td>
<td>Cities and other subnational actors</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public government buildings</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private companies</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emissions other than CO₂</td>
<td>Short-term pollutants</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fluorinated gases</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Power supply</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy efficiency</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Renewable energies</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to energy and energy efficiency</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction of emissions in the supply chain</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other issues</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overriding question is, beyond the domino effect that can generate results of these initiatives in terms of reducing emissions, improving the resilience of ecosystems and populations and their participation in climate action financing, to define the modalities for taking recorded results into account to avoid double counting. These provisions should be taken into account in developing modalities, procedures and guidelines relating to the NDC, the market and non-market-based mechanisms and the setting up of the Transparency Framework and Global Stocktake, among other things.

The representatives of some of these initiatives attended the sessions in Bonn (May 2018) and Bangkok (September 2018) under the Talanoa Dialogue, sharing the successful experiences and good practices in their respective fields and sectors.

Lastly, note the sectoral dynamics conducted outside the UNFCCC processes, for one of the highest emitting sectors, that has made noteworthy progress since 2016. This sector, through the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
has managed to introduce a certain number of concrete measures in terms of technological development and international regulatory standards. In 2016, ICAO introduced regulations including a market mechanism, the CORSIA \(^{190}\) to reduce its emissions and contribute to achieving the ambitious goals set by the Organisation and its members to be achieved by 2030. At present, the 2018 version of the CO\(_2\) emission estimation and declaration tool (CERT) has been adopted and agreement has been reached on the characteristics of a central CORSIA register (CCR) \(^{191}\). The ICAO Board adopted, in June 2018, a set of standards and recommended practices (SARP) that make it mandatory for the States and air operators to implement the ICAO Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) plan \(^{192}\).

The challenge for the Parties to the Paris Agreement is to work so that this new mechanism – like those instigated in other sectors – integrates with the provisions that will be introduced under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on cooperative approaches, to guarantee environmental integrity, ensure sustainable development and avoid double counting of GHG emissions and support (financial/technical).

### I.7. Development and transfer of technologies

#### I.7.1. Background

The question of the development and transfer of climate change technologies has always been at the heart of the negotiation agenda and the actions undertaken by the UNFCCC since its adoption in 1992. This specifically arises from article 4 of the aforementioned Convention which enshrined the importance of technological cooperation in mitigating climate change \(^{193}\) in general, as well as the support necessary for developing countries to develop climate change technologies \(^{194}\) in particular.

In light of this, between 1995 and 2001, the Parties, through regional workshops (Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Pacific and Caribbean, etc.), engaged in a series of discussions and consultations to further focus and analyse the information required to develop the technologies, the technological needs, the scope as well as the nature of the support necessary for the development and transfer of technologies.

In parallel, in 1997 (COP 3), under article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in the same year, the Parties re-stated the importance of cooperation and of technology transfer. At COP 7 \(^{195}\) in 2001, the Parties decided to establish:

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190. Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA); for further information [online] https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/market-based-measures.aspx.

191. Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation; 214th session of ICAO; for further information [online] https://www.icao.int/.


193. UNFCCC, Art. 4, para. 1(c).

194. UNFCCC, art. 4, para. 5.

195. Decision 4/CP.7, Annex
• a transfer technology framework to include 5 key topics: (i) the assessment of technological needs, (ii) information on technologies, (iii) the favourable framework for technology transfer, (iv) capacity-building (v) the mechanism for technology transfer;

• the Expert group on technology transfer (EGIT) to facilitate the operationalisation of the Framework was thus created.

Since its creation, the EGIT has made significant progress; particularly:

• the development of methodological guidelines and a report on the assessment of the methodological needs of benefit to the Parties and not provided for under Annex 1 of the UNCCC with the help of the GEF, UNDP, UNEP and CTI (Climate Technology Initiative);

• support for the implementation of an information portal on climate change technologies (TT: clear);

• support for the organisation of workshops and the development of information notices on the framework beneficial for the transfer of technologies.

In 2007, the scope of the actions of the technology transfer framework was extended with the addition of four new sub-topics: innovative finance, international cooperation, the endogenous development of technologies and collaborative research and development.

In 2008, (COP13 the Parties created the Poznań Strategic Programme on technology transfer (PSP), which was the outcome of strategic discussions and work meetings lead by the GEIT. Since its establishment in 2007, the PSP financed by the GCF and set up with the technical support of the UNEP DTU partnership (UDP) enabled over 85 developing countries to draft their technological needs assessment report mainly consisting in identifying and analysing the barriers and of the favourable framework in order to develop priority climate transfer technologies as well as the development of a technological action plan and project ideas.

Due to the climate emergency, validating the urgency to deploy climate change mitigation and adaptation technologies, the Cancún Agreements in 2010 (COP 16) proved to be a decisive turning-point with the creation of the technological mechanism, composed of a political arm, the Executive Technological Committee (ETC) and an operational arm, the Climate Technology Network and Centre (CTCN).

This turning point opened up a new era in the negotiation agenda regarding technologies. To give shape to these new entities, the Parties thus engaged in – through subsidiary permanent bodies (SBI and SBSTA) – a series of discussions

197. Decision 3/CP. 13, Annex, Section E.
200. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 117(a) and (b).
and text proposal between COP17 (2011) and COP20 (2014), which resulted in adopting decisions concerning the terms of reference regarding the strategic and operational architecture of the TEC and CTCN\textsuperscript{201}.

Furthermore, Decisions 14/CP.18 para.11 (COP18, 2012) and 17/CP.19 para.4 (COP19, 2013) on the development and publication of the joint annual report between the TEC and the CTCN represented significant progress in terms of the operationalisation of the technological mechanism. This allowed the Parties, specifically those of the developing countries, to better appreciate the outcomes realised in terms of technology transfer and especially to gauge the disparities and needs to be filled for the effective implementation of Article 4\textsuperscript{202} of the Convention.

I.7.2. COP21: a turning point for an effective and efficient operationalisation of the technological mechanism of the Convention

The rapid enforcement of the Paris Agreement greatly illustrated the importance accorded by the Parties to the urgency for concerted climate action towards the overall goal of reducing GHG omissions and developing resilience to climate change. The aforementioned agreement effectively accords centre stage to support and cooperation\textsuperscript{203} in the development of the technology transfer in order to instil a new dynamic of sustainable low-carbon emission development and resilience to climate change\textsuperscript{204}, taking into account the national circumstances of the vulnerable countries.

From this perspective, the Paris Agreement is perfectly aligned with the institutional architecture already established by the Convention which is the technological mechanism\textsuperscript{205} and gave new impetus to technology transfers marked by the creation of a new technological Framework\textsuperscript{206}. Specifically, at COP21, the Parties undertook a commitment to strengthen the provision that already exists in terms of support and action in favour of developing transfer technologies. They also took into account the substantial effort required for an effective operationalisation of the working programme to be completed by December 2018, at COP24 (Katowice, Poland).

To operationalise the ambition of this work programme launched in 2016, following the enforcement of the Paris Agreement, the Special Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)\textsuperscript{207} was established and included two major strategic focal points on climate change technologies in its agenda: the development of transfer technologies and enhanced action before 2020.

\textsuperscript{201} Decision 2/CP.17, Decision 4/CP.17, Decision 14/CP.18, Decision 25/CP19 para. 2.
\textsuperscript{202} Para.1(c) and para. 5.
\textsuperscript{203} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 6
\textsuperscript{204} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, paras. 1 and 2.
\textsuperscript{205} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 3
\textsuperscript{206} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 4
\textsuperscript{207} Decision 1/CP.21, para 7.
In relation to the strategic access for the development of transfer technologies, the working programme adopted by the Parties consists in the development of a new technological framework\textsuperscript{208}, required to provide strategic guidelines to facilitate the efficient operationalisation of the Convention’s technological mechanism\textsuperscript{209}. The process for the development of the aforementioned technological framework was mandated by the SBSTA and should, when completed, contribute\textsuperscript{210} to:

- the realisation and implementation of a technological needs assessments (TNA), as well as the the enhanced implementation of their outcomes, especially action plans and draft projects in terms of technologies, thanks to the development of projects accepted by the lending institutions.
- the provision of enhanced financial and technical support to implement the outcomes of the technology needs assessments.
- the assessment of the technologies ready to be transferred.
- the implementation of enabling environments and the elimination of barriers to the development and transfer of socially and environmentally sound technologies;

In addition to the requirements for the implementation of the technological action plans, the questions of innovation and financial support are key discussion points which the Parties, specifically the developing countries, continue to discuss to reach convergent viewpoints in order to contribute to enhanced outcomes on the development of climate change transfer technologies.

Likewise, the Parties request that the TEC and CTCN, respectively the political and operational arm of the technological mechanism of the Convention, to strengthen their actions across two new core focal points\textsuperscript{211} for the long-term effectiveness of the Paris Agreement; consisting in:

- research, development and demonstration of the technologies
- developing and building endogenous capacities and technologies.

Furthermore, the Parties determined that it was necessary to implement an evaluation provision of the technological mechanism of the Convention to better gauge the efficacy and the suitability of the strategic guidelines and the measures undertaken under the Paris Agreement with the aim of developing the technology transfer\textsuperscript{212}. The SBI was also tasked with defining the scope and the practical procedures for the periodic\textsuperscript{213} assessment of the technological mechanism by taking into account, in an exhaustive manner, the CNCT\textsuperscript{214} assessment procedure, as well the reporting terms of the efforts of the Paris Agreement in relation to the periodic Global Stocktake\textsuperscript{215}.

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\textsuperscript{208} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 4
209. Decision 1/CP. 16 para. 117.
210. Decision 1CP/21, para.67(a-d).
211. Decision 1CP/21, para.66.
212. Decision 1CP/21, para. 69.
213. Decision 1CP/21, para. 70.
In addition to the development of transfer technologies, the Parties also decided, at COP21, to establish an investigation process on the mitigation\textsuperscript{216} and adaptation\textsuperscript{217} measures to enhance the actions within this framework. This review process aims, on the one hand, to facilitate dialogue between experts, political decision-makers and the bodies of the technological mechanism (TEC and CTCN) and, on the other hand, to promote the effective use of technologies to deliver a significant contribution to the pre-2020 climate ambition.

COP21 also adopted Decision 12/CP.21 strongly recommending that the CTCN, in the exercise of its functions, uses the guidelines designed by the TEC, which define the areas of improvement for the operationalisation of the outcomes of the technological needs assessment projects\textsuperscript{218}.

Moreover, the links and synergies of actions between the technological and financial mechanisms were at the heart of COP21 negotiations. The Parties thus asked the constituent bodies of this mechanism (notably the TEC CTCN, GCF and GEF) to provide strategic cooperative guidelines to be considered by the bodies of the COP\textsuperscript{219}, to continue to explore and establish productive partnership clusters in terms of financial support, research and to develop an efficient technology transfer mechanism\textsuperscript{220}.

I.7.3. Post-COP21, negotiation trends on climate change technologies

Following the decisions taken at COP21 and specifically the adoption of Paris Agreement, the Parties – in agreement with the bodies of the COP (SBI, SBSTA, APA) and other bodies of the Convention – organised a series of consultations to operationalise the different points of the negotiation agenda summarised below;

\begin{itemize}
  \item the enhancement of the links and consultations between the technological and financial mechanisms.
  \item the Poznań Strategic Programme on technology transfer (PSP).
  \item the independent evaluation of the CTCN and the development of a response strategy proposed by the UNEP.
  \item the scope and the procedures of the periodic assessment of the technological mechanism
  \item development of the technology Framework
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{216} Decision 1CP/21 on the technical revision of mitigation measures para. 109(c).
\textsuperscript{217} Decision 1CP/21 on the technical revision of adaptation measures paras. 128 and 129(a-b).
\textsuperscript{218} Decision 12 CP/21 paras. 4, 5 and 6
\textsuperscript{219} Decision 13/CP 21 paras. 4 and 9.
\textsuperscript{220} Decision 13/CP 21 paras. 7, 8 and 10
The enhancement of the links and consultations between the technological and financial mechanisms

In light of Decision 13/CP 17, paras. 7 and 10 related to the already established cooperation and partnership initiatives, COP22 (Marrakesh, 2016) was a crucial step in the process of strengthening the synergies of action between the two mechanisms of the Convention. Specifically, the Parties positively welcomed efforts undertaken by the GCF in organising annual meetings with the bodies of the technological mechanism and in the development of a joint request for technical assistance from the CNCT through a preparation programme led by the GCF.  

Similarly, developing countries were strongly recommended to take advantage of this preparation opportunity opened by the GCF to develop operational technology programmes and projects taking into account the outcomes of the technological needs assessment and using the technical support services of the CTCN.  

As this issue was not part of the agenda of the additional Bangkok session, COP24 should undoubtedly have to take decisions to enhance the current provisions or even explore new decisions to improve the opportunities for joint action between the constituent bodies of both mechanisms of the Convention.

Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer (PSP)

Since 2010 with the adoption of the Cancún Agreements, the SBI has continued discussions with the Parties to improve the operation of the technological needs assessment project (TNA) financed by the GEF and specifically to contribute to the operationalisation of the outcomes of this project notably the Technology Action Plans (TAP) as well as project ideas developed. This negotiation process includes inter alia:

- The SBI 43 mandate given to the TEC to regularly coordinate and report on the PSP assessment outcomes. The outcomes of the final assessment of the first phase of project TNA 1 will be included in the annual TEC report and submitted to the SBI for approval at COP24. Furthermore, SBI 47 (2017, Bonn) invited the beneficiary countries of the third phase of the global TNA project to take into account the lessons learnt and the outcomes of this final assessment of the TNA 1 project.
- The strengthening of the synergies of the actions between the CTCN and the GEF: incorporating and developing requests for technical assistance from the TAP and project ideas developed (produced by the TNA) contribute to

221. Decision 14/CP. 22 para. 4.
222. Decision 14/CP. 22 para. 7.
223. Decision 14/CP. 22 para. 10.
224. Technology Action Plan (TAP)
225. FCCC/SBI/2015/22, para. 79.
226. FCCC/SB/2017/3, para. 28.
227. SBI 45: Conclusions no. 84.
improving further the harmonisation of the development and technology transfer procedures. In the same way, the conclusions of SBI 47 reiterating the necessity for the GEF to report to the COP on the efforts deployed to strengthen the links between the designated national entities (END – focal point of the CTCN) and the focal point of GEF with regard to the beneficiary countries of the TNA project\textsuperscript{228}.

\textit{Independent review of the CTCN and the development of a response strategy submitted by the UNEP}

Based on the outcomes of the assessment on the efficacy of the operationalisation of the CTCN\textsuperscript{229}, the Parties, at COP23, decided \textit{inter alia}\textsuperscript{230}:

- to renew the UNEP mandate and prolong the CTCN’s hosting contract.
- to ask the UNEP to elaborate and to submit a response strategy for the different points highlighted in the CTCN independent assessment.
- to ask the SBI to submit a draft decision for consideration at COP24 to improve the CTCN’s performances.
- to explore appropriate measures in terms of financial support to allow the CTCN to face the divergences and budgetary constraints outlined in the conclusions of the independent assessment.

Thus the Parties, at the informal sessions of SBI 48.1 (2018 Bonn) were engaged in long and intense discussions on the conclusions and recommendations of the CTCN’s \textsuperscript{231} independent assessment as well discussion on the scope and practical and strategic implications of the response strategies developed and proposed by the UNEP \textsuperscript{232} in compliance with the provisions of Decisions 14/CP. 23 (paras. 1-9).

The principal point of disagreement was paragraph 5 of the draft decision\textsuperscript{233}, which certain groups, notably the G77 groups and the LDC particularly insisted on the need to improve the support for the strengthening the designated national bodies. After several informal and additional sessions agreed to by the President of SBI 48.1, the Parties finally decided to adopt the draft conclusion\textsuperscript{234} proposed by SBI 48.1 considering the outcomes of the independent assessment and the response strategy and also recommended submitting the draft decision to COP24 for review and adoption\textsuperscript{235}.

\textsuperscript{228} FCCC/SBI/2016/20, para. 84.
\textsuperscript{229} Decision 2/CP.17: CTCN references terms: Annex VII, para. 20.
\textsuperscript{230} Decision 14/CP.23, paras. 1-9.
\textsuperscript{231} FCCC/CP/2017/3.
\textsuperscript{232} FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.5.
\textsuperscript{233} FCCC/SBI/2018/L.15/Add.1.
\textsuperscript{234} FCCC/SBI/2018/L.15.
\textsuperscript{235} FCCC/SBI/2018/L.15/Add.1.
Nevertheless, it is opportune to underline that the Parties, such as the countries with economies in transition, verbally stated, during the plenary closure of the intersessions of the Bonn negotiations in May 2018, their objection to the draft conclusions adopted because their status does not allow them to benefit currently from the recommendations of the CTCN response strategy, specifically designed for developing countries.

**Scope and procedures for the periodic assessment of the technological mechanism**

To contribute to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement and particularly the provisions related to the development of transfer technologies, at COP21 the Parties felt it was opportune, indeed necessary, to find out more about the efficacy as well as the suitability of all categories of support allocated to the technology mechanism of the Convention. For this purpose, the SBI was mandated by the Parties to start its 44th session to develop the scope and procedures for this periodic assessment incorporating the CTCN’s procedure and terms of assessment as well as the reporting to the Global Stocktake to inform the Parties about the efforts and supports provided in terms of transfer technologies.

Thus, at SBI 44 (2016, Bonn), the Parties adopted a decision referencing a revision of the terms and guidelines of the periodic assessment as defined and established at COP21. The Parties thus felt it necessary that the assessment of the support to the technological mechanism could not overlook taking into account the Convention’s two additional procedures in the process of being developed which are:

- the working programme on the transparency Framework on the actions and support provided under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.
- the technological Framework under article 10, para. 4 of the Paris Agreement.

To facilitate the development process, the Parties were asked to submit their proposals on the scope and procedures in order that the Secretariat could submit a summary of these proposals at SBI 46 (May 2017, Bonn). SBI 46 thus enabled to determine the divergence of viewpoints between the Parties on the elements of the scope and procedures of the periodic assessment, based on the submissions to the Secretariat on this topic and on the summary report the later had drafted.

236. Decision 1/CP.21, para 69.
238. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 6
240. FCCC/SBI/2016/8 Para.95.
241. FCCC/SBI/2016/8 Para.96.
Specifically, the LDC group highlighted the importance of researching the very limited financial support given to the CTCN, a real limitation potentially impacting negatively on the efficacy of the services it provides to the developing countries. To further explore the discussion and ensure consistency in the proposals developed, the Parties proposed using a technical document highlighting the experiences, lessons learned and best practices of similar assessments previously conducted within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol Convention.

Thus, at SBI 48.1 (April-May 2018, Bonn), the Parties had the opportunity to table intense and constructive discussions on the relevance of the technical document submitted and especially on the informal note prepared by the co-facilitators based on the submissions of the Parties and observers. From this point of view, the major difference centred on the relevance of revising the elements of the scope. In contrast to the negotiation groups bringing together the UNFCCC Annex 1 countries (developed countries) who felt they had already validated the section on the scope of the assessment at SBI 44, the developing countries felt it was necessary to further specify the content regarding the suitability of the support mechanism.

SBI 48.1 closed its agenda by adopting a decision considering the summary note of the submissions, the technical document on the capitalisation of similar assessments and the informal note defining the scope and the procedures of the assessment. Moreover, the Parties mandated SBI 48.2 to continue developing the informal note and particularly the procedures which had not been analysed by the Parties at SBI 48.1.

Informal discussions during the additional Bangkok session (SBI 48.2) introduced a new dynamic to the negotiations marked by the pressing need to agree on the constituent elements of the scope and the procedures for the periodic assessment of the technological mechanism whereby all the regulations related to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement would be adopted at COP24 in December 2018.

Nevertheless and despite agreed efforts, the two proposals of a draft decision relating respectively to the Conference of the Parties acting as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) and at COP24 prepared by the designated facilitators, including the annex, were not adopted by the Parties and therefore should involve a series of intense negotiations for adoption at COP24.

The key points of disagreement critically related to the practical modalities of this assessment. Within the context of the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement, several developing countries reaffirmed their position of favourably incorporating and taking into account the information and data regarding the procedures; specifically the outcomes of the CTCN review, the transparency framework on actions and support (article 13 of the Paris Agreement), the Global Stocktake (article 14 of the Paris Agreement), etc. Moreover, the Parties did not agree on the
constituent elements of the outcomes expected from this assessment process. In addition to the final report, the Parties also emphasised the need, at the end of the assessment process, to set out appropriate recommendations to improve the technological mechanism with the aim of implementing the Paris Agreement.

**General overview on the progress of the negotiations for COP24**

Taking into account these differences of opinion on the modalities, specifically the outcomes, the sources of information and the interconnections with the assessment processes such as the CTCN review, the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies, through a joint concept note published mid-October 2018 proposed substantial improvements which will be submitted to the Parties for their approval at COP24 with the aim of its adoption prior to COP26 in 2020. The key points of this new draft text include inter alia:

- The design of a flowchart indicating the modalities of the periodic assessment and mentioning the respective roles of the CMA, SBI and Secretariat; this flowchart has no legal status for the time being and does constitute a tool which will contribute to transparency regarding the relationships and the tasks of the Convention involved in this process.
- The addition of new paragraphs to the two draft proposals (CMA and COP24) relate to and highlight the importance of the connections between the CTCN review process and the periodic review of the technological mechanism.

**Development of the technological framework**

Following decision 1/CP.21 paragraph 67 sub-paragraphs (a – d), the SBSTA started to develop the technological framework, principally aimed at providing guidelines and general directives to the technological mechanism of the Convention with the view to an enhanced and efficient action for the development of transfer technologies. Based on a compilation of the Parties’ points of view and the information note of the flowchart the initiatives and transfer technology activities, the Parties agreed at SBSTA 45 (2016 Marrakesh) on the need to strengthen the synergies of action with the current initiatives to implement a technological framework and to contribute efficiently to the operationalisation of the technological mechanism of the Convention.

246. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018h. (APA-SBSTA-SBI.2018.Informal.2.Add.5)
247. SBI49.M.i15.
249. FCCC/SBSTA/L.8: Annex
Furthermore, the Parties deemed that the technological framework could play a primary role in the dynamic of sustainable and transformational transfer technologies, as defined by article 10 paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Paris Agreement. Aware of the numerous challenges clearly identified and highlighted during the informal consultations, SBSTA 45 agreed on the following five constituent topics of the aforementioned framework:

- innovation;
- implementation;
- enabling conditions and capacity-building;
- the collaboration and the commitment of the stakeholder Parties; and
- support

Similarly, the communications of the Parties\(^{251}\) and observers\(^{252}\) as well as productive discussions enabled the co-chairs of SBSTA 46 (May 2017, Bonn) to agree on the principles of the framework which are:

- consistency: the need to align with the long-term vision of the Paris Agreement and harmonisation with the plans and the strategies of the Convention and the international institutions considered relevant to the issues related to the transfer of technologies.
- inclusion: considering the active involvement of the relevant actors, the objectives for sustainable development (SDG) and other essential points, including gender, the technological needs determined by the countries, national circumstances of the LDC, local capacities and the endogenous technologies of the developing countries.
- an outcome-based approach; highlighting the need to accomplish, progress and deliver tangible impacts.
- a transformational approach; in compliance with the ambition of the Paris Agreement which incorporates a transitional dynamic towards low-carbon societies and societies resilient to climate change.
- transparency; insisting on the need to improve the follow-up and assessment mechanism to provide better information and updates on the costs, the outcomes as well as the planning process and the management of resources allocated to the actions of the technological framework

From this point of view, it is opportune to mention the submissions of the Parties, for example the LDC\(^ {253}\) submission, which emphasised the need to establish

\(^{251}\) Accessible [online] http://unfccc.int/5900.


a clear and functional architecture to strengthen the links and the synergies of the actions between the technological mechanism of the Convention and the relevant institutions and actors, including the COP, the CMA, the SBI, SBSTA, the Adaptation Committee, NAMA, NAP, national focal point, END, OSC, technology inventors, private operators and international financial institutions, etc.

At its 47th session (November 2017, Bonn) the SBSTA considered the work already carried out by the CTCN and the TEC and the future activities both these entities could launch with the view of the operationalisation of the technological Framework that would be adopted by the Parties. At the same session, the SBSTA mandated the Secretariat of the Convention to prepare a preliminary version of the technological Framework prior to SBSTA 48.1 in Bonn (May 2018) taking account the progress already made on the issue, the principles and topics as well as the ongoing discussions on the structure of the technological Framework.

In compliance with the conclusions of SBSTA 47\textsuperscript{254}, the Parties considered the first version of the technological Framework and renewed the mandate of the SBSTA Chair to continue developing the above framework for its review at the Bangkok session (SBSTA 48.2) and its adoption at COP24\textsuperscript{255}. The Parties, particularly the LDC, reiterated the content of their submission on the structure and their commitment to include the elements related to the enhanced transparency Framework\textsuperscript{256}.

In the same vein, SBSTA 48.2 Bangkok, was also marked by intense negotiating sessions on the technological framework project updated following SBSTA 48.1. The divergent points of view of the informal sessions involved:

- consideration of the circumstances and specific needs of the developing countries;
- the promotion of endogenous technologies strongly stated by the developing countries;
- the pressing need to have a precise and clear definition of the aforementioned structure and particularly its functional links with the technological mechanism and the other structures pertinent to the Convention specifically the GCF;
- the importance of the contribution of the technological framework to the expected transformational changes expressed by the developing countries.
- Given the number of outstanding points, the Parties decided to postpone and launch new discussions on the draft decision and its annex\textsuperscript{257}(updated proposal on the technological framework) at COP24.

\textsuperscript{254} FCCC/SBSTA/2017/7
\textsuperscript{255} FCCC/SBSTA/2018/L.7.
\textsuperscript{256} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 5
\textsuperscript{257} SBSTA48.2.DT:i5.
General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement

To facilitate the next negotiation process sessions (COP24 and SBSTA 49) the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies published a joint concept note (mid-October 2018) taking stock of the new draft proposals on all the elements related to the working programme of the Paris Agreement, including the differences regarding the technological framework project. One of the summary propositions concerns regrouping all the paragraphs and passages regarding support in order to contribute to a better understanding of the technical and financial resources necessary to for the CTCN and TEC, requested by the Parties for the operationalisation of the aforementioned framework.

I.7.4. Conclusions

Reading further into the challenges and the trends of the negotiation dynamics on the progress achieved – specifically following the implementation of the Paris Agreement – would seem to predict optimistic developments at the next sessions in Katowice (COP24).

From the completion of the remarkable work of the EGTT on technological transfers to the working programme post-COP21 (2015, Paris) have resulted in significant progress in negotiations regarding technologies, including:

- the strengthening of the links and the consultations between the technological (TEC and CTCN) mechanisms and the financial (GFC, GEF) mechanisms.
- The Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer (PSP) which took shape through the considerable efforts in support the implementation of the TAP and the synergies of the actions between the GEF and the CTCN.
- the positive independent assessment of the CTCN and the development of a response strategy by the UNEP emphasising the necessity to support the END.
- the scope and the modalities for the periodic assessment of the technological mechanism in the process of being developed.
- the development of the technology Framework

Nevertheless, there are still numerous challenges to be overcome to strengthen the application of the global objective for enhanced action and sustainable collaboration, as defined by paragraph 1, Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. In fact, from the limited financial resources of the CTCN, the absence of a clear architecture of the technological framework, the limited contribution of the financial mechanism etc., all constitute as many limiting factors in relation to finalising the working programme of the APA which is required to be concluded at COP24, to adopt the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement.

258. APA, SBSTA, SBI, 2018h. (APA-SBSTA-SBI.2018.Informal.2.Add.5), Section E (Support, Para. 41)
These barriers, moreover, represent restrictions in relation to the global efficiency of the services of the Convention’s technological mechanism; subsequently, they limit the opportunities to develop the technology transfers for the benefit of developing countries, specifically in relation to aspects such as innovation, development and transfer of endogenous technologies, financial support etc.

The series of informal consultations of the additional Bangkok session highlighted the differences of the groups of the Parties across all issues related to the assessment of the technological mechanism and especially on the support required by the developing countries for the operationalisation of article 10 of the Paris Agreement.

Taking into account the scope and the challenges of the additional points of the negotiations on the development of the transfer technologies (the link with the financial mechanism, the Poznań strategic programme on the transfer of technologies, the independent review of the CTCN, etc.), it seems that there is a real challenge, indeed a blockage, in adopting the decisions in relation to technologies, such that the negotiators will have to open up the two draft proposals and informal documents on the periodic assessment of the technology mechanism259 and on the technology framework260.

From this point of view, the publication prior to COP24 of the joint concept note261 elaborated by the Chair of the subsidiary bodies could help improve the overall dynamic of the upcoming negotiations and particularly on the items on the agenda regarding the periodic assessment of the technological mechanism and the elaboration of the technological framework. In fact, this new note mentions and translates the work to synthesise the information and especially the Convention’s contribution towards improving the textual elements to allow the negotiators to explore and find concrete and consensual propositions especially on the various points of divergence.

I.8. Capacity-building

I.8.1. Introduction to the importance of capacity-building for the implementation of the NDCs, differentiated per country type

Article 11 of the Paris Agreement underlines the importance of capacity-building in developing countries. The objective is to enable them to implement efficient climate change measures, particularly by the implementation of adaptation and mitigation measures to facilitate the development, distribution and the use of technologies, access to climate financing, elements related to education, training and the creation of public awareness as well as the transparent, recurrent and precise

259. SBI48.2.DT:i14a.
260. SBSTA48.2.DT:i5
communication of information. If this capacity-building is to be propelled forward by the countries themselves, taking into account national circumstances and needs, Article 11 emphasises the collaborative required to achieve this. It thus states that all the Parties must cooperate in capacity-building in developing countries, within the framework of implementing the Paris Agreement. Developed countries should thus strengthen their support for capacity-building actions in developing countries.

If the Paris Agreement clearly indicates this need for capacity-building, it is not, however, a new concept within the framework of international negotiations on climate change because the Convention itself had highlighted this need.

I.8.2. Principles enshrined in the Convention

Within the context of international climate change, capacity-building initiatives are rooted in the observation that developing countries, as well as the so-called economies in transition, would not be able to engage in any ambitious actions, both in the area of adaptation and mitigation, without addressing the gaps and the deficiencies identified as limitations for formulating and implementing them.

### What is capacity-building?

Combating climate change sustainably requires considerable effort. Not all countries have the capacity, the knowledge, the tools, the public support, the scientific expertise and the political savoir-faire to achieve this. Thus, capacity-building consists in improving the capacity of the individuals, the organisations and institutions in both the developing countries and in the economies in transition with the aim of identifying, planning and implementing mitigation measures, or developing low greenhouse-gas development strategies (GHG) as well as climate change adaptation strategies. Within the framework of the Convention, capacity-building is designed on 3 levels: individual, institutional and systemic.

Article 6 of the Convention deals with education and public awareness. This article provides that:

- in paragraph a, sub-paragraph (iv) – the training of scientific, technical and management personnel; and
- in paragraph (b)-collaboration to achieve the objectives set out in the Article under the Convention.

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262. By additionally supporting the “Commitments” of the Parties under Article 4, paragraph 1 (i) of the Convention, which provides that the Parties by their cooperation, encourage and support education, training and public awareness of climate change and encourage the broadest participation in this process notably in terms of non-government organisations.
Since the adoption of the Convention, capacity-building has become an integral part of the negotiation process. This was not only broached implicitly and transversally through several other topics, but it was also a negotiation topic in its own right. Capacity-building was also addressed, amongst other topics, in relation to the preparation of national communications, GHG inventories and technology transfer and adaptation. Discussions over several negotiation cycles resulted in the implementation of a capacity-building framework, which has now developed into its current form (see below, inset “The main capacity-building frameworks”).

I.8.3. The capacity-building framework under the Kyoto protocol

Understanding the place of capacity-building in the context of international climate negotiations

The premises of capacity-building discussions were launched at the tenth session of the subsidiary bodies of the Convention. Introduced by the African group of negotiators (GAN), China and the Philippines, at the beginning of the discussions, the Parties expressed their wish to see a capacity-building framework for developing countries established within an intergovernmental process, to ensure the coordination between the various initiatives in train, and to include the finance mechanism.

Over the years, the negotiations acknowledged the limitations to capacity-building faced by developing countries in implementing the Convention objectives, and in particular the needs of the Least Developed Countries (LDC), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and African countries. On the other hand, they also underlined that capacity-building for developing countries must be led by the countries themselves to best reflect national initiatives and priorities.

COP 7 (Marrakesh, 2001) in its Decision 2/CP.7 regarding developing countries and in Decision 3/CP.7 regarding transitioning economies, set up a capacity-building framework to direct the activities related to the Convention and their effective participation in the Kyoto Protocol. These decisions identified the principles which should underline the capacity-building actions actions piloted by the countries. These principles mainly seek to meet the specific needs and conditions prevailing in the developing countries, whilst at the same time reflecting their national priorities and initiatives in terms of sustainable development.

These decisions themselves highlighted that capacity-building activities must amplify the synergies between the Convention and the other multilateral agreements regarding the environment. They also highlighted the specific circumstances regarding LDC and SIDS which must be taken into account in the implementation of this framework. In 2005, with the adoption of the Kyoto protocol, the capacity-
building framework of the Convention also became applicable to the Kyoto Protocol. This framework was reviewed by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).

I.8.4. Establishment of the Durban Forum

An important step was taken at COP17 (Durban, 2011) when the Parties tasked the SBI with “improving the monitoring and review of the effectiveness of capacity-building by organising a yearly Durban Forum, parallel to the sessions of the bodies of the Convention, for an in-depth review of capacity-building, with the Parties, the representatives of the competent bodies created under the Convention [...] to share their experiences, exchange ideas, best practices and lessons learnt regarding the capacity-building work achieved”.

The Durban Forum is an annual event, held jointly at the Bonn intersession negotiations and is open to all participants. The overall objectives of the forum are:

- to fill information gaps;
- to provide an overview of the capacity-building support being provided to developing countries and the corresponding implementation efforts provided by the Parties; and
- to improve the monitoring and review of the effectiveness of the capacity-building process within the international climate change framework.

However, this Forum has neither a budget, nor institutionalised governance. Since May 2012, the Durban Forum on capacity-building met 7 times. The main objective of the last May 2018 session was to improve capacity-building for the implementation of the NDA within the framework of the Paris Agreement.

I.8.5. Creation of the Paris Committee on capacity-building under the Paris Agreement (PCCB)

a. The establishment of the PCCB

The Paris Committee on capacity-building (PCCB) was set up by the COP to fill the current and emerging gaps and needs in the implementation of capacity-building in developing country Parties and to improve capacity-building efforts, including consistency and coordination of capacity-building under the Convention.

Decision 1/CP.21 requested the SBI elaborate the mandate of the PCCB within the context of the third full revision of the implementation of the capacity-building framework in developing countries, in order to recommend a draft proposal on the issue to be reviewed and adopted by COP22.

263. Decision 29/CMP.1 and Decision 30/CMP.1.
264. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 144; see also FCCC/SBI/2012/22
266. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 76.
The principal frameworks for capacity-building set up under the Convention and related legal instruments

The various discussions on capacity-building resulted in the implementation of a capacity-building framework, which current form emerged from the main steps below.

Under the Convention:
In 2001, the Parties, under the Convention, adopted two capacity-building frameworks which meet the needs, conditions and the priorities of two key groups: developing countries and countries with economies in transition. These frameworks provide a set of guideline principles and approaches for capacity-building: a country-based process, involving a “learn by practice” approach and using existing activities. These frameworks also contain a list of priority action areas in terms of capacity-building including the specific needs of benefit to the LDC, SIDS and African countries. They reaffirm that capacity-building is essential to allow these countries to implement the objective of the Convention.

Both frameworks propose a mechanism for capacity-building activities such as the development and the strengthening of skills and knowledge, as well as the opportunity for stakeholders and organisations to share their experiences and to create an awareness to allow them to fully participate in all the processes related to climate change. These frameworks also provide advice regarding the support of financial and technical resources managed by the the Global Environment Fund (GEF), bilateral and multilateral bodies and other intergovernmental organisations. The frameworks also envisage that the developing countries and the economies in transition provide information on their needs and specific priorities through national communications and submissions whilst at the same time promoting stakeholder cooperation and participation.

Under the Kyoto Protocol:
In 2005 the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol decided that the frameworks for capacity-building under the aegis of the Convention were also applicable to the implementation of the Protocol. They approved frameworks to guide capacity-building activities under the Kyoto Protocol in developing countries and in economies in transition.

Under the Paris Agreement:
The Paris Agreement confirms the key guidelines and the aforementioned approaches in terms of capacity-building. It demands that all Parities cooperate to strengthen the capacity-building of developing countries so as to implement the Agreement and calls on the developed country Parties to strengthen their support for the capacity-building activities in these countries. The Parties requested the SBI to supervise the work of the PCCB. It is recognised that the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement involves strengthening capacity-building, particularly of the most vulnerable countries, but also that strengthening capacity-building undoubtedly requires mobilising resources.

Decision 1/CP.21 also established the capacity-building Initiative for transparency (CBIT)\(^{267}\) in 2015 (see Section I.11.). This initiative will allow for the strengthening of institutional and technical capacity-building and help developing country Parties to comply with the increased requirements for transparency under the Paris Agreement under article 13. The GEF supports the function of the CBIT in collaboration with eleven donor countries.

\(^{267}\) Decision 1/CP.21, para. 84.
Following the implementation of the PCCB by Decision CP 21, it was expected that COP22 (2016, Marrakesh) would be first to take stock on the progress of this work under this framework, especially to develop its mandate. In this respect, the deliberations on the PCCB were conducted through the SBI sessions, agreeing the following:

- The definition of the priority topic for the PCCB in 2017 regarding capacity-building activities to implement the NDC;
- Invite representative of the following operational bodies of the finance mechanism and other bodies established under the Convention to participate to the first meeting of the PCCB: Global Environment Fund (GCF); the Green Climate Fund (GFC); The Adaptation Committee; the expert group for the LDC (LEG); the Standing Committee on Finances (SCF); the Technology Executive Committee (TEC).
- Invite representatives of other bodies established under the Convention as well as the operational bodies of the finance mechanism to identify the representatives who can collaborate, where required, on the specific activities related to the work of the Paris Committee on capacity-building (PCCB). The SBI specifically encouraged a representative of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) to participate in the first meeting of the PCCB.
- The SBI also recommended a decision for the COP to consider and adopt.

At the end of COP22, the mandate of the PCCB was adopted and the COP asked the Committee to specify and adopt the modalities and procedures for the function of the first meeting, which was held at the 46th session of the subsidiary bodies. (May 2017)268.

At its inaugural meeting, the ten-member PCCB had therefore to set the guidelines of its working programme and start the identification of the priorities in terms of capacity-building for a full and successful implementation of the NDC in the developing countries. The PCCB had also to promote a global dialogue amongst most of the stakeholders currently involved in the strengthening the capacity-building of the developing countries so that they could implement measures to combat climate change. The purpose of this dialogue was specifically to rationalise and coordinate these efforts, to make them more efficient as well as to avoid duplicating the work.

To achieve these set objectives the PCCB is composed of 4 working groups:
- Working Group 1 on strengthening links with the existing bodies established under the Convention;
- Working Group 2 on cross-cutting issues;
- Working Group 3 on improving the online capacity-building portal;
- Working Group 4 on identifying capacity gaps and needs.

268. Decision 9/CP.7, Decision 16/CP.22 and Decision 6/CMP.12.
The work programme of the Paris Committee on capacity-building (PCCB)

The PCCB is responsible for supervising a work programme for 2016-2020 which includes the key points listed below:

• To intensify synergies through cooperation and avoid duplicating work across the bodies involved in capacity-building;

• To determine gaps, needs and opportunities for capacity-building;

• To distribute the tools and methods for capacity-building;

• To promote cooperation at all levels from international to local;

• To determine best practices, difficulties, experiences and lessons learnt;

• To research how developing countries can create and maintain capacities over time and space;

• To promote coordination, collaboration and consistency throughout the processes, initiatives and strategies for capacity-building;

• To provide the Secretariat with guidelines on the implementation and the development of the online portal.

b. Summary of the second session of the PCCB and lessons learnt

The report of the second meeting of the PCCB269 held in Bonn, 3-5 May 2018, shows the outcomes across the 4 principal topics discussed during this session:

Implementation of the Developing Work Plan of the PCCB for 2017 – 2019:

the objective is

• To establish strategies to improve the implementation of the working plan including outreach/communication, engagement with key stakeholders and resource mobilisation);

• To establish a vision and action plan for each working group within a well-defined time frame;

• To invite technical experts to partake in its working groups;

• To collaborate with the Marrakesh Partnership to strengthen capacity-building;

• To continue its collaboration with non-Party stakeholders, including the organisation of the Capacity-building Day at COP24;

• To identify the options to strengthen the Durban Forum, (including through regional dialogues);

• To address the issue of loss and damage;

• To continue to provide guidance to the Secretariat on the capacity-building portal;

• To invite PCCB members, to provide information on the efforts being undertaken in their respective countries to identify capacity-building related needs and gaps regarding the implementation of the NDC.
• To make recommendations to the SBI.

**PCCB focus areas for 2018**

• To promote support to capacity-building for the implementation of NDC;
• To recognise and continue to address capacity-building gaps related to issues, such as human rights, gender, the “right transition” and the indigenous peoples’ knowledge;
• To pursue the organisation of activities on the issue of human rights and climate change (parallel events, etc.);
• To create a capacity-building online portal.

**PCCB focus areas for 2019**: to continue capacity-building activities for the implementation of the NDC. The following bodies will be invited to participate in the third meeting of the PCCB in 2019: The Adaptation Committee; the Green Climate Fund (GCF); the Global Environment Fund (GEF); the LDC Expert Group (LEG); the Standing Committee on Finances (SCF); the Technology Executive Committee (TEC). Furthermore, the PCCB agreed that representatives of other bodies established under the Convention and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism would be invited to participate in the next meeting of the PCCB.

**Annual technical report on the progress of the PCCB to the COP**: the draft report will be shared with PCCB members for review by 6 August and the final version will be shared with members by 30 August.

The Secretariat’s suggestion in this report is: (i) To exploit the synergies with the bodies involved in different but intrinsically linked topics such as the Technological Executive Committee or the Executive mechanism of the Warsaw international Mechanism; and (ii) to strengthen the collaboration with the entities involved in capacity-building such as the Adaptation Committee, the LDC expert group, the technological mechanism, the expert consultation group for national communications of the non-Annex I Parties, the Standing Committee for Finance, the GEF and the GCF270, demonstrating the PCCB’s ability to play a facilitator role and to promote synergies.

One tool for the facilitator is the online portal currently being developed271. The purpose of this portal is to share information on capacity-building activities implemented as well as other complementary resources272.

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272. Complementary resources of the capacity-building portal [online] https://unfccc.int/topics/capacity-building/workstreams/capacity-building-portal-complementary-resources#eq-3
c. Delineation/cooperation with the Durban Forum

The PCCB working group no. 2 proposed at the second PCCB session (3-5 May 2018) the need to strengthen its strategic engagement with the relevant experts on cross-cutting issues and to consider the outcomes of the seventh Durban Forum (3 May 2018).

The Durban Forum is already linked to the PCCB since the decision of COP23 stating that the Forum must take into account the priority topic of the PCCB at its annual meeting.

In its report listing the capacity-building activities and the possible areas for cooperation between the different bodies under the Convention, the Secretariat suggested the PCCB:

- Consider the outcomes of the cross-cutting challenges of the Durban Forum at its sessions;
- Incorporate the outcomes of the Durban forum into the online capacity-building portal;
- Use the Durban Forum as an opportunity to bring together the viewpoints of a diverse group of stakeholder Parties on the gaps and needs in terms of capacity-building to feed into the PCCB’s work programme.

d. Monitoring and review process; the Secretariat’s summary reports on capacity-building activities

The Secretariat compiles and summarises the reports received from the Parties and from the Global Environmental Fund and the United Nation agencies on the implementation of capacity-building activities. The summary reports are provided for two country groups: developing countries and economies in transition.

The last report on the developing countries was submitted at COP22. This report mainly acknowledges: the emergence of new elements to be taken into account (gender, human rights, the knowledge of indigenous communities), the need to improve reporting on the capacity-building activities and to coordinate these different activities. The next report for developing countries is expected at COP25.

For the economies in transition, the fourth report, under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol was finalised at COP23, in Bonn. This report recognises the advances made by the Parties with economies in transition, the necessary contri-

274. FCCC/CP/2017/11/Add.2, Decision 16/CP.23.
276. FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.2
bution by the Annex I parties and of the GCF to implement these activities, but equally the contribution by the multilateral development banks and international finance institutions. The fifth report is expected in June 2020.

e. Links to capacity-building initiatives

The initiatives undertaken to establish the strengthened transparency framework, i.e. the Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) and the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) complement the mechanisms discussed in this section. Their specific activities are outlined in section 1.5 of this guide.

The NDC Partnership financed by Germany and other credit institutions is a key structure for the Parties or stakeholders who wish to identify capacity-building initiatives financed through its 278 NDC Toolbox Navigator279 or NDC Funding and Initiatives Navigator.

f. Consideration of capacity-building at the Bangkok session and outlook for COP24.

The various aspects of capacity-building discussed at the Bangkok session are summarised in the table below280:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles of the Paris Agreement</th>
<th>Capacity-building elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 4.8 – Information to improve clarity, transparency and understanding of the NDC</td>
<td>Need to enhance the information on the capacities of developing countries and their capacity-building needs. Information to be provided by the developing countries on their capacity-building needs could include: Type of support; Reference year: Implementation period; Amount of financial support needed; Implementation channels; Areas and priorities for intervention; Policies, programmes and projects; Methodologies and pertinent hypotheses to assess the necessary support; Method by which the support will allow the developing country to enhance their capacities to combat climate change.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

According to the PCCB’s annual technical progress report\textsuperscript{281}:

- The PCCB plays an active part in the preparations for the second day on capacity-building which will be organised at COP24;

- With regard to considering the cross cutting issue of gender, the PCCB and the Secretariat are collaborating on two activities to strengthen the capacity-building of the Committee members: 1) an online seminar organised at the end of October 2018 (2), a parallel event at COP24.

- In relation to the cross-cutting issue of Human Rights, the PCCB in conjunction with the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights (HCHR) and the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate justice (MRFCJ) launched event preparations for COP24 on capacity-building to incorporate human rights into climate change action, including the framework for the implementation of the NDC.

\textbf{I.9. Financing}

2018 was marked by two important events related to climate financing:

- The General Assembly of the Global Environment Fund (GCF) held in Vietnam concluded with the seventh replenishment of its resources, with approximately USD4.3 billion for the next four years (2019-2022); and

\textsuperscript{281} FCCC/SBI/2018/15.
the launch of negotiations and the preparation of the first replenishment of the Green Climate fund resources (GCF), which, since its launch in 2015, functions and finances by the mobilisation of temporary resources (2015-2018).

During the negotiations, and following COP23, the key points focussed on the reporting of the developing countries on the mobilisation and the supply of financial resources, in compliance with the provisions under the Paris Agreement in Articles 9 paras 5 and 7. As usual, these proved to be the key focus points during the negotiations, even during the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies (Bonn) and the additional session in Bangkok.

The main objectives for 2018, which conclusions expected at COP24 will be:

• to make the best possible progress on the negotiations to provide the modalities, procedures and methodologies (Reporting Modalities Procedures and Guidelines – MPG) of the operationalisation manual of the Paris Agreement rules on finance issues, in order that they are as balanced and as complete as possible;

• to facilitate increased access to the GCF, the Global environmental fund (GCF), the Adaptation fund (AF), etc., ensuring that the finance mechanism of the Convention and its instruments function correctly;

• to finalise the modalities so that the AF can support the Paris Agreement.

However it is important to highlight that these are practically the same topics and elements which keep repeating in the discussions and negotiations such as the needs, necessities, mobilisations, availabilities, the flows and the state and non-state stakeholders of climate finance etc., since the last COP session chaired by the Fiji (COP23-November 2017, Bonn).

It also needs to be highlighted that most of the important issues linked to climate financing are mainly included in the COP agenda more than in any of the group of bodies in the process, who often deal with technical, methodological or other finance-related aspects.

General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement

In the run up to COP24 and following the additional Bangkok session (4-9 September 2018), the Chairs of the SBI and SBSTA and the co-presidents of the APA published on the UNFCCC website a joint discussion note announcing their assessment of the status of the negotiations and the visions for COP24 across the topics contained in the framework of the Paris Agreement and its Work Programme.

Issues regarding climate change financing under paragraphs 52-64 of Decision 1/CP.21 were attached to this joint note in three documents, which will be used as the basis for COP24 negotiations, namely:

• An information note\textsuperscript{283} determining the information to be provided by the Parties in compliance with Article 9, paragraph 5 of the Paris Agreement.
• The elements of the draft decision\textsuperscript{284} on the accounting modalities of the financial resources supplied and mobilised through public interventions in compliance with Article 9, paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement.
• An additional update of the tool\textsuperscript{285} related to the preparations for convening the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

I.9.1. Long-term climate finance

The issue of long-term finance consists in negotiating a work programme that is constantly updated and which ensures predictability, mobilisation and access to innovative resources for long-term climate finance (between 2020 and 2030 for example), by the developed countries and other non-state actors acting voluntarily for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the least advanced countries (LDC), small Island Developing States (SIDS) and African countries.

The objectives of the Long-Term finance workshops

In compliance with Decision 7/CP.22, the workshop sessions on long-term climate finance in 2017 and 2018, with the aim of intensifying climate mitigation and adaptation financing, dealt with the experiences and lessons learnt. The main points are:
• to articulate and translate the needs identified in the processes promoted by the countries within the projects and programmes;
• the roles and the policies and the environments suited for mitigation and adaptation finances;
• to facilitate improved access.

The main objective of the workshops during the session on long-term climate finance in 2017 and 2018 is to facilitate technical and concrete discussions on the issues above. The conclusions will be reviewed by the COP. The outcomes will also inform the deliberations of the high level ministerial dialogue at COP24 in 2018.

In addition to realising the main objective outlined above, the secondary objectives of the workshop are:
• to arrive at a better understanding of how the needs for climate financing identified and assessed by the developing countries can be articulated and translated into projects and programmes notably through international cooperation;

283. SBI, 2018d.
284. SBSTA, 2018.
285. APA, 2018i.
• to identify the steps and actions that need to be taken to improve access to climate finance;
• to achieve greater clarity on the policies and the regulatory framework necessary to intensify climate finance.

The conclusions of the workshop at the 46th session of the subsidiary bodies exploring climate finance for developing countries and their translation into projects and programmes are outlined in a summary report by the Secretariat of the UNFCCC.286

The following were the conclusions from the negotiations on long-term finance at COP23:287

• it reiterates the commitment of the developed countries, within the context of significant mitigation actions as well as the transparent implementation of the objective to jointly mobilise USD100 billion per year until 2020 to satisfy the needs of the developing countries and to encourage the developed countries to increase the finances mobilised for climate action to achieve this objective;
• encourages the developed countries to continue their efforts to provide a substantial amount of public finances to adaptation measures for climate action and to undertake to establish a more concrete balance between mitigation and adaptation finance, recognising the importance of adaptation finance and the needs in terms of public resources in the form of adaptation grants.
• it positively welcomes the progress made by the Parties to strengthen the enabling environments on a national level, and requests the Parties continue to strengthen the enabling environments and political framework policies;
• it requests the developed countries to prepare the next round of their updated biannual contributions relating to strategies and approaches aimed at expanding climate finance for the period 2018 to 2022, with the view to updating the information available for the roadmap to jointly mobilise USD100 billion annually until 2020, and asks that the Secretariat compiles a summary report of these contributions;
• it requests that the Secretariat, in collaboration with the various entities to explore the resources and means of helping developing countries to assess their needs and priorities, letting the countries take the initiative of this assessment including the technological and capacity-building needs to transform climate finance needs into actions.
• it requests that the Secretariat organises a workshop session in 2018 and to prepare a report of this workshop for review at COP24;

286. UNFCCC, 2017
287. FCCC/CP/2017/L.5.
288. IISD, 2017a
• it notes that the 2018 workshop session must be based on the conclusions and key messages of workshop 2017 and its report; and

• it invites the Chair of the COP when organising the high-level ministerial dialogue of 2018, to align this dialogue to the topic of access to climate finance.

The 2018 workshop on Long-term Finance was held on the margins of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies, 7–8 May in Bonn (Germany). Its main objective was to facilitate technical discussions focusing on action in relation to the following topics:

• To articulate and translate the needs identified in the country-driven processes into projects and programmes;

• The roles of policies and enabling environments for mitigation and adaptation finance;

• To facilitate improved access.

• And to deliver, where possible, concrete findings and conclusions.

The outcomes will also inform the deliberations of the High-level Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Finance at COP24.

The main conclusions of this workshop covered:

• **Facilitating access to climate finance**
  
  – There is a lack of clarity on the difference between climate finance and development finance;
  
  – Multilateral climate funds should further simplify the process of accessing climate finance resources;
  
  – Accreditation to multilateral climate funds can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, but it brings multiple benefits to developing countries in addition to the access to financial resources, particularly in terms of strengthening institutional capacity to meet the standards and criteria defined by the funds and the set objectives;
  
  – Cost–benefit analysis could be used by developing countries to decide between using existing regional implementing entities to access funding or applying for direct access;
  
  – Capacity-building and readiness support for accessing climate finance should be more specifically designed to address the needs of the recipient countries and be provided across the entire project cycle;
  
  – South–South cooperation and regional dialogues should be further promoted to encourage peer-to-peer learning and knowledge exchange;


– In-country climate finance coordination mechanisms need to be strengthened to establish the financing priorities of the projects and programmes;
– Local stakeholder opportunities to access climate finance should be more clearly articulated by the countries as well as the multilateral climate funds;
– Governments and international climate finance providers should clearly articulate opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises to access climate finance, for example through enhanced public–private partnerships so as to de-risk private investment, particularly at the project inception phase.

• **On articulating and translating needs into project and programmes:**
  – Integrating climate change into national budgetary processes and the risk management framework of the private sector will be useful for generating information on national climate finance flows and for a better management of resources for mitigation and adaptation activities;
  – National climate finance strategies can serve as a stepping stone to translating nationally determined contributions (NDC) into projects and programmes;
  – Project readiness support should help countries identify funding opportunities from a variety of climate finance sources, including the GCF;
  – Institutional arrangements, with ministries of finance playing a key role, are essential for integrating the climate change narrative into development priorities and in prioritising projects and programmes in line with national priorities and available resources;
  – Developing countries and finance and implementing institutions should pursue a long-term commitment and cooperation in order to deepen the mutual understanding of needs and challenges;
  – Capacity-building and readiness support should be provided with a long-term perspective and be extended at local and community level to enhance stakeholder awareness, knowledge and capacity;
  – The developing countries and the international lending institutes for climate finance must promote scheduled approaches which will contribute to improving the outlooks and the needs of the countries, to strengthen the participation of the regional and local stakeholders and to attract additional international climate finance.
  – Political commitment to climate action and enabling environments will help create a common and attractive narrative for enhancing stakeholder participation as well as enhancing public institution ownership of an ambitious climate action;

The importance of the outcomes of the workshops on long-term finances are founded in the consideration of the recommendations and conclusions it provides for the negotiations on the same issue, on the one hand, as well as feeding into the
guidelines and directives for the finance mechanism bodies of the Convention and the instruments such as the GCF, GEF, AF, LDCF, SCCF.

I.9.2. Standing Committee on Finance (SCF)

COP23 negotiations tackled two core elements: (i) consideration of the annual report of the Standing Committee on finance (SCF) and (ii) analysis of the SCF functions.

The following decisions were the outcomes on the discussions of the SCF report:

- Approval of the implementation of the SCF work plan for 2018;
- Urge the SCF to develop its work in terms of measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) support beyond the biannual assessment, by recognising the progress achieved by the SCF and noting the need to avoid any duplication of the work in progress within the SBSTA and the APA;
- Urge the SCF to continue its cooperation with the stakeholder Parties and the competent experts in performing its MRV functions on the support, within the context of the broader work plan;
- Invite the SCF to complete its deliberations on its next forum topic at the latest by its first meeting of 2018; and
- Request the SCF to report at COP24 on the progress it has achieved in the implementation of its work plan and to take into account the guidelines submitted to it within other relevant COP decisions.

In relation to the functions of the SCF, the COP concluded:

- Request that the SCF continues to facilitate and to enhance the dissemination and the use of the outcomes and the specific and targeted recommendations to efficiently progress the COP’s work;
- Request that the SCF further refine its approach to maintaining links with the subsidiary and constituted bodies;
- Request that the SCF guarantees the added-value of its forum when deciding its topic, to transmit clear recommendations to the COP, where appropriate, relating to the follow-up actions of the forum and to reinforce the dissemination, the use and the appropriation of knowledge and expertise gained through the forum;
- Urge the SCF to further strengthen its interactions with stakeholder Parties;
- Decide to continue its discussions on the means to enhance the participation of SCF members by recognising the need to ensure the full participation and contribution of all the constituted groups at the SCF meetings;

• Urge the SCF to formulate options to enhance the participation of its members and to submit a report at COP24;

• And agree to set a schedule for the second review of the functions of the SCF at COP25 (2019), at the latest.

The SCF meets twice a year. In 2018, it met for the first time in April for its 17th session. It held at 18th session in September 2018, on the margin of the Bangkok negotiations, and its work covered the points listed on its agenda.

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**Annual SCF forum**

The annual SCF forum 2018 covered the topic “The Architecture of Climate finance: enhancing cooperation and seizing opportunities”. Held in Songdo (Republic of Korea) on 5-6 July 2018, it covered the following:

**Objectives:** Identify the trends, developments, and challenges to the architecture of climate finance on both international and national levels with the view to:

a. Improve the international and national climate finance flows;

b. Strengthen the collaboration with the climate finance of the UNFCCC and other stakeholders;

c. Exchange experiences and identify opportunities for future collaboration internationally and nationally.

**A. The Architecture of Global Climate finance**

The scale and scope of climate finance flows

• The outcomes of the SCF biannual assessment 2016 (for 2013-2014);

• Alternative private financing (South-South cooperation, voluntary contributions, etc.).

Progress on climate finance architecture including the UNFCCC climate funds and lessons learnt;

• country ownership;

• accessibility to climate finance as well as sustainability, predictability and efficacy (issues linked to the criteria and the policies of financing including the type of financing);

• the efficacy of climate finance in releasing the countries' potential and catalysing transformational change;

• the role of the architecture of climate finance in the mobilisation of national, and where necessary, subnational stakeholders and the enhancement of the complementarity of national finance flows;

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293. SCF/2018/17/10
294. SCF/2018/18/2
295. Information documents, presentation material and other relevant information available online: https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/events-meetings/scf-forum/2018-forum-of-the-standing-Committee-on-finance
296. GCF, GEF, AF, LDCF, SCCF.
• In what way do the climate funds of the UNFCCC contribute to releasing other sources of finance?

New developments in climate finance supporting the objectives of the Paris Agreement (concrete examples, i.e. green commitments, policies), including challenges related to the expansion of new climate tools.

**B. The national Architecture of climate finance**

• Governance of climate finance (for example the alignment of policies and investments with the NDC, NAP, national development plans and strategies, Private sector)
• National stakeholder engagement in mobilising resources
• Successes and challenges in reducing the finance risks and effect on levering public and private investments in developing countries
• Challenges encountered in accessing the funds from different sources particularly by the LDC, SIDS, and Africa

**C. To identify the opportunities and the possibilities for additional collaboration:**

• Amongst the international stakeholders of climate finance;
• Amongst the climate funds of the UNFCCC; and
• amongst the international stakeholders and the national architecture of climate finance.

Within the perspective of COP24, the SCF prepared and posted its annual report at the conference after its 19th meeting held in Bonn (Germany, 29-31 October 2018, announcing useful recommendations to the operational bodies of the Convention’s finance mechanism.

**I.9.3. Green Climate Fund (GCF)**

COP23 examined the annual GCF report and decided on providing it with new guidelines, also taking into account also the recommendations of the SCF annual report; which can be summarised as follows:2

• encourages the GCF Council to ensure that the procedure facilitates the lodgement of the approved finance;
• notes that the accreditation for numerous bodies is pending;
• welcomes the Board’s decision to launch the revision of the accreditation framework and its approach to achieving the objective, and urges the Board to adopt and rapidly implement the revised framework in order to simplify and facilitate access to the GCF;

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• urges the Board to ensure that all developing countries have access to all the financial tools available through the GCF, in compliance with the eligibility criteria set out in the governance instrument and in the relevant decisions of the COP, as well as ensuring the application of the policies agreed for the GCF;
• encourages the Board to continue to improve the review process and to approve the applications for readiness support;
• invites the Board to contemplate the methods to improve the availability of the information concerning access to GCF finance, based on needs;
• encourages the Parties to agree on the prerogatives and exemptions required for the efficient and effective operationalisation of the GCF, based on needs, and encourages the Board to highlight the efforts to guarantee that the GCF will effectively benefit from these prerogatives and exemptions;
• decides to continue with its review of the Board’s request recorded in the Board’s decision GCF.B.08/24 (related to the administrative budget of the 2015 Funds) and the procedure laid down in Decision 7/CP.20 (related to the GCF report to the COP);
• immediately urges the Board to ensure the continuity of the administrative services and to finalise its decisions on the choice of administrator;
• encourages the Board to launch its first GCF replenishment process;
• invites the Parties to present their point of view and recommendations on the elements to be taken into account in elaborating the guidelines for the Board at the latest 10 weeks before COP24, and request the SCF to take into account these points of view and recommendations when submitting their strategy their draft guideline document for the GFC Board for review at the COP; and
• urges the GCF to include in its annual report to the COP information related to the measures undertaken to implement the guidelines provided in this decision.

The GCF in 2018

The GCF made significant progress in relation to the amount of finances agreed for the projects and programmes for developing countries and divided equitably between the adaptation and mitigation, ensuring the best balance in geographic distribution across the regions. Responding also to the expectations of the most vulnerable countries, specifically the LDC and SIDS.

In August 2018, after 20 Board meetings, the GCF approved 74 projects/programmes totalling USD3.5 billion of which USD1.5 billion are in the process of being implemented. This exercise would have enabled the reduction of 1.3 billion tCO₂e and would improve the resilience and adaptation of over 217 million inhabitants in different countries of the world, specifically in the island states and the most vulnerable countries. To implement its work, the GCF accredited a total of 59 national, regional and international bodies.

Continued on page 109.
Furthermore, it seems relevant to point out important facts including the delay in launching the process for creating the first GCF resources, but also and especially the spectacular blockage which happened at the Board’s 20th session in Songdo (headquarters of the GCF Secretariat), delivering no project approval or accreditation of new bodies due to the absence of the Co-Chair representing the developing countries and primarily the resignation of the Executive Director of the GCF. A situation which drew criticism and opinions questioning the usefulness of a fund which does not deliver when significant and impactful climate changes occur are observed and recorded and experienced worldwide affecting populations, eco-systems and property.

Finally, the 21st session held in Manama in October 2018, rectifying the loss of confidence and the mishaps of the previous session, dealt with important topics for the future of the funds with a full agenda including approximately sixty points and sub-points including:

- the review of a significant portfolio of a project proposals, accumulatively of circa USD 1.1 billion;
- the implementation of a selection mechanism for the new Executive Director of the GCF Secretariat;
- the discussion on the decision-making procedures, in the absence of consensus or outside the formal sessions of the GCF Board;
- the launch of a process for the creation of the first GCF resources;
- the review of accreditation applications;
- the consideration of issues regarding co-financing, the eligibility of projects and the selection criteria, the scheduled approach, the terms and conditions of financial instruments and the support to adaptation activities etc.;
- The evaluation of programmes and Readiness supports;
- the work programme and GCF budgets for 2019.

At Katowice, the Parties will need to discuss, negotiate and decide on the content of the annual report298 submitted by the GCF Board and other issues such as:

- improved access to GCF resources;
- the promotion of the commitment of the private sector
- the decision-making process
- the outcomes of the review of the initial period of mobilisation of the GCF resources and the process to implement and achieve the first creation of the GCF resources (the procedure having already been initiated by the GCF Board);
- the promotion of a scheduled approach;
- accreditation issues.

I.9.4. The Global Environment Fund (GEF)

2018 was also an important year for the GEF. By continuing its normal activities and by adopting and financing projects it prepared and held a successful 6th assembly adopting its 7th assembly replenishment (GEF-7), totalling USD4.3 billion for biodiversity, combating desertification, climate change, chemical pollutants, international waters etc. It is worthwhile noting the decline in finance allocated to climate change due to the fact that the GCF has become operational and that the contributing countries take their precautions in terms of duplicating the work.

The annual GEF report to the COP drew the following conclusions\textsuperscript{299}, at the close of COP23:

- to improve the consultation process with the developing countries and other stakeholders within the context of the GEF replenishment process;
- to examine the opportunities to optimise the integration of the needs and priorities of the developing companies within the “climate change” sector of the 7th replenishment (GEF-7);
- to continue applying its established policies with regard to grants and concessional funds during its seventh replenishment;
- to provide developing countries appropriate support to help them, in compliance with Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 86 (urge the GEF to support the establishment and operation of the CBIT\textsuperscript{300});
- to ensure, where necessary, that the policies and procedures related to the review and study of the financial proposals are duly followed in an effective manner; and
- to include in its annual report to the COP information related to the measures undertaken to implement the guidelines of this decision.

GEF-7\textsuperscript{301}

The 54th meeting of the GEF Board was held in Da Nang, Vietnam from the 24-26 June 2018. The three-day meeting brought together five hundred representatives of governments, international organisations and civil society organisations. The 24th meeting of the Least Developed Country Fund and the Special Fund for Climate Change also met with the Forum of civil society organisations on Tuesday, 26 June.

The Board approved the seventh replenishment of the special GEF fund (GEF-7) totalling USD4.1 billion and especially adopted decisions relating to:

- the strategy to implement the gender strategy of the GEF which aims to integrate gender-sensitivity in the design, implementation and evaluation of the GEF programmes and projects;

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\textsuperscript{299} FCCC/CP/2017/L.11.
\textsuperscript{300} Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT).
\textsuperscript{301} IISD, 2018a
• the updated co-financing policy, with a new ratio of global co-financing of 7:1;
• The GEF partnership;
• to update the system for the transparent allocation of resources (STAR); and
• the GEF plan of activities and corporate budget for 2019.

Following the Board meeting, the sixth meeting of the GEF Assembly was held on Wednesday 27 and Thursday 28 June 2018, the Assembly having noted the report on the replenishment of GEF-7, the sixth review of the global GEF performance and the report of the ad hoc scientific and technical group.

Over a two-day period, in excess of 1100 participants met at parallel round tables to discuss how to accelerate action in the areas of: food, land use and land restoration, sustainable cities, the blue economy, partnerships to implement the Programme 2030 science based-targets for the Earth circular economy and marine plastics.

In his comments on the replenishment of the GEF-7, Naoko Ishii, Managing Director and President of the GEF, qualified the replenishment as the “best possible outcome after long and difficult negotiations” and underlined that the resources allocated to the different areas would deliver better quality results over the next four years. On Friday, 29 June, the participants visited projects sponsored by the GEF around Da Nang, in Vietnam.

The GEF published its annual report\textsuperscript{302} to the COP, outlining in full the progress made, including the areas and sectors eligible for financing. For this purpose, the Parties will discuss the following at COP24:

• the new policy on co-financing of projects promoting the climate ambition;
• the procedures which will be implemented by the GEF related to the reducing the risks of money-laundering or terrorism financing of projects financed by the GEF;
• private sector participation;
• the 7th replenishment of the GEF resources and greater involvement of potential contributors.

I.9.5. Sixth review of the financial mechanism of the Convention

At COP22, the Parties, through negotiations, agreed to continue updating the directives\textsuperscript{303} for the sixth review of the finance mechanism of the UNFCCC and its instruments, structured in the form of objectives, information sources and criteria.

\textsuperscript{302} Advanced version of the GEF Annual Report to COP 24 [online] https:// unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Final%20GCF%20Report%20to%20UNFCCC%20COP%2024.pdf.

The SCF, having been mandated by the COP to prepare this implementation project agreed at its fifteenth session (March 2017) on the organisation of the work, including the working group, a work schedule, provisional outputs and an awareness strategy.

At COP23, the Parties discussed and agreed the decision summarised below:

- acknowledges the expert contribution of the SCF on the sixth review of the finance Mechanism;
- acknowledges the efforts by the governing bodies of the Finance Mechanism to enhance their mutual complementarity and coherence and between the governing bodies and other sources of investment and financial flows;
- requests the governing bodies of the Finance Mechanism to continue to enhance complementarity and coherence;
- decides to launch the seventh review of the Finance Mechanism at COP26 in compliance with the criteria of the updated directives annexed to Decision 12/CP.22 (related to the sixth review of the Finance Mechanism); and
- urges the SCF to lend its expertise to the seventh review of the Finance Mechanism in 2021, with the aim of achieving the aforementioned review before COP27.

I.9.6. Adaptation Fund (AF)

**Adaptation Fund Report:**

As with any finance mechanism, the Adaptation Fund Committee drafted an annual report to submit to the COP/CMP. This important document as well as the work carried out by the SCF provides guidance to the Parties regarding the directives that the adaptation Fund should receive to improve its function, currently, the technical, operational and legal opportunities to support the Paris Agreement, whilst continuing to benefit from the supports, sharing the procedures, the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and preparing for what might emerge from these in the Paris Agreement.

Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement there has been a concern in relation to the future of the Adaptation Fund and its dependent actions and projects. After intense negotiations before and during COP23, an agreement between the Parties was reached so that the Fund could serve the Paris Agreement. However, there was no agreement on the manner and modalities to be used for the Fund’s new role,

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305. OIF/IFDD, 2017.
nor the terms under which it would continue to support both the Kyoto Protocol and at the same time the Paris Agreement. Neither was it agreed how and from whom it would receive their guidelines and directives.

The conclusions of CMP 13 resulted in the following decisions:

• continued concern as to the permanence, the sufficiency and the predictability of the Adaptation Fund resources, taking into account current uncertainty in relation to the prices of the certified emission reduction units (CER);

• deems that an increase in financial resources is desirable, particularly voluntary support, adding to a part of the fund taken from the CER units in order to sustain the efforts to mobilise the resources of the Adaptation Fund in order to enhance the Fund;

• encourages the Adaptation Fund Board to continue its discussions on enhancing and rationalising the policies of accreditation of the implementation entities, including renewing the accreditation of previously accredited entities;

• requests the Adaptation Fund Board to communicate, within the framework of the annual report, information on Board meetings and other relevant facts arising after the publication of the main part of its annual report;

• decides that the Adaptation Fund agrees to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, under the condition and in application of decisions taken during the third part of the first session of the CMA (CMA 1.3, December 2018);

• decides also that it will review the issue as to whether the Adaptation Fund should help bring about the implementation of the Paris Agreement under the direction of the CMA to which it is accountable, based on a recommendation regarding this issue covered by the CMA at CMP 15 (November 2019); and

• acknowledges the progress made by the APA in the preparatory work necessary on the provisions of governance, institutional structures, control mechanisms and functioning modalities to allow the Adaptation Fund to help bring about the implementation of the Paris Agreement, including the sources of finance, to be defined by the Parties, and awaits with interest the recommendations that the APA will formulate in this matter in 2018.

During the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies (first and second parts), under the agenda of the APA, the Parties discussed the provision for the Adaptation Fund to be able to serve the Paris Agreement. The Secretariat of the UNFCCC was invited to submit legally the possible scenarios in order that the Fund could serve the Agreement. The different sessions highlighted important questions in relation to:

• the body which will be capable of mandating the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) so that it adjusts the institutional provisions of the Secretariat and of the administrator;

310. IISD, 2017a.
311. IISD, 2018b.
312. IISD, 2018b.
• the question of knowing whether the CMA could revise the authority of the CMP on the Fund;
• the statute of the Fund as a functional body of the finance mechanism of the Convention;
• the mandates related to the composition of the AFB; and
• the decision-making schedule seeking to ensure the continuity of the functions of the Fund.

Based on the APA discussions, an informative note was produced which is regularly updated, highlighting three possible scenarios (see figures below), points of view, legal and technical so that the Adaptation Fund can serve the Paris Agreement.313

Figure 8. Possible scenarios of the Adaptation Fund supporting the Paris Agreement – Option 1314

Figure 9. Possible scenarios of the Adaptation Fund supporting the Paris Agreement – Option 2

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
FOR THE ADAPTATION FUND TO SERVE THE PARIS AGREEMENT

SCENARIO 2
AF SERVICES THE KP ONLY UNTIL A FUTURE DATE WHEN IT WILL START TO SERVE THE PA ONLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMA 1.3 - CMP 14</td>
<td>CMA 2 - CMP 15</td>
<td>CMA 3 - CMP 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AF continues to serve CMP/KP</strong></td>
<td><strong>AF stops serving the CMP/KP and starts to serve the CMA/PA only</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Exclusivity
  - CMA recommendation to the CMP

- Additional work
  - CMA considers the recommendations and makes decisions noting the work and recommendations of another body and the AF/Ad hoc body.

- Transfer
  - CMP makes the decision on the AF to stop serving CMP/KP and any arrangement necessary for a soft transition of the AF serving CMA/PA only.

- Guidelines
  - Guidelines only for the CMA
  - Reporting arrangements with the Ad hoc body.

- Administrator/Secretary
  - Administrator/Secretary arrangements under the CMA

- Additional work
  - CMA 1.3 invites another body to work on the arrangements for the financing sources, financing eligibility, composition of the board, administrator/secretariat arrangements.
  - CMA 1.3 invites AF/Ad hoc body to work on the operational rules, procedural rules, administrative arrangements, safeguards.
  - CMA 1.3 decides that the AF serves the PA at an effective future date under the guidance of and accounting to the CMA and that the AF Board could report to the CMA on PA questions.
  - CMA 1.3 invites AF/Ad hoc body to work on the operational rules, procedural rules, administrative arrangements, safeguards.

- Exclusivity
  - CMA recommendation to the CMP

- Additional work
  - CMA considers the recommendations and makes decisions noting the work and recommendations of another body and the AF/Ad hoc body.

- Transfer
  - CMP makes the decision on the AF to stop serving CMP/KP and any arrangement necessary for a soft transition of the AF serving CMA/PA only.

- Guidelines
  - Guidelines only for the CMA
  - Reporting arrangements with the Ad hoc body.

- Administrator/Secretary
  - Administrator/Secretary arrangements under the CMA

**Third review of the Adaptation Fund**

Review of the characteristics, activities and function of the Adaptation Fund, initiated at the 46th session of the subsidiary bodies and finalised at COP23, was extremely useful particularly in terms of the perspective that it will serve the Paris Agreement under the best possible conditions. The Parties, in Bonn, in November 2018 agreed and decided 317 the following 318:

- To review the different methods to increase the efficacy of the functioning of the adaptation Fund;


317. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.32.

318. IISD, 2017a.
• to continue to cooperate with the sub-national stakeholders and the private sector specifically within the framework of micro-financing, insurance mechanisms based on meteorological conditions, but also through the cooperation with local professional associations and farmers in terms of adaptation projects, and public-private partnerships;
• to envisage voluntary monitoring of the funds mobilised for climate action where appropriate; and
• to continue the efforts to improve the complementarity and coherence with other funds, whether or not relevant to the Convention.
• to consider the lessons learned from the cooperation between the Adaptation Fund and private sector stakeholders within the framework of the adaptation projects locally, particularly in relation to the decision-making processes of the Fund and communications with donors;
• to follow and evaluate the time frames for approval of the projects within the framework of the Programme to support planning, by calling up any link between these time frames and the introduction of the environmental and social policy of the Adaptation Fund and to take measures to reduce them, where necessary, whilst continuing to implement the environmental and social guarantees and its gender policy;
• to continue to provide information on the approval deadlines of the projects;
• to continue to follow the impacts of adaptation and the outcomes of the Adaptation Fund, including using local benchmarks or benchmarks specific to one or other sector; and
• to take stock of the progress made in the execution of the mandates arising from this decision in future reports of the Adaptation Fund to be adapted at the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

The 4th review of the Adaptation Fund will commence in June 2020 and will report, for a decision to be made, to COP27 (November 2021).

I.9.7. Points related to the implementation of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement

Paragraph 5: Procedure covering the information that Parties are required to communicate

To reiterate\(^{319}\), the review of this point by the COP/APA, allows the Parties to take stock, globally, on the achievement and the adherence to the *ex-ante* obligations of the developed countries (and other voluntary contributors) in terms of mobilisation and supply of adequate, sufficient and accessible financial resources for developing countries and particularly for the LDC, the SIDS and African countries.

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During the informal consultations, the groups of the developing countries and of the Parties, which some developed countries disputed, highlighted that this point is based on the Paris Agreement work programme and requires an outcome at COP24, and called on the COP23 to take the decision to transfer this point to one of the subsidiary bodies, highlighting the need to ensure its continued and ongoing review throughout 2018.

The Parties then shared their viewpoints on the elements and potential formats for preparing the information. They highlighted amongst other things:

- an overview of trends of the support required to be provided;
- pledged donations;
- indications for the financing of mitigation and adaptation;
- reference years;
- the vehicles used;
- the economic sectors;
- the instruments, such as grants and loans;
- the concepts of new and additional financial resources;
- the strategies and approaches to expand the scale of climate finance;
- a better transparency and comparability of information;
- the use of a shared tabular format; and
- a definition of climate action financing.

The viewpoints of certain developing and developed countries digressed on the issue whether the mandate on this point also included an element of financial mobilisation for climate action and if public development aid (PDA) and financing climate change can be separated.

Informal consultations at a ministerial level subsequently allowed for the adoption of a decision\textsuperscript{320} of COP 23, summarised in the points below:

- reiterates that developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, where applicable, including, where available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties, and that the other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis;
- Welcomes the constructive sharing of views during the round-table discussion among the Parties organised by the Secretariat on 16 May 2017, the summary report on these discussions and the progress made on this matter which is reflected in the informal note
- by the Co-Chairs of the contact group on the issue and;

\textsuperscript{320. FCCC/CP/2017/L.12.}
• Requests the SBI 48 and subsequent sessions on the Paris Agreement work programme to determine the information to be provided by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 5, Article 9, of the Paris Agreement, and to communicate the outcomes to COP24 so that the Conference of the Parties can make a recommendation for consideration and adoption at the CMA 1.3.

At Bonn, at the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies (part 1), the discussions and debates were fairly tense between the developing and developed countries. To move negotiations forward, the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) and the Like Minded Group of States (LMDC) submitted an official presentation in the form of a draft decision on paragraph 5, Article 9. This was attached to the information note\(^{321}\) based on the decision\(^{322}\) taken to continue the negotiations at the second part of the 48th session of subsidiary bodies, to ensure consistency and coordinate on this point.

In Katowice, the Parties will have to pursue the negotiations, especially to achieve the outcome of the COP 24, which can be summarised as follows:

• the establishment of a process allowing a quantitative and qualitative response to the provisions taken under article 9.5.

• the determination of the quantitative and qualitative information to highlight the (ex-ante) potential of mobilisation and provision of finances of the developed counties (Annexe II of the UNFCCC) for the benefit of the developing countries.

The conclusion of these two points at Katowice will deliver sufficient elements to the assessment and transparency mechanism required to be developed in compliance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

**Paragraph 7: Procedures for the “ex-post” accounting of financial resources**

To reiterate\(^{323}\), paragraph 7 of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement covers the ex-post accounting methodologies of the financial resources provided and mobilised by public interventions. This was the issue which was negotiated by the SBSTA, at its 46th session (May 2017). It ended with the continuation of the deliberations between the President of the SBSTA and the co-presidents of the APA to ensure, in a timely manner, the integration of the accounting procedures into the transparency system as outlined in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. At the 47th session of the SBSTA, Bonn (November 2017), the Parties continued their discussions and explored the definitions and understanding of the accounting procedures to submit them for adoption at the first session of the Conference of the Parties acting as the meeting of the Parties of the Paris Agreement (CMA 1).

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At COP23\textsuperscript{324}, informal discussions continued on the revised versions of the informal note approved by the Parties, including the elements of the project regarding: the SBSTA work schedule; objectives and principles; general considerations; cross-cutting concerns (in table format); climate change financing through bilateral, regional and other channels (table format); climate change financing through the multilateral channel (in table format); and climate change financing mobilised by public interventions (in table format).

A decision\textsuperscript{325} was taken by COP23, summarised as follows:

- welcomed the progress achieved, as reported in the informal note of the co-presidents of the Contact Group on this point;
- urged its President to pursue the consultations with the co-presidents of the APA to ensure coherence and coordination, as well as the incorporation in a timely manner of the prescribed accounting procedures, provided in of Article 9, paragraph 5 of the Agreement, set out the by SBSTA, in the modalities, procedures and guidelines on transparency under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, which will be developed by the APA; and
- decided to continue, with the intention of reaching a successful conclusion as soon as possible, the work on this issue, taking into account the considerations listed in paragraphs below and the informal note of the co-presidents and based on the recommendations of the SCF on the 2016 biannual assessment, focussing on financial flows in the area of climate action.

The negotiations on the modalities of the accounting methodologies of the financial resources provided and immobilised by public interventions in compliance with Article 9, paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement during the first part of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies held in May 2018 were agreed under\textsuperscript{326} the following\textsuperscript{327} elements:

- welcomes with satisfaction the work carried out and recorded in the informal note of the co-presidents;
- decides to continue the work on the issue at the SBSTA 48.2 based principally on the informal note, the points of view outlined and the communications received and to deliver the outcomes at COP24 so that it can formulate a recommendation to be reviewed and adopted by CMA 1; and
- requests its president to continue the consultations with the co-presidents of the APA to avoid overlapping and duplication and to ensure the incorporation, in a timely manner, of the modalities under the transparency framework.

\textsuperscript{324} IISD, 2017a

\textsuperscript{325} FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.23.

\textsuperscript{326} FCCC/SBSTA/2018/L.9.

\textsuperscript{327} IISD, 2018b.
I.9.8. Quantitative collective finance target

Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Paris Agreement, provides that “within the framework of a global effort, the developed country Parties should continue to lead the path in mobilising climate action from a broad spectrum of sources, instruments, and sources, taking into account the significant role that public funds play, through various actions, notably by supporting the strategies advanced by the countries and taking into account the needs and priorities of the developing country Parties. This mobilisation of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts”.

This article of the Paris Agreement was completed by paragraph 53 of the work programme contained in decision 1/CP 21, deciding that the developed countries intend to pursue their current collective mobilisation target up to 2025, from the point of view of concrete mitigation measures and transparent implementation; before 2025, the Conference of the Parties acting as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement set a new quantified collective target based on a threshold of USD100 billion dollars a year, taking into account the needs and priorities of the developing countries.

In this context, the developing countries and the African Group (AGN) supported by other groups of developing countries, request that the process which would allow, at the opportune moment (see inset below), this quantified collective target to be determined, within the framework of the preparatory negotiations for the implementation of the various provisions of the Paris Agreement, commences.

AGN Proposal for a procedure (timetable) to determine the quantified collective finance target (by 2025).

2018 take a procedural decision recommending that the CMA initiates the consideration of a new collective finance target in 2020 and agrees on the target at the latest by 2024.

2018 instruct the SCF to commence an analysis on the possible scenarios for a new target based on the needs and priorities of the developing countries.

2019 request the SCF to engage in consultations with the designated bodies under the Agreement/Convention

2020 request the CMA to consider the SCF technical report (analysis)

2020 Initiate considering a new collective target by the CMA by implementing a procedure and a timetable.

2023 Undertake the Global Stocktake as per Article 9.8

2023 Start considering a new collective target by the CMA

2024 Adopt the new collective target by the CMA
I.9.9. Other financial issues

Provision of financial support for the national reports of the developing countries

The climate reporting represents the principal commitment undertaken by the developing countries within the framework of the UNFCCC, on the one hand it has the advantage of presenting a snapshot on the status of the effects of climate change in these countries, but also allows the international community to analyse the level of efforts (adaptation mitigation, finance, transfer of technologies and capacity-building) of the countries both individually and cumulatively in relation to the reference years decided by the COP.

This commitment on behalf of developing countries cannot nevertheless be fully recognised only if the Annex 2 countries of the UNFCCC make sufficient financial resources available to them, through the GEF and its implementation bodies.

The commitment in relation to national communications and the greenhouse gas inventories (GHG) attached to developing countries, has evolved in the updated biennial reports and in a transparency system called “International Analysis and Consultation.” These developments require that financial resources are both reserved and are available to them. This is a topic being negotiated within the framework of the SBSTA, with only relative progress since its 46th session. During the first part of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies, the Parties were unable to come to a decision and agreed to continue the review of this issue next year (2019).

Other finance and budgetary questions

Within the framework of improving the conditions and the efficacy of the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies reviewed:

- activities, the significant milestones in the achievement of the programme and the financial performance of the Secretariat in 2017 FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.3;
- possible prioritising approaches and the budgetary implications of the decisions (FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.2);
- possible improvements to the presentation of the budget and the work programme for the two-year period 2020 to 2021 (FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.4 et Add.1);
- the status of the contributions of April 13, 2018 (FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.6);
- and the relationship on the technical workshop designed to improve the efficacy and the transparency of the budgetary process (FCCC/SBI/2018/2).

328. FCCC/SBI/2018/L.10
329. IISD, 2018b.
330. IISD, 2018b.
Therefore the Parties\textsuperscript{331} agreed the following\textsuperscript{332}:

- state their concern for the high number of contributions not lodged to the baseline budget for the current two-year period and previous years and immediately call on the Parties concerned to pay their contributions without delay;
- ask the Executive Secretary to develop an awareness amongst the representatives of the Parties in the bilateral and multilateral bodies of the problem of arrears and in contributions to the baseline budget;
- note that they must continue to examine the solutions that will allow the raising of contributions to the SBSTA 49;
- thank the Parties who made voluntary contributions to the Special Trust Fund to participate in the process arising from the Convention and to the special Trust Fund for complementary activities;
- request immediately that the Parties contribute to the special Trust Fund for the participation in the procedure arising from the UNFCCC to ensure the greatest level of participation in 2018, as well as to the special Trust Fund for complementary activities to ensure the implementation of a large part of the work programme under the UNFCCC; and
- take note of the annual 2017 report and observe that if the annual report made an effort to comply with the definitive mandate of COP23, future reports will need immediate improvements which will be reviewed at SBSTA 49.

Lastly, the APA reviewed, at the first part of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies, other finance questions related to:

- the procedure to implement a new quantified collective finance target (refer to point I.9.8 above);
- the restrictive guidelines of the CMA for the operation bodies of the finance mechanism;
- the restrictive guidelines of the CMA for the Least Developed Country Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund;
- the modalities for communicating financial information on a bi-annual basis regarding the provision of public financial resources to the developing countries in compliance with Article 9, paragraph 5 of the Paris Agreement.

Discussions and debates on these matters guided by both co-presidents of the APA were compiled as an outcome of the first part of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies in an information note\textsuperscript{333} which was used and updated during the second part of the same session held three months later at Bangkok and which will be continued in Katowice, for potential conclusion.

\textsuperscript{331} FCCC/SBI/2018/L.11
\textsuperscript{332} IISD, 2018b.
\textsuperscript{333} APA, 2018b.
I.10. Adaptation

Despite significant levels of progress made on climate change negotiations, the topics of resilience and adaptation to the effects and consequences of climate change are still being explored, not managing to mobilise a sufficient amount of effort and contribution to allow the developing countries, notably the African countries, the LDC and SIDS, to combat the increasingly pronounced impacts affecting all the regions of the world.

At COP23, as during the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies, it did not seem evident that significant progress in the negotiations on different elements of adaptation had been made, even if a great deal of effort was put into it and particularly to find a balanced and equitable method of handling adaptation and mitigation in form as well as in substance. The Parties were more or less managing ongoing issues related to adaptation on the one hand and on the other hand, presented and introduced their points of view on the final decisions they wanted to see adopted regarding adaptation within the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement.

For COP24, and continuing on from the additional Bangkok session (4-9 September 2018), the reader of this guide is invited to consider closely the following topics in terms of adaptation, which could deliver favourable outcomes and will be agreed at Katowice (Poland),

- The qualitative and quantitative definition\(^{334}\) of the global adaptation objective\(^{335}\) and its consideration in the Facilitative Dialogue in 2018 as well as the first Global Stocktake in 2023
- The consideration of the national communication on adaptation and its constituent elements, whether or not part of the NDA, as well as its related National Registry.

Furthermore, the consideration of the question of vulnerability in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement for African countries will be continued and should see a positive outcome at COP24.

\(^{334}\) The Paris Agreement seeks to strengthen the global response to climate change and increase everyone’s capacity to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change as well as to strengthen resilience to climate change. It defines a global adaptation goal with the purpose of: (i) strengthening adaptation and resilience capacity; (ii) reducing vulnerability to contribute to sustainable development; and (iii) to ensuring a suitable adaptation response within the framework of the goal of maintaining average global warming below 2°C and continuing efforts to maintain it below 1.5°C See [online] https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-big-picture/new-elements-and-dimensions-of-adaptation-under-the-paris-agreement-article-7#goal.

\(^{335}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7 para. 1.
Reminder of the Provisions of the Paris Agreement on Adaptation
(Annex to the submission of the African Group of Negotiators, 2016336)

• Article 2.1: formulates and reaffirms the links between the three global objectives regarding the rise in the temperature and to the adaptation measures and need for financing to ensure mitigation and adaptation actions.
• Article 3: defines the context for the NDA and envisages that these cover all elements including mitigation measures, adaptation, finances, the development and transfer of technologies, capacity-building and the transparency of action and support.
• Article 7.1 formulates the global adaptation objective, its assessment and its consideration within the Global Stocktake.
• Article 7.3 recognises the adaptation efforts made by the developing countries which will also be revised during the Global Stocktake.
• Article 7.4: recognises also the link between mitigation measures, adaptation needs and financing
• Article 7.10: presents the adaptation communications and the type of information which countries are required to communicate.
• Article 7.11: offers flexibility for the developing countries in the use of the different opportunities to communicate on adaptation.
• Article 7.12: registers all the communications on adaptation in the public registry
• Article 7.14: takes into account the aspects based on adaptation which will be revised during the Global Stocktake.
• Article 9.1: requests the developed countries to provider financial resources to the developing countries for adaptation and mitigation.
• Article 9.5: requests the developed countries to provide qualitative and quantitative indicative information on the finances to the developing countries on a biannual basis.
• Article 9.7: requests the developing countries to provide information on the support provided and mobilised for the developing countries on a biannual basis.
• Article 13.5: provides information on the type of information which will be reviewed within the framework of transparency of action, including adaptation.
• Article 13.6: provides information on the type of information which will be reviewed within the framework of transparency of action, including adaptation.
• Article 13.8 deals with information that the Parties must provide regarding adaptation within the framework of transparency of action and support.
• Article 13.9: requests the developed countries to provide information on the implementation resources provided to the developing countries.
• Article 13.10: gives the type of information developing countries should provide on the implementation resources required and received.

• Article 13.11: introduces the expert technical review which the Parties should undergo and the need for strengthening capacity-building in the developing countries to comply with their obligations.

• Article 14.1: establishes the Global Stocktake-assessment and supports the review of all elements, including mitigation and adaptation measures, implementation resources, as well as equity and science resources.

• Article 14.3: provides the outcomes of the Global Stocktake-assessment to provide updates to the Parties and to improve their actions and supports.

General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement

In the preparations for COP24 and continuing on from the additional Bangkok session (4-9 September 2018) the presidents of the SBSTA and SBI and the co-presidents of the APA developed and published a joint discussion note337 on the UNFCCC website – in accordance with the mandate given by the Parties to produce and submit draft negotiating texts for COP24. This contains the annexes (addenda) covering all the issues in the negotiations of the Paris Agreement Work Programme. Addendum 338 on adaptation, covers the following issues:

• Additional guidelines regarding communication on adaptation, including a component of the contributions decided at a national level, outlined in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement.

• Establishment of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement.

• Questions related to Decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 41, 42 and 45.

This addendum is accompanied, for certain topics, by draft decisions covering the recent outcomes achieved at the Bangkok negotiations – draft decisions that will form the basis for the negotiations at Katowice if the Parties agree to it.

I.10.1. Adaptation Committee

In accordance with its mandate arising from the provisions taken by Decision 1/CP.21339 and moving forward together with the LDC Expert Group (LEG) (under the aegis of both subsidiary bodies: the SBI and SBSTA) on the formulation of recommendations which must be prepared for COP24, the Adaptation Committee produced a progress report at COP23, just as in the primary sessions of the subsidiary bodies.

337. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
339. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 42, 41 and 45
Joint Mandates\textsuperscript{340} of the Adaptation Committee and of the LEG in collaboration with the SCF

At its twenty-first session, the Conference of the Parties (COP) asked the Adaptation Committee and the LDC Expert Group (LEG) to tackle three tasks intended to facilitate the application of the Paris Agreement, whose outcome will be reviewed at the first session of the Conference of the Parties acting as the meeting of the Parties of the Paris Agreement (CMA 1). The COP therefore requested that they:

a. Develop jointly the modalities to recognise the adaptation work of the developing country Parties, as provided in of Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Paris Agreement and to formulate recommendations for review and adoption by CMA 1;

b. To formulate recommendations in collaboration with the SCF and other competent institutions for review and adoption by the CMA 1 on:

(i) The adoption of measures necessary to facilitate the mobilisation of support for adaptation in the developing countries within the context of limiting the increase of the average global temperatures under Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;

(ii) The review of the suitability and of the efficacy of the adaptation and support outlined in Article 7, paragraph 14(c) of the Paris Agreement.

At COP23, the SBSTA and SBI noted that the Adaptation Committee and the LEG had completed their work on the recommendations to the CMA related to Decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 41 and 45 in recognising the adaptation efforts of the developing countries, the measures to facilitate the support for adaptation and reviewed the suitability and the efficacy of adaptation and support (in collaboration with the SCF).

The Adaptation Committee also put forward recommendations\textsuperscript{341} regarding Decision 1/CP 21, paragraph 42; this review was continued during the first part of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies\textsuperscript{342} as well as at the additional session in Bangkok for the CMA 1 to reach a decision. This involves essentially to rule, according to the information note\textsuperscript{343} focused on establishing the methodologies to assess the adaptation needs of the developing countries without the latter incurring any charges or additional and useless burdens.

A common decision bringing together the elements of paragraph 41, 42 and 45 of decision 1/CP.21 is expected at COP24 to include the aspects retained within under the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement.

\textsuperscript{340} https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2017/sb/fre/02a01f.pdf

\textsuperscript{341} https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/l02f_1.pdf.

\textsuperscript{342} IISD, 2018b.

\textsuperscript{343} https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/l02f_1.pdf.
Furthermore, in addition to its regular meetings, including the 13th meeting (March 2018), the Adaptation Committee also organised an expert workshop on the national objectives/indicators and their links with the SDG and the work of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (Tokyo, Japan 24-25 July 2018). Its conclusions are important enough to be taken into consideration during climate negotiations in relation to different adaptation and climate resilience issues.

Summary of the Adaptation Committee’s action plan for 2018

a. Remain flexible in order to accommodate any possible monitoring activities under the provisions of the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 and any requests in the context of the pre-2020 stocktakes;

b. Respond to requests from other institutions and provisions under the Convention and continue involving them in the AC’s work;

c. Collaborate with the LEG, following the NAP Expo 2018, to consider ways to assist with the implementation of NAP and to include information thereon in its annual report;

d. In the context of the Technical Examination Process on Adaptation (TEP-A)
   (i) include in the AC report to the COP, recommendations for respective processes and for the constituted bodies under the Convention, as well as the Parties and other organisations on ways forward and necessary actions to be taken, based on the outcomes of the technical expert meetings;
   (ii) Support the organisation and holding of TEP relating to regional adaptation.

e. Continue providing information to the SCF for the preparation of draft guideline decisions to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism;

f. Continue to enhance the links between the technological needs assessments (TNA) and the (NAP);

g. Continue to support the NAP Expo through the invitation from the LEG;

Lastly, it is worthwhile also considering the important work that the Adaptation Committee delivers in relation to “Long-term Adaptation Planning”. An element which could be of importance in the Paris Agreement procedure, from COP24 onwards, and even be part of the package of decisions expected within the framework of the operationalisation rules.

I.10.2. National Communication on Adaptation

A great deal of effort has been made to ensure that the Parties to the Paris Agreement agree on the form and substance of the “National Communication on adaptation”

through multiple meetings which continue to be held up to and including COP 24. Will there be a separate report or a chapter on the reporting of the NDA? Which details will be necessary or indeed useful? What are the financial implications arising from the choice of the type of report?

At this stage, the “National Communication on Adaptation” has diverse and varied formats. It allows the developing countries to assess their capacities and their levels of adaptation and resilience to the effects and the impacts of climate change, to express their vulnerabilities and their needs (in the form of activities, priority national, regional or local programmes and projects etc.) to tackle situations harmful to populations, ecosystems, and economies etc. It also allows for the recording of the efforts undertaken by the developing countries as well as the national investments related to these, by seeking recognition of these but also a follow-up assessment of the adaptation actions and activities carried out or intended to be carried out by the developing countries. Finally, the different elements and conclusions of this tool could be used during the Global Stocktake in 2023.

Finally, the other topic being debated regarding the choice of the procedure for the “National Communication on Adaptation” is the involvement of financial supports arising from the form, type and uses of this reporting. To reiterate, it is evident that for developing countries any new obligation of reporting implies the developed countries making available and providing access to new and additional financial resources (and funds to which they are contributors/donors such as the GEF, GCF and LDCF or the AF), in compliance with the provisions made by COP and the meetings of its instruments (CMP/CMA). An involvement which the developed countries would like to avoid, as well as the funds involved due to a lack of resources, insisting on the voluntary character of this national communication.

The on-going negotiations since the implementation of the Paris Agreement were carried out in the form of debates and discussions relating to the question of the “National Communication on Adaptation” and resulted in the production of continuous adjustments under the aegis of the co-facilitators designated by the APA, of an information note summarising the positions of each one of the principal options, namely the main guidelines for a “National Communication on Adaptation” regardless of the vehicle used (a component or not of an NDA) or other more specific ones for a separate national report.

**I.10.3. Registry of communications on adaptation**

The SBSTA continues to review the question relating to the processes and procedures of the function and use of the public communication registry on adaptation, in compliance with the provisions of of Article 7, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement. Since COP23 and up to the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies and the additional session of September 2018, the Parties continue to consider the following:

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• the links between the registry of national communications on adaptation and that of the NDC;
• taking into account, from its design, the need that the registry be characterised by its simplicity, be user-friendly and provide secure access and use.

Finally, it is important to draw attention to the on-going negotiations related to the Public Registry on “National Communications on Adaptation” in compliance with the provisions of Article 7, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement, to record the adaptation activities and actions as well as those requiring recognition. To date and since SBSTA 47 an information note gives an idea of the design envisaged for the aforementioned registry and the possible elements it should contain. COP24 could perhaps make a decision in relation to this within the framework of the components used for the operationalisation rules manual of the Paris Agreement, through CMA.1.

I.10.4. Nairobi Work Programme (NWP)

In exploring the efforts provided and the encouraging results obtained through the process linked to the NWP, COP23 invited the Parties to submit their points of view and suggestions (before end of March 2018) on how to improve the relevance and the efficacy of the NWP. It also asked the Secretariat to draft a summary report on the work undertaken since the 44th session of the SBSTA to allow the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies to bolster the role of the NWP.

The SBSTA determines in its conclusions that the NWP successfully completed its mandates and invited it to continue its work as a knowledge centre and a benchmark in terms of best practices for adaptation and resilience to climate change for all countries in the world. It is also requested to continue its effort in the main topical areas to stimulate activities which produce useful knowledge-based tools and to catalyse the action required to meet the knowledge needs identified.

It was also decided that the future areas of interest of the NWP should be centred on new questions related to climate change, including specifically: extreme weather phenomena; oceans, coastal zones and ecosystems; agriculture and food security; slow developing phenomena; rural systems and rural communities; means of subsistence and socio-economic elements.

Finally SBSTA 48 decided that the next stocktake of the operational and institutional modalities of the NWP will be carried out at SBSTA 56 for the purpose of assessing the outcomes and the efficacy of the NWP in terms of meeting the needs for knowledge of interest in implementing the Paris Agreement.

352. IISD, 2017a
353. IISD, 2018b.
I.10.5. National adaptation Plan (NAP)

Beyond the statistics provided in terms of the development of the financial support of the GCF to develop the NAP for the developing countries which do not reflect their expectations, COP23 recognised in its conclusions that numerous developing country Parties still have difficulty accessing GCF financing to develop and implement their NAP despite the inclusion of this procedure in the preparatory activities of the GCF. It thus invited the Adaptation Committee and the LEG to review, after the NPA Expo of 2018, ways of contributing to the implementation of the NAP in future work programmes and to include the information on this matter in their reports if applicable. It also invited the Parties to continue to provide information on progress achieved in the realisation of the objectives in developing and implementing the NAP, the experience acquired, best practices and lessons learned, gaps and needs and the support provided and received within this framework process by means of a questionnaire available on the NAP online platform.

For the NAP, several initiatives indicate the elements and components requiring financial support that can be illustrated in the figure below:

Figure 11. Main components of an NAP requiring financial support

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355. IISD, 2017a
SBI 48 for its part, reviewed the progress, best practices and experienced achieved, as well as the outcomes of the workshop359 held within the framework of the Adaptation Committee on access to the planning support programme and preparatory activities of the GCF in order to facilitate adaptation. It also took into account the report on the progress made in the formulation and the implementation process of the NAP. SBI 48 was therefore able to conclude360 that developing country Parties would be invited to submit their examples of national adaptation planning at COP24 and decide to continue the review of this topic at SBI 49.

I.10.6. Technical Examination Process on Adaptation (TEP-A)

The technical examination process361 on adaptation (TEP-A) was established at COP21 as part of the enhanced action pre-2020 under the decision adopting the Paris Agreement362. The TEP-A is conducted during 2016-2020, with the goal of identifying concrete opportunities for enhancing adaptation and resilience, reducing vulnerabilities and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions, thanks mainly to the following four functions of the TEP-A:

- Facilitating the sharing of good practices, experiences and lessons learned;
- Promoting cooperative action on adaptation;
- Identifying actions, including actions that could enhance economic diversification and deliver mitigation co-benefits;
- Identifying opportunities to strengthen enabling environments and enhance the provision of support for adaptation in the context of specific policies, practices and actions.

The COP decided that the TEP-A is to be organised by the subsidiary bodies, governed by the Adaptation Committee and supported by the Secretariat of the UNFCCC. It comprises annual technical expert meetings363, an annual technical paper364 and an annual summary for policy-makers365. The summary for policy-makers feeds into the annual high-level event that builds on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda and will be held in conjunction with the COP until 2020.

The meeting366 of the experts planned for 2018 was held on 9-10 May on the fringes of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies and dealt with the topic: Adaptation planning for groups, communities and vulnerable eco-systems.

359. IISD, 2018b.
360. FCCC/ SBI/2018/L.16
362. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 124.
The Adaptation Committee established a working group to advance its work on the TEP-A, consisting of its members and representatives of other bodies formed under the Convention and civil society representatives.

I.11. Transparency

General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement

Annex 6 of the joint concept note by the presiding officers of the APA, SBI and SBSTA (published in October 2018) relates to the MPG (modalities, procedures and guidelines) for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and notes generally that:

• The Parties have made commendable progress on these aspects.
• All parts of the MPG have become clearer, including the different options considered by the Parties.
• Work on textual proposals to be included has advanced, as has identifying technical work to be undertaken after the adoption of modalities, procedures and guidelines at Katowice.
• It is also highlighted that much work is needed to narrow down the many remaining options and sub-options.

Aspects still to be defined or settled are as follows:

a. How to provide flexibility to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities?

b. Need to consider the practical implications of decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 98 (indicating that the recommendations for the MPG of the enhanced transparency framework must be based on the MRV system established by decision 1/CP.16 during the Cancún Agreements) to determine how the MPG can build upon and eventually supersede the measurement, reporting and verification system established by this decision 1/CP.16 (Cancún Agreement) and Decision 2/CP.17 (on the biennial reporting guidelines, modalities and procedures for international assessment and review, modalities and guidelines for international consultation and analysis).

c. Which IPCC guidelines should Parties use when compiling national inventory reports? And should flexibility be provided to those developing country Parties that need it in the in light of their capacities?

d. How to ensure that the MPG related to the NDC description are coherent with the information provided to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDC being developed under APA agenda item 3?

e. What is the common set of information needed to track progress in implementing and achieving all types of NDC?

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f. Given the close relationship acknowledged by all Parties between the guidance for an adaptation communication under APA agenda item 4 and the MPG for reporting on information on climate change impacts and adaptation under APA agenda item 5, how can the MPG of agenda item 3 be revised to reflect progress made in Bangkok under agenda item 4 on the guidance for an adaptation communication?

g. When and how the outcome of SBSTA agenda item 13 (modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions) are going to be incorporated in the MPG?

h. Should the format of a technical expert review be chosen by a Party, change on a regular frequency, or be based on other criteria (e.g. submission of a report reporting on achievement of an NDC)?

i. Should the frequency and timing of the facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress be linked to the submission of the biennial transparency report and/or the publication of the technical expert review report or occur at certain regular intervals (e.g. every two or five years)?

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I.11.1. Transparency, key to achieving the objectives fixed in the NDC

Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and its accompanying Decision 1/CP.21 provide for the establishment of an enhanced transparency framework. This is a critical instrument for the implementation of the Paris Agreement as it must, inter alia, monitor the advances and progress made with the individual and collective objectives defined in the NDC as well as the transactions implemented under the market mechanisms defined in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and avoid double counting.

This is a particularly ambitious goal given the specific characteristics of the new ascendant regime resulting from the Paris Agreement, wherein it is in the interest of the Parties to highlight their objectives and advances in mitigation, but to face the different obstacles in implementing these actions (cost of measures, internal policy, etc.). Secondly, the highly diverse nature of commitments to mitigation and adaptation taken in the NDC makes it extremely difficult to make comparisons between the Parties.

In addition, this comparison does not only involve the mitigation and adaptation actions; it should also provide a means for monitoring the support provided and received by the various Parties. The enhanced transparency framework must
therefore develop mechanisms that ensure (i) the confidence of various actors in the information provided by the other Parties that will necessitate the use of different types of data and (ii) the comparison between the different Parties. The quest for balance between these two main missions remains a major issue to be addressed.

One of the key questions in the negotiations on transparency is knowing how distinction will be made between the approaches to reporting and the monitoring of mitigation, adaptation and support provided according to the circumstances of countries. The developed countries wish for a common approach, whilst the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), for example, seek a dual approach similar to Annex A/Annex B (Kyoto Protocol), which splits the countries into two categories. There is a broad possibility between these two extremes of applying a certain flexibility to the countries according to their capacities.

I.11.2. The Cancún Agreements and introducing the transparency process

Transparency has been an issue for several years in the Convention processes. A first reporting framework was set up firstly for mitigation actions via the national communications. Distinction was made between the Parties for this framework, mainly with respect to the content to be included in the communication. The first national communications were submitted to the Convention Secretariat in 1997.

The Cancún Agreements of 2010 subsequently enhanced these initial provisions as the Parties committed to sharing every two years information on policies and actions introduced to combat climate change based on their own circumstances. This framework implemented from 2014 onwards has three different stages:

- An initial reporting phase;
- A second stage for national technical assessment of reports submitted;
- A third peer-to-peer exchange covering progress by the country.

Regarding the first reporting phase, the developed countries send their information to the Convention via the Biennial Reports (BR), whereas reporting by the developing countries takes the form of Biennial Update Reports (BUR).

The second and third report review phases are also differentiated. The Biennial Update Reports from developing countries are submitted for International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) while the technical examination of the Biennial Update Reports from developed countries is known as an International Assessment and Review (IAR) process.

I.11.3. Initiatives to enhance the transparency framework

The importance given to enhancing the transparency framework under the Paris Agreement has given rise to two governmental initiatives: the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) and the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT), which are detailed below.
**a. Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)**

Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 84, decides to establish a Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) in order to support developing countries in building up institutional and technical capacities.

The aim of the CBIT is to:

a. To strengthen national institutions for transparency-related activities in line with national priorities;

b. provide relevant tools, training and assistance for meeting the provisions stipulated in Article 13 of the Agreement;

c. assist in the improvement of transparency over time.

At COP22 (Marrakech, 2016), more than eleven countries (including Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America and the Wallonia Region (Belgium)) committed to financing a total of USD50 million to the CBIT. Other lending institutions have stated their intention of dedicating resources to CBIT for the 2018 programming.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is in charge of supporting the introduction and continuation of the CBIT, including the allocation of voluntary contributions to the developing country Parties. Five agencies are currently implementing projects financed by the CBIT: the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Conservation International, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

The CBIT’s Global Coordination Platform (GCP) was launched in April 2017 for the purpose of facilitating the exchange of information on CBIT projects across the different countries, maximise learning opportunities and enhance coordination between the actors working on transparency via an online platform. Any developing country is eligible for the CBIT.

As at 15 October 2018, the platform had forty projects under consideration, including:

- 35 validated concept notes;

- Five approved projects in the following countries: Costa Rica, Chile, Kenya, Uganda and Uruguay.

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369. UNFCCC, 2018b
371. https://www.cbitplatform.org/
Of the forty projects under consideration (approved projects and validated concept notes), 35 indicate a specific field of action:

- Fourteen on adaptation;
- Eight on financing;
- 21 on mitigation;
- Two on the co-benefits of sustainable development.

CBIT projects have therefore increased rapidly, as last year (2017) only ten projects were registered. The CBIT assessment should be initiated before 2021 and the annual GEF report on the CBIT will be considered at COP24372.

**b. Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT)**

Governments (Germany, Italy) and the NGO Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) and the ClimateWorks Foundation have combined to commit USD16 million for an Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT). The aim of the initiative is to provide all policymakers with the tools and support required to measure and assess the effects of their climate actions.

The ICAT provides recommendations and supports capacity-building and knowledge sharing. The recommendations relate to various themes broken down into three categories:

- **GHG**: renewable energies, building efficiency, agriculture, forestry sector and transport charges;
- **Impact assessment**: transformational change and sustainable development;
- **Support**: non-State and subnational action, actor participation and technical review.

The latest version of the ICAT guidelines373 is available online: http://www.climateactiontransparency.org/icat-guidance/.

ICAT is aiming to work with twenty to thirty countries. The following countries have so far accepted the invitation to take part in the Initiative: Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand and Trinidad and Tobago.

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372. UNFCCC, 2018b
373. ICAT, 2018a.
374. ICAT, 2018b.
I.11.4. Recent advances by the different working groups operating under the UNFCCC

Figure 12. Evolution of arrangements related to transparency of support


The activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) created in 2015 by Decision 1/CP.21 are also linked to the development of the new transparency framework provided for under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

The APA is tasked with developing, *inter alia*, the two points expanded in the tables below:

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376. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1
### APA agenda item 3: Guidance in relation to the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21:

- Features of nationally determined contributions (NDC), as specified in Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 26;
- Information to be provided by the Parties to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDC, as specified in Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 28;
- Accounting for Parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDC), as specified in Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 31.

#### APA 1.4 (November 2017)\(^{377}\)

The discussions showed clearly that Parties have divergent views on the scope of NDC and on questions of differentiation between the Parties.

It is recommended to clarify the options regarding the features of NDC. Consolidation and streamlining should be brought to the elements on the information to be shared to facilitate the clarity, transparency and understanding of NDC.

On accounting, there is a need to explore in depth how to implement this process.

To achieve this, the following questions should be clarified: (a) How should the principles of the Paris Agreement be reflected in accounting for NDC? (b) Is accounting about principles, specific rules or some combination of both? Or is it to be

#### APA 1.5 (May 2018)\(^{378}\)

The co-facilitators prepared a tool for “navigating” through the 180 pages of the Informal Note prepared during APA 1.4 and through submissions and interventions of Parties presented since this date.

On top of that, the co-facilitators were tasked with submitting before 1 August additional tools in order to profile the results of a negotiation text from APA during the September 2018 session, but also to give examples of how the Parties could continue to advance towards a base agreed by everyone for the negotiations\(^{379}\).

The latest version of this tool was published on 6 August 2018\(^{380}\).

#### APA 1.6 (September 2018)

The main issues still to be defined relate to the structure of guidance, the scope of NDC, the level of information to be provided and a potential differentiation of features to be followed according to the development level of the country.

These last two aspects mentioned above are experiencing the most diverging views. Similarly, yet to be defined is whether the issues of the nature of contributions will be discussed under this agenda item or elsewhere in the negotiations.

The structure proposed in the current document (which covers 35 pages)\(^{381}\) is as follows:

- NDC features: (i) identification and list of existing features, (ii) new/additional features, (iii) Guidance/elaboration on features

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377. APA.2018.1.InformalNote. Accessible [online] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/APA%201.5%20Reflections%20Note%2C%20v4.0%20%2810%20Apr.2018%29_0.pdf.
381. UNFCCC, 2018b, pp. 3-38.
achieved through transparency? (c) Do targets need to be quantified as part of accounting? If so, what types of NDC must be quantified, in what circumstances and for what purpose? (d) What level of detail in the guidance on accounting is required to ensure the Paris Agreement can function effectively in line with its Article 4?

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APA agenda item 5: Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APA 1.4 (November 2017)</th>
<th>APA 1.5 (May 2018)</th>
<th>APA 1.6 (September 2018)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>achieved through transparency? (c) Do targets need to be quantified as part of accounting? If so, what types of NDC must be quantified, in what circumstances and for what purpose? (d) What level of detail in the guidance on accounting is required to ensure the Paris Agreement can function effectively in line with its Article 4?</td>
<td>– Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding (ICTU): (i) Objectives, (ii) Capacity of developing countries, (iii) Procedural elements, (iv) Substantive elements. – Accounting: (i) Understanding the term, (ii) Objectives, (iii) Capacity of developing countries, (iv) Drawing from approaches under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, (v) Procedural elements, (vi) Specific elements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following elements are to be considered for continued negotiations:
(a) refine and complete the draft elements to ensure that proposals are taken into account correctly, (b) ensure the legal nature of the various proposals, (c) discuss specific examples

The co-facilitators have published, in consultation with the other bodies, a joint concept note on progress made, including a proposal on the next steps to be taken[^385].

The latest version of this tool was published on 6 August 2018[^386].

The 75-page document is structured as follows: A) Introduction, B) National inventory report on anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, C) Information necessary to track progress in implementing and achieving its NDC goals

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[^382]: APA.2018.1.InformalNote [online] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/APA%201.5%20Reflections%20Note%20v4.0%20%2810%20Aug%202018%29.pdf.
[^384]: UNFCCC, 2018b, pp. 199-274.
[^385]: UNFCCC, 2018a.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APA 1.4 (November 2017)</th>
<th>APA 1.5 (May 2018)</th>
<th>APA 1.6 (September 2018)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>that could inform the development of specific provisions to give flexibility to the Parties that need it, (d) clarify the understanding of the extent to which the proposals addressed here are linked to other items on the APA agenda and other bodies, (e) translate the work on the aspects above into coherent elements of text that could form a negotiating text.</td>
<td>The co-facilitators have published, in consultation with the other bodies, a joint concept note on progress made, including a proposal on the next steps to be taken. The latest version of this tool was published on 6 August 2018.</td>
<td>(Article 4), D) Information related to climate change impacts and adaptation (Article 7), E) Information on financial, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support provided and mobilised (Articles 9-11), F) Information of financial, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support needed (Articles 9-11), G) Technical expert review, H) Facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions relating to modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised by public interventions relating to Article 9(5) (for the reporting on financing provided in the past) and Article 9(7) (planned future financing) are discussed in the section of this guide given over to finances (Section I.9).

### I.11.5. Barriers to be overcome

Several barriers to reporting and transparency had already been identified prior to the Paris Agreement. This relates especially to the availability and clarity of the information required and reported, as well as the lack of reporting methods and typology of activities related to climate change.

However, although there is already history inside the Convention on monitoring mitigation actions, there is currently no agreement on how to monitor and assess adaptation actions. There is also no concordance on the parameters that could demonstrate successful adaptation. The new transparency mechanism should therefore consider these aspects.

In addition, until the Paris Agreement, reporting on climate financing had hardly been addressed. Only OECD and research institutions such as the Climate Change Initiative have tried to define a methodology for calculating “mobilised climate financing”, but this has not been validated formally by the Parties and is

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387. UNFCCC, 2018a.
389. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, paras. 5 and 7.
openly criticised by some developing countries. The SBSTA must therefore work on defining rules and methodologies without being able to base this on any existing procedures within the Convention. In addition, beyond rules and methodologies to be set up for reporting on climate financing, a common vision of the various concepts introduced by the Paris Agreement also has to be established. This is the case, for example, of the concepts of “progress in line with previous efforts” and the “provision of scaled-up financial resources”. Beyond the financial means, efforts in terms of technical and capacity-building support should also be monitored.

As mentioned previously, different working groups under the Convention are focusing on these issues, however, several questions have been raised by these various working groups:

- How to ensure sufficiently detailed information for precise and consistent monitoring, without the transparency mechanism becoming a burden for the Parties? Detailed information can be costly despite their potential use in readjusting and increasing the ambition of commitments during the next NDC communication/revision cycle. The question of differentiation is closely linked to this question. Developed countries wish to avoid returning to a differentiation between developed and developing countries, as under the Kyoto Protocol. However, it is generally agreed that the LDC and the SIDS must benefit from less cumbersome regulations.

- Given the major differences between the types of commitment made in the NDC, how can information allowing a comparison between the Parties be guaranteed.

**I.12. Talanoa Dialogue**

**I.12.1. From establishing a facilitative dialogue to the Talanoa Dialogue**

COP21 in Paris provided for the establishment of a facilitative dialogue in 2018 to provide an opportunity to present information, conditions and policy signs needed for the Parties to review their 2020 ambition upwards. In Marrakech, the presidency of COP22 was requested, in collaboration with the presidency of COP23, to undertake open and transparent consultations with the Parties on organising the facilitative dialogue and to report jointly on the preparations for this dialogue to COP23. These consultations were started during the sessions of the subsidiary bodies in May 2017 up to COP23, inclusively. Based on these exchanges of views, the preparations for the facilitation dialogue were finalised during COP23 under the presidency of Fiji.

390. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.
391. Decision 1/CP.22, para. 16.
Reminder of the processes and mandates adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP) regarding the holding and organising of a “facilitative dialogue”

• 21st session of the COP (COP21 – 2015) – Launch of the work programme

The COP “decides to convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Agreement”\(^\text{392}\).

• 22nd session of the COP (COP22 – 2016) – Launch of consultations as to the organisation of the facilitative dialogue

The COP “requests the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session, in collaboration with the incoming President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session, to undertake inclusive and transparent consultations with Parties on the organisation of the facilitative dialogue referred to in decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20, including during the sessions of the subsidiary bodies to be convened in May 2017 and the twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties, and to report jointly back to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session on the preparations for this dialogue”\(^\text{393}\).

• 23rd session of the COP (COP23 – 2017) – Presentation of the results of consultations and adoption by the COP of the structuring/conception of the Talanoa Dialogue emerging from the work and consultations conducted by the presidencies of COP22 and COP23.

The COP “welcomes with appreciation the design of the 2018 facilitative dialogue, to be known as the Talanoa dialogue, announced at the twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties by the Presidents of the twenty-second and twenty-third sessions of the Conference of the Parties, as contained in the informal note by the presidencies of the twenty-second and twenty-third sessions of the Conference of the Parties”\(^\text{394}\) and “launches the Talanoa dialogue, which will start in January 2018”\(^\text{395}\).

I.12.2. Design, organisation, structure and importance of the Talanoa Dialogue

**Design, organisation and structure of the Talanoa Dialogue**

Following Decision 1/CP.21 to establish a facilitative dialogue between the Parties in 2018 and Decision 1/CP.22 on the consultations on the organisational modalities of this dialogue, COP23 was able to define the outlines and modalities for the...
organisation of the Talanoa Dialogue, deciding that it would be structured around three topics:

- Where are we?
- Where do we want to go?
- How do we get there?

At the end of COP23 presided by Fiji, the facilitative dialogue was renamed *Talanoa Dialogue*, to place the process in an inclusive and constructive ancestral dynamic symbolising the Fijian Islands and the Pacific States, as explained in the next box.

**The concept of “Talanoa”**

According to the web platform of the Talanoa Dialogue set up by the Convention Secretariat, the concept of “Talanoa” refers to a traditional word used in the Pacific to reflect a process of inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue. The purpose of *Talanoa* is to share stories, build empathy and to make wise decisions for the collective good. The process of Talanoa therefore involves the sharing of ideas, skills and experience through storytelling. This concept has been applied to the facilitative dialogue so that, during the process, the participants can forge a bond of trust and advance by building phenomena of mutual understanding for enhanced and appropriate climate ambition faced with the climate urgency, whilst responding to the special circumstances and relying on each one’s capacities.

In terms of organisation, COP23 decided that the Talanoa Dialogue would be launched on 1 January 2018 and divided in the same year into two phases, called “technical” and “political” and would conclude at COP24. It was also decided that the non-Party stakeholders (cities, businesses, investors and other actors in the civil society) would be able to contribute to this dialogue by sending in their views or sharing their stories in submissions to the Secretariat, but also by participating in various discussion forums.

**Importance of the Talanoa Dialogue**

As indicated in Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20, the Talanoa Dialogue constitutes a key instrument serving enhanced ambition in the current negotiating and global climate action cycle. It is essential that the Parties can reassess their ambition as quickly as possible if the goals of the Paris Agreement are to be achieved. Recall especially that the Parties are invited by 2020 to: communicate, update or revise

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396. Talanoa Dialogue – Annex II to Decision 1/CP.23.
their NDC, by showing progress compared with the previous contributions and reflecting its highest national ambition; one of the key goals of the Talanoa Dialogue is therefore to contribute to this dynamic.

This is also essential in achieving the long-term mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement of 2°C/1.5°C, whereas in her address at the opening session of the Talanoa Dialogue during the negotiations intersession in Bonn (2 May 2018), Anne Olhoff, representative of the UNEP DTU Partnership, recalled the current global warming scenario of around 3-3.2°C. Adding that for a scenario compatible with the 2°C, an additional reduction of between 11 and 3.5 Gt CO₂-eq had to be achieved by 2030. As for the goal of 1.5°C, the most recent IPCC analysis published in October 2018 indicates that the aggregate effect of NDC by Parties would raise global GHG emissions to between 52-28 Gt CO₂-eq per year in 2030, whereas they should be less than 35 Gt CO₂-eq the same year for a trajectory compatible with the 1.5°C, even in the scenario of a very significant increase in magnitude and ambition post-2030 (see Section I.4). A rapid, bold increase in the ambition level is therefore essential.

In a message published on 8 February 2018, the Fijian presidency of COP23 and Polish presidency of COP24 recalled the importance of the Talanoa Dialogue process in this framework. This forms a framework for international discussion outside classic negotiations, during which countries and other key stakeholders can meet, discuss and take stock to find together the means to enhance the global ambition in the short term (pre-2020) and in the long-term (to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement). As such, the Dialogue will consider, inter alia, the results of the special IPCC report on the 1.5°C objective (Section I.4).

The Dialogue is therefore a key process in determining and working towards the implementation of many measures to advance action plans for combating climate change, that will also contribute to advancing miscellaneous sustainable development goals and other targets of the Paris Agreement, mainly eradicating poverty, resilience, low carbon development, food security, etc.

The Talanoa Dialogue may well be a forum for discussions alongside traditional processes conducted under the UNFCCC, but it nevertheless enters into the pace of negotiations and the global climate action. The next figure thus illustrates how this process enters into the Paris Agreement implementation process (see Figure 13).

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400. Decision 1/CP.23, para. 13.
Following on from these introductory remarks, the next sub-sections offer the read a glimpse of the different phases of the Talanoa Dialogue in 2018 and the dynamics prior to COP24.
I.12.3. The different phases of the Talanoa Dialogue in 2018

As illustrated in Figure 14 above, the two main phases of the Talanoa Dialogue found their high spots simultaneously with the negotiations intersession of May 2018 (48th session of permanent subsidiary bodies) and COP24. Prior of each of these meetings, the Parties and other stakeholders were invited to submit their views to prepare the discussions, respectively, before 2 April 2018 for the first session (May 2018) and before 29 October 2018 for the second session (December 2018).

The Secretariat acted as facilitator in organising the Dialogue, in support of the presidencies of COP23 and COP24. The Secretariat especially moderated a specific online platform, designed to share information on the Dialogue, its evolution and other resources needed to encourage and prepare the participation of all. In particular, the Parties and other stakeholders used this platform for communicating their views. Lastly, it lists the key documents emerging from the official processes inherent to the Dialogue.

Preparatory phase

The objective of the Talanoa Dialogue preparatory phase is to building a strong evidence-based foundation for the political phase that will be held jointly at

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404. According to © UNFCCC [online] https://talanoadialogue.com/important-dates. (Translation OIF/IFDD). First published August 2018. See OIF/IFDD, 2018
405. See [online] https://talanoadialogue.com/.
408. See [online] https://talanoadialogue.com/preparatory-phase.
COP24. Initiated in January 2018, the preparatory phase will conclude simultaneously at COP24 with the launch of the political phase.

The preparatory phase hinges around two major points:

- The invitation to the Parties and other stakeholders to communicate their views to the Secretariat on the Dialogue’s three central questions before 2 April and 29 October 2018 respectively.
- The invitation to the Parties and other stakeholders to organise a series of local, national, regional or international events in support of the Dialogue.

The preparatory phase ends at COP24, with an discussion space to consider the implications of the special IPCC report on global warming of 1.5°C and a final preparatory meeting before the launch of the political phase.

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A commitment by all actors through local, national, regional or global Talanoa sessions in support of the official process of the Dialogue

Throughout the Talanoa Dialogue preparatory phase, both governmental and non-State stakeholders held Talanoa sessions throughout the world, covering a multitude of themes relating to climate change at all levels, to support the Talanoa Dialogue and feed its official sessions. As not all events organised during 2018 can be covered, as they are based on a voluntary inscription process, a certain number are listed within the Talanoa Platform set up by the Secretariat of the Convention.

To mention just one, the High-level Talanoa was conducted at the same time as the Global Climate Action Summit (GCAS) in San Francisco, in September 2018. This High-level Talanoa specifically covered the following topic: “how to turn zero emission development into reality?” This brought together speakers from all sectors and all regions.

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409. The descriptions presented in this Guide are based on this document published by the Secretariat and available [online] https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013db9/downloads/1cbos7k3c_792514.pdf.
411. To consult all events organised and registered during 2018, see [online]https://talanoadialogue.com/calendar.
Patricia Espinosa, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, stated in this respect: “National governments alone cannot solve the climate crisis. And so we are working in tandem with states, regions and cities to achieve tangible and lasting progress, we are working with the global business community and we are tapping the grassroots activism, passion and commitment of civil society and billions of ordinary people around the world”\(^{413}\).

In line with the spirit of Talanoa, marked by inclusivity and transparency, all debates have been recorded and made available online\(^{414}\).

**Political phase**

The political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue is being held at the same time as the Katowice Conference. Based on experiences lived throughout the year, this political phase must unite Heads of State and high-level representatives to take stock of the efforts made collectively. Co-directed by the presidencies of COP23 and COP24, it must more especially:

1. Take stock of the collective efforts to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and
2. Give indications for the preparation of the next NDC communication/revision cycle\(^{415}\).

The political phase is designed so that the political leaders can agree on what has to be done in terms of combating climate change and how the goals of the Paris Agreement can be achieved.

In addition to experiences acquired, this second political phase is informed by communications of views sent to the Secretariat until 29 October 2018. A final report was published following this second round of submissions\(^{416}\). It takes into account the new contributions published between 2 April and 29 October as well as the discussions at the May intersession following the contributions posted before 2 April. Reflections on the IPCC report on the 1.5°C are also included in the final synthesis report.

The final synthesis report must serve as a tool for the political leaders at Katowice. It is thus succinct, clear and credible As indicated previously, it also presents ways or recommendations on how to enhance and implement the NDC\(^{417}\).

\(^{413}\) https://unfccc.int/news/high-level-talanoa-dialogue-shows-how-to-make-zero-emissions-development-a-reality

\(^{414}\) See [online] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XU5Mlo7K8Tw .


\(^{416}\) Accessible at the address indicated previously [online] https://talanoadialogue.com/key-documents-1.

\(^{417}\) Source: https://cop23.com.fj/talanoa-dialogue/.
This report was not yet available for analysis when this Guide was being prepared, however it can now be consulted on the Talanoa Dialogue platform. The next paragraphs offer the reader a panorama of information available when this Guide was being written, including deciphering of the first official session of the Talanoa Dialogue (May 2018) and the communications of views received before 2 April 2018 that informed this first meeting.

I.12.4. Panorama of the first official session of the Talanoa Dialogue conducted at the same time as the May negotiating intersession (30 April-10 May 2018)

The first official session of the Talanoa Dialogue conducted at the same time as the negotiation intersession of May 2018 provided the first opportunity for Parties and other actors to interact in a constructive, open and non-judgemental forum by recounting their own stories. The event commenced with a plenary opening session followed by a day of working groups (arranged in three consecutive sessions) addressing the three primordial questions of the Dialogue. Feedback was then given in a plenary closing session. Note that the Dialogue was also informed by the process of technical expert meetings.

Report of the Presidencies of COP23 and COP24 summarising the discussions conducted during the first official Talanoa session in May 2018

• General comments
For the first time in the UNFCCC process, Parties and other non-Party stakeholders gathered in an informal and inclusive setting for this first official Talanoa session. The Talanoa sessions (6 May) saw participants engaging in constructive dialogue in an atmosphere of openness and mutual respect. They also reaffirmed the importance and need for all actors to contribute to combating climate change. In this framework, one essential lesson was the common recognition of the value of working together and learning from the experience of others. Beyond the Talanoa sessions, the Presidencies also held bilateral consultations with the Parties and non-Party stakeholders to collect views on the organisation and conduct of the political phase and its intended outcome.

• Opening of the Talanoa Dialogue – 2 May 2018
The first official Talanoa session was opened on 2 May 2018, chaired by Luke Daunivalu (Fiji – COP23) and Tomasz Chruszczow (Poland – COP24). Patricia Espinosa, UNFCCC Executive Secretary, welcomed participants to the session,
jointly with the Fijian Minister Inia Seruiratu, who shared a story from his country on the question “Where are we?”. Following these introductory remarks, representatives from groups of Parties and non-governmental organisations shared their expectations of the Talanoa Dialogue.420

The remainder of the opening session featured four panellists commenting on the different questions of the Dialogue.

“Where are we?” – Jim Skea, Vice-Chairman of IPCC Working Group III, addressed this question, recalling the climate urgency from a scientific point of view and the ambitious efforts that have to be formulated from a political point of view, but also the encouraging technical progress in implementing appropriate actions. He also introduced the 6th IPCC assessment report, due for publication in 2023, the same year scheduled for the first Global Stocktake under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement.

Where do we want to go? – Anne Olhoff, representative of the UNEP DTU Partnership, addressed this question, recalling the goal of limiting the increase in temperatures fixed by the Paris Agreement in its Article 2 and the current insufficient political ambition to achieve this. And to highlight the necessary reductions in emissions as well as certain technologies and their cost-benefit ratio, to reduce the gap by 2030.

“How do we get there?” – Anirban Ghosh, representing the Mahindra Group, addressed this question, affirming the commitment of private companies to the global effort to implementing the Paris Agreement, but also that combating climate change can be synonymous with prosperity and even economic growth. And adding that for that, the joint action of States (incentive political and regulatory environments) and companies (innovation, financing) is primordial.

Finally, Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim, representative of the Association for Indigenous Women and Peoples of Chad, provided views on the Talanoa Dialogue from the standpoint of civil society. Commenting on all three questions, she highlighted climate urgency, the need to enhance the climate ambitions and the essential, joint participation of all actors in the process.

• Sessions of the Talanoa Dialogue – Sunday, 6 May 2018

Seven Talanoa Groups422 were set up for the Talanoa sessions. They met to share their stories with a view to building empathy and sharing best practices. Another objective was to provide concrete examples of issues that could be brought to the attention of ministers in the political phase, including examples of what has worked, what has not worked, best practices and/or challenges encountered. Note that all the sessions were recorded and made available online.423

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420. Interventions available [online] https://TalanoaDialogue.com/key-documents
A total of 305 participants (207 Party and 98 non-Party representatives) took part in the sessions, with 162 UNFCCC Parties represented. Each Talanoa session comprised thirty representatives of Parties and five representatives of non-Party stakeholders. Among the seven Talanoa Groups, nearly 474 stories were shared (309 by Parties and 105 by non-Party stakeholders). A summary of the main points raised is available in the synthesis report by the Presidencies.

• Conclusion (8 May) and closing (9 May) sessions

Two conclusion (8 May) and closing (9 May) sessions of the Talanoa Dialogue were then held.

8 May – The conclusion session was organised in open plenary to report back on the sessions held on Sunday, 6 May. The rapporteurs shared certain inspiring stories in order to convey the spirit of Talanoa that infused the discussions. The Parties were then invited to provide their reflections on the sessions. The Parties thanked the Fijian Presidency for its leaderships and welcomed the open, inclusive and positive atmosphere surrounding the discussions. Underlining that discussions were held away from the politics of negotiations, the Parties highlighted that the sessions had allowed the participants to engage in constructive, informative and inspiring discussions. Some Parties even stated that the personal experiences, challenges, sample practices and other lessons could inspire the international climate negotiations.

9 May – The Talanoa closing session was an opportunity for the Presidencies to provide their reflections on progress accomplished. The Fijian Presidency reaffirmed the importance of each one’s commitment to contribute to enhancing the climate action, underlining that the challenge should not be restricted to political spheres, given that it impacts everyone. And adding that the inclusion of non-Party stakeholders had provided the opportunity to draw on a wider range of experiences, whilst urging the Parties to demonstrate the climate ambition that the world needs. The Polish Presidency emphasised the preparations for the political phase, that would take place at the same time as COP24, reinviting each actor to commit to making it a success.

In their statements, groups of Parties expressed their support and determination to engage in and contribute to the Dialogue throughout the year prior to COP24. Non-governmental representatives shared their expectations, some noting the lack of aggregate ambition by Parties in their current NDC, others highlighting such issues as the consideration of vulnerable communities and groups, gender issues and climate justice.

By way of a summary, the next figure gives an overview of the Talanoa Dialogue organisation and sessions during the negotiation intersession in May 2018.

424. See pp. 6-9 [online] https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cgc07t0q_77988.pdf
Figure 15. Synthetic panorama of the dynamics of the Talanoa Dialogue, May 2018

© OIF/IFDD. First published August 2018. See OIF/IFDD, 2018
The first official sessions of the Dialogue held in May 2018 was also built on the communications of views received before 2 April 2018 around the Dialogue’s three central questions. These inputs are summarised in the next paragraphs to give the reader of this Guide a panoramic view of them.

Panorama of inputs received before 2 April 2018

A total of 220 inputs were uploaded into the Talanoa Dialogue platform by the 2 April 2018 deadline. In total, 49 Parties contributed, by submitting fifteen inputs as individual inputs (seven States) or groups of States (eight contributions for 42 States. The other inputs, more than 90% of the total, came from non-State actors.

Figure 16. Talanoa – Breakdown of inputs from non-State actors (received as at 2 April 2018)

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426. See [online] https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cbos7k3c_792514.pdf

427. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 Translated and adapted according to UNFCCC. See [online] https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cbos7k3c_792514.pdf
The analysis of inputs details their trends, by splitting them according to the question they are addressing: Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?

- “Where are we?”

This category listed 107 inputs, including ten from States or groups of States. The main themes and concerns raised are summarised in the next table.

**Table. Overview of inputs received as at 2 April 2018 relative to the question “Where are we?”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Concerns raised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of results on GHG emissions at various scales (global,</td>
<td>The concern is one of massive emissions, still far too high to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. And adding that in a scenario of status quo, it seems implausible that global emissions would peak by 2020. Carbon sinks (forests) and their importance are also evoked, as are the monitoring tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national, sectorial)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of the state of play on climate impacts and vulnerability</td>
<td>The situation of vulnerable communities or ecosystems is addressed most frequently here. Questions on synergies between human and natural establishments (e.g. sustainable building and construction) are highlighted. Numerous references are also made to questions of sustainable development, eradicating poverty or sensitive issues like human rights and climate migrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of initiatives and actions</td>
<td>Here are presented initiatives and actions covering both the problems of adaptation and mitigation, but also the areas where they have contributed to the progress made and the efforts to be made, or difficulties to be overcome, to enhance the ambition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of existing institutional agreements</td>
<td>Sundry aspects of the Paris Agreement are addressed here, mainly the pre-2020 action. The lack of coherence between national objectives and international agreements is also highlighted. Other comments relate to the lack of ambition of NDC or the weakness of the binding force of the Paris Agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next figure gives an overview of the occurrence of topics identified above.
Figure 17. Talanoa – frequency of topics among the “Where are we?” inputs

- “Where do we want to go?”

This category listed 114 inputs, including ten from States or groups of States. The main themes and concerns raised are summarised in the next table.

Table. Overview of inputs received as at 2 April 2018 relative to the question “Where do we want to go?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Concerns raised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification of aspirations in terms of global goals and principles for climate action</td>
<td>The goal of the Paris Agreement is reaffirmed, whilst calling from more ambition. Many inputs evoke the possibility of exploiting the synergies between the various international agendas, mainly with the SDG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of emissions scenarios and trajectories compatible with the goals</td>
<td>This topic is mainly targeting the NDC, showing the current lack of ambition in terms of forecasts to achieve the Paris Agreement goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

428. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 Translated and adapted according to UNFCCC. See [online] https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cbos7k3c_792514.pdf
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Concerns raised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description of a future vision towards a zero (net) emissions world</td>
<td>This zero (net) emissions world is found in inputs at various scales (global and local). To achieve this, the importance of legislative and financial structural changes is highlighted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of a future vision towards climate resilience</td>
<td>The critical situation of some communities is described. A holistic approach is mooted to face up to this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of the vision and future ambition of stakeholders</td>
<td>This mainly involves dynamics of partnerships and drive/influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of expectations for future institutional agreements</td>
<td>Future institutional agreements should exploit synergies better, favour inclusivity and enhance the role of non-State actors. It is also question of introducing more binding rules.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next figure gives an overview of the occurrence of topics identified above.

Figure 18. Talanoa – frequency of topics among the “Where do we want to go?” inputs\textsuperscript{429}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure18}
\caption{FREQUENCY OF TOPICS AMONG THE ‘WHERE DO WE WANT TO GO?’ INPUTS}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{429} \textsuperscript{429} © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 Translated and adapted according to UNFCCC. See [online] https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4ec-9a06-5907e013dcb9/downloads/1cbos7k3c_792514.pdf
• “How do we get there?”

This last category listed 148 inputs, including eleven from States or groups of States. The question is occasionally addressed very generally in the inputs or, conversely, sometimes in very concrete fashion. Most often it involves defining a road map with respect to the goals listed in the previous question. The main themes and concerns raised are summarised in the next table.

Table. Talanoa – Overview of inputs received as at 2 April 2018 relative to the question “How do we get there?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Concerns raised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of existing actions that can be replicated and/or upscaled</td>
<td>Many sectors are evoked and over half the actions quoted are multi-sector or cross-cutting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing knowledge, analysis and opinions on high-potential solutions</td>
<td>These high-potential solutions are considered the fastest and most relevant in combating climate change. Here also, a significant proportion of actions is cross-cutting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations to the Secretariat and Convention bodies on issues to be addressed in the international negotiations</td>
<td>The challenges of a need for transparency and enhanced obligation are highlighted. Possible recommendations for the NDC are also evoked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations on the measures that national governments must take</td>
<td>Here are presented the means of creating legal frameworks favouring the setting up of climate actions at State levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations for the private sector</td>
<td>Here is highlighted especially the importance of low-carbon investments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations for intergovernmental organisations</td>
<td>Enhance the climate-related action of intergovernmental organisations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next figure gives an overview of the occurrence of topics identified above.
I.12.5. Conclusions and next steps

As defined previously, the preparatory phase of the Talanoa Dialogue ends at COP24, with an initial discussion space to consider the implications of the special IPCC report on global warming of 1.5°C and a final preparatory meeting before the launch of the political phase. The political phase must unite Heads of State and high-level representatives to take stock of the efforts made collectively. Co-directed by the presidencies of COP23 and COP24, it must more especially: (i) take stock of the collective efforts to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and (ii) Give indications for the preparation of the next NDC communication/revision cycle.

In addition to the experiences acquired throughout the year, this second political phase is informed by the publication of a final report that takes into account the new inputs published between 2 April and 29 October as well as the discussions at the May intersession following the inputs posted before 2 April. The final synthesis report must serve as a tool for governments in the political phase of the Dialogue during COP24. It is thus succinct, clear and credible.

By way of conclusion, the next figure offers an overview of the various points described within this section relating to the organisation of the Talanoa Dialogue as well as the main steps that have directed its progress since 1 January 2018 up to COP24.

430. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 Translated and adapted according to UNFCCC. See [online] https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cbos7k3c_792514.pdf
Figure 20. Concept diagram of the dynamics of the Talanoa Dialogue throughout 2018

© OIF/IFDD. First published August 2018. See OIF/IFDD, 2018
I.13. Role of non-Party stakeholders in the post-Paris global climate action

I.13.1. Context: a role in growing recognition and of multiple initiatives already in progress

Although States are the main stakeholders in international climate negotiations, non-State actors have been playing a key role in environmental and sustainability questions for many years. In 1992, the Agenda 21 adopted at the end of the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit – during which the UNFCCC was also adopted – recognises that “one of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making”\(^{434}\). In this sense, it identified nine “major groups”\(^{435}\) including non-governmental organisations (NGO), local communities and even commerce and industry.

Since then, the non-State actors have lobbied to promote their specific features and their positions in the decision-making processes within the international negotiations and to develop climate policies, whilst proposing and implement solution packages on the ground. Under climate negotiations, mobilisation of non-State actors was categorically encouraged by the introduction of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA)\(^{436}\).

This initiative has been hugely successful and to facilitate the information and monitoring of LPAA initiatives the Nazca Platform\(^{437}\) was set up in 2014 by France and Peru to list the commitments by non-State actors to climate action. It was recently updated (September 2018), revamped and renamed (“Global Climate Action Portal”\(^{438}\)) (see Section I.14). As at 15 October 2018, 19,136 actions were registered on the portal, with 10,221 collective actions and 8,915 individual actions. On the same date a total of 12,403 stakeholders were committed, including 9,524 cities\(^{439}\), 78 regions\(^{440}\), 2,430 companies\(^{441}\), 354 investors\(^{442}\) and seventeen civil society organisations\(^{443}\) along with 83 collective initiatives\(^{444}\), demonstrating a growing mobilisation of all actors, both in developed and developing countries.

\(^{434}\) United Nations, Agenda 21, Chapter 23, preamble, para. 23.2
\(^{435}\) United Nations, Agenda 21, Section III. Strengthening the role of major groups.
\(^{436}\) LPAA – Lima Paris Action Agenda.
\(^{437}\) “Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action”
\(^{438}\) See [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/.
\(^{439}\) http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=cities.
\(^{440}\) http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=regions.
\(^{441}\) http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=companies.
\(^{442}\) http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=investors.
\(^{443}\) http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=csos.
\(^{444}\) http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/cooperative-initiatives.html.
These elements are not however exhaustive\textsuperscript{445}, as the list of non-State actor actions and involvement has already been extremely rich and varied for many years. Their contribution to global climate action has furthermore been increasingly maintained since 2015, given that COP21 was the opportunity to ratify definitively and enhance their role.

I.13.2. Recognition of the role of non-State actors within the Paris Agreement

Following COP21, the Parties reaffirmed and ratified the fact that combating climate change requires ambitious, wider-scale action by all sectors of society, both public and private.

The central role of non-Party stakeholders is stated on several occasions, including in the preamble to Decision 1/CP.21 to which is annexed the Paris Agreement, in order “to mobilise a stronger climate action and more ambitious by all Parties and other actors including civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other international authorities, local communities and indigenous people [...\textsuperscript{446}].”

Elements relating to the non-Party stakeholders following the Paris results

From a global viewpoint, Decision 1/CP.21 contains a variety of provisions that request non-Party stakeholders specifically, or urge them implicitly, to commit through miscellaneous aspects of the implementation of objectives emerging from Paris:

(i) To any “organisation in a position to do so”: Provide support for the preparation and communication of the intended nationally determined contributions of Parties that may need such support\textsuperscript{447};

(ii) To competent organisations (as targeted in Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49) and “those of organisations and expert bodies outside the Convention, by mobilising them as appropriate”: Develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement of populations related to the adverse impacts of climate change\textsuperscript{448};

(iii) To “Parties and [...] other actors”: promote the voluntary cancellation, without double counting, of units issued under the Kyoto Protocol, including certified emission reductions that are valid for the second commitment period\textsuperscript{449};

\textsuperscript{445} The climate initiatives and actions engaged by non-Party stakeholders are not necessarily entered in the official platform provided for that purpose.

\textsuperscript{446} Decision 1/CP.21, Preamble of the Decision to Adopt the Paris Agreement

\textsuperscript{447} Decision 1/CP.21, para 15.

\textsuperscript{448} Decision 1/CP.21, para. 49

\textsuperscript{449} Decision 1/CP.21, para. 106
(iv) To “non-Party entities”: Post their actions in favour of the climate on the non-State actor portal for climate action⁴⁵⁰, known as “NAZCA”⁴⁵¹;

(v) To the Parties: Work closely with non-Party stakeholders to catalyse efforts to strengthen mitigation and adaptation action⁴⁵²;

(vi) To “non-Party entities”: Increase their engagement in the technical examination processes of adaptation and mitigation actions⁴⁵³;

(vii) To “those responsible in the Parties, international organisations, international cooperation initiatives and non-Party entities”: Engage in the high-level event relating to the LPAA⁴⁵⁴;

(viii) Appointment of two high-level champions to monitor the execution and scaling up of voluntary initiatives of non-State actors under the LPAA⁴⁵⁵ with the support of competent organisations and interested Parties⁴⁵⁶;

(ix) Establishment of a platform for the exchange of experiences and sharing of best practices on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner⁴⁵⁷.

Decision 1/CP.21 even dedicates Chapter V “Non-party entities”⁴⁵⁸ to them. The action of non-State actors “including those of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities”⁴⁵⁹ is underlined and they are invited to scale up their efforts, both in order to find ways to reduce GHG emissions and also to build up resilience in the face of the impacts of climate change⁴⁶⁰. Local and subnational dimensions of adaptation are also showcased⁴⁶¹, clearly recognising the role of cities and local governments in the strategies and actions to be introduced in the future.

Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the contribution of all stakeholders has not only become a key element of climate action but also constitutes an essential lever in raising the level of ambition to achieve its goals, mainly maintaining the rise in temperatures by the end of the century. This is especially characterised by the insufficient commitments currently made by Parties in their NDC for a development path compatible with the 2°C objective⁴⁶². This is also

⁴⁵⁰. See below [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
⁴⁵¹. Decision 1/CP.21, para 117.
⁴⁵². Decision 1/CP.21, para. 118
⁴⁵³. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 119; based on the provisions referred to in paras. 109 and 124.
⁴⁵⁴. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 120(d)
⁴⁵⁵. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 121(b)
⁴⁵⁶. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 123.
⁴⁵⁷. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 135.
⁴⁵⁸. Decision 1/CP.21
⁴⁵⁹. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 134
⁴⁶⁰. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 135
⁴⁶¹. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Article 7
⁴⁶². See UNFCCC,2016a, UN Environment, 2017, or Climate Interactive, 2018.
demonstrated by the reaction of non-Party stakeholders to the United States of America to thwart and minimise the impacts of the decision by the Trump administration to leave the Paris Agreement. Faced with the lack of ambition of governments, multi-actor collaboration is therefore essential to reduce the gap between goals and results.

I.13.3. On the importance of mobilising non-State actors in international climate action in the post-Paris era

The Paris Agreement, based on Decision 1/CP.20, recognised the initiatives and commitments of all actors, including non-State actors, launched under the LPAA. Decision 1/CP.21 also recalls the urgent need to intensify the global response to climate change and encourage greater ambition from governments.

In order to create a link between the Convention and the multiple voluntary initiatives, “two high-level champions” appointed annually by the COP Presidencies (current and future) during the period 2016-2020. These personalities are notably responsible for monitoring the execution (in the extension of the LPAA initiatives) and intensification of voluntary initiatives by non-State actors.

Decision 1/CP.21 details the tasks that fall to these high-level champions. The first champions appointed thus defined a new Climate Action Agenda, made up of a Global Climate Action Plan, published prior to COP22.

Global Climate Action Agenda: The roadmap

Ms. Hakima El Haité and Ms. Laurence Tubiana, high-level climate champions from Morocco and France, have published their roadmap for the implementation of their global agenda. The agenda has the objective of strengthening cooperative initiatives between governments, cities, businesses, investors and citizens in order to reduce emissions rapidly and to help vulnerable countries to adapt to the impact of the climate and to develop their own sustainable future using clean energy.

Roadmap goals

A. Involve the interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including the promotion of voluntary initiatives from the Lima-Paris Action Agenda

1. Build on existing initiatives and support new geographically-varied initiatives

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464. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 121
465. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 122
466. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 122
467. UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership, 2016a.
2. Connect initiatives and alliances to national action plans such as the NDC
3. Ensure more transparency, track results and establish credibility

B. Provide guidance to the Secretariat on the organisation of technical meetings of specialists and work with the Executive Secretary and the current and future presidents of the COP to coordinate annual high-level events

The two champions also invited governments and non-State actors to convey their points of view on this roadmap, as well as any useful input, aiming to stimulate climate action, up until 1 August 2016. During the Bonn Conference in May 2016, the two champions reiterated their commitments, whilst demonstrating their optimism, mainly in terms of the success of COP22 in mobilising non-State actors in the continuation of the “spirit of Paris”.

I.13.4. Assessment between COP22 and COP23

The expectation at COP22 was that these foundations could be consolidated by encouraging, once again, the multi-actor and mainly the participation of non-State actors in achieving the Paris Agreement goals.

In line with the recommendations stipulated by Decision 1/CP.21, a high-level meeting to accelerate climate action took place during COP22 under the Global Climate Action Plan. The event took place on 17 November 2016, following themed sessions held during the two weeks of negotiations. These themed sessions brought together central actors to encourage the deployment and search for solutions in each of the following sectors: forests (8 November), water (9 November), industry and the private sector (9 November), cities and human settlements, with special attention paid to resilience (10 November), energy (11 November), oceans (12 November), transport (12 November), agriculture and food security (16 November).

The results of these sessions were mainly transcribed by rapporteurs during the event on 17 November 2016 to take stock of progress and identify opportunities for climate action. Special attention was paid to the means of mobilising finance to serve the climate action.

Ultimately, all these sessions and their results were used to enhance and fuel the text emerging from COP22, made up by the “Marrakech Partnership for global climate action”. This fixes a programme of actions for the period 2017-2020 to catalyse and support international climate action by Parties and non-Party

470. UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership (2016b).
471. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 120
473. UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership, 2016c.
stakeholders. During the COP22 closing plenary session, Salaheddine Mezouar introduced the text of the Marrakech Partnership, which having been read out received a standing ovation\(^{474}\).

Lastly, COP22 was an opportunity for the Champions, along with many States, regions, cities and companies, to launch a new initiative: “2050 Pathways Platform”\(^{475}\), designed to support actors seeking to devise new long-term, zero-GHG and climate resilient sustainable development pathways. As such, the announcement published at the end of COP22 indicated already the commitment of 22 countries\(^{476}\) to developing a “2050 Pathway”\(^{477}\). At the same time, this same document indicated that fifteen cities\(^{478}\), seventeen States and regions\(^{479}\) and 196 companies\(^{480}\) had joined the platform, once more demonstrating the proactiveness of non-Party stakeholders and their commitment to innovating to contribute to international climate action.

Following COP22, the negotiations intersession held on 8-17 May 2017 in Bonn\(^{481}\) also had to register progress, \textit{inter alia}, in enhancing the action of non-State actors. In this respect, the Convention Secretariat published two documents in particular on the commitments of non-State actors to climate change\(^{482}\). The first document summarised the cooperative activities with United Nations entities and intergovernmental organisations that contribute to the work of the Convention\(^{483}\) and the second related to the views and opportunities of enhancing further the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholder to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Decision 1/CP.21\(^{484}\).

A workshop was organised on 9 May 2017 on opportunities to enhance further the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the implementation of the provisions of Decision 1/CP.21. The Secretariat

\(^{474}\) IISD, 2016b.
\(^{475}\) 2050 pathways, 2016.
\(^{476}\) See for example, the platform set up by Australia [online] http://www.2050pathways.net.au/
\(^{477}\) 2050 pathways, 2016. See Annex 1
\(^{478}\) 2050 pathways, 2016. See Annex 2
\(^{479}\) 2050 pathways, 2016. See Annex 3
\(^{480}\) 2050 pathways, 2016. See Annex 4
\(^{481}\) On 8-17 May 2017, the 46th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 46) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 46) as well as the third part of the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA 1-3) [online] https:// unfccc.int/fr/node/55588
\(^{482}\) IISD, 2017b.
\(^{483}\) FCCC/SBSTA/2017/INF.2 “Summary of cooperative activities with UN entities and intergovernmental organizations that contribute to the work under the Convention”.
\(^{484}\) FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.3 “Views on opportunities to further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the implementation of the provisions of decision 1/CP.21”.
produced a report\textsuperscript{485} on this workshop for consideration by the SBSTA. Over and beyond means for enhancing partnerships between Parties and non-Party stakeholders, the workshop also covered the means for enhancing the ambition of NDC through climate action, the possibilities of expanding the scope of contributions of non-Party stakeholders and intergovernmental level and on the means of diversifying modes of engagement and facilitating participation at intergovernmental level.

Lastly, the Bonn intersession was also an opportunity for non-State actors to take a concrete role in seeking and broadcasting solutions for climate action. This includes especially the organisation, on 8-12 May 2017, technical expert meetings on mitigation relating to the intersector issues in urban environment and land use\textsuperscript{486} (another technical expert meeting on mitigation relating to intersector issues in urban environment was held on 29 June 2017 in Cotonou, Benin). Similarly, technical expert meetings on mitigation were held in Bonn on 16-17 May 2017, relating specifically to the means of integrating adaptation to climate change with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction\textsuperscript{487}.

\textbf{I.13.5. Continue on the path of implementation, assessment of COP23 and towards COP24}

COP23 also marked a major step in continuing this work. The next paragraphs thus propose an assessment of the main steps overcome during COP23 and covered during 2018 which, in some cases, will end at COP24.

\textit{Organisation of a first formal, open and “historic” Dialogue between Parties and other stakeholders on 8 November 2017 in parallel to COP23}

Note firstly that COP23 hosted, on 8 November 2017, an open Dialogue between Parties and non-Party stakeholders during an official forum. This dialogue entered into the implementation of the provisions of the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{488}, especially the conclusions of the SBSTA at the end of its 46th session (May 2017)\textsuperscript{489}, which had urged the organisation of such a dialogue. According to the report by the Fijian

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{485} FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.7 “In-session on opportunities to further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the implementation of the provisions of decision 1/CP.21. Report by the Secretariat”.
  \item \textsuperscript{486} http://unfccc.int/resource/climateaction2020/media/1303/TEMS_March_Agenda.pdf
  \item \textsuperscript{487} http://unfccc.int/focus/adaptation/technical_expert_meeting/items/10144.php or http://tep-a.org/
  \item \textsuperscript{488} Mainly in its Article 6, para. 8(b) that targets “enhancing public and private sector participation in the implementation of nationally determined contributions” or its Article 12 that aims to enhance public participation in climate change.
  \item \textsuperscript{489} FCCC/SBI/2017/7 paragraph 119(b)(i).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Presidency\textsuperscript{490}, this Dialogue was a “historic” event, convening “for the first time during formal proceedings an official dialogue between Parties and non-Party stakeholders”. The Dialogue united about fifty Parties and a multitude of representatives from non-Party stakeholders, including environmental organisations, companies and the private sector, trade unions, young people, women, indigenous peoples, subnational governments, farmers and research institutes. Given the overwhelming interest in this historic event, the 430-person room capacity proved insufficient to seat all of the participants.

Two main topics set the pace for the discussions: (i) enhancing the ambition level and implementation of NDC and (ii) enhancing access and participation of observers to the formal processes under the auspices of the Convention. This is conveyed by official policy recommendations of the COP23 Presidency on both topics, based on the reflections of all participants in the debates. The atmosphere of the Dialogue was overall constructive and focused on the means of enhancing action synergies. In conclusion, the Presidency stated that this first open Dialogue had been a “resounding success”. Poland, as the incoming presidency of COP24, welcomed these results positively and confirmed the organisation of a similar Dialogue at Katowice.

\textit{Continuation of activities of the Global Climate Action Plan during COP23}

Under the Global Climate Action Plan in the context of the Marrakech Partnership, the COP23 events hinged around sector workshops during themed days and high-level sessions. These are summarised in the next figure and tables.

\textsuperscript{490} https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/observer_organizations/application/pdf/final_open_dialogue_report_151117.pdf
Figure 21. Panorama of activities of the Global Climate Action Plan during COP23

PANORAMA OF ACTIVITIES
OF THE GLOBAL CLIMATE PLAN DURING COP23

THEMED DAYS

FRIDAY
10 NOVEMBER
- ENERGY
- WATER
- AGRICULTURE

SATURDAY
11 NOVEMBER
- HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
- OCEANS AND COASTAL AREAS
- TRANSPORT

SUNDAY
12 NOVEMBER
- FORESTS
- INDUSTRY
- SUMMIT OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEADERS
- HEALTH DAY

HIGH-LEVEL SESSIONS

MONDAY
13 NOVEMBER
- OPENING SESSION
- FINANCE
- SDG 11 (SUSTAINABLE CITIES) AND
- SDG 2 (ZERO HUNGER) AND CLIMATE

TUESDAY
14 NOVEMBER
- INNOVATION
- RESILIENCE
- CLOSING SESSION (BONN ZONE)

WEDNESDAY
15 NOVEMBER
- GENDER DAY
- HIGH-LEVEL CLOSING SESSION (BUHLA ZONE)

491. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 According to UNFCCC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Final reports (key messages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 10 November 2017    | Agriculture⁴⁹³ | The talks highlighted short-term (2018) and medium-term (2020) priority actions, especially:  
• **In the short term:** Enhance and invest in knowledge and information; build capacity to address barriers to implement climate action; scale up public and private climate finance flows to agriculture and use them in a catalytic manner.  
• **In the medium-term:** Strengthen a multi-sector and multi-stakeholder dialogue towards more integrated approaches; incentivise public-private partnerships.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|                     | Energy⁴⁹⁴ | The talks highlighted short-term (2018) and medium-term (2020) priority actions, especially:  
• **In the short term:** Feed into the 2018 facilitative dialogue strategies and good practices of countries, companies, cities, communities and others who are driving energy sector transitions.  
• **In the medium-term:** Accelerate energy efficiency through policies, financial support and capacity-building; enhance investments in the transformation of the energy sector; strengthen the targeted support for all stages of clean energy technology innovation; develop long-term energy plans; adjust the national policy and regulatory frameworks to foster an environment that incentivises greater investment, including from the private sector.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|                     | Water⁴⁹⁵ | The talks highlighted short-term (2018) and medium-term (2020) priority actions, especially:  
• **In the short term:** Scale up collaboration between climate and water communities during 2018 in preparation for COP24; disseminate lessons learned and build upon the projects and best practices facilitating adaptation, mitigation and climate resilience in national and transboundary basin organisations, municipalities and economic sectors;  
• **In the medium-term:** Enhance the visibility and contributions of water within the Global Climate Agenda and UNFCCC; build capacity to address climate adaptation and mitigation through the Water-focused Basin Initiatives; mobilise and increase the climate finance portfolio for water and governance.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

⁴⁹². https://unfccc.int/climate-action/marrakech-partnership/events/gca-at-cop-23  
⁴⁹⁴. Complete report is available [online] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP%2023%20GCA_energy_outcome.pdf  
The talks highlighted short-term (2018) and medium-term (2020) priority actions, especially:

- **In the short term:** Enhance the dynamics of the Convention processes and its related legal instruments; enhance the sharing of knowledge and capacities; enhance, restructure and revitalise the climate financing mechanisms.
- **In the medium-term:** Align the policies at all levels of governance; enhance financing and standardisation of processes inherent to the project preparation from the viewpoint of financial institutions; strengthen the institutions to allow the implementation of standards and policies in the sector; increase the capacity to access and use new financial instruments.

### Oceans and coastal areas

The talks highlighted short-term (2018) and medium-term (2020) priority actions, especially:

- **In the short term:** Support countries in the development and implementation of nature-based adaptation and mitigation actions, with a focus on SIDS, low-lying areas and developing countries; Support countries in their effort to include coastal and oceans-related actions into the revision and strengthening of existing NDC and access public and private financial resources for the implementation of actions; support the Oceans Pathway Partnership, led by the presidency of COP23.
- **In the medium-term:** Submit strengthened and revised NDC including targeted goals in the sector; mainstream ecosystem management in coastal and marine natural resources policies and in the national climate plans; develop investment plans for a blue economy; develop and support measures to address the displacement of coastal and island populations as a result of climate change.

### Transport

The discussions were mainly centred around the following issues: developing policies and identifying goals for the sector; sustainable freight for a low-carbon emission transport system; shifting personal mobility through innovations in transport technologies, systems and integrated planning; accelerating the adoption of clean vehicles; adapting infrastructures; reducing international maritime transport emissions and decarbonising supply chains.

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497. Complete report is available [online] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop_23_outcome-oceansday_ver01.pdf
| 12 November 2017 | **Forests**\(^{499}\) | The talks highlighted short-term (2018) and medium-term (2020) priority actions, especially:
- *In the short term*: scaling up progress on forests; adaptation and resilience of forests and societies; integrate forests and other land uses in public policies; scaling up finance.
- *In the medium term*: mobilise multi-stakeholder partnerships to implement the goals of the New York Declaration on Forests (mainly the 2020 targets) and encourage the monitoring of progress through transparency; strengthen forest governance frameworks, build national and local capacity and mobilise finance to implement targets set by the NDC and the domestic goals of the countries, especially in relation to adaptation; strengthen subnational action to encourage more ambitious forest related climate change mitigation and adaptation goals under the NDC. |
| **Industry**\(^{500}\) | The talks highlighted short-term (2018) and medium-term (2020) priority actions, especially:
- *In the short term*: Strengthen the participation and contribution of non-State actors in the preparatory phase for the 2018 facilitative Dialogue; improve the effectiveness of actions by Parties and other stakeholders by identifying collaborative opportunities, by organising a series of events by 2020; improve the dynamics inherent to the technical examination processes (TEP) of experts associating Parties and other stakeholders.
- *In the medium-term*: Create shared ambition/articulation between global and national action plans for decarbonising key sectors, especially supply-chains and energy end uses. |

\(^{499}\) Complete report is available [online] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop_23_outcome-forestsday_final.pdf

\(^{500}\) https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/1211_industry_outcome_1511.pdf.
## Issues and positions

**Table. Global Climate Action Plan at COP23\textsuperscript{501} – High-level sessions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Key messages or descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 November 2017</td>
<td>Opening session of the high-level meeting on the Global Climate Action Plan</td>
<td>The opening of the high-level event on Global Climate Action at COP23 introduced the high-level debate and topics (of the following two days) and also summarised the the discussions from the previous three themed days. Through concrete examples from representatives of business, finance, civil society and cities and regions, the event focused especially on the enhancement of pre-2020 ambition to strengthen the rapid implementation of the Paris Agreement. The programme is available online\textsuperscript{502}.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>For each of these sessions, whilst building on the previous discussions (themed days), the discussions brought together high-level panellists and identified and adopted measures to be implemented in the short (2018) and medium (2020) term, as well as highlighting a certain number of commitments made during COP23 to advance actions and initiatives in each sector. A full report detailing priority objectives and commitments is available online for each event\textsuperscript{503}.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SDG 11\textsuperscript{504} (sustainable cities and communities) and climate action</td>
<td></td>
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<td>14 November 2017</td>
<td>Innovation</td>
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<td>Resilience</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SDG 2\textsuperscript{505} (zero hunger) and climate action</td>
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\textsuperscript{501} https://unfccc.int/climate-action/marrakech-partnership/events/gca-at-cop-23

\textsuperscript{502} https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/website_precis_gca_opening_0311.pdf.

\textsuperscript{503} https://unfccc.int/climate-action/marrakech-partnership/events/gca-at-cop-23.

\textsuperscript{504} Target 11: Ensure that cities and human settlements are open to all, safe, resilient and sustainable. See [online] https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/cities/

\textsuperscript{505} Target 2: Eliminate hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. See [online] https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/hunger/
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>14 November 2017</td>
<td>Closing session&lt;sup&gt;506&lt;/sup&gt; (Bonn zone)</td>
<td>This closing session was an opportunity to celebrate the end of the series of themed activities and high-level commitment in the Bonn Zone (civil society zone). Once again, this session brought together all actors that are committed to taking concrete climate measures. It was also an occasion to revisit the events held, which in total culminated in more than hundred events in a variety of formats, such as plenary sessions, round tables, press conferences and digital dialogues for live streaming on social networks. The programme is available online&lt;sup&gt;507&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 November 2017</td>
<td>High-level closing session&lt;sup&gt;508&lt;/sup&gt; (Bula zone)</td>
<td>In the evening of 15 November, the high-level event was brought to a close with highlights of the Global Climate Action programme relayed to assembled delegates, Ministers and Heads of State at one event within the main plenary room of the negotiations. This event also provided a platform where non-Party stakeholders can pass on the critical message of the need for accelerated climate action and there commitment to act as a link between actions on the ground and the sphere of negotiations. During this session, the &quot;Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2017&quot; was presented to the Parties by the high-level champions. This Yearbook shows how the actions of non-Party stakeholders can accelerate the global climate momentum. The United Nations Secretary General, António Guterres, Frank Bainimarama (President of COP23) and Patricia Espinosa (UNFCCC Executive Secretary) also took the floor to call for inclusive, enhanced and global action.</td>
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<sup>506</sup> Civil society zone.
<sup>507</sup> https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/1411_gca_bonn_closing_1411.pdf.
<sup>508</sup> Negotiations zone.
Publication of the first Yearbook of Global Climate Action, under the Marrakech Partnership

COP23 also featured the publication of the first edition of the Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2017 under the Marrakech Partnership\textsuperscript{509}. This once more emphasises the recognition henceforth universal of climate action that must be more ambitious and more effective by all governmental levels, the private sector and the civil society, to limit the increase in the temperature increase and thus avoid the worse effects of climate change\textsuperscript{510}. In this context, the report demonstrates the efforts by all actors to achieve the goals of the Marrakech Partnership, which provides a solid roadmap for catalysing and revitalising the climate action of Parties and other stakeholders during the period 2017-2020, to support full implementation of NDC.

Key messages of the annual assessment (2017) of global climate action under the Marrakech Partnership

A series of key messages is highlighted for the status and assessment of global climate action in 2017, including\textsuperscript{511}:

• **Alignment of the Marrakech Partnership goals and action by the non-Party stakeholders with the implementation of the Paris Agreement**: mainly by promoting that the initiatives of these actors form operational implementation tools to end the necessary transformations, for example by plugging the needs/gaps in terms of sectorial, financing, capacity, technologies or information approaches on the climate.

• **Actions by subnational governments are spreading**: by recalling those becoming world leaders in offering decent, climate-resilient living conditions to their citizens through sustainable energy, transport and food policies, etc. And adding that through subnational coalitions, more than a billion people have already committed to reducing their GHG emissions by 80% by 2050.

• **Businesses are transforming**: by indicating the many commitments made by the private sector to more towards sustainability, mainly by reducing the impacts of production methods on natural resources. Add adding that collectively, private sector action could provide the scale needed to transform our economies globally in a low-carbon and climate-resilient transition.

• **Action on climate resilience is strengthening**: by focusing mainly on commitments by non-State actors in oceans and water at COP22, or regarding agriculture and the development of clean energy infrastructures in developing countries and SIDS.

• **Transparency and monitoring of global climate action is improving**: mainly under the Marrakech Partnership, where the majority of initiatives (∼70%) have been intensified and diversified and where the majority are already reporting concrete results.

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\textsuperscript{509} UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership, 2017.
\textsuperscript{510} UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership, 2017, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{511} UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership, 2017, pp. 11-12. Executive Summary.
• Global climate action is moving to the South; what is clear in the report is that global climate action is scaling up, especially in the South.

• Climate financing needs boosting; by recalling once again the essential aspect of climate financing that is still insufficient to achieve the necessary transformations in all sectors to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.

In substance, the report details the progress, challenges and opportunities in all seven priority sectors of the Marrakech Partnership (land use, oceans and coastal areas, water, human settlements, transport, energy and industry). Lastly, the report addresses a certain number of key messages512 to the Parties and national governments, to contribute to enhancing action synergies between Parties and non-State actors in the UNFCCC process in 2018 and strengthen global climate action. These include:

• being part of the technical examination process (TEP);
• participate in the development and implementation of NDC;
• continue efforts to strengthen climate resilience;
• find innovative financing solutions beneficial to all;
• participate actively in the facilitative Dialogue in an open, inclusive manner based on the experiences of all.

Adoption of the Bonn-Fiji Commitment of local and regional leaders

From the point of view of non-Party stakeholders, another major advance parallel to COP23 was the adoption by acclamation of the “Bonn-Fiji Commitment” during the Summit of local and regional leaders on 12 November 2017, characterising their commitment to implement the Paris Agreement at all levels (Bonn-Fiji Commitment)513.

Bonn-Fiji Commitment of local and regional leaders to implement the Paris Agreement at all levels (Bonn-Fiji Commitment)

In this document, subnational government actors emphasise that a new era has started following the adoption and entry into force of the Paris Agreement for global climate action building on the commitment of all stakeholders worldwide and at all levels. The document is broken down into three parts: (i) commitments, ambitions and actions, (ii) calls to the UNFCCC Parties and member States of the United Nations and (iii) list of concrete and joint initiatives.

513. Climate Summit of Local and Regional Leaders, 2017.
Regarding ambitions, the subnational government actors undertake to:

- *raise their climate action ambition and*: implement the Paris Agreement goals in their jurisdictions; enhance the resilience of their populations and communities; cooperation with many more local and regional governments globally; work with Parties and identify opportunities for greater collected climate ambition.
- *take holistic and transboundary sustainability action and*: implement the Paris Agreement goals in coherence with the SDG; encourage governments at all levels to mainstream the Paris Agreement goals into policies within their jurisdiction; join forces with all stakeholders within their jurisdictions and territories; prioritise and expand their partnerships beyond their borders and continents, etc.

Regarding calls to the UNFCCC Parties and member States of the United Nations:

- *In relation to the NDC*, the subnational governments: urge Parties to conclude the Paris Agreement Implementation Guidelines by 2018; encourage Parties to seize the opportunity created by the transition to a new “urban world” by enhancing from now on the synergies between national and subnational actions; invite all Parties to demonstrate leadership by strengthening the urban and subnational dimension of their NDC, etc.
- *In relation to an inclusive and ambitious global climate architecture*, the subnational governments: call on the global finance community to prioritise capacity building, technology transfer, project preparation, decentralised cooperation and strategic plans and investments; call on Parties to increase the funding to the UNFCCC finance mechanisms and for innovative, climate-friendly solutions and infrastructures; request Parties to recognise the increasing frequency and intensity of climate risks; request the Presidencies of the COP and high-level champions to strengthen the synergies between national and subnational actions under the Marrakech Partnership action programme, etc.

Lastly, the subnational governments invite all interested Parties and other stakeholders to collaborate in the implementation of these various points. The document ends by listing twenty concrete and joint initiatives whereby the subnational actors are organising themselves into networks and implementing concrete, ambitious and inclusive solutions to respond to the climate challenges and contribute to the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals.

**Continuing work on the technical examination process and technical expert meetings**

As a continuation of the enhancement of synergies between actions of Parties and other stakeholders, COP23 also adopted a decision (Decision 13/CP.23) regarding technical expert meetings on mitigation and adaptation, assessing the technical examination process (TEP)\(^\text{514}\), as provided for during COP21\(^\text{515}\). Globally, the Parties suggested a certain number of points to make the TEP more effective, mainly by addressing the following elements:

\(^{514}\) Decision 13/CP.23 – Assessment of the technical examination processes on mitigation and adaptation.

\(^{515}\) Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 113 and 131.
• integrate the TEP better with the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action516;
• focus the TEP on specific options and opportunities for enhancing mitigation and adaptation that are actionable in the short term, including those with positive fallout for sustainable development517;
• identify topics for the TEP on mitigation actions until 2020518;
• making the TEP more interactive, by communicating the agendas and questions well in advance and by concluding the technical expert meetings with a session on proposing ways forward and actions to be taken519;
• continue and monitor as necessary these options and possibilities mentioned above, mainly by informing the summaries for policymakers, high-level events and the Talanoa Dialogue520;
• organise regional technical expert meetings, building on existing regional climate action events, as appropriate521;

Regarding the TEP on adaptation, Decision 13/CP.23 also requested the Adaptation Committee, when engaging the TEP on adaptation, to consider the needs expressed by Parties in their NDC, their national adaptation plans and their national communications, to deal with the four aspects of the TEP on adaptation provided for in Decision 1/CP.21522 and to include in its annual report to the COP recommendations on the ways forward and actions to be taken, given the results of technical expert meetings523.

### Topics for the technical examination process on mitigation until 2020

In its Decision 13/CP.23, the COP had tasked the high-level champions with identifying, by 12 January 2018, in consultation with the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), topics for the technical examination process (TEP) on mitigation for the period until 2020.

In March 2018, the Convention Secretariat published the notification of topics retained, providing for the TEP on mitigation to cover524:

516. Decision 13/CP.23, para. 1.
517. Decision 13/CP.23, para. 2.
518. Decision 13/CP.23, para. 3.
519. Decision 13/CP.23, para. 8.
520. Decision 13/CP.23, para.10.
521. Decision 13/CP.23, para. 9.
522. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 127.
523. Decision 13/CP.23, para. 5.
• 2018: Industry – questions relating to the circular economy and industrial waste reuse and prevention solutions;

• 2019: Energy – questions relating to off-grid and decentralised energy solutions for smart energy and water use in the agri-food chain;

• 2020: Human settlements – questions relating to sustainable low-emission housing and building solutions.

Following notification of topics adopted, a certain number of technical expert meetings on mitigation were held in 2018, as listed below:

• April 2018 in Nairobi (Kenya) – Regional meeting organised on energy efficiency actions in industry\(^\text{525}\) during the African Carbon Forum.

• May 2018 in Bonn (Germany) – During the negotiation intersession in April-May 2018\(^\text{526}\), meetings were held on 1-2 May 2018 on questions relating to the circular economy and industrial waste reuse and prevention solutions.

• July 2018 in Singapore – Regional TEP organised during Climate Week for Asia-Pacific, relating to the ways and means of encouraging waste-to-energy and circular economy solutions to stimulate climate action\(^\text{527}\);

• August 2018 in Montevideo (Uruguay) – Region TEP organised during Climate Week for Latin America and the Caribbean countries, also relating to the ways and means of encouraging waste-to-energy and circular economy solutions to stimulate climate action\(^\text{528}\);

Local communities and indigenous peoples platform

This platform was established at COP23 to enhance the knowledge, technologies, practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous peoples\(^\text{529}\) in relation to climate change, but also to facilitate the exchange of experiences and improve the participation of local communities and indigenous peoples in the UNFCCC process. A draft text was drawn up for review and adoption at COP24 to move the operationalisation of the platform forward.

Preparation of the 2018 facilitative Dialogue, called the “Talanoa Dialogue”

Lastly, COP23 was a crucial step in preparing the 2018 facilitative dialogue, renamed the Talanoa Dialogue by the Fijian Presidency (see Section I.12). Following COP23, the modalities of this dialogue also enhanced the dynamics of global and multi-actor climate change to assess collective efforts and enhance the climate ambition, by learning from the experiences of both Parties and other non-Party


\(^{527}\) https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Concept%20Note.pdf

\(^{528}\) https://unfccc.int/playground-20/level-2/level-3/items-m-event-2018

\(^{529}\) Decision 2/CP.23
stakeholders. Note in this respect that throughout 2018, the dynamics of the Dialogue were strengthened by events held at local, national, regional and international levels.

High-level Talanoa during the Global Climate Action Summit (GCAS)\textsuperscript{530} – San Francisco, September 2018

A few weeks prior to the launch of COP24, representatives of all sectors of society met in September 2018, in San Francisco, during the Global Climate Action Summit (GCAS)\textsuperscript{531}. It also hosted a high-level Talanoa Dialogue specifically on the following topic: “how to turn zero emission development into reality?” In line with the spirit of Talanoa, marked by inclusivity and transparency, all debates have been recorded and made available online\textsuperscript{532}, to inspire actors over and beyond the attendees.

More especially, this summit was a chance to recall once more the importance of global climate action through “inclusive multilateralism” to quote Patricia Espinosa, UNFCCC Executive Secretary\textsuperscript{533}. Non-State actors have made many commitments to resilient and low-carbon development\textsuperscript{534}, which, when implemented, could generate more than 65 million new jobs by 2030. The results of the Summit constituted a “Call for action” of actors who are seizing the opportunities for a transition to a low-carbon economy.

Note also that at this summit, UN Environment published a first draft of a chapter of its future Emissions Gap Report that relates specifically to the action of non-State and subnational actors to plug the emissions gaps\textsuperscript{535}. This underlines the vital aspect of global collaboration to achieve the necessary emission reductions to limit global warming. As such, the efforts of non-State and subnational actors would cover (under full implementation of international initiatives) forecast reductions included in a total of between 15 and 23 Gt CO\textsubscript{2}-eq per year until 2030 compared with the current political scenario\textsuperscript{536}. This reminds us of the conclusions of the IPCC in its most recent report of October 2018 on the 1,5°C goal, that also highlights the importance of seamless and joint intervention of national authorities and all other stakeholders for a wider-scale global response\textsuperscript{537}.

\textsuperscript{530} https://www.globalclimateactionsummit.org/
\textsuperscript{531} https://www.globalclimateactionsummit.org/
\textsuperscript{532} See [online] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XU5MIo7K8Tw
\textsuperscript{534} https://www.globalclimateactionsummit.org/step-up/
\textsuperscript{535} UN Environment, 2018.
\textsuperscript{536} UN Environment, 2018, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{537} Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.
The Talanoa Dialogue will end at COP24 with a political phase that should take stock of the collective efforts to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and prepare for the first NDC renewal cycle in 2020.

I.13.6. Conclusions
In conclusion, these developments send positive signals for global climate action based on a seamless, multisector and multi-actor vision. They affirm again the importance of such dynamics. All these processes should be continued and strengthened during forthcoming negotiation sessions, especially during COP24, which will be a decisive COP for continuing the current dynamics.

The Talanoa Dialogue, in particular, whose final sessions will be held at Katowice, constitute a crucial forum in increasing global climate ambition and associating Parties and other non-Party stakeholders more concretely in these dynamics. At the same time, the Parties should agree to adopt rules to operationalise the Paris Agreement.

COP24 is therefore a primordial conference, during which non-Party stakeholders should again be at the heart of debates to support the intergovernmental process in a more forceful and more ambitious achievement.

I.14. Climate initiatives

I.14.1. Background
The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 is both historic and universal, in that it unites all UNFCCC Parties for the first time. Strengthening this universal nature at intergovernmental level, it conveys and recognises also the efforts made by a plethora of actors, both governmental and non-governmental, for enhanced global climate action. Monitoring the mobilisation and actions is important given that they fundamental in achieving and enhancing the Paris Agreement ambition, which is conveyed by the setting up of various global platforms to ensure its publicity and transparency.

Under climate negotiations, mobilisation of non-State actors was categorically encouraged by the introduction of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA). This initiative has achieved great success and to facilitate the details and the follow-up for initiatives of the LPAA, the Nazca platform538 was set up. This was set up in 2014 by France and Peru539 to list as far as possible the commitments by non-State actors to climate action. It has recently been updated (see next box) to capture and steer better initiatives that move global climate action forward.

539. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2015. "An initiative from the French and Peruvian governments, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the administration department of the UNFCCC"
Launch of the Global Climate Action Portal (NAZCA 2.0)

In September 2018, NAZCA platform version 2.0 was launched, to improve the representation of initiatives and actions and facilitate navigability through the information contained on the platform. The NAZCA platform was renamed “Global Climate Action Portal.

This new improved tool is the fruit of a unique collaboration between the UNFCCC Secretariat and its main partners in collecting and sharing data: CDP (also known as Carbon Disclosure Project)\(^{540}\), Carbonn Climate Registry\(^{541}\), Climate Initiative Bonds\(^{542}\), UN Environment’s Climate Initiatives Platform\(^{543}\), Global Covenant of Mayors\(^{544}\), Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change\(^{545}\), The Climate Group\(^{546}\) and UN Global Compact\(^{547}\).

Actions are registered voluntarily by non-Party stakeholders on each of these platforms. They are then pooled on the Global Climate Action Portal. They can also be entered directly in this portal\(^{548}\). The range of commitments is organised on the Global Climate Action Portal between:

- Cooperative initiatives: commitments made collectively by a variety of non-State actors: companies, cities, subnational regions, civil society investors, often in partnership with countries, uniting different actors around a same goal.
- Individual actions: commitment by a single actor to achieve a particular goal.

They can then be filtered by:

- **General criteria:**
  - eight main themes: land use, oceans and coastal areas, water, human settlements, transport, energy and industry, and
  - five types of actor: cities, regions, companies, investors and civil society organisations.
- **Sub-criteria refine the search:**
  - country in which the action takes place.
  - cross-cutting themes: decent work, disclosure, education, finance, gender, health, innovation, long-term strategy, mitigation, other, policy, resilience.
  - types of action: bonds issuance, carbon price establishment, emission reduction, energy efficiency, investment, other, policy establishment, renewable energy, resource consumption.
  - sustainable development goals (SDG), used to filter the actions according to the seventeen SDG\(^{549}\).

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As at 15 October 2018, 19,136 actions were registered on the portal, with 10,221 collective actions and 8,915 individual actions. On the same date a total of 12,403 stakeholders were committed, including 9,524 cities, 78 regions, 2,430 companies, 354 investors and seventeen civil society organisations along with 83 collective initiatives, demonstrating a growing mobilisation of all actors, both in developed and developing countries.

I.14.2. Panorama of major climate initiatives

In this context, this part presents a panorama of major initiatives undertaken on the fringes of the adoption of the Paris Agreement, or identified as being able to contribute to the achievement of its goals, on the initiative of a significant number of actors: governments, companies, cities, local authorities, regions, investors and civil society organisations, etc. Given the shortage of ambition of Parties characterised by the insufficient commitments of their NDC and emission pathways incompatible with achieving the Paris Agreement goals (see Sections I.4 or I.5), this diversity of committed actors and the many climate initiatives are today deemed essential in reducing the gap between the goals fixed by the Agreement and their achievement, thus validating the need for joint and decompartmentalised collaboration between governmental and non-State actions (see Section I.11).

The following paragraphs will also attest to the fact that these initiatives are a way of helping to respond to the many aspects of combating climate change in the field, in the short, medium and long term, under cover of a global, multi-sector approach in terms of both mitigation and adaptation.

• Agriculture and food security

Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP): The Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme was launched by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to improve the resilience of small agricultural producers to agricultural change. The aim is to help the producers financially so that they can access information, tools and technologies to enhance their resilience to climate change. According to the terms of the IFAD, the Adaptation for Smallholder

556. Note: The elements in the next paragraphs are listed only as a guide, non-exhaustively, and in no way prejudice the importance of initiatives/actions in relation to each other. For a broader overview of the actions, the reader is invited to consult the Global Climate Action Portal [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/ or one of the other platforms referred to previously that feed this global portal.
557. https://www.ifad.org/web/guest/asap
Agriculture Programme offers a new source of co-financing to reproduce at larger scale adaptation to climate change, to be included in the new IFAD investments. During COP23, the IFAD stated its commitment to supporting countries in their efforts to implement the Paris Agreement, by adapting agriculture to the effects of climate change whilst reducing GHG emissions from agricultural practices.\footnote{558. https://www.ifad.org/web/latest/speech/asset/39761271}

**Initiative for the Adaptation of African Agriculture – AAA**\footnote{559. http://www.aaainitiative.org/fr/initiative}: The initiative aims to enhance the resilience of African farmers by promoting sustainable soil management, improved water management and risk management at the same time as customised development of capacities, policies and financing mechanisms. The launch of the Global Framework on water scarcity helps the countries to integrate climate change and the sustainable use of water in the policies of agricultural sectors and the intersector dialogue.

**4 to 1000 initiative**\footnote{560. http://4p1000.org/}: The 4 to 1000 initiative aims to demonstrate – supported by scientific documentation – that agricultural soils can play a crucial role where food security and climate change are concerned, mainly by implementing concrete actions on storing carbon in the soils and farming practices to achieve this. It involves bringing together all voluntary actors in the public and private sectors (national governments, local and regional authorities, companies, professional organisations, NGO, research centres, etc.); the latest update available to partners and members of the initiative (published at the same time as COP23 – in November 2017) demonstrates the success of this objective.\footnote{561. https://www.4p1000.org/sites/default/files/content/tableau_partenaires_et_membres_16_novembre_2017.pdf.}


**Food Security Climate Resilience Facility – FoodSECuRe**\footnote{563. Applicable to French version of the document only.}\footnote{564. https://www.wfp.org/climate-change/initiatives/foodsecure.}: Fund developed by the World Food Programme (WFP) to support financially and programmatically community-centred action to reinforce and build climate resilience, reduce losses and prejudices and improve the consolidation of resilience post-disaster.

**Life Beef Carbon**\footnote{565. https://unfccc.int/news/life-beef-carbon-toward-the-low-carbon-beef-farm.}: The project goals are to develop an action plan to reduce the beef carbon footprint by 15% over ten years in four countries producing beef in Europe: France, Ireland, Italy and Spain.
• Forestry

**Bonn Challenge on Forest Restoration**[^66]: The initiative launched by Germany and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) aims to bring 150 millions of the world’s deforested and degraded land into restoration by 2020, a goal increased in 2014 to 350 million hectares by 2030. During COP23, IUCN restated its support for the implementation of the Paris Agreement[^67], whereas government promises under the initiative had already exceeded 160 million hectares in restoration in total. As of 15 October 2018, the Internet site of the initiative shows 56 commitments, for a promise of the restoration of 168.43 million hectares in total, with potential benefits of 15.66 Gt CO₂ sequestration[^68].


[^69]: Applicable to French version of the document only.

**Lima Challenge[^70]**: The initiative is associated with the New York Declaration and is an integral part of the PALP. It counts fourteen signatory countries[^71] and is financed by Germany, the United Kingdom and Norway. The main goal of the initiative is to halve the rate of loss of natural forests globally by 2020 and strive to end natural forest loss by 2030.

**The New York Declaration on Forests[^72]**: Adopted in 2014 by more than 130 governments, private sector companies and civil society organisations, the declaration provides the target of halving the loss of natural forests globally by 2020 and halting global deforestation by 2030 with a potential annual reduction in GHG emissions of between 4.5 and 8.8 billion tonnes of CO₂ by 2030.

• Seas, oceans and coastal areas

**Adaptation of West African Coastal Areas[^73]**: This initiative, also known as the West African Coastal Areas Management Programme, is intended to reduce the areas deemed “hot points” for coastal erosion of 30% by 2020 and 70% by 2025 in West Africa. It also aims to protect 30% of the population in priority flood areas by 2020 and 70% by 2025 in the coastal regions of West Africa[^74].


[^69]: Applicable to French version of the document only.


[^71]: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guyana, Liberia, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Philippines.


African Package for Climate-Resilient Ocean Economies: Through this initiative, the United Nations Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the World Bank and the African Development Bank (ADB) have announced their ambitious technical and financial support for economics living off the oceans in Africa and enhance resilience to climate change in coastal areas. The initiative has given itself the goal of mobilising USD3.5 billion to support, between 2016 and 2021, action in favour of the oceans and climate and a vision over the next five years of action on oceans and climate for six oceans.

Blue belt initiative: The purpose of this initiative is to build up the resilience of coastal communities and promote sustainable fishing and aquaculture in line with SDG 14, to conserve and sustainably exploit the oceans, seas and marine resources for the purposes of sustainable development. As such, the initiative sets up a collaborative platform to support implementation, by forming a network of experts to support the actors in assembling and financing adaptation projects and monitoring their implementation. This platform can also promote a series of priority actions and economic opportunities associated with initiative-taking.

Blue Growth Initiative: Launched in 2013, it aims to enhance the resilience of coastal communities and establish the productive potential of fishing and aquaculture in order to support food security, poverty reduction and sustainable management of aquatic resources within the member countries of FAO. The initiative is also intended to explore the synergies with the Sustainable Development Goals, especially those dealing with the eradication of poverty (SDG 1), zero hunger (SDG 2) and protection of aquatic life (SDG 14).

Maritime Regions in Action against Climate Change: Launched by the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), the initiative mainly aims to reduce emissions, develop sustainable energy solutions and run effective adaptation in the maritime regions.

• Adaptation and resilience

Global Resilience Partnership: An independent partnership of public and private organisations, the initiative involves identifying and expanding innovative resilience solutions. Its main key actions are promoting and facilitating inclusive decision making, strengthening the integrity of ecosystems, promoting flexibility.

580. Applicable to French version of the document only.
583. Applicable to French version of the document only.
in the solutions and learning and taking advantage of innovation to generate the most number of opportunities\textsuperscript{585}.

**Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems – CREWS\textsuperscript{586}:** The purpose of the initiative is to increase the ability to produce and communication effective information on the risks from the impacts of hazardous hydrometeorological and climatic phenomena in the least developed countries (LDC) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This results-based initiative is targeting an early warning and information system on the “at least modest” risks for the LDC and SIDS in question. by 2020, USD100 million should be mobilised under the initiative to fill the gaps in existing programmes\textsuperscript{587}. It is also planned to set up a Special Allocation Fund administered by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery\textsuperscript{588}.

**African Adaptation Initiative – AAI\textsuperscript{589}:** The AAI is seeking to improve the actions relating to adaptation and loss and damage in Africa. It comprises three phases for 2016, 2020 and 2030 and is based on four pillars: (i) strengthen climate information services; (ii) strengthen the political and institutional frameworks; (iii) improves actions on the ground; and (iv) reinforce the financing and investment of climate adaptation. This initiative is also seeking to promote the importance of enhanced action during the pre-2020 period.

- **Cities and local authorities**

  **Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance\textsuperscript{590}:** The initiative groups cities committed to achieving long-term goals of drastically reducing CO\textsubscript{2} by 80 to 100% by 2050. The alliance seeks to provide solutions to mega-cities to target ambitious reduction levels and spark collaboration to achieve their respective goals as effectively as possible\textsuperscript{591}.

  **Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance\textsuperscript{592}:** The aim of the initiative is to catalyse and accelerate additional capital flows to cities, maximise investments in low-emission and climate-resistant infrastructures and close the investment gap in urban areas. The initiative is an alliance of over forty organisations.

  **Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy\textsuperscript{593}:** Support the implementation of the European goal of reducing GHG emissions by at least 40% by 2030, by

\textsuperscript{585} http://www.globalresiliencenetwork.org/aboutus/

\textsuperscript{586} https://unfccc.int/fr/news/risques-climatiques-et-systemes-d-alerte-precoce

\textsuperscript{587} This sum is being envisaged based on an estimate by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction indicating that it is the sum required to achieve the goals of the initiative.

\textsuperscript{588} Find out more about the initiative [online] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/crews-presentation.pdf

\textsuperscript{589} https://www.africaadaptationinitiative.org/

\textsuperscript{590} http://carbonneutralcities.org/

\textsuperscript{591} https://carbonneutralcities.org/initiatives/game-changer-fund/

\textsuperscript{592} http://www.citiesclimatefinance.org/

\textsuperscript{593} https://www.eumayors.eu/en/
adopting a common approach towards combating climate change. In addition, cities commit to reporting on progress made every two years, following the development of an initial Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plan describing their intended key actions when joining the initiative.

- **Transport**

  **Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport – SLoCaT**: The initiative promotes the integration of sustainable transport in global policies on sustainable development and climate change. The essential goal of the Partnership is to promote low-carbon emission sustainable transport and thus reduce the growth of GHG emissions generated by land transport in the developing countries, whilst maximising the contribution of transport to poverty eradication and sustainable development. SLoCaT is a multi-stakeholder partnership of over ninety organisations.

- **Energy**

  **International Solar Alliance**: This Alliance was launched to make possible a “change in scale” in the deployment of solar energy in solar resource rich countries. The goal of the initiative is to mobilise substantial investment by 2030 (over USD1 billion) for the massive deployment of affordable solar energy. As at 15 October 2018, seventy countries have signed the International Solar Alliance framework agreement and 47 countries have signed and ratified it.

  **Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves**: This public-private United Nations Foundation initiative aims to achieve the goal of “100 by 2020”. In other words, it involves giving 100 million households improved, clean fuel and energy cookstoves by 2020. These goals are not only for combating climate change, but also for improving the means of existence and health of populations and making women autonomous. In addition, the Alliance introduces tools to measure progress and success, whilst facilitating the improvement of activities over time; efforts should thus become applicable to a maximum number of regions and markets over time.

  **Global Geothermal Alliance – GGA**: Its long-term aim is to realise the potential of geothermal energy to achieve a five-fold growth in the installed capacity for geothermal power generation and more than two-fold growth in geothermal heating by 2030. In the short term, the goal is to develop and operationalise the Global Geothermal Alliance as global platform for improved dialogue, knowledge

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595. http://www.slocat.net/
596. http://isolaralliance.org/
597. http://isolaralliance.org/MemberCont.aspx
599. https://unfccc.int/fr/news/l-alliance-mondiale-pour-des-cuisini%C3%A8res-
600. http://www.globalgeothermalalliance.org/
sharing and coordinated action to take up the technical, regulatory, political and financial challenges for greater penetration of geothermal energy in the global energy mix. As at 15 October 2018, the alliance counts 46 member countries and 33 partner international institutions.

**Africa Clean Energy Corridor Initiative**\(^601\): The goal of the initiative is to meet half the total demand for electricity from clean, indigenous and cost-effective renewable resources in Eastern and Southern African regions by 2030. The initiative mobilises the countries of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) and the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP) and also aims to boost the phenomenon of regional integration.

**Africa Renewable Energy Initiative – AREI**\(^602\): The initiative seeks to promote the huge renewable energy potential of the continent. Its goal is to achieve new and additional renewable energy generation capacity of 10 GW by 2020 and 300 GW by 2030\(^603\). This should help to guarantee universal access for African populations to sufficient quantities of clean, appropriate and affordable energy. It also intends to set up a framework encouraging the countries to take a technological leap forward, which will be a crucial advantage in achieving the initiative’s goals.

**SIDS Lighthouses initiative**\(^604\): The initiative envisages supporting the strategic deployment of renewable energies in the SIDS by mobilising USD500 million, deploying an additional power of 120 MW of additional renewable energy capacity (100 MW from photovoltaic solar installations and 20 MW from wind farms), a significant number of small hydroelectric and geothermal energy projects and the development by all SIDS of a renewable energy road map.

**Industry, innovation and private companies**

**Caring for Climate**\(^605\)-\(^606\): Caring for Climate is one of the largest worldwide coalitions of companies committed to combating climate change. As at 15 October 2018, the initiative counts over 460 organisations\(^608\). The goals pursued are mainly to revitalise the leadership of companies in terms of carbon pricing, set up science-based targets, adaptation to climate change and responsible commitment of companies

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\(^{602}\) [http://www.arei.org/](http://www.arei.org/)


\(^{604}\) [http://islands.irena.org/](http://islands.irena.org/)

\(^{605}\) Applicable to French version of the document only.

\(^{606}\) [http://caringforclimate.org/about/](http://caringforclimate.org/about/)

\(^{607}\) The Caring for Climate coalition is a member of the Global Compact organisation launched by the United Nations in 2000, with the goal of pushing companies throughout the world to promote the key principles of the United Nations such as human rights, social responsibility, compliance with international labour standards and regulations, environmental protection and anti-corruption.

\(^{608}\) [http://caringforclimate.org/about/list-of-signatories/](http://caringforclimate.org/about/list-of-signatories/)
in relation to climate policies\textsuperscript{609}. The initiative is also targeting transparency of actions and requires public and annual progress reports.

**Divest-Invest Global Movement**\textsuperscript{610}: The initiative involves uniting investors and making sure that financial placements and asset transfers transit via clean and renewable technologies. As at 15 October 2018, the initiative’s website indicates that “DivestInvest is now rooted in the financial mainstream, with hundreds of institutional investors managing trillions in assets on board”, by uniting over a thousand companies, some 59,500 private individuals for a combined 6.3 billion assets\textsuperscript{611}.

**RE100**\textsuperscript{612}: The acronym of the RE100 initiative refers to the ambitious goal to involve and support major companies that have committed to using 100% renewable energy by 2020. The initiative federates companies from both developed and developing countries and counts 152 companies as at 15 October 2018\textsuperscript{613}.

- **Emissions other than CO\(_2\)**
  
  **Climate and Clean Air Coalition – CCAC**\textsuperscript{614}: Initiative to strengthen the cooperation between government and non-government partners to undertake actions to reduce short-lived climate pollutants (namely black carbon, methane and hydrofluorocarbons) to mitigate global warming considerably in the short term. The initiative goals are in keeping with both the Paris Agreement goals and a large number of the Sustainable Development Goals\textsuperscript{615}. As at 15 October 2018, the initiative counts 61 States, seventeen international organisations and 51 NGO\textsuperscript{616}.

- **Cross-cutting goals**
  
  **Low Carbon Technology Partnerships Initiative – LCTPi**\textsuperscript{617,618}: As at 15 October 2018, the initiative groups more than 150 companies and seventy partners\textsuperscript{619} with a view to accelerating the development of low-carbon technical solutions in order to limit the increase in global temperature to 2\(^\circ\)C above pre-industrial levels. The initiative has developed a total of nine areas for major intervention: climate smart agriculture, operation of forest services as carbon sinks, cement industry, chemicals industry, carbon capture and storage, renewable energies, low-carbon fuels, low-carbon freight and energy efficiency in buildings.

\textsuperscript{609} http://caringforclimate.org/workstreams/
\textsuperscript{610} https://www.divestinvest.org/
\textsuperscript{611} https://www.divestinvest.org/commitments/
\textsuperscript{612} https://www.theclimategroup.org/RE100
\textsuperscript{613} http://there100.org/companies
\textsuperscript{614} http://www.ccacoalition.org/fr
\textsuperscript{615} http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/en.
\textsuperscript{616} http://www.ccacoalition.org/en/partners.
\textsuperscript{617} Applicable to French version of the document only.
\textsuperscript{618} http://lctpi.wbcsd.org/.
\textsuperscript{619} http://lctpi.wbcsd.org/the-solution/.
I.15. Gender and gender equality

I.15.1. Context: “gender”, “gender equality” and climate

Gender refers to the analysis of the status of men/women, the characteristics of each sex, social relationships between women and men, and socio-cultural perceptions linked to each sex. Gender in the Paris Agreement is included under the notion of “gender equality”.

In general, gender equality issues in the context of combating climate change involve recognizing and incorporating the specific vulnerabilities of each gender in the face of climate change, which tend to aggravate pre-existing social and economic inequalities. It is generally women who are the most affected by poverty and precariousness and who are more vulnerable to the consequences of climate disturbances. At the same time, unequal access of women to decision-making processes and the labour market aggravates inequalities and often prevents them from fully contributing to climate policies, whether it be in terms of their planning, development or implementation.

However, women can (and do) play a crucial role in the response to climate change. First of all, due to their traditional knowledge, especially regarding the management of resources and/or sustainable practices within households and communities. This key role is also highlighted in the education of children, with whom the future of sustainable and resilient development lies. Furthermore, the participation of women in political life should enable increased cooperation between citizens via improved representativeness and create social peace as well. On the contrary, the lack of representativeness of women continues to increase existing inequalities and should reduce the effectiveness of policies.

In the context of the international climate negotiations, recognizing gender equality also involves supporting and strengthening the participation and representation of women in the negotiations and in international climate action. The Parties to the UNFCCC thus acknowledged that it was important to involve men and women as equals in the Convention process and also in the development and implementation of national climate policies, which should strive for this gender equality. This resulted in a specific agenda item in the negotiations conducted...

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621. See the above box on “Gender equality in the Paris Agreement”.
under the Convention, “gender and climate change”. This also subsequently resulted in integrating a general objective in the Paris Agreement that is related to the issue of gender equality in combating climate change.

I.15.2. Acknowledgement and incorporation of gender-related issues in international negotiations

Brief overview of the debates related to gender in the international negotiations, and their emergence in the talks led under the UNFCCC

Gender themes were incorporated as early as 1992, at the international conference in Rio, particularly via the adoption of Agenda 21, which, at the time, already identified women as one of the “major groups” of civil society and whose participation was considered as essential to achieving sustainable development. Chapter 24 of this document, “Global action for women towards sustainable and equitable development”, is dedicated to them. The questions of the participation and representation of women also quickly became a distinct issue in the international negotiations. Its first implication was in the Beijing Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, which asserts that “women’s empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace”.

Based on the Beijing Declaration, the Parties to the UNFCCC at COP 7 (in 2001 in Marrakech) highlighted the need to have a more balanced representation of both genders among elected members of the bodies created pursuant to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Other than the question of parity in decision-making bodies, gender appeared more generally as linked to effectiveness of climate action. Thus, in the Cancún Agreements in 2010, the COP recognised that “equality of sexes and effective participation of women […] are of great importance to act efficiently on all aspects of climate change”. At COP17 in 2011 for example, the Secretariat was asked to include the application of gender-sensitive methods and tools in the cross-cutting issues, within the framework of the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to this climate change.

624. United Nations, 1992 Agenda 21, Chapter 23
625. United Nations, 1992 Agenda 21, Chapter 24
627. Decision 36/CP.7
628. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 7
629. Decision 6/CP.17
As part of the sequel to COP 7630, there was a major turning point at COP18 (in 2012 in Doha), with the decision of the Parties to enhance Decision 36/CP.7 “by adopting a goal of gender balance in bodies established pursuant to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, in order to improve women’s participation and inform more effective climate change policy that addresses the needs of women and men equally”631.

In this same decision, the COP introduced means to follow the achievement of this objective and in particular requested the Secretariat of the Convention632 to:

- Maintain information on the gender composition of constituted bodies established under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, including information on the representation of women from regional groups;
- Gather information on the gender composition of delegations to sessions under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol;
- Report this information to the COP for its consideration on an annual basis, in order to enable the tracking of progress made towards the goal of gender balance in advancing gender-sensitive climate policy.

Since then, an annual report on gender composition published by the Secretariat makes it possible to monitor the progress made633.

**Gender distribution that is still unequal in the UNFCCC processes**

Prior to COP23 held in Bonn in 2017, the report on gender composition for the evaluation of that year634 assesses that the percentage of women represented is less than or equal to 38% in three-fourths of the constituted bodies. The percentage of representation of women is between 50% (Paris Committee on Capacity-building) and 10% (enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee and the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism). There are not any women in the bureaux of the main decision-making bodies—the bureaux of the COP, CMP and CMA. As for the bureaux of the SBI and SBSTA, they have six members, two of whom are women. As for the APA bureau, it has three members, two of whom are women. Regarding the gender composition of the delegations of the Parties, the report shows that at the November 2016 session (COP22/CMP 12/APA 1), the overall representation of women in the delegations was 32%, compared with 42% at the May 2017 intersession (46th session of the subsidiary bodies). At the same negotiation sessions, in November 2016, 27% of heads of delegations of the Parties were women, and in May 2017, 29% of them were women.

630. And particularly Decision 36/CP.7 on improving the participation of women in the representation of Parties in the bodies established under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.
631. Decision 23/CP.18, para. 2
632. Decision 23/CP.18, para. 8
634. FCCC/CP/2017/6.
Another point of progress of COP18 was the effective recognition of gender equality as a cross-cutting theme that concerns all of the elements of this article, namely:

- education and public awareness raising on climate changes and their impacts;
- public access to information on climate changes and their impacts;
- public participation in the review of climate changes and their impacts, and the development of appropriate measures to face them;
- training scientific, technical and management staff;
- international cooperation in designing and exchanging educational and public awareness material on climate changes and the impacts, and educational and training programmes\(^635\).

As for making the Doha programme operational, COP18 provided for the first gender workshop, which was held in November 2013 in Warsaw\(^636\).

Finally, a major innovation is the decision of COP18 to add the “issue of gender and climate change” as a standing item on the agenda of the sessions of the COP to allow it to consider the progress made\(^637\). Since 2012, gender has thus been integrated as a negotiation theme in its own right, given its inclusion on the agendas of the both the COP and SBI sessions.

### I.15.3. Continuation of the work and main steps prior to COP21

Following the work conducted under the aegis of SBI in 2014, COP20 developed the Lima work programme on gender that covers two years\(^638\). The objective was to conduct a review in 2016 at COP22, to take\(^639\) “any necessary action needed to strengthen the progress of furthering these goals”\(^640\). The adopted Decision recommends Parties to “advance gender balance”, particularly regarding the representation of women in the bodies created by virtue of the Convention (and the Kyoto Protocol), and “achieve gender-responsive climate policy in all relevant activities under the Convention”\(^641\).

In this sense, the need to broaden the gender framework in the context of climate changes is highlighted, going well beyond the participation of women in activities related to climate action. The Conference of Lima was also an opportunity to encourage various bodies created under the Convention, such as the GEF and

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\(^635\) Decision 15/CP.18, Annex para. 8.
\(^636\) SBI, 2013
\(^637\) Decision 23/CP.18, para. 9.
\(^638\) Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.
\(^639\) See “Continuing work on gender and gender equality following the Paris results” above.
\(^640\) Decision 18/CP.20, para. 16.
\(^641\) Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.
GCF, to mainstream and enhance the mainstreaming of gender topics in their activities. The Lima work programme also requested the Secretariat to organise two workshops to pursue gender-related actions, focusing on both mitigation and adaptation.

Outcomes of the workshops held by the SBI under the Lima work programme on gender

The first workshop was organised in Bonn in June 2015 at the 42nd session of the SBI. This workshop was on the climate policies that promote gender equality, focusing on mitigation as well as development and technology transfer. The question of the definition of terms linked to the subject of gender was also dealt with. The report on the workshop was to be considered by the SBI during its 43rd session, held at the same time as COP21. The SBI’s main conclusions concerned, in particular, the organisation of training and awareness-raising activities on issues related to gender and climate change, whilst highlighting the efforts to step up existing work in the areas of adaptation, mitigation, financing, technology and capacity-building. The need to implement gender-sensitive and appropriate gender action in these fields of action was recalled as well.

The second workshop was scheduled for May 2016, as a continuation of the programme mentioned above, focusing particularly on adaptation, capacity-building and training of stakeholder representatives working on gender-related issues. The Secretariat prepared a technical paper on the directives and other tools that enable the integration of gender in activities related to climate change in April 2016, for consideration by the SBI at its 44th session (May 2016). On Thursday, 26 May, the SBI plenary adopted its conclusions, in which the SBI:

- expressed its appreciation for the two-year Lima Work Programme on gender equality and the comments received in support of the programme;
- expressed its support for the continuation and enhancement of the work programme;
- requested the Parties and observers to provide information on progress towards achieving the objectives of achieving a balance between gender and gender-sensitive climate policy;
- agreed to continue to examine this issue [...] with a view to preparing a draft decision for review during COP22.

The outcomes of this meeting were the result of a long process, for which hopes were running high, especially as a “draft decision” was included in the COP22 timetable.

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642. Decision 8/CP.20, paras. 17 and 18.
643. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 11.
644. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 12.
645. FCCC/SBI/2015/12.
646. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 11.
647. FCCC/SBI/2015/L.31, para. 6
648. UNFCCC, 2016b
649. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.16.
650. IISD, 2016a, pp. 16-17
Following the two-year Lima work programme, there is broad consensus among parties on gender-related issues, among both developed and developing countries and as a general and guiding principle. Several Parties, including the countries of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), the LDC, Switzerland, Norway, Australia and Turkey, thus called for the inclusion of gender equality in the preamble of the Paris agreement in September 2015. The European Union (EU) and India had already made a similar call in June 2015. The EU, the African Group and AILAC, among others, had also requested that it appear in the objectives. These proposals were included in the draft agreement drawn up at ADP 11 (Bonn, October 2015).

I.15.4. Outcomes of COP21 and integration of a specific gender equality objective into the Paris agreement

In the end, in the final version of the Paris Agreement, the word “gender” was replaced by “gender equality”, to ensure recognition of the necessary equal involvement of women and men in combating climate change at all levels.

Decision 1/CP.21 includes the topic of gender equality and the empowerment of women, by “Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.”

This same text is recalled right from the preamble of the Paris Agreement, with the awareness that “climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on [...] gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.”

In Article 7 of the Agreement, which establishes the global adaptation objective, “Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate.”

651. IISD 2015b, p. 4
652. IISD, 2015a, p. 5
653. IISD, 2015b, p. 5
654. ADP, 2015
655. Decision 1/CP.21
656. Decision 1/CP.21, Preamble of the Paris Agreement
Finally, the topic of gender equality is included in Article 11, which addresses capacity-building, and which should, in particular, “be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive” 658.

Also note that in 2015, the adoption of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was also an occasion to highlight the importance of gender and gender equality, via the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), particularly SDG 5 on gender equality.

**Issues relating to gender and gender equality are widely acknowledged, beyond the international climate negotiations**

Beyond the progress of the Paris Agreement, 2015 was a turning point for the acknowledgement and consideration of the topic of gender equality at the international level. Indeed, 2015 also saw the adoption of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (25 September) establishing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations 659, which defines seventeen SDG with their 169 targets for their achievement.

**Figure 22. SDG, Goal 5 (SDG 5): gender equality** 660

Among these SDG, there is a specific goal to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (SDG 5), as well as a second goal on reducing inequality within and among countries (SDG 10). The targets set in SDG 5 on gender equality guide countries towards ending all forms of discrimination and violence and to ensure that women, in all domains, can make their voices heard, make choices, and access opportunities and resources on an equal footing. Eleven other goals

658. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 11, para. 1
– concerning subjects as varied as ending poverty and work, health, water and sanitation, just societies and sustainable cities – provide targets which are explicitly linked to achieving gender equality.\textsuperscript{661}

On the whole, the Member States of the United Nations have integrated these questions as mandatory prerequisites and targets for executing the major international programmes in progress. According to the United Nations, “gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. Providing women and girls with equal access to education, […] decent work, and representation in political and economic decision-making processes will fuel sustainable economies and benefit societies and humanity at large.”\textsuperscript{662}

\textbf{I.15.4. Continuation of work on gender and gender equality following COP21}

Through COP21, yet again, the Parties to the UNFCCC acknowledged the importance of involving women and men on equal terms in the UNFCCC processes, as well as in the development and implementation of climate policies, based on the strict acknowledgement of “gender equality” via cross-cutting targets in the Paris Agreement.

It was not until COP22 that there was to be an evaluation of the progress on the actions led on this issue, particularly in the assessment of the Lima Work Programme on Gender\textsuperscript{663}. The Marrakech Conference was an opportunity to strengthen the commitments revolving around gender equality issues. One of the results of this was the organisation of a day specifically devoted to this theme\textsuperscript{664}.

After COP22, the Parties decided to continue and enhance the Lima Work Programme on gender for a period of three years, with the objective of undertaking a new review of the work programme at COP25 (2019)\textsuperscript{665}. All of the points relating to the continuation of this work programme are in Decision 21/CP.22, between paragraphs 7 and 30. Below is a non-exhaustive list of the points:

- The Parties are invited to continue to assist in training and awareness-raising for gender balance\textsuperscript{666}, as well as in building the skills and capacity of their female delegates to participate effectively in UNFCCC meetings\textsuperscript{667} (with specific emphasis on delegates from Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change\textsuperscript{668});

\textsuperscript{661} UN Women, 2015, pp. 4-5


\textsuperscript{663} Decision 18/CP.20, para. 16.

\textsuperscript{664} http://unfccc.int/gender_and_climate_change/items/9948.php.

\textsuperscript{665} Decision 21/CP.22 para. 6.

\textsuperscript{666} Decision 21/CP.22, para. 7(a).

\textsuperscript{667} Decision 21/CP.22, para. 7(b)

\textsuperscript{668} Decision 21/CP.22 para. 8.
• It was decided that annual workshops during sessions of the subsidiary bodies will be organised during the first series of sessions in 2018 and 2019\(^{669}\). The themes of these workshops should be prepared throughout 2017, for consideration at COP 23\(^{670}\);

• The Secretariat was also requested to prepare a technical paper identifying entry points for integrating gender considerations in workstreams under the UNFCCC process for consideration by the SBSTA at its 48th session (April-May 2018)\(^{671}\);

• The Secretariat was requested to draw up a technical report on improving gender balance\(^{672}\), for consideration at COP23\(^{673}\);

• The SBI is requested to develop “a gender action plan in order to support the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates under the UNFCCC process, which may include priority areas, key activities and indicators, timelines for implementation, the responsible and key actors and indicative resource requirements for each activity, and further elaborate its process of review and monitoring”\(^{674}\).

An initial workshop session was held on 10 and 11 May\(^{675}\) in Bonn at the 46th session of the SBI\(^{676}\), on the potential elements of a gender action plan\(^{677}\). The Parties\(^{678}\), as well as observers and other stakeholders\(^{679}\), were invited to submit their views. The sequel to this workshop was planned at the 47th session of the SBI (SBI 47) in November 2017, at the same time as COP 23.

### I.15.4. Continuation of work on issues related to gender equality during COP23

Following the proceedings conducted under the aegis of SBA 47, and pursuant to paragraph 27 of Decision 21/CP.22, COP23 adopted a decision for the “establishment of a gender action plan”\(^{680}\). This decision reaffirms Decisions 36/CP.7, 1/CP.16, 23/CP.18, 18/CP.20, 1/CP.21 and 21/CP.22, the Paris Agreement, as well

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669. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 11.
670. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 12.
671. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 13.
672. In accordance with Decisions 36/CP.7, 1/CP.16 and 23/CP.18.
673. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 20.
674. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 27.
676. FCCC/SBI/2017/1.
678. Available at the following address: http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_parties/items/5900.php.
679. Available at the following address: http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_non-party_stakeholders/items/7481.php.
680. Decision 3/CP.23
as the resolution of the General Assembly on the Sustainable Development Programme for 2030; with the main objective being to make progress on work on gender equality under the aegis of the Convention processes.

Figure 23. Decisions relating to gender adopted by the COP

More specifically, and “taking into account the imperative of a just transition of the workforce when implementing the gender action plan”, the COP adopted the action plan for gender equality in the annex of the Lima Work programme on gender which:

- seeks to advance women’s full, equal and meaningful participation and promote gender-responsive climate policy and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in the implementation of the Convention and the work of Parties, the secretariat, United Nations entities and all stakeholders at all levels;

- strives to enhance further gender-responsive climate policies in all activities relating to adaptation, mitigation and the corresponding implementation resources (funding, technology development and transfer, and capacity building) as well as decision-making for climate policy implementation;

681. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
• strives for the representation of women in all aspects of the process that results from the Convention, and for the mainstreaming of gender equality in all of the relevant objectives and targets under the Convention, which will greatly contribute to increase the effectiveness.

Furthermore, the COP welcomed the technical document drawn up by the Secretariat on the means of implementation to achieve gender balance\textsuperscript{682}.

Also note that the Parties have observed that the delegations and constituted bodies have hardly progressed in reaching the objective of gender balance\textsuperscript{683}.

Regarding monitoring the progress made in the implementation of the gender action plan, the COP asked the Secretariat to draw up a synthesis report, to be considered by the SBI at its session in November 2019\textsuperscript{684}. This report should also highlight the relevant areas for improvement and the additional work to be done via subsequent action plans, to develop recommendations that the COP could examine at its twenty-fifth session (November 2019) and so that the COP can plan the next steps, including an assessment of the impacts of the action plan\textsuperscript{685}.

Lastly, the COP decided that the themes of the annual workshops led during the sessions of subsidiary bodies during 2018 and 2019 would respectively be the communication mentioned regarding activity E.1 of the gender action plan\textsuperscript{686}, and the short – and long-term impacts of this plan, as the synthesis report mentioned above may reveal as well.

More specifically, activity E.1 consists of the analysis of the following points:

a. Information on the differentiated impacts of climate change on women and men, with special attention paid to local communities and indigenous peoples;

b. Integration of gender considerations into adaptation, mitigation, capacity-building, Action for Climate Empowerment, technology and finance policies, plans and actions;

c. Policies and plans for and progress made in enhancing gender balance in national climate delegations.

\textbf{I.15.4. Assessment between COP23 and COP24}

Pursuant to the mandate resulting from Decision 3/CP.23, the first workshops were led at the same time as the April-May 2018 sessions of subsidiary bodies. These workshops took place over two days, with:

• The first part, on 2 May 2018, which concerned E.1 activities: (a) Information on the differentiated impacts of climate change on women and men, with special attention paid to local communities and indigenous peoples; and

\textsuperscript{682} FCCC/TP/2017/8
\textsuperscript{683} Decision 3/CP.23, para. 4.
\textsuperscript{684} Decision 3/CP.23, para. 5.
\textsuperscript{685} Decision 3/CP.23, para. 7.
\textsuperscript{686} See Table 5 of Decision 3/CP.23.
(b) Integration of gender considerations into adaptation, mitigation, capacity-building, Action for Climate Empowerment, technology and finance policies, plans and actions.

• The second part, on 9 May 2018, which concerned activities E.1: (c) Policies and plans for enhancing gender balance in national climate delegations. To this end, working groups have been established to discuss the five main subjects from which potential options could emerge to reach the targeted objective: (1) capacity-building and raising awareness; (2) networking and sharing experiences; (3) financing; (4) special temporary measures; and (5) policies and measures.

All of the information on these two workshops (agenda, presentations, workshop reports, etc.) may be viewed on the website of the Convention687.

Objectives of the workshops led during the negotiation intersession (April-May 2018)688

Based on the information that the Secretariat has communicated, the main objectives of the workshops were:

• To raise awareness on the differentiated impacts of climate change, including how to identify such differences and address them in policy and action design and implementation;

• To build the capacity of participants to understand the tools and mechanisms that facilitate the design and implementation of gender-responsive climate policy and action;

• To raise awareness on possible options for enhancing gender balance in national climate delegations;

• To provide an opportunity for Party delegates and observers to brainstorm on possible options.

Lastly, note that between these two workshops, on 5 May 2018689, there was a dialogue to discuss the recommendations issued by the Secretariat in its technical paper (FCCC/TP/2018/1) mentioned above. This dialogue specifically aimed to discuss possible actions within each of the constituted bodies’ respective workstreams involving gender considerations, to enable progress towards the goals set by the Parties in terms of gender balance. This report will be submitted for consideration at COP24.


After these developments, COP24 and the upcoming negotiating sessions are thus an occasion to continue work on gender equality. Lastly, to conclude, note that despite the progress made, there are still major efforts to be made to achieve the gender equality objectives that have been set, in both the international climate negotiations and at the national level.

I.16. Agriculture

I.16.1. Background

A recent report (in 2017) of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) states that agriculture uses 11% of the globe’s land surface and accounts for 70% of all freshwater withdrawals and 80% of deforestation worldwide. Furthermore, the food chain is said to be responsible for approximately 30% of world energy consumption, which results in an average of 10 Gt CO₂ eq of estimated annual GHG emissions. As for agriculture, it is said to represent approximately 11% of global GHG emissions. In terms of forecasts, various factors such as the increase in the world population and the simultaneous rise in the demand for foodstuffs for human and animal feed could put further pressure on natural resources and lead to a growing rise in GHG emissions related to the sector.

However, the agricultural sector could also be a driving force for climate change mitigation and adaptation by revamping food production systems and making good use of the important role that agricultural land and forests could play as carbon sinks. From a socio-economic point of view, data from the World Bank also shows that agriculture is the main source of income for 80% of the world’s poor population. The transformations in the sector will thus be an essential catalyst to achieve the mitigation targets of the Paris Agreement, and also to adapt to climate change in the context of sustainable development, combating poverty, resilience and food security.

At the global level, resolving the challenges related to the agricultural and land use sectors involves dealing with a complex equation which has not always been a priority in the climate negotiation agenda. However, this equation has been incorporated into the negotiations starting from 2011, and was addressed in 2017 in particular, with the adoption of a decision hailed as historic at COP23 (in November 2017).

690. FAO, 2017. p. 82.
691. “With mainly nitrous fertilizer (N₂O), breeding and rice paddies (CH₄), 10% for the change in land use and mainly deforestation (CO₂), 3% for other causes, peat bog and forest fires (CO₂)”.
692. FAO, 2017. p. 82.

Discussions related to agriculture started in 2008 under the aegis of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). In particular, it was during COP17 (in Durban in 2011) that there was a major turning point in terms of the consideration of issues related to agriculture. Indeed, as per the outcomes of the work of the AWG-LCA, the COP requested the SBSTA to consider these issues for the Parties to exchange their views with each other.\(^\text{696}\)

The new item on the SBSTA negotiation on issues related to agriculture incorporates the themes of adaptation and mitigation with a broad prism, and also brings together developing as well as developed countries around these issues.

Between the 36th (May 2012) and 47th (November 2017) sessions of the SBSTA, the Parties and accredited observers exchanged their views on these issues, via communications and talks during the negotiations, as well as via five workshops that were held between 2013 and 2016, at the same time as the SBSTA sessions. The latter offers a panorama of the main issues that were discussed under the SBSTA and are listed in the following table, which offers the reader of this Guide useful links to access further information on each issue.

### Table. Summary table of the workshops held between 2013 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workshop programme</th>
<th>Sessions</th>
<th>Useful links</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workshop on the current state of scientific knowledge on how to enhance the adaptation of agriculture to climate change impacts while promoting rural development, sustainable development and productivity of agricultural systems and food security in all countries, particularly in developing countries, taking into account the diversity of the agricultural systems and the differences in scale as well as possible adaptation co-benefits.</td>
<td>SBSTA 39, November 2013</td>
<td>All documents (agenda, speeches, workshop report, etc.): <a href="https://unfccc.int/event/workshop-on-the-current-state-of-scientific-knowledge-on-how-to-enhance-the-adaptation-of">https://unfccc.int/event/workshop-on-the-current-state-of-scientific-knowledge-on-how-to-enhance-the-adaptation-of</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop on the development of early warning systems and contingency plans in relation to extreme weather events and their effects such as desertification, drought, floods, landslides, storm surge, soil erosion, and saline water intrusion.</td>
<td>SBSTA 42, June 2015</td>
<td>All documents: <a href="https://unfccc.int/event/session-workshop-development-early-warning-systems-and-contingency-plans-relation-extreme">https://unfccc.int/event/session-workshop-development-early-warning-systems-and-contingency-plans-relation-extreme</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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696. Decision 2/CP17
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workshop programme</th>
<th>Sessions</th>
<th>Useful links</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workshop on the assessment of risk and vulnerability of agricultural systems to different climate change scenarios at regional, national and local levels, including but not limited to pests and diseases.</td>
<td>SBSTA 42 June 2015</td>
<td>All documents: <a href="https://unfccc.int/event/session-workshop-development-early-warning-systems-and-contingency-plans-relation-extreme">https://unfccc.int/event/session-workshop-development-early-warning-systems-and-contingency-plans-relation-extreme</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop on the identification of adaptation measures, taking into account the diversity of the agricultural systems, indigenous knowledge systems, differences in scale, as well as possible adaptation co-benefits, and by sharing experiences in research and development and in field activities, including socio-economic, environmental, and gender aspects.</td>
<td>SBSTA 44 May 2016</td>
<td>All documents: <a href="https://unfccc.int/event/session-workshop-assessment-risk-and-vulnerability-agricultural-systems-different-climate">https://unfccc.int/event/session-workshop-assessment-risk-and-vulnerability-agricultural-systems-different-climate</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop on the identification and assessment of agricultural practices and technologies to enhance productivity in a sustainable manner, food security and resilience, considering the differences in agro-ecological zones and farming systems, such as different grassland and cropland practices and systems.</td>
<td>SBSTA 44 May 2016</td>
<td>All documents: <a href="https://unfccc.int/event/in-session-workshop-on-the-identification-and-assessment-of-agricultural-practices-and-technologies">https://unfccc.int/event/in-session-workshop-on-the-identification-and-assessment-of-agricultural-practices-and-technologies</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, the exchange of views between Parties enables developed country Parties to highlight the importance of considering mitigation and adaptation objectives in a holistic manner, via a single agenda item under the aegis of the SBSTA. As for the developing country Parties, they have requested that the work of the SBSTA focus on capacity-building and technology transfer, considering the importance of food security, climate financing, marginalised small farmers and issues related to gender and traditional knowledge in particular. Developing country Parties have also highlighted the possibility of discussing and addressing other various issues related to agriculture under the various bodies of the UNFCCC, the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).

At SBSTA 47 (in November 2017), the exchange of viewpoints on agriculture continued, considering the results of the last five workshops of the aforementioned sessions. At the end of SBSTA 47, the Parties recommended a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP23.

697. See all of the discussions and communications of the Parties related to agriculture under the aegis of the SBSTA [online] https://unfccc.int/topics/land-use/work-streams/agriculture/sbsta-work-on-agriculture#eq-9.
I.16.3. Results of COP23 and adoption of the work programme of the “Koronivia joint work on agriculture”

Via Decision 4/CP.23 at COP23, the Parties adopted the joint SBSTA and SBI work programme entitled the “Koronivia joint work on agriculture”. Several observers consider that this decision is a historic agreement for the negotiations on agriculture under the Convention, as it highlights the key role of agriculture and food security in the international climate agenda.

Decision 4/CP.23, paragraph 1 requests the SBSTA and SBI “to jointly address issues related to agriculture, including through workshops and expert meetings, working with constituted bodies under the Convention and taking into consideration the vulnerabilities of agriculture to climate change and approaches to addressing food security”. Regarding the progress made on all of the work on these items, and the outcomes of this work, the subsidiary bodies are requested to report to COP26 (November 2020).  

Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the Decision identifies the following elements to start the work:

a. Modalities for implementation of the outcomes of the five in-session workshops on issues related to agriculture and other future topics that may arise from this work;

b. Methods and approaches for assessing adaptation, adaptation co-benefits and resilience;

c. Improved soil carbon, soil health and soil fertility under grassland and cropland as well as integrated systems, including water management;

d. Improved nutrient use and manure management towards sustainable and resilient agricultural systems;

e. Improved livestock management systems;

f. Socio-economic and food security dimensions of climate change in the agricultural sector;

By starting to address these different points, without limiting themselves to them, the Parties and observers were also invited to submit their views on the elements to include in the activities targeted in paragraph 1 above, until 31 March 2018, for consideration at the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies, from April to May 2018.

I.16.4. Results of the 48th session of subsidiary bodies and the adoption of a roadmap for 2020 to make progress on the Koronivia work programme on agriculture

At the 48th session of the permanent subsidiary bodies (SB 48 – April-May 2018), the SBSTA\textsuperscript{699} and SBI\textsuperscript{700} continued to pursue the consideration of issues related to agriculture in the sequel to the Decision adopted at COP23 and the mandate which was entrusted to them. The subsidiary bodies collectively addressed the Koronivia joint work.

At the end of SB 48, the Parties adopted a “roadmap” to operationalise the 2020 Koronivia joint work programme on agriculture, which will be concluded at the 53rd sessions of the SBSTA and SBI (in November 2020). This roadmap was annexed to the SBSTA 48.1 and SBI 48.1 work session reports respectively.

This roadmap plans for workshops held at the same time as the future sessions of the standing subsidiary bodies, and should address the various points specified in Decision 4/CP.23, paragraph 2.

Prior to each session, the Parties and observers are invited to communicate their views on the issues related to the upcoming workshops. After each workshop, a report will be published and reviewed at the following session of the subsidiary bodies.

Table. Summary table of the workshops planned as part of the roadmap (2018-2020) and the communications planned prior to each of these workshops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to Decision 4/CP.23</th>
<th>Workshop programme</th>
<th>Sessions</th>
<th>Communication of views prior to the workshops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>para. 2 (a)</td>
<td>Modalities for implementation of the outcomes of the five in-session workshops on issues related to agriculture and other future topics that may arise from this work</td>
<td>SBSTA/ SBI 49 December 2018</td>
<td>Until 22 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para. 2 (b)</td>
<td>Methods and approaches for assessing adaptation, adaptation co-benefits and resilience</td>
<td>SBSTA/ SBI 50 June 2019</td>
<td>Until 06 May 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

700. FCCC/SBI/2018/9 – Item 10 on the SBI agenda.
## I.16.5. Parallel sessions at COP24 and prospects

Regarding the 49th SBSTA and SBI sessions in Katowice, held at the same time as COP24, the Parties and observers were invited to communicate their views on the work programme referred to in Decision 4/CP.23, para. 2(a) on the modalities of the implementation of the results of five session workshops held on issues relating to agriculture and other future topics that could emerge from this work.

Furthermore, in accordance with the conclusions of SBSTA/SBI 48.1701 (April-May 2018), the subsidiary bodies requested the Secretariat to invite the representatives of the bodies constituted under the Convention, particularly emphasising the first workshop that is planned for December 2018, which will also bring Parties and observers together in the talks.

In terms of prospects, note that in their conclusions of the April-May 2018 intersession, the subsidiary bodies invited the Parties and observers to submit their views on future topics which are not listed in Decision/CP.23, as well as on the progress made on the Koronivia work programme until 28 September 2020, for consideration by the subsidiary bodies in their report to COP26 (November 2020)702.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to Decision 4/CP.23</th>
<th>Workshop programme</th>
<th>Sessions</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>para. 2 (b)</td>
<td>Methods and approaches for assessing adaptation, adaptation co-benefits and resilience</td>
<td>SBSTA/SBI 50 June 2019</td>
<td>Until 06 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para. 2 (c)</td>
<td>Improved soil carbon, soil health and soil fertility under grassland and cropland as well as integrated systems, including water management</td>
<td>SBSTA/SBI 51 November 2019</td>
<td>Until 30 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para. 2 (d)</td>
<td>Improved nutrient use and manure management towards sustainable and resilient agricultural systems</td>
<td>SBSTA/SBI 52 June 2020</td>
<td>Until 20 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para. 2 (e)</td>
<td>Improved livestock management systems</td>
<td>SBSTA/SBI 52 June 2020</td>
<td>Until 20 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para. 2 (f)</td>
<td>Socio-economic and food security dimensions of climate change in the agricultural sector</td>
<td>SBSTA/SBI 52 June 2020</td>
<td>Until 20 April 2020</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Lastly, note that after its 43rd session (Nairobi, Kenya, 11-13 April 2016), the IPCC decided to prepare its sixth assessment report, the *Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL)*\(^7\(^{03}\). At its 45th session (Guadalajara, Mexico, 28-31 March 2017), the main orientations of the special report were approved\(^7\(^{04}\). The report should be finalised and made public in September 2019.

\(^7\(^{03}\). See the page devoted to the report on the IPCC web portal [online] http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr2/.
\(^7\(^{04}\). IPCC, 2017
Part II.
Understanding the state of international climate negotiations: from the Paris Agreement to its implementation

II.A Implementation of the Agreement... From Fiji/Bonn (COP23) to Katowice (COP24)

II.A.1. Key topics of COP23 and the Fijian presidency

COP23 (November 2017, Fiji/Bonn) was so-called “transitory” session of the COP, with the main aim of moving forward on the negotiating points of the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP), as defined by Decision i/CP.21, to make possible the adoption of the operationalisation rules of the said Agreement during COP24 in 2018 by converting the guidelines into technical clauses.

COP23 was held in conjunction with the 13th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 13) and the second meeting of the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1.2). At the same time as the COP23, the subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA) also held their 47th sessions and the APA held the fourth part of its first session (APA 1.4)\textsuperscript{705}.

As this was the second COP session since the adoption of the Paris Agreement (December 2015), following COP22 (2016, Marrakech), the negotiations focused on aspects to be resolved with a view to adopting the many decisions relating to the PAWP. The Conference was also marked by two major political elements, by being held in the aftermath of the declaration by the President of the United States, Donald Trump, of its withdrawal from the Agreement\textsuperscript{706} and by being presided over by a Small Island Developing State (SIDS), the Fijian Islands. This was a unique opportunity to focus the debates on enhanced ambition to face up to the climate urgency that is already having a significant impact on many regions worldwide.

\textsuperscript{705} IISD, 2017a

On this last point, note that the Fijian presidency marked the spirit of negotiations by introducing the concept of “Talanoa” – describing an inclusive, participatory, friendly, united, participatory and transparent dialogue – a concept adopted to organise the first Facilitative Dialogue provided for by Decision 1/CP.21, in parallel to COP22. The topics highlighted by the Fijian presidency include enhancing ambition and pre-2020 action, a major issue for countries vulnerable to climate change, in the same way as the questions of adaptation and climate finance. With a view to helping to raise pre-2020 ambitions, the document “Fiji Momentum for Implementation” was adopted. This underlines the determination of Parties to conclude the negotiations on the PAWP in December 2018, whilst launching formally the Talanoa Dialogue in accordance to the provision under Decision 1/CP.21.

Over and beyond the Fijian impetus, the outcomes of negotiations that should lead to technical progress in the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the Paris Agreement are still fairly limited. With a view to adopting decisions resulting from the PAWP in December 2018, one of the central goals of the Fijian presidency was to convert long lists of topics into negotiating texts with clear options. The negotiations were occasionally marked by procedural quarrels and by pairing negotiating issues within the bodies, increasing the discussion forums and limiting progress.

The main advances for a large majority of informal negotiating texts were improved reflection of the positions of all Parties. As such, the informal notes reflecting the viewpoints of Parties were expanded considerably, without for all that moving towards clear negotiating options. For a few negotiating points, the presidents of the subsidiary bodies were asked to convert them into informal negotiating documents. This was especially the case for questions relating to transparency or cooperation mechanisms, where progress was admittedly made, without it being possible to formulate informal negotiating texts. Faced with these arduous sessions and the difficulty in moving onto discussions of substance, the possibility of an additional negotiating session for 2018 had already been discussed informally.

It was impossible to overcome several political issues in Bonn, mainly in terms of a new approach to the differentiation of responsibilities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Many participants had the impression that progress was uneven between the different negotiating issues. Whereas certain defend an approach to conclude the debates on less complex issues so that more time can be allocated to contentious and substantive issues, other Parties urge an egalitarian rate of progress. The question of the organisation of work was also at the heart of interim negotiations between Bonn (COP23) and Katowice (COP24).

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707. Decision 1/CP.23
708. IISD, 2017a; Climate Focus, 2017.
709. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 13
710. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6
712. IISD, 2017a
Another gap has appeared between the developing and developed countries around the issues of climate finance definition and mobilisation, which remains a major issue influencing the entire negotiating process. Whilst the developed countries have called for restricting the negotiations to the framework of the Paris mandate, the developing countries believe that many important questions are not considered in sufficient depth, like the predictability of climate financing flows and support for adaptation efforts. In particular, the question of pre-2020 action was put forward by the developing countries as a crucial issue to simulate political will and weave bonds of trust713.

II.A.2. Importance of COP24 for the implementation of the Paris Agreement

The priority for COP24 will be to finalise the discussions relating to the PAWP so that operationalisation rules can be adopted for the Paris Agreement, thereby ensuring, especially, full implementation of the NDC, cooperation between countries to do this, on-going enhancing of ambitions in order to reach the goal of the Agreement to limit the increase in temperatures (2°C/1.5°C) by the end of the century.

The Talanoa Dialogue will enter its political phase during COP24. The COP will therefore welcome high-level political representatives who will take stock of the collective efforts by Parties to achieve the long-term temperature limitation goal. This political phase will mainly inform the preparation of the communication or revision of NDC and the Global Stocktake (as shown in Figure 24 below). In this context, the demonstration of political will and the determination to pursue the efforts in implementing the Paris Agreement is crucial to create an enabling environment for enhancing the ambitions and commitments of States.

Figure 24. Timetable of the Paris Agreement to raise ambition714

713. IISD, 2017a
714. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
The Polish presidency of COP24 sets out the goals fuelling its political coordination on the electronic portal dedicated to the Conference\textsuperscript{715}. In particular, the presidency seeks to defend the principle of voluntary action provided for under the Paris Agreement together with appropriate consideration given to commitments given the different stages of development of the countries. The Polish presidency also wishes to develop political declarations on carbon neutrality, based on carbon sequestration by forests and soils as well as the promotion of electric vehicles and the “fair transition” of active workers in the operation of fossil fuels.

From a global perspective, the road to COP23\textsuperscript{4} is also entrenched in the rounds of conferences, summits, meetings and other international events that could give the negotiations some momentum or climate action in general, especially:

- The One Planet Summit (December 2017, Paris), chaired joint by France, António Guterres, United Nations Secretary General, and Jim Yong Kim, World Bank President, bringing together actors from public and private climate finance with the goal of mobilising resources for the implementation of the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{716}.
- The Innovate for Climate Conference (I4C) (May 2018, Frankfurt) also intended to unite representatives from the commercial, technology, finance and political sectors to mobilise climate investment\textsuperscript{717}.
- The Petersberg Climate Dialogue, presided over by Germany and Poland (June 2018, Berlin), an informal meeting of ministers and representatives of 35 countries to prepare for COP24\textsuperscript{718}.
- The ministerial meeting on climate action under the auspices of the European Union, China and Canada (June 2018) to progress in the implementation of the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{719}.
- Regional meetings including the Climate Chance Africa Summit\textsuperscript{720}, the Asia-Pacific Climate Week\textsuperscript{721}, the Latin America Climate Week\textsuperscript{722} between July and August 2018.

\textsuperscript{716} Official webpage: https://www.oneplanetsummit.fr/fr/. The twelve commitments made by the participants can be accessed: https://www.oneplanetsummit.fr/en/the-12-oneplanet-commitments/.
\textsuperscript{718} Webpage of the German Environment Ministry about the Petersberg Climate Dialogue: https://www.bmu.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/internationale-klimapolitik/petersberger-klimadialog/.
\textsuperscript{719} The summary by the presidents of the meeting is accessible [online] https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20180621_moca_en.pdf.
\textsuperscript{721} Official webpage: https://asiacarbonforum.com/.
\textsuperscript{722} Official webpage: https://www.latincarbon.com/.
The Global Climate Action Summit (September 2018, San Francisco) bringing together political representatives and non-State stakeholders to enhance ambitions in terms of climate policy, with special attention paid to subnational actions and decarbonising of the economy\textsuperscript{723}.

The United Nations General Assembly and the New York climate week in September 2018\textsuperscript{724}.

Lastly, note that the COP24 negotiations should also be informed, even influenced, by the publication of the special IPCC report on the 1.5°C goal in October 2018 (see also Section I.4 on this).

II.A.3. The main frictions between the Parties after the Bonn negotiation intersession (April-May 2018)

In the continuation of COP23 (November 2017, Bonn), the May 2018 negotiation intersession was also unable to formulate informal negotiating texts, placing huge pressure on the shoulders of negotiators for the additional Bangkok session held in September 2018. At the same time, the option of carrying forward to issues to Bangkok resulted in all key topics during this negotiating session also being delayed. In this respect, draft decisions for review and adoption by the COP were only developed for a limited number of topics:

- Road map for Koronivia joint work on agriculture\textsuperscript{725};
- Ways of enhancing developing training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, so as to enhance actions under the Paris Agreement. Mandate to review the Doha work programme\textsuperscript{726};
- Ways of enhancing developing training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, so as to enhance actions under the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{727};
- Coordination of the support for the implementation by developing countries of mitigation activities in the forestry sector, including institutional devices\textsuperscript{728};
- Review of the smooth operation of the Climate Technology Centre and Network\textsuperscript{729};
- Work programme relating to the least developed countries\textsuperscript{730}.

The meeting stood out for a growing tendency to explore the synergies between the different negotiating points to achieve a “balanced and comprehensive package”. Oppositions between blocks of developed countries and developing

\textsuperscript{723}. Official webpage: https://www.globalclimateactionsummit.org/.
\textsuperscript{724}. Official webpage: https://www.climateweeknyc.org/about-us.
\textsuperscript{725}. FCCC/SB/2018/L.1.
\textsuperscript{726}. FCCC/SBI/2018/L.3/Add.1.
\textsuperscript{727}. FCCC/SBI/2018/L.3/Add.2.
\textsuperscript{728}. FCCC/SBI/2018/L.9/Add.1.
\textsuperscript{729}. FCCC/SBI/2018/L.15/Add.1.
\textsuperscript{730}. FCCC/2018/L.17/Add.1.
countries also tightened. The first block does not see Katowice as a “finance COP” whilst the second insists on the “Annex 1/non-Annex I” type of differentiation to attract more attention to the issues of adaptation and finance. Another crucial issue that came to light is that the topic of climate finance, scattered and discussed under many items on agendas of different negotiating bodies, must be approached in more integrated and centralised fashion\textsuperscript{731}.

To deal with the increasingly complex interdependencies in the negotiations, the co-presidents of the APA, SBI and SBSTA were tasked with producing a joint concept note before Bangkok. Similarly, to make it easier to navigate through the contents of very long informal notes developed and discussed under the APA, the co-presidents obtained the mandate to revise the “tools” already prepared prior to the conference.

\textbf{II.A.4. Sessions and outcomes of permanent subsidiary bodies between COP23 and COP24}

\textit{Main outcomes of SBI 48.1 (May 2018)}

The negotiations conducted under the auspices of SBI 48.1 (May 2018) achieved a certain amount of progress. For example, the SBI formulated a draft decision for adoption by the COP regarding the review of the smooth operation of the CTCN and the review of the support for the implementation by developing countries of mitigation activities in the forestry sector.

The Parties were unable to reach consensus on the question of common timetables for NDC in order to formulate a draft decision. On this topic, several Parties called for the next session to focus more on substantive discussions to move the debates forward. Discussions on the public NDC registries and adaptation communications were also carried forward to SBI 48.2.

A conference room paper on financing climate action under Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement was circulated during the negotiations. This was taken into account during the revision of the informal note. The note was welcomed by the Parties and the negotiations at SBI 48.2 will continue on this basis.

The SBI and SBSTA held common negotiations on the impact of response measures. The Secretariat was requested to prepare a report on the workshop held in Bonn on the use of economic modelling tools. Also, both bodies fixed the scope of the review of the work of the improved forum and invited the Parties and observers to communicate their points of view on this work before 21 September 2018. The review will be the basis for developing the work programme of the forum. It has been suggested that the forum serve the implementation of the Paris Agreement from December 2018 (subject to the decision taken at CMA 1.3)\textsuperscript{732}.

\textsuperscript{731} See especially discussions in the analyses of Carbon Brief, 2018 and Third World Network, 2018, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{732} IISD, 2018b.
Another positive outcome from negotiations under the SBI and SBSTA was the progress made in the Koronovia work programme on agriculture adopted by the Parties at the end of COP23 in November 2017 (see Section I.16). SBI/SBSTA 48 (April-May 2018) subsequently were able to adopt a road map establishing six workshops to continue the discussions on this topic. The workshops will be held between 2018 and 2020.

Lastly, note that during the joint meeting of the subsidiary bodies and APA on 5 May 2018, the president of SBI was confident that a negotiating text could be developed, even if progress was not apparent in all the issues negotiated.

**Main outcomes of SBSTA 48.1 (September 2018)**

Regarding negotiations on the technology framework under Article 10.4 of the Paris Agreement, the draft by the SBI president was welcomed and the negotiations will continue on this basis.

The negotiations in relation to the cooperation mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement were slowed substantially due to the links highlighted with the negotiations on climate financing. Also, the positions vary within the developing countries over this link between cooperation mechanisms and climate finance. The negotiations will thus continue in Bangkok on the basis of slightly modified informal notes to reflect the viewpoints of Parties better.

The accounting modalities for financial resources provided and immobilised by public interventions, in accordance with Article 9.7 of the Paris Agreement, is another contentious issue. The developed countries would like to continue to produce climate financing reports with different methodologies in different countries, whilst developing countries would like an approach based on detailed regulations that use the concept of “grant equivalence” for loans and the inclusion of loss and damage. This topic was also carried forward to the Bangkok session733.

**Main outcomes of SBI 48.2 (September 2018)**

The SBSTA only considered the agenda items included in the “decision package” to be adopted at COP24 at this second part of its 48th session, mainly:

5. Common timetables for the NDC by virtue of Article 4.10;
6. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry by virtue of Article 4.12;
7. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry by virtue of Article 7.12;
11. The report of the Adaptation Committee (joint SBSTA/SBI negotiations);
12. Issues relating to the LDC;
14(a). Scope and modalities of the periodic assessment of the technology mechanism in order to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement;

733. IISD, 2018b.
Climate finance issues: identification of the information to be provided by the Parties in accordance with Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement;

Modalities, work programme and functions of the forum on the impacts of response measures under the Paris Agreement (joint SBSTA/SBI negotiations).

The negotiations on common timetables for the NDC were marked by the question of selective differentiation in rules between the developed and developing countries, proposed by the LMDC. The negotiations on the transfer of technologies proceeded more easily and ended with the preparation of a draft decision for adoption by the CMA. Similarly, a draft decision on the modalities, work programme and functions of the forum on the impacts of response measures under the Paris Agreement, a joint agenda item with the SBSTA, was produced.

The predictability of climate financing flows is one of the sensitive points in the negotiations. For example, the LMDC stated that no progress could be made on the PAWP without progress on questions of financing. The AGN insists that the reporting modalities must be negotiated as well as the type of information that has to be reported, which is opposed by the developed countries. The negotiations around this issue risk furthermore to block the talks within the APA on the transparency framework.

Main outcomes of SBSTA 48.2

Like the SBI, the SBSTA only considered items on its agenda linked directly to the PAWP:

- Report of the Adaptation Committee (joint SBSTA/CBI negotiations);
- Development and transfer of technologies: technology framework by virtue of Article 10.4;
- Modalities, work programme and functions of the forum on the impacts of response measures under the Paris Agreement (joint SBSTA/SBI negotiations);
- Issues relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement;
- Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions in accordance with Article 9.7.

Progress was made in the negotiations on the international cooperation approaches based on market and non-market mechanisms. The countries in the ALBA group asked that more balanced progress be made between the operationalisation of market...
mechanisms and the non-market-based approaches\textsuperscript{738}. Similarly, negotiations on the sensitive question of the accounting of financial resources managed to reduce the text from sixty to six pages\textsuperscript{739}. Negotiations about the technology framework also progressed and both a draft decision and draft framework were published\textsuperscript{740}.

II.A.5. Sessions and outcomes of the APA between COP23 and COP24

\textit{Navigation of complex informal texts}

The APA presiding officers agreed that the interim session in Bonn in May 2018 was a positive experience. The informal notes were revised and the “tools” prepared proved useful for navigating through the various options included in very long texts. This is above all the case for APA agenda item 3 on the new guidelines for the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.1, as the initial version of the informal note had nearly 180 pages.

The presiding officers noted that the meetings with heads of delegation had proven very productive for progress in the negotiations, in the same way as the organisation of joint discussions on intrinsically linked negotiating issues, such as the communication of adaptation and the transparency framework. This approach has become promising faced with time constraints to reduce the texts and the options on the table.

\textit{Main outcomes of the fifth part of the first APA session (APA 1.5)}

The main outcome was to mandate the presiding officers of the working groups to develop “tools” by August 2018 for review in Bangkok. These tools were published early August 2018 for all APA agenda items (see Annexes 1-7 of document APA1.6.Informal.\textsuperscript{741}).

These tools contain proposals for rationalising the elements dealt with under the APA and provide examples on possibilities of progressing in the negotiations, without for all that prejudicing the negotiation outcomes. All the options identified by the Parties remain on the negotiating table and any Party can submit communications, if necessary.

The tools identify the negotiating options, formulate certain central questions for the specific negotiation issue or provide short descriptions of key areas of friction, etc. They also occasionally contain a tabular summary on the paragraphs still containing similar (or duplicated) proposals between the Parties. All the tools attempt to formulate and propose a structure for a future negotiating text and, although informal, give the Parties a solid base for negotiating on substantive details.

\textsuperscript{738} Timperley, J., 2018.
\textsuperscript{739} IISD, 2018c.
\textsuperscript{741} APA, 2018h.
Preparatory phase of the Talanoa Dialogue

With nearly seven hundred communications, mostly from non-State actors, the Talanoa Dialogue has managed to mobilise the actors around the three questions below in its preparatory phase742: Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there? The Bonn meetings were deemed useful and productive by most participants. The totally new format in the UNFCCC process bringing State representatives and non-State actors together in a common discussion forum was also welcomed positively. The preparatory phase will continue through other decentralised events up to COP24. The political phase will be launched after a preparatory session to discuss the implications of the special IPCC report on global warming of 1.5°C743.

Main outcomes of the sixth part of the first APA session (APA 1.6)

The tools prepared by the APA presiding officers were welcomed favourably and agreed as a negotiating basis. Progress was therefore possible on texts and the publication of at least two iterations of informal notes per agenda item.

In relation to the guidelines on the NDC mitigation section by virtue of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, the question of differentiation of responsibilities between developing country Parties and developed country Parties gives rise to tension. The development of rules on two levels is promoted by China and the G77 but opposed by the EU and the United States. From a similar perspective, the central political issue to be resolved under negotiations on the transparency framework is the operationalisation of provisions for flexibility of Parties in accordance with the CBDR744.

The debate surrounding the questions of climate finance is conducted within APA under agenda item 8, where the developing countries are pushing for the setting up of a process to define a new climate finance goal by 2025. The developed countries are opposed to preparing such a CMA decision given an overloaded agenda745.

II.A.6 From Bangkok to Katowice: towards a negotiating text

Prior to the Bangkok session, the joint presiding officers of the subsidiary bodies and the APA noted in their joint concept note the need to reach an agreed basis for negotiations. This basis is supposed to take the form of a text reflecting clear, streamlined options and with sufficient detail to be converted rapidly into a negotiating text746. This goal was not achieved and the Executive Secretary, Patricia

742. Talanoa Dialogue – Annex II to Decision 1/CP.23.
746. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018a. (APA-SBSTA-SBI.2018.1.Informal)
Espinosa, was forced to note that the progress made remained unequal between the different PAWP elements. The key issues to be resolved, which depend on political decisions, are mainly the responsibilities of transparency and reporting and the predictability of short – and long-term climate financing and whether there is differentiation of countries in two categories, like under the Kyoto Protocol, or far more subtle differentiation.

At the end of the Bangkok session, the Secretariat published a 307-page compilation of all the PAWP texts taking stock of their negotiation status. The conclusions of all three bodies are also presented in a common table and annexed to each draft conclusion from the session. Faced with a persistent lack of precision and rationalisation, the Parties mandated the joint presiding officers to prepare once again a “joint concept note” on progress made and the identification of means of progressing, this time containing proposed texts, for publication in mid-October 2018.

This common concept note by the joint presiding officers was thus published on 15 October 2018. The joint presiding officers note progress made in the note, which nevertheless remains insufficiently balanced. They describe the organisational approach that will be adopted to facilitate the negotiations and navigate the interrelations between the various issues. Nine annexes contain their proposals to advance the options resulting from informal notes towards negotiating texts about the different articles of the Paris Agreement to be operationalised under the Paris Agreement Work Programme. An addendum is developed for each topic, containing (a) a brief assessment of progress made and suggestions about how to progress; (b) an explanation of the approach adopted in formulating proposed texts and managing interconnections; (c) proposed texts.

By developing these proposals, the joint presiding officers sought to harmonise the state of progress between the different notes, streamline the text and eliminate or combine similar options and propose solutions where possible. At the same time, the joint presiding officers underline that the substantive content of the text is still determined by the Parties and that all key options remain on the negotiating table.

The joint presiding officers also highlight that the Parties should decide on the technical work to be pursued in 2019 and that practical experiences will be a valuable source of information for the CMA in developing specific future rules. The joint presiding officers therefore urge the Parties to focus on solutions likely to overcome the divisions and forge a consensus on key aspects of the Paris Agreement work programme.

747. United Nations, Newsroom 2018
748. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2018.
750. The conclusions of the session are available [online]
APA: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/L04.pdf;
SBSTA: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/L16.pdf;
751. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
II.B Deciphering succinctly the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{752}

Form and legal implications

As opposed to the Kyoto Protocol which contains quantified and binding commitments for the Parties targeted in its Annex B, the Paris Agreement commits all Parties to adopt internal measures with the aim of conducting mitigation objectives that are self-determined. Several disputes drew the limelight with respect to the Agreement’s legal or legally binding nature which was not clear enough when the text was analysed. Whilst the mitigation approach by the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) represents a more significant, almost universal participation by the Parties to the Convention, their non-legally-binding nature and lack of collective ambition raised concerns\textsuperscript{753}. Numerous actors expected that the Paris Agreement would result in commitments in terms of mitigation and financing that would be legally binding. For this, they were reminded that such regulations did not necessarily guarantee implementation, regarding previous experience, but that they could on the contrary reduce participation and the level of global ambition of the agreement.

Nevertheless, several elements testify to the legal force of the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{754}:

- It is an international treaty submitted for signature and national ratification processes to guarantee its effectiveness;
- Like the majority of international legal texts, it contains both binding provisions and others with no mandatory force;
- In this sense, several clear legal requirements appear through the interdependent elements and processes of the Agreement’s architecture, in relation to long-term objectives; Parties’ individual obligations; national reports and reviews; the process of aligning the NDC time frames towards a common timetable; the transparency and accounting system; and the mechanism aimed at facilitating implementation and promoting the fulfilment of Parties’ obligations.

All these provisions result in a certain number of obligations for Parties with respect to the international community.

The sophistication of the architecture of the Paris Agreement can be seen as a hybrid model reconciling the efforts that are “top down” and “bottom up”\textsuperscript{755}. This architecture has turned out to be the most efficient to reconcile the divergent views of the Parties and render the agreement acceptable to all\textsuperscript{756}. However, given that the Agreement must be ratified entirely and without reservations\textsuperscript{757}, several analysts

\textsuperscript{752} Updates and summaries adapted from the Guide to Negotiations, 2017.
\textsuperscript{753} IISD, 2015c, p. 50
\textsuperscript{754} Bodansky, 2016
\textsuperscript{755} See discussion by Bodansky, 2016, p. 18-20
\textsuperscript{756} Obergassel, \textit{et al.}, 2016
\textsuperscript{757} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 27 providing for “no reservations may be made to this Agreement. Note, however, that in practice, certain countries ignored this and issued reservations when depositing their ratification instrument.
have concluded that the legal form is globally binding once in force even though it contains elements that are not binding\textsuperscript{758}.

In plain language, distinction is made among the provisions of the Paris Agreement between elements that are binding and others that are not. Among the non-binding elements are financing\textsuperscript{759} and emissions reduction\textsuperscript{760} whilst binding aspects of the Agreement include the periodic communication of NDC at regular intervals of five years\textsuperscript{761}, transparency of actions and support\textsuperscript{762} and the advancement of ambition.

It is important to note the subtlety whereby, despite the obligation for Parties to communicate their NDC\textsuperscript{763}, the implementation or execution of their targets is not legally binding\textsuperscript{764}, on the other hand. In effect, the Agreement simply requires the Parties to adopt internal measures for mitigation in order to achieve the NDC goals. According to the analyses by Galbraith\textsuperscript{765}, only the procedural aspect of the NDC\textsuperscript{766} is binding and there is therefore no legal obligation in the substance of Article 4.

### Summary of the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement consists of 29 articles, which can be structured into three parts:

- The context, principles and objectives of the Agreement, addressing the treatment of cross-cutting issues;
- The main obligations relating to substantive issues, in particular mitigation, adaptation, financing, the development and transfer of technology, transparency of action and support and capacity-building;
- Institutional, procedural and legal issues.

This Agreement is guided by a bottom-up approach sustained by the principle of self determination of mitigation objectives and adaptation at the national level through NDC. It is accompanied by Decision 1/CP.21 aimed at giving it effect and outlining the actions to develop to facilitate entry into force and sustain implementation of its regulations.

\textsuperscript{758} See Bodle, Donat and Duwe, 2016; and Jeyaratnam, Whitmore, Hokpin and Mountain, 2015
\textsuperscript{759} See Jeyaratnam, Whitmore, Hokpin et Mountain, 2015; and Obergassel, \textit{et al.}, 2016
\textsuperscript{760} Obergassel, \textit{et al.}, 2016
\textsuperscript{761} Obergassel, \textit{et al.}, 2016
\textsuperscript{762} IDDRI, 2015
\textsuperscript{763} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 2.
\textsuperscript{764} See discussion by Bodansky, 2016, p. 13-14
\textsuperscript{765} Galbraith, 2015
\textsuperscript{766} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 2.
Figure 25. Concept diagram of the structure of the Paris Agreement

PARIS AGREEMENT

STRUCTURE

DECISION 1/CP.21
OPERATIONALISATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND RELATED GOALS
Adoption (I), Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (II), Decisions to give effect to the Agreement (III), Pre-2020 enhanced action (IV), Non-Party entities (V), Administrative and budgetary matters (VI)

1
Context
Principles
Goals
Cross-cutting issues

2
Obligations in terms of:
Mitigation, Adaptation, Loss and damage, Financing, Development and transfer of technology, Transparency of action and support, Capacity-building, etc.

3
Institutional, procedural and legal provisions

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Figure 26. Concept diagrams showing the main articles of the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{768}

\textbf{PARIS AGREEMENT}

\textbf{MAIN ARTICLE - 1/3}

\textbf{PREAMBLE}

Introduces the founding principles of the Paris Agreement

Reaffirmation of principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, mitigation issues and taking adaptation into account, right to food security and right to development, the role and necessary involvement of all actors in combating climate change, etc.

\textbf{ARTICLE 1}

Definition of terms of the Paris Agreement


2. "Conference of the Parties", for Conference of the Parties to the Convention

3. "Party", understood as Party to this Agreement

\textbf{ARTICLE 2}

Paris Agreement objectives

Strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, mainly by:

a) Holding the increase in the global temperature to well below 2 \(^\circ\)C, even 1.5\(^\circ\)C, above pre-industrial levels by 2100;

b) Increasing the ability to adapt and promote resilience to climate change without compromising food production

c) Making finance flows consistent with low-carbon and resilient development

\textbf{ARTICLE 3}

Commitments, NDC and raising the ambition level

It is incumbent on all Parties to undertake and communicate on ambitious efforts through their NDC, which represents advancement over time, whilst recognising the need to support the DC for the effective implementation of the goals of this Agreement

\textbf{ACRONYMS}

NDC Nationally Determined Contributions

DC Developing countries

\textsuperscript{768}. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
### Paris Agreement

**Main Articles - 2/3**

#### Article 4
**Mitigation**
- Peaking of emissions as soon as possible to achieve the long-term temperature goal laid down in Article 2
- Each Party must establish its NDC corresponding to its highest possible ambition level;
- Reviewable every five years, always upwards;
- Each Party is invited to communicate long-term strategies.

#### Article 5
**Forests**
- Preserve and strengthen the GHG sinks and reservoirs, mainly the forests
- Pursue and enhance arrangements adopted by virtue of the Convention (REDD+);
- Promote the adoption of non-carbon-related measures.

#### Article 6
**Mechanisms**
- General framework for the cooperation activities, mitigation and adaptation activities, sustainable development and environmental integrity
- Cooperative approaches; transfer of results of mitigation; mechanisms to contribute to mitigation and support sustainable development.

#### Article 7
**Adaptation**
- Enhance adaptation capacity; increase resilience; reduce vulnerability to climate change and sustainable development
- Strengthen support and international cooperation, mainly in favour of developing countries; communication of national adaptation measures.

#### Article 8
**Loss and Damage**
- Avoid and reduce as much as possible the loss and damage from the effects of climate change and remedy it, mainly in a sustainable development framework
- Enhancing the Warsaw International Mechanism; cooperation and facilitation of action and support.

#### Article 9
**Financing**
- Financial resources for mitigation and adaptation for developing countries for implementation of objectives
- Mobilisation of resources by developed countries or on voluntary basis; from a broad spectrum of sources; biennial communications on financing.

#### Article 10
**Technology**
- Development and transfer of technologies to increase resilience to climate change and reduce GHG emissions
- Creation of a Technology Mechanism by virtue of the Convention; strengthening of cooperation; technical and financial support for innovation.

#### Article 11
**Capacity-Building**
- Contribute and improve the capacities of developing countries, mainly the most vulnerable, faced with the effects of climate change
- Cooperation; development and deployment of technologies; access to financing; communication of capacity-building activities.

### Acronyms

- NDC: Nationally Determined Contributions
- GHG: Greenhouse gases
## PARIS AGREEMENT
### MAIN ARTICLES - 3/3

**ARTICLE 12**
**Education and awareness**
Contribute to the awareness of the importance of measures to combat climate change.
The Parties cooperate in taking measures to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information.

**ARTICLE 13**
**Transparency**
Build up mutual trust and promote effective implementation.
Creation of an enhanced transparency framework of measures (mitigation and adaptation) and support for developing countries; technical review by experts.

**ARTICLE 14**
**Five-year global stocktake**
First global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter, to update and enhance the measures, as for international cooperation in achieving objectives.

**ARTICLE 15**
**Facilitation of implementation and compliance with provisions**
Creation of a facilitation mechanism for implementation of the Agreement and compliance with its provisions, formed by a committee of experts, acting in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner.

**ARTICLE 18**
**Subsidiary Bodies**
The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention serve, respectively, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement.

**ARTICLE 19**
**Directives for subsidiary bodies**
Subsidiary bodies or other institutional arrangements established by or under the Convention help to implement the Paris Agreement; the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) specifies their functions and may provide further guidance to such subsidiary bodies and institutional arrangements.

**ARTICLE 20**
**Signature and ratification**
The Paris Agreement is open for signature from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017 and is open for accession from the day following the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, taken to be the Depositary.

**ARTICLE 21**
**Entry into force**
The Paris Agreement enters into force on the thirtieth day after the date at which 55 Parties, accounting for 55% of the total global greenhouse gas emissions, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance or accession.
Article 2: Goal

The Paris Agreement is based on three main goals indicated in its Article 2 which form part of the wider context of implementing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), sustainable development and eradicating poverty:

a. Hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century;

b. Increase the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low GHG emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;

c. Make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development.

The goals of the Agreement thus listed are mainly targeting three components – mitigation, adaptation and financing. The Parties to the Paris Agreement commit collectively to actions to achieve these goals, with levels of ambition regularly assessed and enhanced on the basis of transparency.

769. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 Adapted according to UNFCCC, 2018, see [online] https://unfccc.int/resource/annualreport/media/UN-Climate-AR17.pdf.
**Mitigation**

One of the main compromises reached in Paris concerns the long-term goal of limiting temperature above pre industrial levels by 2100. The emergence of scientific research on the risk run with the goal of 2°C has reinforced this positioning before and after the Paris Conference. The Paris Agreement ratified this long-term goal by requesting the Parties to pursue the actions to limit the increase in global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre industrial levels.

Decision 1/CP.21 also invited the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and on related scenarios on the evolution of GHG global emissions. The IPCC has in the meantime accepted this invitation and published this report in October 2018 (see Section I.4).

The Agreement also defines a specific world target of mitigation in very clear terms: a balance between anthropogenic emissions and absorptions by sinks must be achieved during the second half of the 21st century (see also Article 4).

All these targets are clearly more ambitious than many expected prior to COP21770.

**Article 3: Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)**

The Paris Agreement indicates that Parties submit their NDC within the meaning of Articles 4 (mitigation), 7 (adaptation), 9 (finance), 10 (development and transfer of technology), 11 (capacity-building) and 13 (transparency). The implementation of the NDC at national level is one of the first steps to be overcome in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the agreement. It requires converting the NDC into policies, strategies, programmes, projects, measures and initiatives that can contribute to the achievement of the goals related to the NDC.

Once the first NDC have been reported, strong expectations are placed on the countries to ensure implementation and the preparation of the subsequent reporting cycles for future NDC. The implementation of the NDC and low carbon emission and climate-resilient development strategies necessitates the commitment of all Parties as well as actual international cooperation.

The Paris Agreement provides for the assessment of collective progress made in achieving the goal of the Agreement through periodic global stocktakes. The first global stocktake is scheduled for 2023 and should be undertaken every five years thereafter unless otherwise decided by the COP.

Scientific assessments relating to the ambition of NDC submitted are unanimous that the stated reduction goals currently result in warming around 3°C in 2100 and therefore remain insufficient to achieve the Agreement’s 2°C goal771.

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770. IISD, 2015c, p. 50
Article 4. Mitigation

With a view to achieving the long-term temperature goal laid down in Article 2, the Agreement seeks to lead Parties to reach peaking of global GHG emissions as soon as possible and to make reductions rapidly thereafter, in accordance with the best scientific data available, in order to reach a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and anthropogenic removals by sinks of GHG in the course of the second half of the century, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

As stated previously, the Paris Agreement does not assign quantified mitigation goals on the Parties, nor does it define a global level of emissions to be reached. Rather it stresses the national mitigation plans on climate change through the NDC. The Agreement stipulates that the efforts of all Parties will represent a progression in time, recognising the need to help developing countries so that the Agreement is efficiently applied.

The decision aimed at giving effect to the Agreement (Decision 1/CP.21) notes with concern that much greater emission reduction efforts will be needed than those associated with the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) in order to hold the increase in the planet’s temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels\(^{772}\). Consequently, an effort must be carried out at all levels in order to transform the entire economic system into the realisation of the mitigation objectives. The role of means for implementation: financing, investments and innovative instruments both domestic and international, capacity-building and technology transfer for this, will be determining factors to this effect.

Obligations in reducing GHG emissions

The Agreement commits the Parties to communicate their NDC at intervals of five years and to pursue national mitigation actions in order to make their contributions which should not only always progress with respect to previous efforts, but also adjust to take into consideration the results of the global stocktake which will assess and aggregate global progress. Decision 1/CP.21 invites the Parties to communicate their first NDC no later than at the time of depositing their ratification, adherence and or approval of the Agreement. The INDC submitted by the Parties before the entry into force of the Paris Agreement will be considered as being their first NDC unless said Parties decide otherwise.

In order to harmonise the temporal horizons of the NDC, the decision commits the Parties, whose submitted INDC/NDC comprise a calendar until 2025, to communicate a new NDC and those whose INDC/NDC comprise a calendar up to 2030, at least to adjust them and then do so every five years\(^{773}\).

\(^{772}\) Decision 1/CP.21, para. 17.
\(^{773}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 9.
The Agreement gives very limited detail of the elements of the NDC, calling upon developed countries to continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets, whilst developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts and are encouraged to move over time towards reduction targets. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) was requested to develop further guidance on features of the NDC for consideration and adoption by the CMA at its first session\textsuperscript{774} in December 2018, in parallel with the COP24.

\textbf{Low GHG emission development strategies}

The Agreement also commits all the Parties to formulate and communicate between now and 2020\textsuperscript{775} strategies for development of low GHG emissions in the long term\textsuperscript{776}, given their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in respect of the different national situations and keeping in mind the three main objectives defined in Article 2.

The strategies for the development of low GHG emissions in the long term communicated by the Parties to the Paris Agreement are published online by the Secretariat of the Convention\textsuperscript{777}.

\textbf{Article 5. Forests}

The initial goal of the REDD+ mechanism was to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. The mechanism was established by Decision 2/CP.13 in 2007 and was developed further by subsequent decisions of the Convention. By Decision 1/CP.16, the COP defines further the REDD+ activities which target reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and include the role of conservation, sustainable forest management and development of forest carbon reservoirs in developing countries\textsuperscript{778}. Decisions 9/CP.19 and 15/CP.19 set out the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, which led to more significant progress in implementation aspects of the REDD+ mechanism.

The Paris Agreement ratified the progress made under the REDD+ by inviting the Parties to take measures to apply and enhance, mainly by results-based payments, the existing framework defined in the directives and relevant decisions already adopted under the Convention\textsuperscript{779}. In the plenary session to adopt the Paris Agreement,

\textsuperscript{774}. With the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016, the first session of the CMA was held in Marrakech.
\textsuperscript{775}. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 35.
\textsuperscript{776}. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 19.
\textsuperscript{777}. As at 15 October 2018, ten Parties to the Paris Agreement have communicated a long-term strategy to the Secretariat. All strategies communicated can be consulted at [online] https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies.
\textsuperscript{778}. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 70.
\textsuperscript{779}. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 5, para. 2.
Panama, on behalf of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, stated that the REDD+ implementation mechanism would allow the State and non-State players to participate and serve the communities which depend on ecosystem services provided by the rainforests.\textsuperscript{780}

To secure the financing of forest-related mechanisms, Decision 1/CP.21 recognises the importance of suitable, predictable financial resources, including results-based payments, if appropriate, to implement general approaches and positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation whilst encouraging the coordination of the support from, \textit{inter alia}, public and private, bilateral and multilateral sources like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other sources, in application of the relevant COP decisions.

**Article 6. Cooperation mechanisms: market and “non-market” mechanisms**

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides for three new market-based mechanisms: it offers countries the opportunity to cooperate voluntarily in the implementation of mitigation activities (cooperative approaches)\textsuperscript{781}, it establishes a “\textit{mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development}” (often referred to as the Sustainable Development Mechanism, SDM)\textsuperscript{782} and it finally recognises non-market based approaches\textsuperscript{783}. These different mechanisms can be considered as a major, unhoped for success. This success is due in part to the fact that the Parties have fulfilled the potential of market mechanisms and other forms of cooperation to help in achieving their NDC.

The three instruments of Article 6 reflect widely the previous discussions on the NMM, FVA and non-market-based approaches.

**Cooperative approaches – Article 6, paragraph 2**

Under cooperative approaches, Parties are free to undertake mitigation action, bilaterally or in a group and to transfer the mitigation outcomes. Cooperative approaches can play a role in achieving NDC, but that role is not yet defined. Cooperative approaches are not subject to a specific monitoring process, but the transactions take place within an accounting system of accounting that will be defined by virtue of the Agreement.\textsuperscript{784} In this context, huge importance is given to the transparency of both activities and the transfer of mitigation outcomes. In terms of the central requirements for a robust accounting system, the main objectives from executing the provisions of Article 6, paragraph 2 will be to ensure transparency of mitigation activities and that the cooperative approaches contribute to a higher ambition level whilst promoting sustainable development.

\textsuperscript{780} IISD, 2015d, p. 14
\textsuperscript{781} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{782} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 4-7.
\textsuperscript{783} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 8.
\textsuperscript{784} In accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Paris Agreement relating to transparency.
Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) – Article 6, paragraph 4

The mechanism established in Article 6, paragraph 4, called Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM), is placed under the supervision of the United Nations. A complete set of rules, modalities and procedures must be developed. The emission reductions within this mechanism must be “real, measurable and long-term”. In addition, the reductions must be additional, the activities must have a precise scope yet to be defined and they must be verified and certified by Designated Operational Entities (DOE). The SDM extends beyond classic market mechanisms. Thus, both the host Party and the purchasing Party should define a contribution and the SDM should “allow overall mitigation of global emissions”. Contributions to the net mitigation by the host Parties can be achieved through an explicit agreement or by a mitigation effect of an activity which does not mean the issuing of negotiable certificates. The goal of overall mitigation of emissions could raise the ambition level beyond the sum of NDC of Parties participating in the mechanism. Nevertheless, this question also relates to the appropriate accounting.

Non-market – based approaches – Article 6, paragraph 8

Unlike the cooperative approaches or the SDM, non-market-based approaches do not allow the transfer of mitigation results. The implications that this could have and the way in which such approaches would affect international cooperation remains subject to future analyses and consultations. The expectations from measuring, reporting and verification approaches (MRV) and any accounting system require clarification. Numerous terms introduced into the two paragraphs have no definition and no history in international negotiations. This is especially true for the term non-market-based approaches which the according to the text should be “integrated, holistic and balanced”.

Article 7. Adaptation

The Paris Agreement establishes for the first time a global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience to climate change and reducing vulnerability to this change. The Agreement recognises the link between the mitigation ambition level and the adaptation needs but includes no quantitative element, mainly in terms of financing.

785. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(f), requires in this respect that “experience gained and lessons learned from existing mechanisms and approaches adopted under the Convention and its related legal instruments”.
786. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(b)
787. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(d)
788. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(c)
789. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(e)
790. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 4(d).
In terms of guiding principles, the Agreement establishes that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems. It should also be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socio-economic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate. In terms of planning, each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication which could set out its priorities, its implementation and support needs and its projects and measures without imposing an additional burden on the developing countries. The communication on adaptation can be incorporated in a national adaptation plan, an NDC and/or a national communication.

Progress in adaptation efforts towards the goal of Article 7 will be analysed during the global stocktake every five years. However, a global evaluation of efforts and individual needs related to such a long-term qualitative goal, and given the absence of precise indicators, could prove to be a difficult exercise. Technical and methodological work will be necessary during sessions of future talks on this question.

**Article 8. Loss and damage**

Considering loss and damage in the Paris Agreement in a separate article from the one on adaptation is a major step taking account of residual, potentially irreversible impacts of climate change in the vulnerable countries.

The Agreement places the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts under the authority of the CMA. It will monitor its guidelines and may subsequently be enhanced in accordance with its decisions.

The Parties should improve the understanding, action and support, especially through the Loss and Damage Mechanism in the framework of cooperation and facilitation, with respect to loss and damage associated with the harmful effects of climate change.

Decision 1/CP.21 nevertheless states that this article devoted to loss and damage does not give rise to or provide a basis for any liability or compensation\(^{792}\).

**Article 9. Financing**

The provision of financial support and other means of implementation is the third objective of the Paris Agreement contained in Article 2; it seeks to make finance flows compatible with a pathway towards with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. This provision helps to send a strong signal to the private sector to re-assess and redirect its investments\(^{793}\).

\(^{792}\) Decision 1/CP.21, para. 52.

\(^{793}\) Bodle, Donat and Duwe, 2016
Ultimately, the Paris Agreement has not jeopardised the provisions of the Convention which restate the primary responsibility of developed countries in providing developing countries with financial resources, for both mitigation and adaptation purposes, in continuation and with an increase of their obligations under the Convention and to existing commitments (mainly the promise of 100 billion made in Copenhagen). The “other Parties” are invited to provide or continue to provide voluntary financial support.

The Agreement also calls for a balance between adaptation and mitigation in the provisions of financial resources, taking into account country-driven strategies and the priorities and needs of developing countries, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the LDC and the SIDS.

The Paris Agreement offers the Parties the option of using a broad spectrum of sources, instruments and channels, through sundry actions, whilst bearing in mind the crucial role of public sources. Article 9, paragraph 4 also recognises the importance of public and grant-based sources for adaptation. The Agreement places greater emphasis on the public sources by requesting the developed countries to communicate transparent, coherent information every two years on the support provided to the developing countries and raised by public interventions. Provision is made for the modalities, procedures and guidelines on communicating this information to be adopted by the CMA at the end of its first session in December 2018, at the same time as COP24.

Just like for the mitigation and adaptation actions, the global stocktake will take into account the assessment of implementation means. In this respect, the developed countries are called on to continue to communicate every two years quantitative and qualitative information, mainly on the projected amounts of public financial resources in favour of developing countries. The other Parties which provide resources on a voluntary basis are invited to communicate this information every two years, also on a voluntary basis.

Although the Paris Agreement requires individual communications of quantifiable information, it makes no mention of information quantified on the overall financing needs. Only Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 54, stipulates that the developed countries intend to continue their current collective mobilisation objective until 2025 with a view to concrete mitigation measures and transparent implementation. A new collective quantified goal higher than the lowest level of USD100 billion per year is planned by 2025.

The Convention’s Financial Mechanism, including its operating entities, is called on to fulfil the functions of the Financial Mechanism of the Paris Agreement. As such, Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 59 considers that the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the entities responsible for operating the Financial Mechanism, along with the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Fund for Climate Change (SFCC), can combine to
implement the Paris Agreement. Decision 1/COP11 also recommended that the
CMA consider how the Adaptation Fund could contribute to the application of
the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{794}.

\textbf{Article 10. Development and transfer of technology}

Article 10 of the Paris Agreement notes the importance of technology in imple-
menting mitigation and adaptation measures and recognises efforts to deploy and
disseminate technology, strengthening cooperative action on technology developing
and transfer and the role of the Technology Mechanism created by virtue of the
Convention in the Agreement.

It was decided in Paris to strengthen the Technology Mechanism and the
mandate given to the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) for the purpose of supporting the
application of the Agreement and undertaking new work including, \textit{inter alia}\textsuperscript{795}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Technology research, development and demonstration;
  \item Developing and building up of endogenous capacities and technologies.
\end{itemize}

A technology framework was created\textsuperscript{796}. It is responsible for giving general
guidelines to the work of the Technology Mechanism to promote and facilitate
enhanced action in technology development and transfer, in support of the imple-
mentation of the Agreement and for the purposes of the long-term vision.

In addition, Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10, states clearly that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The developed Parties must, and other Parties which provide voluntary support
        should, communicate information on the support provided in the form of
        financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building to the developing
        country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11.
  \item The developing country Parties should communicate information on the support
        they need and which they have received, in the form of financial resources,
        technology transfer and capacity building under Articles 9, 10 and 11.
\end{itemize}

It must therefore be emphasised that even if the Parties did not reach agreement
on a global objective for technology development and transfer or in defining
national and global monitoring indicators, the work to be carried out under Decision
1/COP.21\textsuperscript{797} on preparing guidelines for the Transparency network and for the Global
Stocktake\textsuperscript{798} will be an opportunity to use the progress made by the Technology
Mechanism and the Technology Framework to succeed with the necessary evaluations
and provide relevant recommendations to move the technology development and
transfer agenda forward.

\textsuperscript{794} In accordance with the provisions of Decision 1/COP.21, paras. 60-61.
\textsuperscript{795} Decision 1/COP.21, para. 66.
\textsuperscript{796} Decision 1/COP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10 para. 4.
\textsuperscript{797} Decision 1/COP.21, paras. 94-99.
\textsuperscript{798} Decision 1/COP.21, paras. 99-101.
Article 11. Capacity-building
Capacity-building should be driven by the countries, take into account and satisfy national needs and encourage the ownership by the Parties, especially for the developing countries, mainly at national, infra-national and local levels. It should be inspired lessons learned from experience, mainly capacity-building activities performed under the Convention, and represent an effective, iterative, participative, transversal and gender-equality sensitive process. The Parties are called on to cooperate in order to increase the capacity of developing country Parties in implementing the Agreement. The developed countries should enhance their support for capacity-building measures in the developing countries.

The Paris Agreement invites all the Parties which assist developing countries with their capacity-building to communicate regularly on these capacity-building measures or initiatives. Developing countries should regularly provide information on the progress made on implementing capacity-building plans, policies, actions or measures to implement the said Agreement.

The Paris Agreement provides for appropriate institutional arrangements for capacity-building action which, based on the pre-existing arrangements under the Convention, contribute to the application of the Agreement. At its first session, the CMA should consider and adopt a decision on the initial institutional arrangements for capacity-building.

Article 12. Education, training, awareness-raising and participation of the public
The Paris Agreement emphasises the cooperation of the Parties in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognising the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions undertaken under the Agreement.

Article 13. Transparency of measures and support
The enhanced transparency framework is one of the key aspects of the architecture of the new global climate regime adopted in Paris in December 2015. In the context of a bottom-up regime, with no possibility of sanctions against defaulting governments, a strong transparency framework is critically important. This framework is decisive to build trust internationally in the effective introduction of mitigation actions and their assessment. It also informs the stakeholders that can put pressure on to enhance these actions. The introduction of strong public policies then becomes more likely.

The biennial reporting and review process introduced in the Cancún Agreements provides a solid basis to establish the enhanced transparency provided for in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. This new enhanced framework must:

- Monitor advances/progress towards achieving individual and collective emission reduction objectives;
• Increase understanding of how to complete NDC. However, for some types of NDC, such as those without detailed mitigation goals, it will be more difficult to assess the changes or expected impacts.

The new mechanism will be flexible with regard to defining the scope, frequency and level of detail in the communications, as well as the scope of the reviews.

In terms of the communications relating to the support provided to achieve the obligations and commitments made under the Paris Agreement, the reporting will follow the process established under the UNFCCC. The challenges of reporting and reviewing this type of information are well known. For the most part, they relate to the availability and clarity of the information required and reported, as well as the lack of reporting methods and typology of activities related to climate change.

In the absence of clearly-defined rules and methodologies, reporting on financial support for measures to combat climate change poses a greater challenge, compared with reporting on GHG emissions and emission reductions (for example, regarding the reporting on climate financing mobilised through public interventions). In this instance, it is vital for all multilateral development banks, environment funds, international organisations, the private sector and national governments to participate in the communication and information effort. Communicating the support received by developing countries will also be critical, since few countries have established this process. In addition, ex-ante communication by developed countries on financing provided and used is seen as crucial, since this was previously done on a voluntary basis.

Moreover, in addition to the need to establish the rules and methodology for reporting on climate financing, it also remains to establish a shared vision of the concepts introduced by the Paris Agreement, for example, the concepts of “progress in line with previous efforts” and the “provision of scaled-up financial resources”.

Ending differentiation between the Parties is one of the main features of the enhanced transparency framework ushered in by the Paris Agreement. A second important difference which can be highlighted concerns the purpose of reporting. Prior to this, the transparency system was based primarily on mitigation actions. This new enhanced framework for transparency and support must also take into account transparency regarding the resources provided to complete mitigation and adaptation actions, in other words, the financial, technical and capacity-building resources needed to achieve objectives. Transparency on adaptation actions will also be a central challenge for implementing the Paris Agreement.

Article 14. Global stocktake

The Paris Agreement provides for an assessment of the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement through periodic global stocktakes. The first global stocktake is scheduled for 2023 and should be undertaken every five years thereafter, unless otherwise decided by the COP. Prior to the first global
stocktake, a facilitative dialogue between the Parties is planned for 2018 (renamed Talanoa Dialogue – see Section I.12), to take stock of collective efforts by the Parties to achieve the long-term objective set out in Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Agreement and clarify the next NDC communication cycle in 2020.

The transparency framework and the global stocktake have been described by some as “the ambition mechanisms” of the Agreement. The dual obligation to report and take stock of mitigation, adaptation and support every five years creates a collective assessment of achievements and efforts required.

The next figure shows how contributions to the global stocktake are related to the entire global stocktake process. It emphasizes the comprehensive, collective and facilitative nature of the global stocktake.

Figure 28. Conceptual diagram of the global stocktake

799. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 According to the diagram of the UNFCCC Secretariat
Article 15. Facilitation of implementation and compliance with provisions

Apart from the Global stocktake, the facilitation mechanism instituted by the Paris Agreement to facilitate its implementation and promote compliance with its provisions is a significant arrangement. This mechanism will consist of an expert-based committee favouring facilitation and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive; it will pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties.

The Committee should operate under the modalities and procedures to be decided by the CMA at the end its first session in December 2018, at the same time as COP24. The Committee will subsequently report annually to the CMA.

Article 16-22. Institutional provisions and final clauses

Ordinary sessions of the CMA will coincide with ordinary sessions of the COP. Nevertheless, the CMA may hold extraordinary sessions at such other times as it may deem necessary or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.

The permanent subsidiary bodies – the SBSTA and the SBI – created by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention also service the Paris Agreement respectively.

The Paris Agreement was opened for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 22 April 2016 until 21 April 2017. It is planned that it will enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention, representing a total of at least an estimated 55% of all global GHG emissions, deposit their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

As at 5 October 2016, 191 Parties out of 197 have signed the Paris Agreement, including 72 Parties, which together account for 56.75% of the total of global GHG emissions, which have deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary. Thus, both thresholds in Article 21 of the Paris Agreement have been passed, opening the way for the Paris Agreement to enter into force on 4 November 2016, a few days before the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP22) in Marrakech (7-18 November 2016). This process is illustrated in the next figure.

Given the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, the Marrakech Conference (November 2016) thus welcomed:

- The 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP22).

802. https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement
• The 12th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto protocol (CMP 12).
• And the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1)

**Figure 29. Process for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement and ratification status**

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**Opening of the process for signature and ratification**

The Paris Agreement is open for signature at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017 and is open for accession from the day following the date on which it is closed for signature (Paris Agreement, Article 20.1).

- **12 December 2015**: Adoption of the Paris Agreement
- **22 April 2016**: The Paris Agreement is open for signature
- **21 April 2017**: The signature period is closed
- **22 April 2017**: The Paris Agreement is open for accession

... Each State must then deposit formally its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with Secretary General of the United Nations, taken to be the Depositary (Paris Agreement, Article 20.1)

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**Actual progress of the Parties**

The first step incumbent on the Parties is to sign the Paris Agreement. In international law, the signing of an agreement, the step prior to ratification, engages a country not to commit acts contrary to the goals or rationale of this agreement. Ratification reflects its intention to be held by this agreement. Once the ratification, acceptance, approval or accession process has been carried out in accordance with the national procedure of each State, the related instrument must be deposited formally with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

**Conditions required for entry into force**

- **5 October 2016**: 191 States have signed the Paris Agreement. These include 72 States which have ratified the Agreement, accounting for 56.75% of global emissions
- **4 November 2016**: Both thresholds (55 - 55%) have been reached, vindicating an entry into force of the Agreement on the thirtieth day following, i.e. 4 November 2016
- **15 October 2018**: Of the 197 Parties to the UNFCCC, 193 have signed the Paris Agreement and 181 have ratified it

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Part III.
Understanding international climate negotiations: general information

III.A. Brief history of international negotiations on climate change

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In this framework document, signatory countries undertake to stabilise the greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Following this event, the question of global warming has increasingly taken centre stage on the international agenda. The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994 and since then, the Parties have launched themselves into international negotiations to reinforce the global response to climate change.

The first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 1) of the UNFCCC was held in 1995 in Berlin, to commence work in this sense and complete the commitments made in Rio. The Parties thus adopted the Kyoto Protocol during COP 3804 (Kyoto, December 1997). This obliges the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC (developed countries) that have ratified the Protocol to reduce the emission level of six GHG by at least 5% compared with the 1990 level in the period 2008-2012805. The Kyoto Protocol is therefore the first binding provision, established by virtue of the Convention and international law, to limit emissions of countries.

Not all operating modalities of the Protocol could not, however, be finalised in Kyoto and the Parties continued to negotiate on these topics in subsequent years. The Marrakesh Accords adopted in 2001 thus saw the adoption of operationalisation modalities for the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Protocol only came into force in February 2005 and its implementation was delayed in a most countries. Australia only ratified it in December 2007, for example. Canada even withdrew in 2011. And the United States, the largest GHG emitter in the world until 2004 (since passed by China)806, has never ratified the Protocol.

804. The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) meets annually. Each COP session is therefore referred to using the acronym COP x; Paris was the 21st session of the COP and was therefore COP21.

805. Kyoto Protocol, Art. 3, para. 1

With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties embarked on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Two ad hoc working groups were set up in 2005 and 2007 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved an Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP – set up in 2005 in parallel with the dialogue on long-term cooperation), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA – set up in 2007), which constituted a specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention.

COP13 (2007) provided a two-year road map on these issues known as the Bali Action Plan. This aimed to reach an agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen on a post-2012 climate regime under the Convention. The Parties did not manage to reach a detailed agreement at the planned date. The negotiations therefore continued during the next COP (Cancún in 2010 and Durban in 2011), before being concluded in Doha in 2012. At the same time, the Parties, acting as a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, agreed on an amendment to the Protocol providing for GHG reduction targets during a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. Adopted by CMP 8, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol provides, for this second commitment period, for an increase in ambition focusing on two main points: (i) a commitment by Parties to reduce their emissions by 18% compared with 1990 and (ii) a broader composition of Parties targeted by these quantified goals.

With these decisions, the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP18) to the UNFCCC and the 8th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 8) in Doha brought the mandates of the ad hoc working groups under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) to an end.

At the same time, a new stage had commenced with the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in 2011 (COP17). This worked for more than three years on developing an agreement intended for adoption during COP21 in Paris and which, it was assumed, would enter into force in 2020. The next COP, in Doha, Warsaw and Lima, moved in this direction, whilst attempting to plug the ambition gap between the commitments taken by the Parties by 2020 and those necessary to limit global warming to less than 2°C compared with pre-industrial levels by the end of the century.

In 2015, this process resulted in the adoption of the first universal agreement on climate at COP21 in Paris. Less than a year after its adoption, the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, a few days prior to COP22. The Marrakech Conference (COP22, 7-18 November 2016) moved forwards on the path of implementation of the Paris Agreement, by setting 2018 as a deadline for defining implementation modalities for the said Agreement.

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807. For further information, see [online] https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol.
COP23 (November 2017) and the other negotiating sessions thus made progress, mainly in the Paris Agreement work programme, in accordance with the elements included within Decision 1/CP.21 and at the same time as other progress in implementing related goals resulting from the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.

Figure 30. International climate negotiations, main stages from 1988 to 2015 (1/2)808

808. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
Figure 31. International climate negotiations, main stages from 1988 to 2015 (2/2)

TIMELINE
OF CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS - 1988–2015
PART 2

2009 - COP15
Copenhagen
Adoption of the Copenhagen Accord. The developed countries commit themselves to assembling 100 billion dollars a year for the developing countries by 2020

2008 - 2011
2008
Commencement of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 2008-2012

2010 - COP16 Cancún
Adoption of the Cancún Accords, with a certain number of technical advances like the creation of the Green Climate Fund and REDD+

2011 - COP17, Durban
- Creation of the ADP, for the adoption of a new agreement in 2015 - Effective launch of the Green Fund - Definition of a second period for the Kyoto Protocol

2012 - COP18, Doha
- Commencement of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 2013-2020 - Reaffirmation of the ambition to adopt a new agreement by 2015

2013 - COP19, Warsaw
- Launch of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol - Launch of the INDC process

2015 - COP21, Paris
Adoption of the first universal climate agreement including all UNFCCC Parties

2014 - COP20, Lima
Lays the foundations for the new international climate agreement planned for COP 21

ADP
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

CC
Climate change

UNFCCC
United Nations Framework on Climate Change

COP
Conference of the Parties

INDC
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions

GHG
Greenhouse gas

WMO
World Meteorological Organization

UNEP
United Nations Environment Programme

809. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
History of negotiations – Main milestones


The 13th session of the Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC (COP13), serving as the widely-publicised third session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 3), was held in Bali, on 3-15 December 2007, in a climate of citizen pressure. One of the essential challenges of this international meeting was to establish a multilateral cooperation framework for the post-2012 period that would coincide with the start of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

The conclusions after several meetings and sessions of delegates culminated in an agreed action plan under the Convention and a two-year road map. The Bali Action Plan consists of a set of decisions emanating from the Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention, initiated during the Montreal Conference (2005). The Bali Action Plan forms a coherent basis for negotiations with a view to adopting an “agreed outcome under the Convention”, an essential part of a climate regime for the post-2012 period.

A change in formulation was one of the most significant developments brought by the Bali Action Plan. For the first time, the terms “developed” and “developing” countries replaced the terms “Parties included in Annex I” and “non-Annex I Parties”. This innovation extended the perspective to new combinations and effort levels by the countries. Another major advance was the link established between the mitigation efforts of developing countries and the financial and technological support from developed countries.

The negotiation process opened up by the Bali Action Plan, that should have ended in 2009, only finally reached an end in 2012 in Doha. It is structured around five areas: shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, development and transfer of technology and financing.

• Mitigation: This issue was shown as one of the most thorny issues of COP13. Whilst the United States, Canada and other Parties favoured tough language on the actions and commitments of developing countries, the Group of 77 and China (G77+ China) sought greater emphasis on a discourse dealing more with the commitments of Annex I Parties, therefore of developed countries. Lastly, both views were taken into account and the Parties agreed to examine the option of taking:

  – For the developed countries: “measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally-appropriate mitigation commitments or initiatives, including quantified GHG emission limitation and reduction objectives”, taking into account differences in their national circumstances;

810. Decision 1/COP13
811. Decision 1/COP11
812. IISD, 2007, p. 16
813. Decision 1/COP13, para. 1(b)
For the developing countries: “nationwide appropriate mitigation actions (...) in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing resources and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner”.

- **Adaptation**: It was decided to boost the action for adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, mainly by examining international cooperation in order to achieve the urgent application of miscellaneous adaptation measures, given the immediate needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries, mainly the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the African countries.

- **Technology development and transfer**: The Bali Action Plan provides for reflecting on effective mechanisms to eliminate the obstacles of access by developing country Parties to environmentally sound technologies at affordable cost and facilitate their roll-out. The debates on these issues have mainly covered the financing of these technologies and the intellectual property rights. These issues are also discussed in other forums such as those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

- **Financing**: The mitigation measures of developing countries were linked for the first time in Bali to the financial and technological support provided by the developed countries. Financing is also envisaged to help developing countries to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The Bali Action Plan thus sets up the bases for the financial framework to support developing countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts.

**Copenhagen Accord (2009)**

The Copenhagen Conference (COP15) was intended to endorse the main components of a post-2012 climate regime using two negotiating processes, firstly under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and secondly under the Convention (AWG-LCA). The Parties nevertheless were unable to agree on establishing this regime, a situation conveying the failure of the Copenhagen negotiations. It must, however, be remembered that a political agreement in the form of a high-level declaration by a few States could be reached during the COP15, known as the Copenhagen Accord. On the day following the Copenhagen Conference, a total of 114 Parties stated their agreement. Although not binding, note that the Copenhagen Accord includes the two current principal GHG emitters, namely China and the United States.

The Accord underlines the political desire of States associated with it to address climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Noted by the COP15, the Copenhagen Accord

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814. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(c)
815. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(d)
816. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(e)
818. Decision 2/CP.15
Accord clarifies certain aspects of the negotiations, like the long-term GHG emission reduction targets and financing. The developed countries set themselves the goal of assembling collectively USD100 billion per year until 2020 to finance climate projects of developing countries. Lastly, this Accord served as the basis for negotiations leading to the Cancún Agreements and also those of the Paris Agreement.

Cancún Agreements (2010)
The Cancún Conference was held on 29 November-11 December 2010 and launched the bases for a new negotiating cycle under the UNFCCC. Despite the far more modest expectations than at the Copenhagen Conference, or perhaps because of it, the Cancún Conference resulted in a “balanced set” of decisions which the international community greeted with enthusiasm. The Cancún Agreements assembled the progress in Copenhagen into a formal agreement and sent a political signal to continue the discussions on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties associated themselves unanimously with this, with the exception of Bolivia.

The significant progress brought by the Cancún Agreements mainly consists of the creation of institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Adaptation Committee and the Technology Mechanism made up of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). Other progress made includes creating a register to facilitate support for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) and the launch of the REDD+, which aims at Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD), as well as the role of conservation, sustainable forest management and development of forest carbon reservoirs in developing countries (the “+” in REDD+). The Cancún Agreements also provide for the development of National Adaptation Plans (NAP), mainly for the least developed countries.819

Durban Platform (2011)
The Durban Conference (COP17) launched the process for negotiating a unique agreement under the UNFCCC, with the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This group has the mandate of implementing “a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”, which should enter into force and be applied no later than 2020. Also known as the Durban Platform, this process has made it possible to encourage long-term cooperation involving all the countries. It thus represents significant progress in the central question of whether the developed countries or the developing countries should make the effort. One of the goals of the Platform is “ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties”821.

819. Decision 1/CPI6, paras. 14-16.
820. Decision 1/CPI7, paras. 2 and 4.
821. Decision 1/CPI7, para. 7.
This progress was not achieved without difficulty. A few countries among the main GHG emitters—Canada, Russia and Japan in particular—refused to commit to a second commitment period\textsuperscript{822}, which provoked considerable controversy. However, by reaffirming the willingness of the Parties to reach agreement on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, the outcome of the Durban Conference was ultimately to strengthen trust between the Parties. It testifies to a universal political will to combat climate change with a constructive commitment by the most vulnerable countries and emerging countries. The initiative of China, which announced its willingness to commit to reducing its emissions from 2020 onwards under certain conditions, brought with it other emerging countries with significantly increasing GHG emissions, such as Brazil and South Africa.

Progress was also made at the Durban Conference on the topic of adaptation to climate change, with a framework and guidelines for the NAP created the previous year in Cancún\textsuperscript{823}. These aim to build up the capacities of developing countries, mainly the least developed and the most vulnerable countries, in terms of assessing and reducing their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.

**Doha Climate Gateway (2012)**

The United Nations Conference on Climate Change held in Doha (Qatar) in 2012 (COP18/CMP 8) was an opportunity for delegates to consolidate the progress made in the previous three years of international negotiations and opened the way to raising ambitions and multiplying efforts at all levels.

The Doha Climate Gateway, at outcome snatched at the last minute on the last evening of the Conference, refers to two major elements. Firstly, the adoption of the “Doha Amendment” to the Kyoto Protocol that records the second commitment period in it. This commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 2020. As at 15 October 2018, 117 Parties have ratified the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, a number that is still not enough for it to enter into force\textsuperscript{824}. The second element in the Doha Climate Gateway is the conclusion of negotiations under the Bali Action Plan of 2007. In Doha, the Parties finally disbanded the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA, whose mandates had been extended twice during the last three years of extended negotiations.

COP18 therefore allowed a certain streamlining of the UNFCCC negotiation process. The ADP, SBI and SBSTA henceforth formed the only three negotiation channels, compared with the five that existed in 2012. The Doha Decision reaffirms the ambition to adopt “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” by 2015. It also provides for a negotiation text to be available before May 2015.

\textsuperscript{822} Decision 1/CMP.7, Annex 1.
\textsuperscript{823} Decision 5/CP.17
\textsuperscript{824} Access the updated list [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=en (last consulted on 15 October 2018).
Warsaw Conference (2013)

Although the Warsaw Conference (COP19) proved insufficient in terms of climate urgency, it nevertheless produced a series of decisions which map out the route towards the Paris Conference. One of its advances was to clarify further the modalities for preparing the draft negotiation text for 2015 and for the submission process for the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) of the Parties to the UNFCCC825. The INDC indicate the voluntary efforts of countries in terms of climate change that could be included in the 2015 agreement. The term “contributions” adopted finally achieved consensus in the final minutes of the Warsaw negotiations. It nevertheless leaves major issues hanging, including the legal nature of these contributions, the differentiation between the countries based on their different levels of development and emission and financial support, technology transfer and capacity-building.

In addition, the Parties were invited in Warsaw to intensify their efforts to reduce the ambition gap for the pre-2020 period, by cancelling, for example, the certified emission reductions (CER)826.

The agreement on the CTCN rules, which marks its operationalisation, and on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage was a positive signal towards the implementation of the Cancún Agreements and the Durban and Doha decisions. REDD+ was also the subject of numerous decisions of a technical nature, which now form the “Warsaw Framework for REDD+”.

In addition, voluntary pledges for finance amounting to almost USD280 million were announced in Warsaw for the REDD+. A sum in total contrast to the sum the GCF could count on in December 2013, which was no more than USD 6.9 million. This figure greatly fuelled the loss of confidence among developed and developing countries, which deplored the 71% decrease in financing of climate-related activities in 2013827. To remedy this, a high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance was established in Warsaw, with meetings planned every two years until 2020. Guidelines for the GCF were also adopted to make it more operational828.

Lima Call for Climate Action and the road to Paris (2014)

On the final straight to Paris, the Lima Conference (COP20) took advantage of the outcomes of previous COP and managed to lay the bases for the future agreement of 2015. After extended negotiations, the Parties adopted in December 2014 “the Lima Call for Climate Action”, which contains especially in its annex a draft version of the future Paris agreement829. The Lima Call also states that the future agreement

825. Decision 1/CP.19
826. Decision 1/CP.19, para. 5(c)
827. IISD, 2013, p. 31
828. Decision 4/CP.19
829. Decision 1/CP.20, Annex
should give balanced consideration to six issues: mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, capacity-building and transparency of measures and support.

The document also includes a decision about the INDC. This sets out their scope, the data they can contain, the submission methods and measures to be taken by the Secretariat Convention bodies. The Parties are invited especially to include elements on adaptation and implementation resources. Lastly, they are asked to specify the reason why they believe their efforts to be fair and ambitious.

The Parties also adopted a set of decisions under the COP and CMP 10 that was held at the same time. These contribute among other things to the operationalisation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. They establish the Lima work programme on gender, with the results scheduled for review for 2016 during COP22. The Lima Ministerial Declaration on education and awareness-raising was also adopted during COP20. This aims to raise the awareness of children and the general public to the effects of climate change and encourage them to change their behaviour.

Progress on adaptation remained modest in Lima. Although many countries sought revised guidelines for the NAP, the COP saw no need for the review. In addition, the COP expressed its concern in Lima over the lack of funds to meet the needs of the LDC, and notably the deficit in the LDC Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which could support the NAP formulation and implementation process.

In addition, the Parties held a first annual high-level ministerial meeting aimed at reinforcing the implementation of measures identified under the work relating to the commitments for the pre-2020 period. In terms of financing, the Parties also held their first biennial ministerial meeting relating to the work programme on long term financing. Lastly, the first biennial reports and sixth national communications were assessed under the auspices of the SBI for the first time in Lima, with the assessment of seventeen developed countries.

The Paris Agreement, adoption of the first universal climate agreement (2015)

During COP21, in Paris, the Parties adopted the first “universal” climate agreement, bringing together all Parties to the UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, which are aimed at operationalising it, enabled real progress to be made with regard to global issues (for a more detailed description, see Section II.B).
In addition to including all the Parties to the UNFCCC, a certain number of issues were reaffirmed and/or confirmed, such as mitigation and market mechanisms, and also adaptation, loss and damage, financing, technology transfer, capacity-building, and the recognition of the role and necessary involvement of all players in combating global warming, and all this through the prism of monitoring implementation and transparency, with a view to achieving the targets.

At the end of COP21, the Parties agreed to implement a real long-term programme, a particular feature of which is the target henceforth set in a legally-binding instrument of limiting the global temperature increase to “well below 2°C”, even to 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. The fundamental principles of the Convention and of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities were reaffirmed.

One of the main innovations emerging from Paris is the introduction of nationally determined contributions (NDC), i.e. the commitments established in sovereign fashion and determined freely by the States constituting their national climate targets, which must be renewed every five years and always upwards. From 2023, global progress in climate action will be reviewed through a “global stocktake” which will subsequently take place in five year cycles. This global stocktake will not only review progress and mitigation efforts deployed, but will also take into account other crucial elements provided for by the Agreement, such as adaptation or the means of implementation and support (financing, technology, etc.).

Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the programme of negotiations provided for by Decision 1/CP.21, with the annexed Agreement, outlines a certain number of elements for its operationalisation and application, planned initially for 2020. This work is split between the permanent subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA), which also serve the Paris Agreement, and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA). This is an ad hoc negotiating body for preparing for the entry into force and operationalisation of the Agreement by developing draft decisions that the COP will recommend to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) for review and adoption at its first session, once the Agreement has entered into force. The APA has been holding its sessions at the same time as the sessions of the subsidiary bodies since 2016.

**Marrakech: the “Action Conference”**

COP22 was held in Marrakech on 7-18 November 2016. Announced as the “Action Conference” following the adoption of the Paris Agreement the previous year, it plotted the path for the operationalisation of the goals set in Paris. The keen interest surrounding the event was boosted by the unprecedented speed with which the Agreement entered into force, on 4 November 2016, just a few days before the start of COP22. In accordance with this, the Marrakech Conference also included the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1).
The Parties adopted over thirty decisions at the end of this Conference, mainly relating to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement. The following advances were made possible by the decisions of the Parties (non-exhaustive): the Adaptation Fund should serve the Agreement, the definition of the mandate of the Paris Committee on capacity-building (PCCB) and the launch of the process for identifying information to be provided by the developed countries in their biennial financial communications. Also, 2018 was set as the deadline for defining implementation modalities of the Paris Agreement (constituted by the work programme of the Paris Agreement as set out in Decision 1/CP.21) and their adoption by CMA 1. Other cross-cutting themes for the implementation of the Agreement were defined, for example developing the 2018 Facilitation dialogue or enhancing pre-2020 action.

COP22 was also an opportunity to enhance the visibility of climate governance and environmental multilateralism on the international stage, with the adoption of two political decisions: the “Marrakech Proclamation” affirming the commitment of the Parties to continue implementing goals set and the “Marrakech Partnership” that fixes a programme of actions for the period 2017-2020 by recognising the essential role that the non-Party stakeholders should play in global climate action and sustainable development alongside States.

Although the Conference failed to return concrete results on a number of key elements on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, it did serve to understand better the viewpoints of Parties and move the talks forward on a large number of questions. Not lastly that a shadow was cast over COP22: the announcement that the candidate Donald Trump had won the United States Presidential election during the Conference. During his campaign, Trump had indicated clearly that he would withdraw from the Paris Agreement if elected. For a certain number of observers and delegates, fears over the ambition of international climate action rose to the surface, mainly in terms of the impact on financing or, inter alia, achieving the mitigation goals in line with the issues during the pre-2020 period.
Bonn Conference under Fijian Presidency: the “Transition Conference”

COP23 was held in Bonn under Fijian Presidency on 6-17 November 2017. It also included the 13th session of the CMP (CMP 13) and the second session of the first part of the CMA (CMA 1.2), the 47th sessions of the permanent subsidiary bodies (SBI 47 and SBSTA 47) and the fourth part of the first session of the APA (APA 1.4).

Overall, the Bonn Conference under Fijian Presidency was technical in nature and constituted a “Transition Conference” towards 2018, a step in the main negotiating cycle in progress, with the adoption of the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement. This Conference was also transitional in the sense that one of the main goals of the Fijian Presidency was to assess efforts deployed and prepare the next deadlines until 2020, whilst enhancing the climate ambitions and efforts in the pre-2020 period.

As such, one of COP23 priorities was to finalise preparations for the Facilitative Dialogue and design its modalities. At the end of COP23, this was renamed the Talanoa Dialogue (reflecting a process of inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue in the tradition of the Pacific islands), deciding that it would be structured around three questions: Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there? COP23 decided that the Talanoa Dialogue would be launched on 1 January 2018 and divided in the same year into two phases, called “technical” and “political”, and would conclude at COP24. It was also decided that the non-Party stakeholders (cities, regions, businesses, investors and other actors in the civil society) would be able to contribute to this dialogue. In parallel with COP24, the political phase marks the culminating point of the Dialogue processes and should take stock of the collective efforts to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and give indications for the preparation of the next NDC communication/revision cycle.

At the end of the Conference, the Parties adopted a total of 31 decisions, including 24 and seven under the COP and CMP respectively. For the vast majority of them, the COP decisions moved the work on the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by 2018 forward. The decision entitled “Fiji Momentum for Implementation”, for example, urged the Parties to continue the efforts in this context. The same decision contains many provision, especially relating to the Talanoa Dialogue (its modalities are annexed to the Decision), the implementation and enhancing of the ambition level by 2020, recalling mainly the goal of mobilising USD100 billion annually in favour of developing countries or the importance of

843. IISD, 2017a
844. Talanoa Dialogue – Annex II to Decision 1/CP.23.
845. See [online] https://cop23.com.fj/talanoa-dialogue/
846. See [online] https://unfccc.int/decisions?f%5B0%5D=conference%3A4100
847. Decision 1/CP.23
ratifying the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, but also deciding to organise at both COP24 and COP25 an “assessment of the implementation and ambition level by 2020”.

More globally, COP23 made operational the platform of local communities and indigenous peoples848, introduced an action plan for gender equality849 (see Section I.15), adopted a “historical” decision on agriculture through the “Koronivia joint work on agriculture”850 (see Section I.16) and continued the work on climate financing851 (see Section I.9). COP23 also set out guidelines for the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts852.

From the point of view of non-Party stakeholders, COP23 was also an occasion to reaffirm their ambition to participate in global climate action (see section I.13). Note, for example, that COP23 welcomed for the first time an Open Dialogue between Parties and other stakeholders on 8 November 2017853, which will be carried forward to Katowice. COP23 also allowed activities relating to the Global Climate Action Plan to continue and also non-Party stakeholders to make parallel commitments. In this respect, note especially the adoption of the Bonn-Fiji Commitment of local and regional leaders by more than three hundred subnational signatory governments to enhance climate ambition in achieving the Paris Agreement goals.

Conclusions and opening: From the Fiji/Bonn Conference to the Katowice Conference

Between the Fiji/Bonn Conference and the Katowice Conference, the Parties have continued work on the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement, first and foremost through the negotiating intersession of April-May 2018, hosting the 48th sessions of the subsidiary bodies (SBI 48 and SBSTA 48), and the first part of the first session of the APA (APA 1.5)854. Faced with the extent of the work programme to formulate the necessary draft decisions for Katowice, an additional negotiating session was organised on 4-9 September 2018 in Bangkok (Thailand), bringing together once more the subsidiary bodies to continue on from their previous sessions (SBI 48.2 and SBSTA 48.2) and the APA for the sixth part of its first session (APA 1.6)855.

848. Decision 2/CP.23
849. Decision 3/CP.23
850. Decision 4/CP.23
852. Decision 5/CP.23
855. https://unfccc.int/sb48-2
At the end of the session, the Secretariat published a compilation of 307 pages, which takes stock of the status of the negotiations related to the work programme of the Paris Agreement and offers an overall viewpoint on all elements from the talks under the aegis of the various negotiation bodies. Although it forms an initial solid base for the Katowice negotiations, this document nevertheless still does not bring out clear options on many elements, thereby creating a real challenge for Katowice. Negotiators and delegates will only have a few days in Katowice to finalise draft decisions and submit them to the COP which should recommend them to the CMA for review and adoption.

Faced with a persistent lack of precision and rationalisation, the Parties mandated the APA, SBSTA and SBI joint presiding officers to prepare a “joint concept note” on progress made and the identification of means of progressing, this time containing proposed texts, for publication in mid-October 2018. This was yet another key stage in facilitating the Katowice negotiations.

To reduce the time pressures at Katowice, it was decided to start the Conference on Sunday, 2 December 2018, a day before the date planned initially, as the available time could then be used to finalise the negotiations under the Paris Agreement work programme. This early opening has also been supplemented by formal preparatory meetings prior to the Conference. The pre-session preparatory meetings are planned as follows:

- 26-27 November 2018: Least Developed Countries (LDC)
- 28-29 November 2018: Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
- 28-29 November 2018: African Group
- 30 November – 1 December 2018: Group of 77 and China (G77/China)

III.B. Structure of the Convention and description of the role and mandate of its main bodies and ad hoc groups

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) comprises many bodies. Some make decisions, others play a consultative role and several are allocated to precise issues. The flow chart below lists the different bodies. The following table describes each one briefly.

856. UNFCCC, 2018b
III.B.1. Structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Figure 32. Concept diagram of the Convention structure

858 © Guide to the Negotiations of the COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018, according to the IPCC.
Table. Bodies formed under the Convention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-making bodies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference of the Parties (COP)</td>
<td>The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention. It is an association of all country Parties to the Convention. The COP reviews the implementation of the Convention and considers the commitments of Parties in the light of the Convention goal, new scientific discoveries and experience accumulated in implementing policies to combat climate change. The COP meets in annual ordinary sessions, unless the Parties decide otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference of Parties acting as the meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)</td>
<td>The CMP is the supreme decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. It has also met every year since its entry into force. Parties discuss the implementation, execution and effectiveness of the Protocol at these meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)</td>
<td>The CMA is the supreme decision-making body of the Paris Agreement. It initiated its first session in November 2016 which is scheduled to end in December 2018, at the same time as COP24, with the adoption of the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subsidiary bodies common to the COP, CMP and CMA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)</td>
<td>Advises the COP, CMP and CMA on scientific and technical issues which are specific to or shared by them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)</td>
<td>Advises the COP, CMP and CMA on improving the effective application of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist bodies created by virtue of the COP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology mechanism comprising the following two components:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Executive Committee (TEC)</td>
<td>Seeks to carry out the application of the framework for implementing meaningful and effective actions to enhance the transfer of or access to technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)</td>
<td>Facilitates the establishment of a network of organisations, initiatives and national, regional, sectoral and international technology networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Committee on Finance (SCF)</td>
<td>Helps the COP to carry out its functions relating to the Convention’s financial mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation Committee (AC)</td>
<td>Promotes the implementation of enhanced action for adaptation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee of the Warsaw international mechanism on loss and damage (WIM)</td>
<td>Addresses loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, in particular extreme weather events and phenomena that are gradual, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB)</td>
<td>Provided for by the Paris Agreement to address gaps and meet needs, both current and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing country Parties and further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard to coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities. The Committee’s mandate was adopted during COP22 in Marrakech. The Committee met for the first time in May 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum on the impact of response measures&lt;sup&gt;859&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Helps the countries concerned to deal with the impacts of response measures that have been implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ad hoc working groups created by virtue of the COP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)</td>
<td>Prepares for the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by developing draft decisions that the COP will recommend to the CMA for consideration and adoption at its first session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist expert groups created by virtue of the COP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Group of Experts on national communications of non-Annex I Parties (CGE)</td>
<td>Assists the non-Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC in preparing their national communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LDCEG)</td>
<td>Advises the least developed countries on preparing and implementing NAP plans, among other things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist bodies of the CMP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)</td>
<td>Ensures the effective implementation and correct operation of the CDM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JI)</td>
<td>Spearheads the implementation and verification of the JI in the Annex I countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Committee</td>
<td>Is responsible for guaranteeing compliance with commitments and supports the Parties finding it difficult to comply with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. This committee includes a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist body of the CMA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance with the provisions of the Agreement Paris</td>
<td>Should be made up of twelve experts focused on facilitation and operation in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner. The APA should submit the modalities of the committee to the CMA during COP24, in 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination body</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of the UNFCCC</td>
<td>It supports the application of the Convention. It coordinates and organises the meetings of the various bodies and provides technical expertise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>859</sup> Work programme overseen by subsidiary bodies
III.B.2. Description of the role and mandate of the main decision-making bodies

The Conference of the Parties (COP), the supreme body of the Convention, brings together those countries which, by signing and ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have become Parties to this Convention. As such, the COP aims to implement the ultimate Convention objective.

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) is a totally separate legal entity from the COP and is the supreme decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. The CMP includes the sub-group of Parties to the Convention which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties to the Protocol alone have the right to participate in decisions made by the CMP.

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) is the highest authority of the Paris Agreement. It assembles all Parties to the Convention which, having signed and ratified the Paris Agreement, have become Parties to this Agreement.

The Bureau of the COP and the Bureau of the CMP administer the intergovernmental process for the COP and for the CMP. The UNFCCC Secretariat coordinates and organises the meetings of the various bodies and provides technical expertise.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are two partner organisations of the UNFCCC and play a key role in the process. The GEF has been in existence since 1991 and was named as the entity responsible for administering UNFCCC funds earmarked to help developing countries. The IPCC helps establish the scientific base by publishing climate change assessment reports and specialist studies on specific topics.

III.B.3. Description of the role and mandate of the main ad hoc working groups

The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) is mandated to advise the COP, CMP and CMA on improving the effective application of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) is tasked with advising the COP, CMP and CMA on scientific and technological issues which are specific to or shared by them.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) is tasked with preparing for the entry into force and operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by developing draft decisions that the Conference of the Parties will recommend to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris
Agreement (CMA) for review and adoption following its first session\textsuperscript{860}, which should end at the conclusion of COP24 (December 2018). It has been holding its sessions at the same time as the sessions of the subsidiary bodies since 2016.

Note that the SBI and SBSTA are permanent bodies whilst the APA is an \textit{ad hoc} group.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Description of the role and mandate of the closed ad hoc working groups}
\end{center}

With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties embarked on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Two \textit{ad hoc} working groups were set up in 2005 and 2007 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved an Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP – set up in 2005 in parallel with the dialogue on long-term cooperation), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA – set up in 2007), which constituted a specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)}\textsuperscript{861}. This group was established in 2005 to facilitate the negotiations on the commitments of developed countries (parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC) for the second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. These negotiations covered new GHG emission reduction targets and how to achieve them, for example market mechanisms\textsuperscript{862}.
  \item \textbf{Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA)}. The Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention was initiated in 2005 during the Montreal Conference (COP11). It aimed to enhance the implementation of the Convention, mainly by making it easier to analyse cooperation approaches in respect of sustainable development, adaptation and technological potential. At the end of this two-year dialogue uniting all the Parties to the Convention a new subsidiary body, the AWG-LCA, was created in Bali in December 2007\textsuperscript{863}. Its mandate was to complete successfully, in two years, a process to enable the effective application of the Convention through long-term cooperation action.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{860} Decision 1/CP.21, para. 11.
\textsuperscript{861} By virtue of Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol, following Decision 1/CMP.1, Study of paragraph 9 of Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol on the commitments of the Annex I Parties for the following periods
\textsuperscript{862} The Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B is a list of Parties which have made quantified commitments to reducing or limiting GHG emissions
\textsuperscript{863} Decision 1/CP.13

Continued on page 263
The mandate of both these working groups, scheduled to end in Copenhagen in 2009, was extended until the Doha Conference (2012).

A new working group then took up the reins:

- **Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)**\(^{864}\) Set up in Durban in 2011, the ADP started its work in 2012. Its mandate was to develop for 2015 a protocol, another legal instrument or a mutually-agreed text with legal force, developed by virtue of the Convention and applicable to all the Parties. This should enter into force and be implemented in 2020. It was also tasked with studying measures to compensate for the lack of pre-2020 ambition level in terms of the 2°C objective.

The decision to create the Durban Platform marked the start of a new and significant chapter in the collective effort by Parties to combat climate change. After difficult discussions since Copenhagen in 2009, the Durban Platform initiated a more inclusive climate regime transcending the traditional lines separating until then the groups of so-called “developed” and “developing” countries. Its work was terminated at the end of the first week of the COP in Paris, when the working group submitted the draft Paris Agreement to the COP presidency.

### III.C. Presentation and positions of different negotiating groups

#### III.C.1. Presentation of the main negotiating groups

#### 1.1. Introduction to the main negotiating groups

Every Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement can be represented at the sessions organised under the auspices of the Convention, its ancillary legal instruments and their constituted bodies by a national delegation made up of one or more civil servants and experts accredited to represent and negotiate on behalf of their government.

The climate change negotiation process revolves around regional groups and negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are defined by the official United Nations classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests.

#### 1.1.1. United Nations Regional Groups

Depending on the organisation method instigated within the United Nations, the various negotiating Parties are split into five regional groups included in the list below, which mainly serve during elections of the bureau\(^{865}\) of governing bodies\(^{866}\):

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864. Decision 1/CP.17
865. The members of the Bureau are elected from representatives of different regional groups and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).
• Africa;
• Latin America and the Caribbean;
• Asia and the Pacific Region;
• Eastern Europe;
• Western Europe and “Others”.

Apart from the African countries, that gather in a group that also acts as negotiating coalition (see below, the African Group), the member countries of other regional groups negotiate within strategic alliances through formal and less formal (ad hoc) coalitions to state their positions and serve their interests in the negotiations. As stated previously, the negotiating coalitions are political and strategic alliances, set up on the basis of common interests.

### 1.1.2. Negotiation coalitions

During negotiations, the voices or positions of countries are ideally carried on behalf of a negotiation coalition (common group position) or failing that on behalf of their government (national position). The next paragraphs distinguish between the formal and less formal coalitions among the most important and most strategic in the current method of organisation of climate change negotiations.

### 1.2. Formal negotiating groups

**African Group of Negotiators (AGN) or African Group**

The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) is the only regional group that operates as a genuine negotiation coalition. It comprises 54 member countries that share miscellaneous concerns such as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the fight against poverty. The Group currently makes common declarations, mainly on questions relating to adaptation, transfer of technologies, capacity-building, transparency and financing, all of which are central to the implementation of ambitious climate actions for the countries represented within the AGN. The group’s presidency rotates between the five African sub-regions (North, East, Centre, West and South). It changes every two years to ensure the greatest possible continuity and stability. Currently, up to December 2019, Egypt has the presidency, having succeeded Mali on behalf of the West African region.

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867. These “Others” include Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States.

868. Formal or Informal is used in this case in accordance with the recognition of the group by the United Nations System in the majority of UN negotiating forums. As an example, the informal groups do not name/elect representatives in the groups formed under the UNFCCC.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) is a group of island States that are active as a coalition in both the United Nations negotiations and under the UNFCCC. For the first time, in 1992, the SIDS was recognised as a group of developing countries in its own right, in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in Rio de Janeiro.

Most SIDS\(^{870}\) also belong to the Group of 77 and China (G77 + China) and nine are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC)\(^{871}\). Bahrain is the only small island State member of the United Nations that does not belong to SIDS.

Least Developed Countries (LDC)
The LDC\(^{872}\) are low income countries confronted by heavy structural obstacles that affect their legitimate ambition to pursue and achieve sustainable development. They have few human resources and are highly vulnerable to economic, climate and environmental shocks. There are currently 47 countries\(^{873}\) classed in the LDC list which was updated by the United Nations in 2017\(^{874}\) following the graduation of Equatorial Guinea (2017) three years after that of Samoa in 2014. Also active as a negotiation coalition at the United Nations in New York, the LDC are very active in international climate change negotiations, working together to defend their interests relating to the recognition of their particular vulnerability and their need for support in scheduling their adaptation. The UNFCCC thus recognises in its Article 4, paragraph 8, the \textit{“specific needs”} and \textit{“special situation”} of the LDC, given that they are the least capable of facing up to the impacts of climate change.

Group of 77 + China (G-77 + China)\(^{875}\)
This is a free and heterogeneous alliance of developing countries, formed in 1964 under the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The developing countries normally work via the G-77 + China to establish common negotiating positions. G-77 + China is today active in the entire United Nations system. Currently comprising 134 members, the group is governed by the country occupying the presidency in New York under an annual rotation system\(^{876}\). China is an associate member rather than a full member of the G-77. The group tries to develop a common position on the main negotiation topics. A majority group in the negotiations and representing approximately 85\% of the world’s population,

\(^{871}\) http://unohrrls.org/about-sids/country-profiles.  
\(^{872}\) http://www.ldc-climate.org/.  
\(^{873}\) 33 in Africa, thirteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean.  
\(^{875}\) http://www.g77.org  
\(^{876}\) Egypt took over the presidency of the G-77 + China for 1 January-31 December 2018.
the G-77 + China supports in particular the economic interests of its members on a variety of issues within the United Nations. However, given that the G-77 + China constitutes a diversified group with different strategic interests and socio-economic development priorities, its members can speak during the debates individually, or in other coalitions or regional groups that are found within the G-77 + China, and sometimes adopt diverging positions. Maintaining group unit is still a major challenge. Given their huge diversity on several points of view, the G-77/China member countries also sometimes adopt diverging positions during the climate change negotiations, which they then defend via another negotiation coalition or regional group such as the AGN, SIDS, group of LDC, etc.

**European Union (EU)**

The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union of 28 member countries\(^{877}\). The EU represents its member countries. As a regional economic integration organisation, the EU is itself a Party to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol\(^{878}\) and the Paris Agreement, without however having a separate voting right from that of its individual member countries. Despite some internal differences, the EU member countries manage to coordinate, adopt a common position and speak with a single voice during climate change negotiations. To achieve this, the 28 EU member States meet in a closed circle prior to the sessions of talks to agree on common negotiating positions. The country holding the EU presidency\(^{879}\) – which rotates every six months – thus speaks for the EU and its 28 member States.

**Umbrella Group**

The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the EU. Formed following the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, it comes from the JUSSCANNZ group\(^{880}\) and is active in all United Nations forums, including international climate change negotiations within UNFCCC. The composition of the group is not always the same. The normal list is Australia, Canada, United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine. Other countries join the group periodically in a timely fashion depending on the topics addressed.

**Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**

The EIG was formed in 2002 by members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Mexico and South Korea. It has

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877. Despite Brexit, the United Kingdom remains so far a full member of the EU and the resulting rights and obligations continue to apply fully to this state and its territory.  
878. Initially as the European Economic Community  
879. The Presidency of the EU Council is held by Austria from July to December 2018.  
880. JUSSCANNZ is an acronym for Japan, United States of America, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand.
subsequently been joined by Monaco and Liechtenstein. Mexico and South Korea are rare OECD members that are not included in Annex I Parties to UNFCCC. Member countries are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland. Given the complexity and negotiating issues, other strategic negotiating coalitions are formed around questions of common concern.

1.3. Informal negotiating groups

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) unites small island and low-lying coastal countries sharing development problems and similar concerns in terms of environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. AOSIS groups 44 States and observers from all oceans and all regions of the world: Africa, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, Pacific and South China Sea. Thirty-nine are members of the United Nations, nearly 28% of developing countries and 20% of UN members (Niue which is classed as a Small Developed Island State and the Cook Islands are not full members of the United Nations). The AOSIS member States work together mainly through their New York diplomatic missions to the UN. AOSIS functions on the basis of consultation and consensus. The main political decisions are made during plenary sessions at ambassador level. The Alliance has no official charter, nor does it have a regular budget or secretariat. The Permanent Representative of the Maldives is the current president and AOSIS operates, as under previous presidencies, out of the Chairman’s Mission to the United Nations.

Coalition for Rainforest Nations

This coalition was formed originally in 2005, under the initiative of Papua New Guinea. The ultimate aim of this coalition is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions due to deforestation. The composition of this coalition has varied over time. It includes around 52 countries from Africa, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, Asia and Oceania. Its members do not always speak with the same voice and sometimes make a statement on behalf of certain among them only.

BASIC Group

BASIC is a group of countries made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the Copenhagen Conference (COP15). After the meeting, BASIC published a
series of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, in particular a second commitment period for developed countries by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol and scaled-up financing for the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to coordinate its positions and to develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important emerging countries that count among the large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor in international climate negotiations.

**Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)**

CACAM groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I Parties with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Given that these countries are not included in Annex I to the Convention and the lack of clarity within UNFCCC on the definition of “developing countries,” the CACAM countries stand out through this coalition in which they do not view themselves as developing countries. They rarely take a common stance on other issues.

**Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)**

ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation of the socialist countries of Latin America and the Caribbean aiming to promote cooperation in these areas and offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated by the United States. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, representing a hub of six countries, namely Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on the principle that developed countries must demonstrate ambitious action in global efforts to combat climate change.

**Like Minded Group of States (LMDC)**

The LMDC is a spontaneous coalition of countries created during the Bonn Conference on climate change in May 2012. It is part of the G-77 + China and aims to reinforce and unify this group. The LMDC is made up of several countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active South American Parties, especially Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba, and African Parties (Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.). Also called “Developing countries

885. SEI, 2010
887. www.alianzabolivariana.org ; and www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/Article
with similar views”, this coalition is also found in other international forums, especially the World Trade Organisation. It is a group of States uniting around a very strong central position on major questions for developing countries, mainly equity and respect for the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

**Arab Group**

The Arab Group is made up of 22 member States from the League of Arab States, namely Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Mauritania, Somalia, Palestinian Authority, Djibouti and the Comoros. The contours of this coalition are well defined inasmuch as its members have been accustomed to working together since 1945 as a pressure group towards international institutions under the name of the League of Arab States (commonly called the Arab League). Their positions in the climate negotiations are regularly and carefully coordinated, often by Saudi Arabia, and are expressed and pronounced through speeches in plenary sessions or simply during negotiating sessions. They hold regular preparatory meetings at the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo prior to the UNFCCC negotiating sessions.

**Climate Vulnerability Forum**

The Climate Vulnerability Forum is an international partnership of countries that are highly vulnerable to global warming. The forum serves as a South-South cooperation platform for participating governments to act together in the face of global climate change. The CVF met for the first time near Malé, in the Maldives, in November 2009 and was attended by Heads of State, Ministers and other Heads of Government representing countries threatened by climate change worldwide. Since then, it has applied itself to reinforcing the cooperation, knowledge and awareness of climate problems. During the high-level CVF meeting held during COP21 (Paris, 2015), the Declaration of Manila-Paris and the CVF road map 2016-2018 were adopted. This calls especially for 100% renewable energy production by 2050. This commitment was reaffirmed at COP22 (Marrakech, 2016), during which the member countries confirmed their desire to attempt, among other things, to achieve maximum resilience and achieve as quickly as possible 100% renewable energy production at national scale. The rotating presidency of the Forum has been held by the Maldives, Kiribati, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Philippines and Ethiopia. The Marshall Islands currently hold the presidency.

Lastly, note that several other groups or formal and informal coalitions work together to defend their common interest under the international climate change negotiations within UNFCCC. These include the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Cartagena Dialogue and the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC – see below) to cite the most active.

888. https://thecvf.org/about/.
III.C.2. Positions of the main negotiating groups

As discussed in the previous part introducing the main negotiating groups, several countries take part in the climate negotiations within groups or coalitions that, in most cases, constitute strategic alliances. These groups therefore bring together countries with common interests to promote under these negotiations. This part therefore explores a few topics of common interest around which the main, most active coalitions are organised within the negotiations under the UNFCCC processes.

**African Group**

Africa is unusual in that it defends a common position carried by the African Group of Negotiators, which is nevertheless decided and adopted by their Ministers for Environment during African Ministerial Conferences on the Environment and the Committee of African Heads of State and Governments on Climate Change. This particular feature must be underlined as normally the geographical distribution of groups does not suggest a common position, given that the Parties are free to belong to one or several groups presenting a common position. The group emphasises the flexibility to be granted to Africa given that it is recognised as the most vulnerable continent to climate change\(^ {889} \), the historical responsibility and leadership of developed countries, the importance of developed countries providing the developing countries with support for mitigation and adaptation\(^ {890} \), financing issues, transfer of technology and capacity-building.

To ensure the completion of the Paris Agreement work programme, the group has put forward the need to discuss a new long-term financing goal for 2025 and modalities on the biennial communications in the agenda items for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA). The group also requests the developed countries to provide total support to the developing countries for the formulation, implementation and updating of adaptation communications as a component of nationally determined contributions (NDC), in order to take account of information on the needs of developing countries and related costs, including the support required to implement adaptation measures through grants. Still on financial issues, the group is pressing for more visibility and transparency regarding the financial resources that have to be mobilised and provided to the developing countries, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 9.5 and 9.7 of the Paris Agreement. The African Group insists that the facilitative dialogue should also address the question of emissions prior to 2020 by calling on the developed countries to find the means to plug the gap, mainly financial, to achieve 8 gigatonnes fewer emissions, through initiatives and programmes among other things, in order to prevent the burden weighing on the developing countries after 2020.

**Small Island Developing States (SIDS)**

Since its creation in 1990, the group defends the special case of its extreme vulnerability to the rise in ocean levels. This vulnerability, reinforced by climate change

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889. African Group, 2016b
890. African Group, 2017
with increasingly visible and hazardous impacts, has exacerbated in recent years the positions of island States belonging to this coalition during climate negotiations. One major objective is especially to conclude a binding agreement on the setting up of a mechanism that compensates for losses caused by global warming, addition to the fixed goal, which should become binding, of a target limiting global warming to 1.5°C above the pre-industrial era by the end of the century. The aim is to limit the already predictable and catastrophic impacts of climate change.

**Least Developed Countries (LDC)**

Today this is a group of 47 Parties to the Convention including the countries that are the most economically disadvantaged and also the most vulnerable in terms of climate and environment. Since 2001, these countries have been acting in consultation via the Group of LDC in the negotiations under the UNFCCC. In the negotiating process that led to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the group strongly supported a path to limit the temperature to 1.5°C and the need to agree on binding provisions. Although the group makes little contribution to GHG emissions, it has always shown its willingness to ensure that all parties make an ambitious contribution to limiting emissions and implement climate change decisions.

**G-77 + China**

The name G-77 + China tends to underline the particular position of China in relation to the whole group, mainly its position as an industrialised developing country. The diverging interests within the group often make consensus impossible and push the Parties more to express their positions and submissions through sub-groups. The position of the G-77 + China hinges on calling on developed countries to be at the forefront in combating climate change and its negative impacts. The G-77 + China mainly urges the signatory Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to ratify the Doha Amendment, also with a view to enhanced ambition pre-2020. More globally, the group calls for an increase in ambition for the pre-2020 period. Given their level of socio-economic development and poverty eradication priorities, the group underlines the importance of financial support and its transparency. In this context, the goal of clarifying the mechanisms for achieving the financial goal of USD100 billion by 2020 is central, in particular in terms of adaptation targets. It also insists on the question of the transfer of technology. Lastly, the G-77 + China wishes the developed countries to increase their goal of mobilising USD100 billion a year from 2020 onwards, to achieve a new, more ambitious goal in 2025 at the latest (100 billion should be a threshold for this new target to be reached), as approved in the finance section of Decision 1/CP.21.

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891. LDC Group, 2015
893. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 53
European Union (EU)

The 28 members of the Union adopt a common position during negotiations, whereby the emerging developing countries should commit to reducing emissions, in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement, and thus contribute substantially to emissions reduction in the pre-2020 period. It also insists on building adaptation capacities.

Umbrella Group

Heterogeneous group made up of developed countries. The group takes the position that the reduction of GHG emissions to reach the target of maintaining the temperature below the bar of 2°C should result from efforts by all Parties, including through contributions from developing countries. Similarly, the group puts forward that the GHG communication and accounting requirements should be identical for all countries. In this respect, the group puts forward that the historical emission levels should therefore not be taken into account to determine the level of ambition for the reduction; this should rather be based on the current level of accumulated emissions. Note that the group's position has been weakened by the wish expressed by the United States to leave the Paris Agreement, even if many observers hope that a solution to resolve the crisis will be found.

Environmental Integrity Group

The only group with both developing and developed country members, it seeks to facilitate rapprochements between the negotiating Parties by constructing gateways with other groups. Its positions are often close to the EU positions. For COP21, the group favoured a binding yet fair agreement for the developing countries. Regarding the implementation of the Paris Agreement, mainly the means of implementation, the group takes a more qualified position with especially the reservation of Switzerland over the allocation of additional financial resources for the developing countries. The group's position is also mixed over the level of ambition of NDC. During the negotiations, it regularly defends the fact that developed countries cannot provide aid without comprehensive mitigation actions by developing countries, especially when this involves financial resources.

ALBA

The group's analyses and positions are founded on the view that climate change results from a capitalist economic model that favours a predatory development model towards natural resources and the environment. The ALBA position is based on the premise that the developed countries are historically responsible for climate change and must therefore reduce their emissions drastically and pay their “climate change...
“debt” to the developing countries. The developed countries should furthermore provide the financial and technical resources to the developing countries to support their adaptation and mitigation efforts and forest restoration and conservation. It is fundamental for this group that any action to combat climate change is founded on the vision of global peoples and organisations, not on a capitalist vision of private and multinational companies.

**Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)**

With eight member States\(^{896}\), it was formed during COP18 (Doha, 2012). Its has a progressive vision and expects from developed countries an up-front commitment on reducing emissions and financial support that must condition the implementation of a low-carbon development strategy\(^ {897}\). It is one of the results of the Cartagena Dialogue initiated by Costa Rica in 2011 and bringing both developing and developed countries together, informally, during its sessions.

**Like Minded Group of States (LMDC)**

The coalition created in 2012 by some 25 States or more, all members of the G-77 + China, are grouped around a perception of climate change and international measures to address it as a brake to the socio-economic development of members of this group. The demographic weight of this group is considerable as it includes over half the world population. The position of the group turns on the fact that the developed countries must set an example and play a pioneering role in terms of mitigation, in compliance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. They must also support adaptation efforts, provide a financial contribution and transfers of technologies to avoid impeding the development of countries making up the group.

**Arab Group**

With its 22 member countries, including a large number that also belongs to the LMDC – which explains that the positions of the two groups are often similar –, the Arab Group emphasis the negative impacts of measures to combat climate change on their economies. It believes that the developed countries should therefore make a substantial financial contribution to the collective effort.

**BASIC Group**

Representing the acronym for Brazil, South Africa, India and China, this group saw the light of day in November 2009 just before COP15. The goal was to coordinate their efforts and harmonise their positions before the negotiations that culminated in the Copenhagen Accord. BASIC insists that it is a coalition within the G-77 +

\(^{896}\) Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Peru.
\(^{897}\) AILAC, 2015.
China and not a negotiating group. The group tends to defend the position of the block of emerging countries within G-77 + China. The group takes the position that any flexibility in the context of negotiations must be extended to all developing countries without distinction. The group has campaigned for limiting the increase in temperature to 2°C, unlike the developing countries who sought a more ambitious limit set below 1.5°C. The group insists on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities, differentiation between developed and developing countries and the lead role that developed countries must play.
Annexes

A.1. Themed sheets

Sheet 1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry into force</th>
<th>21 March 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratification status</td>
<td>197 Parties(^{898}), including 196 countries and the European Union (EU)(^{899})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme decision-making body:</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties (COP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main objective

[Article 2]: “[..] stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”

UNFCCC Annexes

- Annex I – List of 41 Parties, including the EEC\(^ {900}\): developed countries and countries with economies in transition\(^ {901}\);
- Annex II – List of 24 Parties, including the EEC\(^ {902}\): developed countries members of OECD included in Annex I, excluding countries with economies in transition\(^ {903}\);
- The Parties not included in Annex I are essentially developing countries; the least developed countries (LDC) classified as such by the United Nations receive special attention under the Convention\(^ {904}\).

Commitment of the Parties

- All Parties: for example, prepare a national greenhouse gas emission inventory, implement mitigation programmes and adaptation actions, offer cooperative support in technological research and dissemination and facilitate the education and awareness of the general public (Article 4.1).
- Annex I Parties: mainly, implement national policies to mitigate climate change and weaken emissions in the long term (Article 4.2).
- Annex II Parties: support developing countries financially and technically, mainly by helping to prepare their national communications, easing their adaptation to climate change and encouraging access to technologies (Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5).

Useful links

- Convention website: www.unfccc.int
- Convention text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf

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899. The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
900. EU today
902. EU today
903. Originally 25, but Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered into force on 28 June 2002, in accordance with Decision 26/CP.7
# Sheet 2. Kyoto Protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry into force</th>
<th>16 February 2005</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>192 Parties(^{905}), including the EU(^{906}); five Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification status of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>117 Parties(^{907}).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme decision-making body:</td>
<td>Conference of Parties acting as a meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main objective</td>
<td>Establish quantified and binding targets for limiting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions to boost the UNFCCC goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Annexes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Annex A: List of the six greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO\(_2\)), methane (CH\(_4\)), dinitrogen oxide (N\(_2\)O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF\(_6\)).  
| • Annex B: List of 39 Parties, included the EU\(^{908}\): developed countries and countries with economies in transition which have made quantified commitments to reducing or limiting greenhouse gas emissions. |

## Commitment of the Parties

| Parties included in Annex B: |  
| • Limit or reduce by 5.2% the quantity of GHG emissions compared with 1990 emissions, except countries with economies in transition, which can choose a reference year other than 1990\(^{909}\);  
| • Implement national or regional policies and measures to fulfil compliance with quantified commitments to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (Articles 2 and 4). The Parties can fulfil their commitments through domestic measures and flexibility mechanisms;  
| • Publish an initial report giving the information required to implement the commitments, especially for the accounting of assigned amounts (Article 7);  
| • Publish a report demonstrating the progress made in achieving commitments (Articles 3 and 7); and  
| • Set up a national emissions inventory system based on methodologies approved by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Article 5); |

**All Parties:** Prepare programmes to establish the national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, to mitigate and facilitate the adaptation to climate change, cooperate to support technology transfer, research and education and present in their national communications information on the actions undertaken to combat climate change (Article 10);  

**Parties included in Annex II of the UNFCCC:** Finance developing countries, mainly to help them set in place their national emissions inventory and encourage technology transfer (Article 11).  

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906. The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).  
908. EU today  
909. Article 3 para. 5 of the Kyoto Protocol.
The second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at CMP 8\textsuperscript{910} under the title "Doha Amendment". It commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 2020\textsuperscript{911}. Thus this period will last eight years and not five years as for the first period. Regarding its effective date, although the Doha Decision encourages countries to implement the second commitment period before the countries ratify it, the countries are free to choose from what date they will enforce it.

### Useful links
- Text of the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol according to Article 3, paragraph 9 (Doha amendment) for the second commitment period: [http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/fre/13a01f.pdf](http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/fre/13a01f.pdf).

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\textsuperscript{910} Eighth Conference of Parties acting as a Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
\textsuperscript{911} Decision 1/CMP 8
Sheet 3. Ratification status of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal instruments</th>
<th>Ratification status</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>197 Parties⁹¹², including the European Union (EU)⁹¹³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>192 Parties⁹¹⁴, including the EU⁹¹⁵; five Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>117 Parties⁹¹⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Agreement</td>
<td>181 Parties⁹¹⁷, including the EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹¹³ The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
⁹¹⁵ The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
⁹¹⁶ As at 15 October 2018 [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_en
⁹¹⁷ As at 15 October 2018 [online] http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php
## A.2. Negotiation document nomenclatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision x/CP.x</td>
<td>COP decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision x/CMP.x</td>
<td>CMP decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision x/CMP.x</td>
<td>CMP decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/CP/x</td>
<td>COP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/KP/CMP/x</td>
<td>CMP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/KP/CP/x</td>
<td>AWG-KP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SBI/x</td>
<td>SBI preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SBSTA/x</td>
<td>SBSTA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SB/x</td>
<td>Preparatory document or provisional or current agenda of the two subsidiary bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/APA/x</td>
<td>APA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCF/x</td>
<td>Preparatory document of the Green Climate Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/ARR/x</td>
<td>Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory (from 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/TRR/x</td>
<td>Report of the technical review of the biennial report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/WEB/IRI/x</td>
<td>Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory/Document published on the Web only (listing used until 2004 inclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/ASR/x</td>
<td>GHG inventory annual status report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/WEB/SAI/x</td>
<td>GHG inventory summary and assessment report/Document published on the Web only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/COM/x</td>
<td>National communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/DPR/x</td>
<td>Demonstrable Progress Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/IDR.x</td>
<td>In-depth Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM EB-x</td>
<td>CDM Executive Board Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMSN/IGO/x</td>
<td>Document submitted by intergovernmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMSN/NGO/x</td>
<td>Document submitted by non-governmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/TP/x</td>
<td>Technical document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Add.x</td>
<td>Text added to a document presented previously (Addendum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Amend.x</td>
<td>Amendment to a text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Corr.x</td>
<td>Correction of a text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/CRP.x</td>
<td>Conference Room Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/INF.x</td>
<td>Information series containing general information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/L.x</td>
<td>Limited distribution document: Draft report or text (limited document)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/MISC.x</td>
<td>Miscellaneous documents: Points of view of Parties and observers; list of participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Rev.x</td>
<td>Text revision which supersedes the text published previously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non paper</td>
<td>Internal, unofficial document to facilitate the negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Note:

- x indicates a serial number a year.
- For the Green Climate Fund documents (GCF/x), see: www.gcfund.org/documents/in-session-documents.html
- Access all documents on the Convention website: https://unfccc.int/documents
A.3. Abbreviations and acronyms (French – English)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABPA</td>
<td>Alliance bolivarienne pour les Peuples de notre Amérique (ALBA en espagnol)</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA in spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AILAC</td>
<td>Alliance indépendante de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes</td>
<td>Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Alliance bolivarienne pour les peuples de notre Amérique</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND</td>
<td>Autorités nationales désignées</td>
<td>Designated National Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEI</td>
<td>Alliance des petits États insulaires (<a href="http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis">www.sidsnet.org/aosis</a>)</td>
<td>Alliance of Small Island States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Groupe de travail spécial de la plateforme de Durban pour une action renforcée</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEI</td>
<td>Analyses et Examens internationaux</td>
<td>International Analysis and Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAI</td>
<td>Consultations et Analyses internationales</td>
<td>International Consultations and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCNUCC</td>
<td>Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches</td>
<td>Framework for Various Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>Contribution déterminée au niveau national</td>
<td>Nationally Determined Contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CdP</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Comité exécutif</td>
<td>Executive Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESNU</td>
<td>Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Comité exécutif de la technologie</td>
<td>Technology Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDN</td>
<td>Contribution prévue déterminée au niveau national</td>
<td>Intended Nationally Determined Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Comité permanent des Finances</td>
<td>Standing Committee for Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties servant en tant que Réunion des Parties de l’Accord de Paris</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRP</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties agissant en tant que Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRTC</td>
<td>Centre et Réseau des Technologies du Climat</td>
<td>Climate Technology Center and Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Conseil de Stabilité financière</td>
<td>Financial Stability Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Démarches concertées</td>
<td>Cooperative Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSE</td>
<td>Dialogue structuré entre experts</td>
<td>Structured Expert Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EET</td>
<td>Équipe d’experts techniques</td>
<td>Team of Technical Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Entités opérationnelles désignées</td>
<td>Designated Operational Entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA Fonds pour l’adaptation</td>
<td>Adaptation Fund</td>
<td>AF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEM Fonds pour l’Environnement mondial</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
<td>GEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPMA Fonds des pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries Fund</td>
<td>LDCF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPP Fonds de Préparation de Projets</td>
<td>Project Preparation Facility</td>
<td>PPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSCC Fonds spécial des Changements climatiques</td>
<td>Special Climate Change Fund</td>
<td>SCCF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVC Fonds vert pour le climat</td>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
<td>GCF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEMO (ou PDVS) Groupe d’États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)</td>
<td>Like Minded Developing Countries (Like Minded Group)</td>
<td>LMDC (ou LMG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEPMA Groupe d’Experts sur les pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>Least Developed Country Expert Group</td>
<td>LEG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GES Gaz à Effet de Serre</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gas</td>
<td>GHG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GETT Groupe d’Experts pour le Transfert de la Technologie</td>
<td>Expert Group on Technology Transfer</td>
<td>EGTT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIEC Groupe intergouvernemental d’Experts sur l’évolution du Climat</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
<td>IPCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gt éq-CO₂ Gigatonne d’équivalent CO₂</td>
<td>Gigaton of CO₂ equivalent</td>
<td>GtCO₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTS-AP Groupe de Travail spécial pour l’Accord de Paris</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement</td>
<td>APA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77 + Chine Groupe des 77 et Chine (<a href="http://www.G77.org">www.G77.org</a>)</td>
<td>Group of 77 and China</td>
<td>G77 + China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI Évaluation et Révision internationale</td>
<td>International Assessment and Review</td>
<td>IAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIEDE Association internationale pour l’échange de droits d’émission</td>
<td>International Emissions Trading Association</td>
<td>IETA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC Mécanisme de Crédit conjoint</td>
<td>Joint Crediting Mechanism</td>
<td>JCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALP Plan d’action Lima-Paris</td>
<td>Lima-Paris Action Agenda</td>
<td>LPAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAN Mesures d’Atténuation appropriées au niveau national</td>
<td>Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</td>
<td>NAMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDD Mécanisme pour un Développement durable</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Mechanism</td>
<td>SDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP Mécanisme de Développement propre</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
<td>CDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNV Mesure, Notification, Vérification</td>
<td>Measuring, Rapportage, Verification</td>
<td>MRV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC Mise en œuvre conjoint</td>
<td>Joint Implementation</td>
<td>JI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;P Modalités et Procédures</td>
<td>Modalities and Procedures</td>
<td>M&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMM Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché</td>
<td>New Market Mechanism</td>
<td>NMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR Niveaux de référence</td>
<td>Reference Levels</td>
<td>RL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRE Niveaux de référence des émissions</td>
<td>Reference Emission Levels</td>
<td>REL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OACI Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
<td>ICAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODD Objectifs de Développement durable</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
<td>SDGs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCDE Organisation de Coopération et de Développement économiques</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
<td>OECD</td>
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<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>English</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMM Organisation météorologique mondiale</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization (WMO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONG Organisation non gouvernementale</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization (NGO)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONU Organisation des Nations unies</td>
<td>United Nations (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS Organe subsidiaire</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body (SB)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCST Organe subsidiaire de Conseil scientifique et technologique</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advise (SBSTA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSMOE Organe subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANA Plan d’Action national d’Adaptation</td>
<td>National Adaptation Programme or Action (NAPA)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED Pays en développement</td>
<td>Developing country (DC)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PEID Petits États insulaires en développement</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States (SIDS)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PET Processus d’examen technique</td>
<td>Technical examination process (TEP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PET-AD Processus d’Examen Technique sur l’Adaptation</td>
<td>Technical examination process on Adaptation (TEP-A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIB Produit intérieur brut</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK Protocole de Kyoto</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol (KP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMA Pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries (LDC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNA Plan National d’Adaptation</td>
<td>National Adaptation Plan (NAP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTN Programme de Travail de Nairobi sur les incidences des changements climatiques et la vulnérabilité et l’adaptation à ces changements</td>
<td>Nairobi Work Program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change (NWP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB Rapport biennial</td>
<td>Biennial Report (BR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBA Rapport biennial actualisé</td>
<td>Biennial Updated Report (BUR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMD Responsabilités communes mais différenciées</td>
<td>Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBD)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMD-CR Responsabilités communes mais différenciées et capacités respectives</td>
<td>Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>REDD Réduction des émissions issues de la déforestation et de la dégradation forestière</td>
<td>Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RET Réunion d’experts techniques</td>
<td>Technical Expert Meeting (TEM)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIT Relevé international des transactions</td>
<td>International Transaction Log (ITL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA Secteur d’activité</td>
<td>Workstream (WS)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA1 Secteur d’activité 1</td>
<td>Workstream 1 (WS 1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA2 Secteur d’activité 2</td>
<td>Workstream 2 (WS 2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE Union européenne</td>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UQA Unité de quantité attribuée</td>
<td>Assigned Amount Unit (AAU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>URCE Unité de Réduction certifiée</td>
<td>Certified Emission Reduction (CER)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTCATF Utilisation des terres, changement d’affectation des terres et forêt</td>
<td>Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF)</td>
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</table>
### A.4. Abbreviations and acronyms (English – French)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>French</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAU</td>
<td>Assigned Amount Unit</td>
<td>Unité de quantité attribuée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action</td>
<td>Groupe de travail spécial de la plateforme de Durban pour une action renforcée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Adaptation Fund</td>
<td>Fonds pour l’adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AILAC</td>
<td>Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>Alliance indépendante de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOSIS</td>
<td>Alliance of Small Island States</td>
<td>Alliance des petits États insulaires (<a href="http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis">www.sidsnet.org/aosis</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Ad hoc working group on the Paris Agreement</td>
<td>Groupe de travail spécial de l’Accord de Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPA</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA in spanish)</td>
<td>Alliance bolivarienne pour les Peuples de notre Amérique (ALBA en espagnol)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPOA</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America</td>
<td>Alliance bolivarienne pour les peuples de notre Amérique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Biennial Report</td>
<td>Rapport biennal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUR</td>
<td>Biennial Updated Report</td>
<td>Rapport biennal actualisé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Cooperative Approaches</td>
<td>Démarches concertées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBDR</td>
<td>Common but differentiated responsibilities</td>
<td>Responsabilités communes mais différenciées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBDR–RC</td>
<td>Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities</td>
<td>Responsabilités communes mais différenciées et capacités respectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
<td>Mécanisme de Développement propre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>Nationally Determined Contributions</td>
<td>Contribution déterminée au niveau national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Certified Emission Reduction</td>
<td>Unité de Réduction certifiée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties servant en tant que Réunion des Parties de l’Accord de Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties agissant en tant que Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDN</td>
<td>Intended Nationally Determined Contribution</td>
<td>Contribution prévue déterminée au niveau national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCN</td>
<td>Climate Technology Center and Network</td>
<td>Centre et Réseau des Technologies du Climat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Developing country</td>
<td>Pays en développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>AND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA Designated National Authorities</td>
<td>Autorités nationales désignées</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE Designated Operational Entities</td>
<td>Entités opérationnelles désignées</td>
<td>EOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB Executive Board</td>
<td>Comité exécutif</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
<td>Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies</td>
<td>CESNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGTT Expert Group on Technology Transfer</td>
<td>Groupe d’Experts pour le Transfert de la Technologie</td>
<td>GETT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU European Union</td>
<td>Union européenne</td>
<td>UE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB Financial Stability Board</td>
<td>Conseil de Stabilité financière</td>
<td>CSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVA Framework for Various Approaches</td>
<td>Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches</td>
<td>CDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77 + China</td>
<td>Groupe des 77 et Chine (<a href="http://www.G77.org">www.G77.org</a>)</td>
<td>G77 + Chine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCF Green Climate Fund</td>
<td>Fonds vert pour le climat</td>
<td>FVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>Produit intérieur brut</td>
<td>PIB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF Global Environment Facility</td>
<td>Fonds pour l’Environnement mondial</td>
<td>FEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHG Greenhouse Gas</td>
<td>Gaz à Effet de Serre</td>
<td>GES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GiCO₂e Gigaton of CO₂ equivalent</td>
<td>Gigatonne d’équivalent CO₂</td>
<td>Gt eq-CO₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAR International Analysis and Review</td>
<td>Analyses et Examens internationaux</td>
<td>AIEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAR International Assessment and Review</td>
<td>Evaluation et Révision internationale</td>
<td>EEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA International Consultations and Analysis</td>
<td>Consultations et Analyses internationales</td>
<td>CAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
<td>Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale</td>
<td>OACI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IETA International Emissions Trading Association</td>
<td>Association internationale pour l’échange de droits d’émission</td>
<td>AIEDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
<td>Groupe intergouvernemental d’Experts sur l’évolution du Climat</td>
<td>GIEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITL International Transaction Log</td>
<td>Relevé international des transactions</td>
<td>RIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCM Joint Crediting Mechanism</td>
<td>Mécanisme de Crédit conjoint</td>
<td>MCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI Joint Implementation</td>
<td>Mise en œuvre conjoint</td>
<td>MOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>Protocole de Kyoto</td>
<td>PK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC Least Developed Countries</td>
<td>Pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>PMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund</td>
<td>Fonds des Pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>FPMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEG Least Developed Country Expert Group</td>
<td>Groupe d’Experts sur les Pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>GEPMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMDC (ou LMG) Like Minded Developing Countries (Like Minded Group)</td>
<td>Groupe d’États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)</td>
<td>GEMO (ou PDVS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPAA Lima-Paris Action Agenda</td>
<td>Plan d’action Lima-Paris</td>
<td>PALP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry</td>
<td>Utilisation des terres, changement d’affectation des terres et foresterie</td>
<td>UTCATF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;P Modalities and Procedures</td>
<td>Modalités et Procédures</td>
<td>M&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRV Measuring, Rapportage, Verification</td>
<td>Mesure, Notification, Vérification</td>
<td>MNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</td>
<td>Mesures d’Atténuation appropriées au niveau national</td>
<td>MAAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Adaptation Plan</td>
<td>Plan national d’Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPA</td>
<td>National Adaptation Programme or Action</td>
<td>Plan d’Action national d’Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
<td>Organisations non gouvernementale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMM</td>
<td>New Market Mechanism</td>
<td>Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>Nairobi Work Program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change</td>
<td>Programme de Travail de Nairobi sur les incidences des changements climatiques et la vulnéralité et l’adaptation à ces changements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
<td>Organisation de Coopération et de Développement économiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Project Preparation Facility</td>
<td>Fonds de Préparation de Projets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD</td>
<td>Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation</td>
<td>Réduction des émissions issues de la déforestation et de la dégradation forestière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Reference Emission Levels</td>
<td>Niveaux de référence des émissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL</td>
<td>Reference Levels</td>
<td>Niveaux de référence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBI</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Implementation</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBFSTA</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advise</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de Conseil scientifique et technologique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCCF</td>
<td>Special Climate Change Fund</td>
<td>Fonds spécial des changements climatiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Standing Committee for Finance</td>
<td>Comité permanent des Finances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
<td>Objectifs de Développement durable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Mechanism</td>
<td>Mécanisme pour un Développement durable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>Structured Expert Dialogue</td>
<td>Dialogue structuré entre experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States</td>
<td>Petits États insulaires en développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Technology Executive Committee</td>
<td>Comité exécutif de la technologie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEM</td>
<td>Technical Expert Meeting</td>
<td>Réunion d’experts techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEP</td>
<td>Technical examination process</td>
<td>Processus d’examen technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTE</td>
<td>Team of Technical Experts</td>
<td>Équipe d’experts techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Organisation des Nations unies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
<td>Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
<td>Organisation météorologique mondiale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td>Workstream</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS1</td>
<td>Workstream 1</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS2</td>
<td>Workstream 2</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.5. Thematic glossary

**Additionality**
Characterises the GHG emission reductions generated by the compensatory projects must be greater that the emissions which would have occurred without these projects. The goal of environmental additionality is to demonstrate that a project produces actual, measurable, additional and long-term GHG reductions.

**Adaptation**
Ability of a system to adjust its mechanisms, processes and structure to climate change. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned; it can occur in response to or in advance of a change in conditions.

**Hot air**
Due to their industrial recession in the 1990s, certain Annex B countries to the Kyoto Protocol (like Russia and Ukraine) received higher emission limitation targets than their total amount of emissions without taking any measures for domestic reduction. This quota surplus (hot air) could potentially be sold to other countries via flexibility mechanisms.

**Improvement in greenhouse gas removals**
Calculated improvement of greenhouse gas removals between a baseline scenario and a project. The removal designates the penetration of greenhouse gases in a living organism that assimilates these gases, thereby allowing the disappearance of the removed greenhouse gases.

**Annex I**
Annex I is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. It quotes forty developed countries and countries with economies in transition that have made commitments to stabilise the greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels.

**Annex II**
Annex II is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. It identifies 24 developed countries (including in Annex I) that have agreed to provide financial and technological aid to developing countries to combat climate change.

**Annex B**
Annex B is attached to the Kyoto Protocol. It identifies 38 developed countries and countries with economies in transition that have made commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the period 2008-2012.

**Anthropogenic**
Greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities are called anthropogenic when they do not come from natural emissions. These are additional emissions which can be considered as pollution.

**Mitigation**
Human intervention to reduce the sources of greenhouse gases or reinforce the sinks of greenhouse gases, either by extending the surface area or by improving their removal capacity.

**Afforestation**
Action of planting trees on land that has had no forest cover for a certain number of years.

**Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)**
The combination of capture and storage of carbon dioxide with bioenergy causing the atmosphere to absorb CO₂. According to IPCC scenarios relating to the goals of 1.5 to 2°C, several Gt CO₂ a year should be removed from the atmosphere in the second half of the 21st century.

**Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)**
The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other than the atmosphere. This process designates the separation of the CO₂ from flue gases, processing fossil fuels to produce CO₂-rich fractions and storage in underground geological formations or in the seabeds.
Carbon neutrality
Can mean two different things: Either, the goal of only emitting a minimum amount of GHG that matches a physical quantity removed from the atmosphere at the same time, or the goal of emitting zero GHG. It also often involves the action of investing in one or more projects that will avoid producing an equivalent quantity of GHG than generated by the entity seeking carbon neutrality.

Climate change
Climate variations that are attributed directly or indirectly to human activities, altering the composition of the atmosphere, and which are added to the natural variability of the climate note during comparable periods.

Fossil fuel
Natural gas, petroleum, coal or any solid, liquid or gaseous fuel derived from these materials.

Supplementarity
In the context of the UNFCCC, supplementarity refers to the option available to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to introduce, in addition to the Kyoto mechanisms, suitable domestic policies, energy-related or otherwise, to fulfil the GHG emission reduction objectives in the long term.

Compliance
Obligation whereby the emitter is required to comply with his objectives of GHG emission reductions. The verification of compliance with the commitments and mandatory objectives is an essential factor in a mandatory emission reduction system. Compliance includes the verification modalities, the organisation responsible for verifying the compliance and the possible sanctions.

Business as usual
Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from general trends in an economy with no emission control policy. This reference is used to estimate the effectiveness of policies and measures undertaken to combat greenhouse gas emissions.

Compensatory credits
Emission rights representing a tonne of sequestered or removed equivalent CO₂, given to the promoter of a compensatory credit project to reduce GHG emissions.

Woodland clearance
Conversion of forest to non-forest.

Synonym: Deforestation

Emission right
Any emission right symbolises the reduction of GHG emissions by one metric tonne of equivalent carbon dioxide, i.e. an emission unit, an emission quota or a compensatory credit. These rights can be traded inside international or national carbon trading systems.

Greenhouse gas emission
Total mass of a GHG which is released into the atmosphere during a given period.

CO₂ equivalent
The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO₂) that would cause the same amount of radiative forcing as a given mixture of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases.

NOTE 1: The CO₂ equivalent is calculated using the mass of a given GHG multiplied by its global warming potential.

NOTE 2: Annex B lists global warming potentials established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Greenhouse gas emission or removal factor
Factor reporting the activity data on the GHG emissions or absorption.

NOTE: A greenhouse gas emission or removal factor can include an oxidation factor.
Fungibility

Quality of what is consumed through use and which can be replaced by other similar products. In the context of the carbon market, fungibility makes no distinction between the categories of units and considers them all identical (one AAU would therefore be equivalent to a JI project unit and also to a unit resulting from an internal measurement of energy efficiency).

Carbon leakage

Part of GHG emission reductions in Annex B countries that may be offset by an increase in emissions in non-constrained countries above their baseline levels. This can occur through (i) relocation of energy-intensive production units in non-constrained regions; (ii) increased consumption of fossil fuels in these regions through decline in the international price of oil and gas triggered by lower demand for these energies; and (iii) changes in revenues (thus in energy demand) due to improved economic conditions.

NOTE: The term also refers to the situation in which a carbon capture activity (tree planting, for example) on one piece of land inadvertently, directly or indirectly, triggers an activity, which in whole or part, counteracts the carbon effects of the initial activity.

Greenhouse gases (GHG)

Gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that remove and re-emit the infrared radiation. They help maintain the heat in the Earth’s atmosphere. These gases are produced by both natural and anthropogenic processes. The main gases are water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), dinitrogen oxide (N₂O), the chlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), nitrogen trifluoride (NF₃), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆).

Energy intensity

Ratio of energy consumption to economic or physical output. At the national level, energy intensity is the ratio of total domestic consumption or final energy consumption to Gross Domestic Product or physical output.

GHG inventory

Assessment that measures the GHG emissions from activities of an entity (country, business, municipality, etc.). This assessment is calculated in relation to a reference year.

Carbon market

Name for a group of greenhouse gas emissions trading and transaction mechanisms. The carbon market designates both the voluntary market for the voluntary compensation of GHG emissions and the regulated markets that make the regulated emitters compliant.

Voluntary market

Carbon credits trading mechanism not linked to national or international regulations.

Materiality

An item of information, an error or an inaccuracy are normally considered as material if they can influence people building on them. This concept comes into play when verifying project data and embodies the idea that there is a threshold beyond which the search for other potential errors is not longer justified in terms of time, money or the efforts required. Thus, if the error found generates a difference in the emission reductions of the project which is below the set threshold, this error is viewed as negligible or, in other words, immaterial.

Clean development mechanism (CDM)

Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12). It assumes the implementation of emission reduction or avoidance projects in the developing countries. The CDM projects or programmes of activities require at least three partners to carry them out: the developing country (the host country represented by the Designated National Authority or DNA, a project sponsor in the host country and a purchaser of certified emission reduction units or CER).
**Joint implementation (JI)**

Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanism is used by the governments of developed countries and countries with economies in transition, and their companies, to finance greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in the other developed countries and countries with economies in transition (mainly the Eastern European countries and Russia). In return, these States receive emission credits that they can sell or deduct from their own national efforts.

**Baseline**

This is a historical level used to calculate subsequent changes in greenhouse gas emissions. This level is determined micro-economically or macro-economically. It is of crucial importance in determining the additionality level of reductions resulting from joint initiative projects or those implemented under the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint Implementation.

**Carbon black**

Carbon black, also known as furnace black or lamp black, is an amorphous form of the carbon produced by industrial activity. It is a climate forcer (has a warming effect on the climate) that has only been of interest to the scientific community for a few years.

**Global warming potential (GWP) or planet warming potential (PWP)**

Index describing the radiation characteristics of greenhouse gases. The GWP or PWP represents the combined effect of the time these gases remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing outgoing infrared radiation. This index approximates the time-integrated warming effect of a unit mass of a given greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, relative to that of CO₂.

NOTE: The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change contain planet warming potential tables.

**Greenhouse gas programme**

Voluntary or mandatory, international, national or sub-national system or plan which records, counts or manages the emissions, removals, greenhouse gas emission reductions or improvements in greenhouse gas removals.

**Carbon sink**

Any process, activity or mechanism, natural or artificial, that removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere (for example, trees, plants and oceans).

**Reforestation**

Planting of forests on lands that had previously contained forests but have been converted to other uses.

**Additional reductions**

See Additionality

**Greenhouse gas emission reduction**

Calculated drop in GHG emissions between the baseline scenario emissions and the actual emissions avoided by a project.

**Reduction in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)**

International issue of the post-2012 climate regime on the financial provisions and the transfer of technology under the reduction plan for emissions caused by deforestation and forest degradation. This issue also includes the protection and sustainable management of forests and the promotion of forest carbon stocks in the developing countries resulting, for example, from adapted silvicultural practices or plantings.

**Greenhouse gas reservoir**

Physical unit or biosphere, geosphere or hydrosphere component capable of storing or accumulating a GHG removed from the atmosphere by a greenhouse gas sink or a GHG captured at its source.

NOTE 1: The total mass of carbon contained in a GHG reservoir at a given moment can be called reservoir carbon stock.

NOTE 2: A GHG reservoir can transfer GHG to another reservoir.

NOTE 3: Collecting a GHG at its source before it enters the atmosphere and stoking the GHG collected in a GHG reservoir can be called GHG capture and storage.
<p>| <strong>Baseline scenario</strong> | Hypothetical reference case that represents in the best possible way the conditions that would be the most likely in the absence of the greenhouse gas project.&lt;br&gt;NOTE: The baseline scenario coincides with the GHG project chronology. |
| <strong>Sequestration</strong> | Action of removing the carbon from the atmosphere. CO₂ sequestration projects can participate in two distinct and sometimes complementary ways to carbon sequestration: (i) by extracting the carbonic gas from the atmosphere and storing it as over – and underground biomass; (ii) by producing additional renewable biomass where the waste-to-energy conversion can avoid the recourse to fossil fuels. |
| <strong>Greenhouse gas source</strong> | Physical unit or process releasing a GHG into the atmosphere. |
| <strong>Affected greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir</strong> | GHG source, sink or reservoir influenced by the activity of a project through modifications to the supply and demand of the market regarding its associated products or service or through physical movement.&lt;br&gt;NOTE 1: Unlike the associated GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs which are linked physically to a GHG project, the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are linked to a GHG project by changes caused by market supply and demand.&lt;br&gt;NOTE 2: An affected GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found off the project site.&lt;br&gt;NOTE 3: The reductions in emissions or the increases in GHG removals attributable to the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are commonly called “leaks”. |
| <strong>Controlled greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir</strong> | A GHG source, sink or reservoir that operates under the guidance or influence of an author of a greenhouse gas project proposal through financial, political, management or other instruments.&lt;br&gt;NOTE: A controlled GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found on the project site. |
| <strong>Associated greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir</strong> | A GHG source, sink or reservoir with material or energy flows entering or exiting the project or which are contained within it.&lt;br&gt;NOTE 1: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found upstream or downstream of the project and can be located on or off the project site.&lt;br&gt;NOTE 2: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir can also include activities relating to the design, construction or declassification of a project. |
| <strong>Standard of performance</strong> | Simplified approach of additionality and the baseline scenario. Rather than seeking to prove the additionality and to determine the baseline scenario for each project, the standard of performance is an approximate evaluation that establishes a generic baseline scenario as a quantitative standard of performance. Any project where the emissions are below this predefined standard is considered as additional. |
| <strong>Monitoring</strong> | Continuous or periodic assessment of emissions and removals of GHG or other GHG-related data. |
| <strong>Emission cap-and-trade system</strong> | System that assigns rights to companies for their greenhouse gas emissions based on governmental environmental objectives. Compensatory credits issued thanks to a GHG reduction project can also be traded in this system. |
| <strong>Tonne of carbon equivalent</strong> | See equivalent CO₂ |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Removal unit</strong></td>
<td>Unit issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and which covers the net removal by carbon sinks of GHG from Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emission unit</strong></td>
<td>Under the cap-and-trade system, an emission unit designates a right of emission generated by the government according to the declared GHG emissions verified by the companies. A right of emission relates to the authorisation to emit 1 tCO2eq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assigned amount units (AAU)</strong></td>
<td>Units issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in their national register. The amount assigned is calculated according to emissions of the base year and quantified emission reduction commitments. This quantity is expressed as a percentage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Certified emission reduction (CER)</strong></td>
<td>Certified emission reductions (CER) are emission credits obtained through CDM projects. These credits can be applied directly to fulfil the quantified commitments of Annex B countries. Note: the acronym CER for Certified units of emissions reduction is also used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emission reduction units (ERU)</strong></td>
<td>These are units converted from an assigned amount unit (AAU) or a removal unit and handed to the project participant under joint implementation activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target user</strong></td>
<td>Person or organisation identified by those in charge declaring information relating to greenhouse gases and which relies on this information to take decisions. [NOTE 1: The target user can be the customer, the responsible party, the administrators of the GHG programme, regulators, the financial community or other stakeholders involved such as local authorities, ministerial departments or non-governmental organisations. [NOTE 2: The level of assurance is used to determine the accuracy a validator or verifier gives to his validation or verification plan to detect any errors, omissions or false declarations. [NOTE 3: There are two assurance levels (reasonable or limited) that result in validation or verification reports that are formulated differently. See ISO 14064-3: 2006 A.2.3.2 for sample validation and verification reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF)</strong></td>
<td>Land use and their changes (forest, agriculture, natural areas, etc.) have a significant influence on carbon storage (sink) and methane (CH₄) releases and therefore on climate change. They contribute to the anthropogenic emissions taken into account by the Kyoto Protocol. The problem of land and forest use goes hand in hand with the concerns of two other conventions: biodiversity and desertification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability</strong></td>
<td>Vulnerability defines to what extent a system can be degraded or damaged by climate change. It depends not just on the sensitivity but also on the adaptability of the system to new climatic conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.6. Agenda for meetings during the Katowice Conference

COP24 – 2-14 December 2018918

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organisational matters:
   a. Election of the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session;
   b. Adoption of the rules of procedure;
   c. Adoption of the agenda;
   d. Election of officers other than the President;
   e. Admission of organisations as observers;
   f. Organisation of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies;
   g. Dates and venues of future sessions;
   h. Adoption of the report on credentials.
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies:
   b. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation;
4. Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
5. Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Convention under Article 15:
   a. Proposal from the Russian Federation to amend Article 4, paragraph 2(f), of the Convention;
   b. Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico to amend Articles 7 and 18 of the Convention;
   c. Proposal from Turkey to delete the name of Turkey from the list in Annex I to the Convention.
7. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.

8. Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism:
   a. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;

9. Second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention.

10. Matters relating to finance:
    a. Long-term climate finance;
    b. Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance;
    c. Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund;
    d. Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility;
    e. Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement.

11. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.

12. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention

13. Capacity-building under the Convention.

14. Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention:
    a. Implementation of the Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures (decision 1/CP.10);
    b. Matters relating to the least developed countries.

15. Gender and climate change.

16. Other matters referred to the Conference of the Parties by the subsidiary bodies.

17. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
    a. Audit report and financial statements for 2017;
    b. Budget performance for the biennium 2018-2019;
    c. Decision-making in the UNFCCC process.

18. High-level segment:
    a. Statements by Parties;
    b. Statements by observer organizations.

19. Other matters.

20. Conclusion of the session:
    a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-fourth session;
    b. Closure of the session.
CMP 14 – 2-14 December 2018

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organisational matters:
   a. Adoption of the agenda;
   b. Election of additional officers;
   c. Organisation of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies;
   d. Adoption of the report on credentials;
   e. Status of ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies:
4. Matters relating to the clean development mechanism.
5. Matters relating to joint implementation.
7. Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund.
8. Report on the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments.
9. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I^20
   a. National communications;
10. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.
11. Matters relating to:
   a. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Kyoto Protocol;
   b. Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol.
12. Other matters referred to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol by the subsidiary bodies.
13. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
   a. Audit report and financial statements for 2017;
14. High-level segment:
   a. Statements by Parties;
   b. Statements by observer organizations.

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920. The term “Party included in Annex I” is defined in Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol.
15. Other matters.

16. Conclusion of the session:
   a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its fourteenth session;
   b. Closure of the session.

**SBSTA 49 – 2-8 December 2018**

1. Opening of the session.

2. Organisational matters:
   a. Adoption of the agenda;
   b. Organisation of the work of the session;
   c. Election of officers other than the Chair;
   d. Mandated events.


5. Development and transfer of technologies:
   a. Technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement;
   b. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;

6. Research and systematic observation.

7. Koronivia joint work on agriculture.

8. Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.

9. Impact of the implementation of response measures:
   a. Improved forum and work programme;
   b. Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;
   c. Matters relating to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Kyoto Protocol.

10. Methodological issues under the Convention: emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport.

11. Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement:
   a. Directives on the cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement;

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b. Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement;
c. Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement.
12. Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement.
13. Reports on other activities:
   a. Annual report on the technical review of information reported under the Convention by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in their biennial reports and national communications;
   b. Annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
   c. Annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories and other information reported by Parties included in Annex I, as defined in Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol.
14. Other matters.
15. Closure of and report on the session.

SBI 49 – 2-8 December 2018

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organisational matters:
   a. Adoption of the agenda;
   b. Organisation of the work of the session;
   c. Multilateral assessment working group session under the international assessment and review process;
   d. Facilitative sharing of views under the international consultation and analysis process;
   e. Other mandated events.
   f. Election of officers other than the Chair.
3. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention:
   a. Status of submission and review of seventh national communications and third biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
   b. Compilations and syntheses of second and third biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;

4. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention:
   a. Information contained in national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
   b. Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
   c. Review of the terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
   d. Provision of financial and technical support;
   e. Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports of Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.

5. Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement.

6. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.

7. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.

8. Matters relating to the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol:
   a. Review of the modalities and procedures for the clean development mechanism;
   b. Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the Kyoto Protocol.

9. Koronivia joint work on agriculture.


12. Matters relating to the least developed countries; and matters referred to in paragraphs 41 and 45 of decision 1/CP.21.


14. Development and transfer of technologies:
   a. Scope of and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism in relation to supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement;
   b. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
   c. Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer.

15. Matters relating to climate finance: identification of information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement.
16. Matters relating to capacity-building for developing countries:
   a. Capacity-building under the Convention;
   b. Annual technical progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building;
   c. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.
17. Impact of the implementation of response measures:
   a. Improved forum and work programme;
   b. Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of
      the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;
   c. Matters relating to Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol;
   d. Progress on the implementation of decision 1/CP.10.
18. Gender and climate change.
20. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
   a. Audit report and financial statements for 2017;
   b. Budget performance for the biennium 2018-2019;
   c. Budgetary matters;
   d. Continuous review of the functions and operations of the secretariat.
21. Other matters
22. Closure of and report on the session.

CMA 1.3 – 2-14 December 2018

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organisational matters:
   a. Adoption of the agenda;
   b. Application of the rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties;
   c. Election of additional officers;
   d. Organisation of work;
   e. Status of ratification of the Paris Agreement;
   f. Adoption of the report on credentials.
3. Matters relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
4. High-level segment.
5. Other matters.
6. Conclusion of the session:
   a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
      meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;
   b. Closure of the session.

APA 1.7 – 2-8 December 2018

1. Opening of the session.

2. Organisational matters:
   a. Election of officers;
   b. Adoption of the agenda;
   c. Organisation of the work of the session;

3. Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21 on:
   a. Features of nationally determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 26;
   b. Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally
determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 28;
   c. Accounting for Parties’ nationally determined contributions, as specified in
   paragraph 31.

4. Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement.

5. Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

6. Matters relating to the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement:
   a. Identification of the sources of input for the global stocktake;
   b. Development of the modalities of the global stocktake.

7. Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement.

8. Further matters related to implementation of the Paris Agreement:
   a. Preparing for the convening of the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
   b. Taking stock of progress made by the subsidiary and constituted bodies in relation to their mandated work under the Paris Agreement and section III of decision 1/CP.21, in order to promote and facilitate coordination and coherence in the implementation of the work programme, and, if appropriate, take action, which may include recommendations.

9. Other matters.


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default/files/resource/l02a1.pdf?download#page=2

APA (2018b). APA agenda item 8 Further matters related to implementation
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https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/l02a1.pdf?download#page=159

APA (2018c). Revised additional tool under item 4 of the agenda – informal
document by the co-facilitators – final iteration. 08 September 2018. APA1-6.
IN.i4v2. https://unfccc.int/documents/182087

APA (2018d). Revised additional tool under item 4 of the agenda – informal
document by the co-facilitators – final iteration. 08 September 2018. APA1-6.
IN.i4v2. https://unfccc.int/documents/182087

APA (2018e). Revised additional tool under item 5 of the agenda (Revised
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APA (2018f). Revised additional tool under item 6 of the agenda. Final iteration.

APA (2018g). Revised additional tool under item 7 of the agenda (final iteration).

APA (2018h). Tools additional to and based on the informal notes contained in
the annex to the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement
from the fifth part of its first session. Informal document by the Co-Chairs, APA1.6

APA (2018i). Revised additional tool under item 8 of the agenda. Further
matters related to implementation of the Paris Agreement: (a) Preparing for the
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SBI (2018c). Informal note by the co-facilitators. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement. 9 September 2018. SBI48.2.IN.i7. https://unfccc.int/documents/182111


ENERGIES 2050 was born with the certainty that the development trajectories of our societies are not inevitable. As an informal network since 2007, and as a French non-profit and non-governmental organisation working exclusively in the general interest since 2011, ENERGIES 2050 contributes relentlessly to the transformation of our societies for a more humane, plural and united future, both at international level with States and international institutions and also in close cooperation with territories and local governments, public and private economic actors and citizens. Gathering members and partners from more than sixty nationalities, ENERGIES 2050 works to set up a new, positive and inclusive development model and to convert constraints into action possibilities. As a collective adventure in the quest for better ways of living together, ENERGIES 2050 has committed to the Great Transition, including combating climate change, implementing sustainable development, the energy transition, sustainable cities and regions and the shift towards a more humane, plural and united society, bringing peace and respecting the common goods of humanity.

ENERGIES 2050 breaks its activities down into five complementary areas:

• Executing demonstrative and repeatable projects accompany by technical studies and research actions to show the possibilities;
• Organising or attending meetings and conferences in order to expand the opportunities for sharing, exchanges and discussions;
• Publishing the results of research using a format in line with target audiences to pool and share knowledge and go beyond the restricted circles of experts and the normal dissemination circles.
• Educating, training and building the capacities so that each individual can understand, know, feel concerned and act;
• Communicating to the greatest number to inform, mobilise and unit the desire to act.

ENERGIES 2050 and its partners implement projects in more than forty countries. ENERGIES 2050 is active in the following topics: eco-development and sustainable development; combating climate change; climate, environment and energy policies; research and innovation; sustainable cities and the challenges and opportunities in rural areas; low-carbon development strategies; energy transition and development of renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and controlling demand for energy; responsible and sustainable tourism; buildings and the construction sector; natural resources and the common goods of mankind such as biodiversity, water and agriculture; ecological and environmental economics; responsible business dynamics and corporate performance; gender; environmental education; circular economy, social and united dynamics; behaviour change and citizen action expressed in all its forms be they artistic or applied in daily behaviour changes so that each individual becomes and responsible, united eco-citizen.

ENERGIES 2050 is a recognised player in climate change negotiations and in preparing and setting up national and international low-carbon strategies and action programmes. ENERGIES 2050 is also known for successfully introducing concrete mitigation and adaptation projects with huge innovation potential and for deploying essential capacity-building programmes to support country ownership and boost national excellence and that of actors involved. ENERGIES 2050 has especially been privileged to support several African countries in preparing their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) and in producing briefing files for submission to the Green Climate Fund. The association also launch ethiCarbon Afrique® in 2012. This strong, solidarity-based and innovative tool is designed to contribute to a real African energy revolution.

ENERGIES 2050
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+33 (0)6 80 31 91 89
The Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development) is a subsidiary body of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF – International Organisation of the Francophonie) and its headquarters are in Quebec City.

Under its original name of Institut de l’Énergie des Pays ayant en commun l’usage du Français (IEPF – Energy Institute for Countries with French as a common language), the IFDD came into being in 1988 following the 11th Summit of the Francophonie held in Quebec in 1987. It was created in the wake of the global energy crises and from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. In 1996, the Institute took the resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 as the major guide for its action and became the Institut de l’énergie et de l’environnement de la Francophonie (Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) And in 2013, following the Rio+20 Conference, it was renamed Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development).

Its mission is to contribute to:

- training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- support for development players in initiatives to prepare and implement sustainable development programmes;
- the promotion of the sustainable development approach in French-speaking countries;
- the development of partnerships in the various economic and social development sectors, mainly environment and energy, for sustainable development.

IFDD action falls under the Strategic Framework of the Francophonie, within mission D “Sustainable development, economy and solidarity” and Strategic Objective 7 “Contribute to the preparation and implementation of the post-2015 development programme and sustainable development goals”.

The Institute is in particular lead partner in the following two programmes under the OIF 2015-2018 schedule, implemented in partnership with other OIF units:

- Increase the capacities of target countries to develop and implement national, regional and local sustainable development strategies which are inclusive, participative and results-based;
- Build up the capacities of French-speaking players to allow active participation in international negotiations and decisions on the economic, environment and sustainable development, and their implementation.

www.ifdd.francophonie.org
The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a language - French - and common values. It currently groups 88 States and governments, including 54 Members, seven associate members and 27 observers. The 2018 Report on the French language worldwide sets the number of French speakers at 300 million.

The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies.

The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman and official representative.

61 member States and governments
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27 observers:
Argentina • Austria • Bosnia Herzegovina • Canada-Ontario • Costa Rica • Croatia • Czech Republic • Dominican • Republic • Estonia • Gambia • Georgia • Hungary • Ireland • Latvia • Lithuania • Louisiana • Malta • Mexico • Montenegro • Mozambique • Poland • Slovakia • Slovenia • South Korea • Thailand • Ukraine • Uruguay.

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Assessment form for the Guide to the negotiations and the Summary for policymakers

To assist us in improving the next versions of the Guide to the Negotiations and the Summary for policymakers, we should be grateful if you would assess this version on a scale of 1 to 4, adding your comments below.

You can also fill out this form online at the following address:
www.ifdd.francophonie.org/assessment-guide-to-the-negotiations

1 = highly satisfactory  2 = satisfactory  3 = rather unsatisfactory  4 = highly unsatisfactory

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Other comments:

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Please forward the form to the following address:

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56 rue Saint-Pierre, 3rd floor
Quebec City (Quebec) G1K 4A1, Canada
Fax: +1 418 692-5644
E-mail: ifdd@francophonie.org
This Guide to the Negotiations and its accompanying Summary for policymakers is produced every year by IFDD as support for the sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Aimed at helping negotiators to understand better the challenges of the 24th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP24), Part I of the guide sets out the current major issues. Special attention is paid to the elements making up the Paris Agreement work programme, whose operationalisation rules should be adopted at COP24. Part II sets out the progress made in the negotiations between COP23 and COP 25 and deciphers succinctly the Paris Agreement and the operational modalities emerging from Decision 1/CP.21. Part III offers a general conceptual framework, comprising a brief history of the climate negotiations, a description of the Convention and its main bodies and ad hoc groups as well as a presentation of the main negotiating groups and their positions.

Although this publication is intended especially for negotiators from Francophone countries, it should also be a useful tool for all other interested stakeholders. The Guide to the Negotiations and the Summary for policymakers is enhanced year on year and goes beyond the climate change negotiating structure. This is strengthened under the current international climate action which, following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, is aiming categorically to set up a decompartmentalised multi-actor and multi-sector momentum. Academics, public or private figures and representatives of civil society organisations or international institutions – they are all using the Guide and the Summary increasingly as an independent, factual and up-to-date source of information for the negotiations with an analytical, dynamic review of the issues.

We are hopeful that the various contributions will meet the expectations of our readers.