24th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Summary for policymakers

2 to 14 December 2018
Katowice, Poland
24th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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A few words from the Director of the IFDD

The French-speaking States and Governments, stakeholders in the Paris Agreement, are making every effort to convert their nationally determined contributions into national measures and programmes to combat climate change. The implementation of the Paris Agreement is very topical and the French-speaking actors are also busy in executing mitigation and adaptation initiatives based on national priorities and their particular situation.

The recent IPCC report released on 18 October 2018 revealed that compliance with the commitments made under the Paris Agreement would put us on the path of a global warming temperature of 3°C at the end of the century. This trend that is so far from the goals of the Paris Agreement has disastrous consequences for mankind and its environment.

Emissions need to be reduced immediately and drastically before 2030, as suggested by the IPCC experts. In this respect, the various Parties to the Paris Agreement are invited to raise the ambition of their national contributions in order to target a maximum rise in temperature to 1.5°C, which would reduce the risks and effects of climate change significantly.

Since the Paris Agreement entered into force in November 2016, it has become urgent for Parties to adopt the guidelines for its implementation (Paris Agreement Rules), especially relating to mitigation, communications on adaptation, transparency framework of measures and support and greenhouse gas inventories, in biennial and national reports. But, it is crucial that emission-reducing, adaptation and climate-resilience enhancing actions are increased, to avoid chaos for present and future generations.

The 24th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 24), scheduled for 2-14 December in Katowice, Poland, is an opportunity for the Parties to adopt measures to realign climate action in the countries, for full implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The high-level segment, the ministerial segment and the Talanoa Dialogue, scheduled on the fringes of the negotiating sessions, are a chance for policymakers and various climate actors to harmonise the different positions, towards the adoption of a regulation for the Paris Agreement in Katowice and the raising of the emission reduction ambition.

The French-speaking policymakers and delegates attending COP 24 will bring their contributions to this international negotiating process that is increasingly complex, in a context marked by an urgent need for action.
As in previous years, the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF-International Organisation of the Francophonie), through its subsidiary body, the Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD - Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development) will make its presence felt alongside French-speaking delegates. The Institute has arranged in particular a preparatory workshop for negotiators on 1 December 2018 and a ministerial consultation on 10 December 2018 in Katowice. In addition, a French-speaking pavilion (no. 23) has been set up on the COP 24 site so that member States and Governments can hold parallel events on French-speaking climate action and discuss the challenges facing the climate issues. It is the pavilion for all French-speakers!

Readers, the Institute makes this Guide to the Negotiations available to provide you with relevant information on the state of negotiations and the issues of COP 24, some of which are mentioned above. Its production has been made possible through the mobilisation of the French-speaking expertise and of our partners, especially ENERGIES 2050, which we thank most warmly.

The Institute is also producing an online application for the Guide to the Negotiations, which includes several functionalities and is available on Android and iOS.

Pleasant reading and my best wishes for successful negotiations in Katowice!

Jean-Pierre Ndoutoum
Editorial

Composition and methodological elements
This Summary for Policymakers supplements the Guide to the Negotiations, documents produced every year by IFDD as support for the sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Guide to the Negotiations and this Summary for Policymakers which accompanies it is enhanced year on year and goes beyond the climate change negotiating structure. This is strengthened under the current international climate action which, following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, is aiming categorically to set up a decompartmentalised multi-actor and multi-sector momentum. Academics, public or private figures and representatives of civil society organisations or international institutions – they are all using the Guide and the Summary increasingly as an independent, factual and up-to-date source of information for the negotiations with a dynamic review of the issues.

The authors have striven to propose a global and analytical presentation of issues for each part, whilst exposing the expectations of the 24th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP24) under Polish presidency. Once again, the drafting team has sought to encourage accessibility to information for readers with varying degrees of knowledge about the negotiation process. The aim is still for each individual to to be able to access the information he needs based on his priorities and the time he can give to it. Outreach boxes, illustrative and synthesis diagrams support the descriptions and detailed analyses of the various questions addressed in the negotiations wherever possible. The notion addressed can thus be grasped immediately. Readers are referred to other sections and source documents the length of the text so that they can broaden their understanding of a topic if necessary.

Note that only the official nomenclatures are quoted when reference is made to the documents from the negotiations. They are designed to make reading easier and can also be used to find the documents referred to on the UNFCCC website very easily1.

Presentation of the contents of the Summary for Policymakers
Part I puts into perspective the major issues of the current negotiations, with special attention paid to the elements making up the work programme for the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement as well as current dynamics conducted in the negotiating process or in parallel. Part II sets out the progress made in the negotiations between COP23 and COP25 and deciphers succinctly the Paris

Agreement and the operational modalities emerging from Decision 1/CP.21. Part III offers lastly a general conceptual framework, with a brief history of the climate negotiations, a description of the Convention and its main bodies and ad hoc groups as well as a presentation of the main negotiating groups and their positions.

The 2018 edition of the Guide and its Summary are once more benefiting from inputs from a group of authors from different French-speaking countries who have been involved in the climate negotiations for many years and also from a Review Committee, whose members have also been selected for their expertise, to strive for the highest possible quality. We are hopeful that the various contributions will make the Guide and its Summary even more relevant and useful for readers. We ask them to share their assessment and suggestions with us by filling in the form at the end of the guide.

This Guide and this accompanying Summary were updated on 15 October 2018. Updating boxes along with modifications in the Guide’s narrative have been added subsequently to take into account the various documents published after this date. These include the joint concept note from the presiding officers of the APA, SBI and SBSTA and the associated addenda relating to the different items of the Paris Agreement work programme.
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Part I.
Issues and positions

I.1. Issues related to the permanent subsidiary bodies

The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention. It also serves as the meeting for the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and to the Paris Agreement (CMA). Under the Convention, two permanent subsidiary bodies have been established: the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), which also serve the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The permanent subsidiary bodies usually meet twice a year during ordinary sessions, once with the COP, and another time at the headquarters of the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn.
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)

The SBI agenda is structured around the main pillars of the implementation of the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement: transparency, mitigation, capacity-building and finance. It is also under the SBI that intergovernmental meetings and other administrative, financial and institutional issues are negotiated. The SBI is increasingly involved in coordinating the work of bodies and specialised entities in the topics of its mandate, such as the Adaptation Committee, the Standing Committee on Finance and the Technology Mechanism.

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Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)

The SBSTA provides information and advice on the scientific and technological issues related to the Convention, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. The following areas are negotiated under this body: impacts, preparation and communication of GHG inventories, scientific observation and research and methodological issues. The SBSTA is also a body that liaises with other organisations providing climate change expertise, such as the IPCC.

Note also that the SBI and SBSTA handle certain issues together, in particular: the vulnerability of developing countries to climate change, response measures, adaptation issues, Technology Mechanism, Adaptation Committee, REDD+ process and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage⁴.

I.2. The issues related to the Ad Hoc Working Groups (AWG) and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)

Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)

By adopting the Paris Agreement, the Conference of the Parties (COP) also decided to run a major work programme accompanying it, via Decision 1/CP.21. This decision set up the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA⁵, under which are discussed the modalities to operationalise the provisions included in Decision 1/CP.21 and the work programme of the Paris Agreement.

The Parties accepted the proposal of the APA joint presiding officers to continue their work in a single contact group that has to consider the six substantial agenda items (see Annex A.4 to view the APA agenda items), to address fundamental questions, review progress accomplished, determine the way forward and review the draft conclusions. To navigate the complex negotiations and reach the planned decisions within a tight time frame, the APA has adopted a work method based on two pillars: close coordination among the various negotiation groups as well as with subsidiary bodies; and drawing up negotiation tools to make it easier to read very long informal notes. Furthermore, a platform providing an overview of the updated status of the negotiations for the various articles of the Paris Agreement and the provisions of Decision 1/CP.21 was established⁶.

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⁵. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 7.
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)

With the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016, a few days before COP22 (Marrakesh, 6-17 November 2016), the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1) was held at the same time as COP22. Given the rapid and early entry into force of the Paris Agreement, it was decided that CMA 1 would be extended until December 2018, with three sub-sessions in 2016, 2017, and 2018, at the same time as the COP sessions, to improve the chances of reaching a conclusion on the issues which should be decided on during CMA 1. CMA 1.3 in Katowice will thus be extremely important, as it will mark the culmination of the “transition” COP in Marrakech and Bonn, by forming the first decision-making COP for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The objective is to adopt a package of decisions that constitute the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement, to enable the implementation of the key aspects of the Agreement, especially: the NDC, transparency, cooperation mechanisms, climate finance, mechanisms for capacity-building and technology transfer and adaptation. Moreover, the political phase of the facilitative dialogue, which was renamed the Talanoa Dialogue after the Fijian COP23, will be held at the same time as CMA 1.3 along with a meeting of high-level political representatives.

To prepare for the negotiations, the joint presiding officers of the APA, SBI and SBSTA published a joint concept note on 15 October 2018. This note gave their assessment of the general state of progress of the negotiations and the organisational approach they intended to adopt to facilitate the negotiations in Katowice. In nine annexes, they detail their analysis of the state of the negotiations and propose texts about the various negotiating issues linked to the Paris Agreement work programme.

The next figure gives an overview of the different issues negotiated and their allocation; most of them must be the subject of a decision at COP24.

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7. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
Figure 2. Division of the issues amongst the negotiating organisations

8. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
Summary table of the stakes of the Katowice negotiations

To adopt the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement, the negotiations during COP24 will focus on the aforementioned points. Beyond the APA, the agendas of the subsidiary bodies also deal with issues directly or indirectly related to making the Paris Agreement operational. The next table gives an overview of items on the agendas of different bodies mandated to move these different negotiating items forward. It also refers to sections of the Summary where the various issues are discussed in more detail.

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9. Indicative selection based on the issues addressed in the Guide and that match the agenda items of the Katowice sessions (December 2018). For further information: see the detailed agendas in the Annex (A.4).
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I.3. The mechanisms of the Paris Agreement

General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement

In Addendum 2 of the joint concept note published in mid-October 2018\(^\text{10}\) the SBSTA president observes that the negotiations concerning Article 6 made significant progress at the Bangkok session and that the options were detailed very clearly. However, he highlights the need to identify compromises likely to generate support from several negotiating groups.

- Regarding the negotiations on Article 6.2, the main task will be to focus on the decisional elements for 2018 and develop further the technical work programme for 2019.
- Regarding the negotiations on the mechanism of Article 6.4, the Parties should agree on the decisions required so that the mechanism can be an instrument that is available from 2020, including the election of members of the Supervisory Body and the definition of a work programme for 2019.
- Regarding the negotiations on the work programme under Article 6.8, the Parties must identify and focus on the key options revolving around governance issues, as well as the steps and phases of the work programme to enable its implementation from 2019.

Context of negotiations and main issues

The aim of the negotiations is to adopt guidelines according to the modalities set out in Article 6.2\(^\text{11}\), the rules, modalities and procedures applicable to the mechanism established under Article 6.4\(^\text{12}\) and the need to find more clarity in the role of non-market-based approaches (Art. 6.8)\(^\text{13}\). The technical and political levels of the negotiations on the mechanisms of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement are extremely interdependent, especially concerning issues related to transparency (Art. 13), NDC accounting (Art. 4.13) and the Global Stocktake (Art. 14)\(^\text{14}\). Many questions are asked in order to ensure environmental integrity, including for defining additionality of mitigation with respect to political instruments, or for entire sectors. The structure of a draft text for each mechanism was developed at SBSTA 48, providing an initial consolidation approach. The objective of the Parties is henceforth to adopt the rules that are required for the initial operationalisation of the articles during COP24, leaving the more technical and specific questions for subsequent negotiations.

\(10\) APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018e. (APA-SBSTA-SBI.2018.Informal.2. Add.2.).
\(11\) Decision 1/CP.21, para. 36.
\(12\) Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 37-38.
\(13\) Decision 1/CP.21, para. 39.
\(14\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement.
A key issue for the negotiations is the development of the regulations of the three articles in a balanced manner, enabling, in particular, progress toward a common understanding of the operationalisation of non-market mechanisms.

**Progress of negotiations since COP23**

The central issues currently being negotiated include robust accounting given the wide variety of NDC and the transfer of elements of the regulations, methodologies and approaches of the Kyoto mechanisms (Clean Development Mechanism – CDM and Joint Implementation – JI). Other questions addressed relate to the differences in governance between the provisions under Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 4 – especially the objectives to avoid double counting and ensure a contribution with a global ambition. At the same time, another highly sensitive question is knowing whether emission credits will be taken for Article 6.4 only or also for Article 6.2. Regarding the non-market-based approaches (Art. 6.8), several types of activity that could potentially figure have been listed, but the orientation of the mechanism remains completely open.

Following the request by Parties during COP23, informal documents consolidated on the basis of informal notes and previous submissions by Parties were presented in May 2018. However, the negotiations did not make significant progress at the Bonn intersession, mainly due to their close political ties with climate funding issues. At the additional session in Bangkok, the Parties structured the three informal notes by identifying the elements of decision, the elements of an initial annex containing the specific regulations to be adopted, as well as the elements for a second annex that specifies the activities for a work programme for 2019.

**Degree of international surveillance for the mechanism under Article 6.2**

The degree of international control of the implementation of the mechanism is at the heart of negotiations on Article 6.2. On one side, several countries and groups of countries are demanding robust governance and detailed guidelines – comparable to the CDM system –, whereas others suggest a bottom-up governance for Article 6.2, whose operation would be directed entirely by the participating countries in the absence of a supervision entity. Others even suggest removing any reference to market mechanisms and placing all international cooperation activity under the non-market-based mechanism regime. The challenge for Parties to agree on the “commoditisation” of “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” (ITMO) and the corresponding adjustment of NDC is linked to this question. Positions on the ITMO vary between fungible and verified reductions on one side and opposition to an international definition and specification of the measuring unit on the other. Similarly, several proposals to determine the basis for corresponding adjustments are on the table. The requirement to quantify mitigation outcomes in the NDC is currently emerging, which is related to a fungible definition of ITMO and a
corresponding adjustment that reflects the quantified targets or inventories. The informal text also contains the option of introducing a tax on ITMO to support adaptation activities. A few groups of negotiators from developed countries are against this option that seeks to use cooperative approaches to establish links between the national emissions trading systems.

**Role of the mechanism under Article 6.4**

The informal text shows a certain continuity of the rules, modalities and procedures of the CDM in the operationalisation of the mechanism, whilst introducing new potential elements such as the global mitigation of emissions, enhanced mitigation ambition, protection of human rights, assistance to the countries that are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, as well as safeguards for avoiding double counting. A number of Parties suggests that the mechanism services to mobilise a range of activities, including initiatives based on scheduled, sectoral and other projects that could receive credits for emission reductions achieved. It is also suggested that the mechanism should go over and beyond total offsetting of emissions. However, the challenge is still to determine whether these activities and the activities not included in the NDC are eligible for the mechanism as well as to find modalities to ensure “real, measurable and long-term benefits” and sustainable development. Most developed countries propose strict governance of the mechanism under Art. 6.4 by the CMA and guided by a Supervisory Body. Although several options remain on the negotiating table, the Supervisory Body will most likely be responsible for designating operational entities and issuing emission reduction credits based on baseline methodologies and a Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system that is more or less close to the CDM.

**Non-market-based approaches**

It remains to determine whether the framework for the activities under Art. 6.8 will involve mapping/registering needs for financing and capacity-building or whether it takes on a facilitating function. Seven options have been put forward for its governance, from creating a body or specific committee overseen by the SBSTA and/or the SBI to decentralised international or national implementation. Although the reporting modalities and the question of adoption of international or decentralised regulations are still open, the informal document contains specific proposals for the work activities. The first type of activity would be related to the identification of the fields of intervention, in which non-market approaches could be implemented later, whilst the second type of activity concerns the development of tools and the identification of relevant information to share.

**I.4. Continuation of efforts toward the 1.5°C**

In Paris, several developing countries had emphasised that it is was important to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5°C, rather than 2°C, as they were already
dealing with various repercussions of global warming. Thus, the ALBA\textsuperscript{15}, AOSIS\textsuperscript{16}, Coalition for Rainforest Nations\textsuperscript{17}, African Group\textsuperscript{18} and LDC Group\textsuperscript{19} had all made 1.5°C one of their main objectives. The African Group and AILAC had suggested that an increase of over 1.5°C should involve developed countries offering more financing to developing countries, which would be confronted with the most adverse effects of global warming\textsuperscript{20}.

By implementing the Paris Agreement, the Parties aim to enhance the global response to the threat of climate change by “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”\textsuperscript{21}. These mitigation targets have been a culminating point of talks conducted under the auspices of the Convention since COP15 (see Figure 4 below). In Paris, the Parties also recognised that the emissions trajectory for 2030 which resulted from the \textit{intended} nationally determined contributions (INDC) should be reduced by 28% to reach a 2°C target by 2100 and that more data was required to establish a least-cost pathway that enables the achievement of a target of 1.5°C\textsuperscript{22} above pre-industrial levels.

The Parties therefore invited the IPCC “to present a special report in 2018 on the consequences of global warming above 1.5°C above pre industrial levels and on scenarios of evolution of global emissions of greenhouse gases”\textsuperscript{23}. This was published by IPCC at the beginning of October 2018, following its 48th session. This scientific analysis should henceforth play a crucial role in informing policymakers and enhancing the global climate ambition. The challenge for governments to transition toward pathways compatible with the 1.5°C is admittedly a sizeable one, at a time when consensus in the scientific literature points to insufficient political efforts currently, that would result in warming around 3-3.2°C by 2100\textsuperscript{24}. This observation was reaffirmed by the IPCC, which stated that “limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society”\textsuperscript{25}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} ALBA, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{16} AOSIS, 2015
\item \textsuperscript{17} Coalition for Rainforest Nations, 2015
\item \textsuperscript{18} African Group, 2015
\item \textsuperscript{19} Group of Least Developed Countries, 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{20} African Group, 2013; IISD, 2015, p. 5 for AILAC, Mexico and the Dominican Republic
\item \textsuperscript{21} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2
\item \textsuperscript{22} Decision 1/CP.21, para. 17
\item \textsuperscript{23} Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21
\item \textsuperscript{24} https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1chvcrjkc_974354.pdf.
\item \textsuperscript{25} IPCC, 2018b.
\end{itemize}
IPCC special report on global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels

The following paragraphs provide an overview of a few of the conclusions that can be drawn from the IPCC analysis. All of the documents relating to the analysis of global warming of 1.5°C are available online on the IPCC web portal26.

Global warming of 1.5°C, potential impacts and associated risks

The impacts of climate change are already clear and significant, whereas the IPCC considers that human activities have caused a rise of approximately 1°C in global temperature above the pre-industrial era27. With a rise in temperature to 1.5°C, 2°C or more, the risks progressively increase. Overall, the impacts will be more severe in poor and vulnerable regions due to the loss of their livelihoods, food insecurity, population displacements, health impacts and much more. Current trends suggest that a rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels could occur between 2030 and 2052, with already highly significant consequences, which would be even greater in a scenario of 2°C or more (see Figure 3 below).

For example, the sea level would rise by 10 cm more at 2°C than at 1.5°C, exposing ten million more people to such impacts as coastal flooding or saltwater infiltration in their fields and drinking water reserves. Furthermore, the IPCC indicates that economic losses increase as the temperatures rise. Also, most of the adaptation needs are reduced at 1.5°C, whilst pursuing this target offers perspectives that are less costly overall in terms of adaptation, mitigation and impacts. This information should thus encourage governments to take the measures required to reach the most ambitious goal of the Paris Agreement. In this respect, the IPCC analysis does clarify the options that involve a rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.

Related global GHG emissions pathways

Systemic measures must be taken in all sectors to achieve the 1.5°C target, especially in regional development, energy, industry, construction, transport and urbanism. To reach an emissions balance of zero by mid-century, net global anthropogenic CO₂ the target must be to reduce emissions by about 45% above their 2010 levels by 2030. The remaining emissions should be offset by removing the CO₂ from the atmosphere through negative emission technologies. The IPCC nevertheless states that technologies have yet to be proven on a large scale, adding that they could represent a considerable risk for sustainable development.

In its analysis, the IPCC confirms the observation of the lack of ambition in current governmental commitments, that would raise global GHG emissions to between 52-28 Gt CO₂-equivalent per year in 2030, whereas they should be less than 35 Gt CO₂-equivalent the same year for a pathway compatible with the 1.5°C by 2100, even in the scenario of a very daring increase in magnitude and ambition post-2030. Lastly, the IPCC highlights the importance of decompartmentalised and broader-scale action requiring joint intervention of national authorities and all other stakeholders. International cooperation also continues to be an essential catalyst that can create a favourable environment for global action in the context of sustainable development, especially for developing countries and vulnerable regions. The search for synergies with the SDG would be another relevant aspect to be explored.

27. IPCC, 2018c.
In conclusion, this scientific analysis by IPCC should actually play a crucial role in supporting the process of implementing the Paris Agreement (see Figure 5 below) and enhancing global climate ambition, whilst the operationalisation rules for the said Agreement should be adopted at COP24. In particular, the results of the special IPCC report are to be considered in the political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue conducted in Katowice (see Section I.12), but also, in particular, for the first review cycle of the NDC planned for 2020. Also note that following the decision adopted at its 47th session (Paris, France, 13-16 March 2017), the IPCC pursued the considerations of its future work as part of the Global Stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, which will be conducted starting from 2023, and every five years thereafter.

Figure 3. Examples of differentiated consequences caused by a temperature increase of 2°C/1.5°C above the pre-industrial era

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28. IPCC, 2018a.
29. © Guide to the Negotiations of the COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018, according to the IPCC.
## Issues and positions

**UNFCCC**

Stabilise [...] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.

**COP15**

To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention [...] we understand, given the scientific opinion whereby the rise in global temperature should be limited to 2°C [...]

We request that the implementation of this agreement be assessed by 2015 [...]

This would imply planning to boost the long-term objective by taking into account sundry elements provided by scientific work, especially in terms of a rise in temperature of 1.5°C.

**COP16**

Recognises moreover that a considerable drop in global greenhouse gas emissions is proving essential according to scientific data [...] to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions in order to contain the rise in the average temperature of the planet below 2°C above pre-industrial levels [...]

Recognises also the need to envisage, during the first examination of the global long-term objective, enhancing the global long-term objective based on the most certain scientific knowledge, mainly about the worldwide rise in average temperature of 1.5°C.

**COP17/ADP**

Noting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and emission change pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

**COP21**

Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, it being understood that this will reduce the risks and the effects of climate change considerably.

**COP21+IPCC**

Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to present a special report in 2018 on the consequences of global warming of more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and on associated profiles of evolution of global emissions of greenhouse gases.

Encourages scientific centres to review the gaps in data and research during structured dialogue between experts, including by focusing on scenarios that limit warming to below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100 and all regional and local repercussions associated with these scenarios.

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30. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
Figure 5. Provisions, targets and main mechanisms of the Paris Agreement that may be advised by the IPCC assessment on the 1.5°C target

### PROVISIONS, TARGETS AND MECHANISMS
OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ADVISED BY THE IPCC ASSESSMENT

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<th>ARTICLE 2</th>
<th>ARTICLE 4</th>
<th>ARTICLE 7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication</td>
<td>Reach a balance between anthropogenic emissions by the sources and the anthropogenic absorptions by the greenhouse gas sinks during the second half of the century on an equitable basis</td>
<td>Enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change with a view to contributing to sustainable development</td>
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<th>ARTICLE 8</th>
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<tr>
<td>Avoid, reduce to a minimum and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change</td>
<td>Provision of financial resources to assist developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation purposes</td>
<td>Sharing a long-term vision on the importance of giving full effect to the development and transfer of technologies</td>
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<th>ARTICLE 11</th>
<th>ARTICLE 12</th>
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<tr>
<td>Improve the abilities and capacities of developing country Parties, especially those with the fewest capacities</td>
<td>Enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information</td>
<td>Relating to the global stocktake, with the task of periodically assessing the implementation of the Agreement, to assess the collective progress toward achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals</td>
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### I.5. Issues relating to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)

**NDC: a dynamic at the heart of the Paris Agreement**

Prior to COP21 in 2015, most of the Parties to the Convention had submitted an *Intended* Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). The Paris Agreement provides for these INDC to be converted into nationally determined contributions (NDC). The NDC are one of the cornerstones of the Agreement, mainly for reaching collective mitigation goals. However, NDC-related issues go beyond mitigation, with the Agreement indicating that it is incumbent upon Parties to

31. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.
communicate and commit to ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4 (mitigation), 7 (adaptation), 9 (finance), 10 (technologies), 11 (capacity-building) and 13 (transparency)\textsuperscript{32}.

Figure 6. Ratification status of the Paris Agreement and communications of the NDC in relation to the number of Parties to the UNFCCC\textsuperscript{33}

Following its entry into force (4 November 2016), the priority is for the Parties to the Paris Agreement to transpose their NDC into national measures. As at 15 October 2018, 181 Parties have ratified it\textsuperscript{34} and 177 NDC have been communicated\textsuperscript{35}. Nevertheless, current governmental commitments are not enough to contain warming below the bar of 2°C/1.5°C by 2100, as provided for in the Paris Agreement (see also Section I.4). The hypothesis of full implementation of the current NDC would rather result in warming of around 3-3.2°C\textsuperscript{36}. Enhancing NDC-related ambition is thus an essential corollary to achieving long-term objectives, as well as short – and medium-term objectives This will also depend on progress at the Katowice Conference, where the operationalisation rules for the provisions of the Paris Agreement are due to be adopted.

\textsuperscript{32} Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 3
\textsuperscript{33} © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 Figures updated on 15 October 2018.
\textsuperscript{34} https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification.
\textsuperscript{35} http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx.
\textsuperscript{36} https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1chvcrjkc_974354.pdf.
Monitoring the implementation of the objectives and raising the ambition of NDC

The Paris Agreement sets up a binding architecture to reach the highest level of ambition in the mitigation targets linked to the NDC. First and foremost, the Parties commit to submit their NDC when acceding\(^{37}\) to the Paris Agreement\(^{38}\). Each Party to the Agreement must subsequently communicate and renew its NDC upwards every five years\(^{39}\), registering its highest possible ambition level. Periodic Global Stocktakes (from 2023 onwards) will assess the NDC and collective efforts every five years\(^{40}\). An initial assessment of efforts made is planned for Katowice, through the Talanoa Dialogue\(^{41}\) (see Section I.12). This should also allow the first revision cycle of NDC in 2020 to be prepared, based especially on the latest IPCC analysis of global warming greater than 1.5°C\(^{42}\).

Continuation of work on NDC and issues for Katowice

The next paragraphs provide an overview of the main negotiating points on the NDC, for which the subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA) and the APA have the mandate to submit draft decisions to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1) for consideration and adoption at Katowice.

General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement

During the preparation for COP24 and after Bangkok, the SBI and SBSTA Chairs and the APA Co-Chairs continued their effort to streamline the negotiation options for all of the points concerning the work programme of the Paris Agreement. As such, they developed and published a joint concept note\(^{43}\) in mid-October 2018 supplemented by annexes (“addenda”) offering new approaches or text options on various points in the talks. However, these various documents do not prejudge the final results that will be decided on in Katowice, or replace the various documents that the negotiations produce (informal notes, tools, etc.) under the various bodies (SBI, SBSTA, APA).

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37. Ratification or equivalent process
38. If they have not already done so via their INDC, or if they decide to modify them – see Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.
41. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.
42. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21.
43. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
Regarding the NDC, several addenda offer new approaches and options – whilst highlighting key political questions to be resolved – that the reader is invited to consider, especially Addendum 1, on the elements relating to Article 4 of the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 22-35. This addendum is divided into two parts:

(i) Part 1, concerning: Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21 (item 3 on the APA agenda); and

(ii) Part 2, concerning the: Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement (item 6 on the SBI agenda); Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement (item 5 on the SBI agenda); Impact of the response measures (item 9 on the SBSTA agenda).

**Issues related to the APA**

Regarding mitigation, note firstly APA agenda item 3 relating to the “new guidelines on the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21” and more especially the development of guidelines on: (a) the NDC characteristics, (b) specific information to facilitate the clarity, transparency and understanding of NDC and the accounting of NDC. This point crystallises a certain number of political tensions, whereas the mitigation component and NDC accounting affect the core of the Paris Agreement, mainly to harmonise, assess and monitor the efforts in achieving the long-term goal of limiting temperatures (2°C/1.5°C). In Bangkok (September 2018, APA 1.6), the Parties continued to work on the tool published by the joint presiding officers of the APA in August 2018, without managing to develop a revised version on the substance. A revised tool was nevertheless published, simply aiming to correct an omission in the previous tool. The negotiations in Katowice should make it possible to settle the questions of substance and reach consensus among the Parties.

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44. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018c.
45. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018d.
47. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 28.
48. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 31.
50. IISD, 2018b.
Structure of the text in the document published at the end of the Bangkok session (APA agenda item 3)

Following Bangkok\(^52\), the elements of texts (35 pages) are organised based on the following structure:

- **NDC characteristics**: (i) identification and list of existing characteristics, (ii) new/additional characteristics, (iii) Guidance/development of characteristics
- **Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding (ICTU)**: (i) Objectives, (ii) Capacity of developing countries, (iii) Procedural elements, (iv) Substantive elements.

Note that some elements were slightly restructured after the publication of the joint concept note\(^53\) of the APA joint presiding officers. Addendum 1 (Part I) of this note\(^54\) addresses these elements.

Regarding adaptation, transparency and monitoring the implementation, the APA will also have to finalise its work on a number of other decisive points for the future NDC-related processes. In particular: the new guidelines for adaptation communications, mainly included in the NDC (see Section I.10); the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the purposes of the transparency framework of measures and support (see Section I.ii); Global Stocktake issues (see Section I.6); the modalities and procedures to ensure the smooth functioning of the committee responsible for facilitating implementation and promoting compliance with provisions (Section I.6).

**Issues related to subsidiary bodies**

Some issues related to NDC are being negotiated under the aegis of subsidiary bodies; these should also constitute key elements of the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement. Discussions have continued on these points since the Bonn session (November 2017, at the same time as COP23), until SB 48.2 (Bangkok, September 2018) and will culminate in Katowice to establish draft decisions for consideration and adoption by CMA 1.

\(^{52}\) UNFCCC, 2018. pp. 3-38.
\(^{53}\) APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
\(^{54}\) APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018c.
**SBI**

Regarding issues related to NDC under the aegis of the SBI, the issues that are addressed mainly concern transparency (see Section I.11), particularly:

- Item 5 on the SBI agenda: *Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement for review and adoption by the CMA55*, whose outcomes from the informal consultations were published after Bangkok56.

- Items 6 and 7 on the SBSTA agenda relate to public registries.
  - Establishment of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the NDC public registry57, with the results of informal consultations published following Bangkok (SBI48.2.IN.i658)
  - Establishment of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry for communication adaptation measures59 (see Section I.10).

Note that joint consultations at COP24 will be held to explore the synergies between these two registries, as evoked during negotiating sessions of different groups of Parties60.

**SBSTA**

The issues that the SBSTA handles especially include questions concerning the cooperation mechanisms established by the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (see Section I.3) and accounting modalities of financial resources provided and mobilised via public interventions (see Section I.9). Other negotiating points under the auspices of the SBSTA will also be decisive in the future NDC-related processes, especially the development and transfer of technologies (see Section I.7), research and systematic observation or the impact of resource measures implemented.

**Conclusions**

At the end of the Bangkok session, the outcomes were published in a 307-page document. Although this document was an initial robust base for the Katowice negotiations, it has yet to work out clear options for several elements. In this respect, the joint concept note61 by the presidents of the SBI and SBSTA and joint presidents of the APA published mid-October 2018 provided additional rationalisation. Supplemented with annexes (“addenda”) that offer new approaches and text options for all the points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement, this

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55. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 10.
56. SBI, 2018a.
58. SBI, 2018b.
60. IISD, 2018b, p. 10
61. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
work could be a point of departure for the Parties to take discussions forward without prejudging the final outcomes that will be decided at COP24. The Katowice negotiations will therefore be intense and doubtless strained as attempts are made to give concrete expression to the work programme under several aspects.

All the more so that several oppositions were table between the Parties in Bangkok, more especially relating to mitigation and the predictability of financing, for example, as well as the differentiation in burden sharing in the collective effort to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement62. The negotiators thus bear a heavy responsibility and the results of their work will be decisive for efficient operationalisation rules for Agreement, whilst the NDC are the main means of implementation. Globally, Katowice will mark a crucial stage in the global climate action process for a lasting and enhanced ambition, which should also be reinforced by the Talanoa Dialogue. Many observers have certain expectations for an increase in the ambition level in the short and medium term from Talanoa.

I.6. Ambition and sectoral approaches

The Paris Agreement and its accompanying decision63 offer a certain number of mechanisms – that combined with the sectoral initiatives undertaken by both public and non-State actors since COP21 – that establish a genuine ambition for facing up to climate change issues. Thus, commitments by States under the UNFCCC are gradually being strengthened by international cooperative initiatives (ICI) on climate, that can be made up of all types of actor – public and private – and take any form of cooperation.

**Ambition mechanisms of the Paris Agreement**

At the end of COP22, the Parties welcomed the very clear programme of work established in the APA conclusions to finalise the work by December 2018. During COP23 and the preceding and subsequent meetings of the subsidiary bodies (SBSTA 47, SBSTA 48 and SBI 47 SBI 48) and the Paris Agreement working group (APA 1.5, APA 1.6), negotiations on agenda items involving ambition-related themes saw significant progress towards adopting decisions during COP24 at Katowice in December 2018. The concept notes developed by the presidents of the subsidiary bodies and the co-presidents of the APA published in mid-October 2018 attempted to define the working modes and the priorities at Katowice and to improve the structure of informal notes, by presenting them in a format that could see them adopted as decisions. The challenge is henceforth to adopt a balanced “package” that can take into consideration the concerns of all Parties, whilst ensuring that the matters carried forward to 2019 are concluded within the stipulated time-frames, to the satisfaction of the Parties.

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62. IISD, 2018b.
63. Decision 1/CP.21
The next paragraphs take stock of this so-called progress, highlighting the key matters to be resolved during COP24.

- **International cooperation mechanisms for the implementation of NDC**

  At the end of the Bangkok session, the co-facilitators issued informal notes on the guidelines for the international transfer of mitigation results, the rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism for mitigation and sustainable development and the work programme for the framework for non-market-based approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (see also Section I.3). These informal notes annexed to the concept note by the presiding officers of the APA and the SBI and SBSTA presidents will serve as a basis for the next negotiations towards adopting a decision on Article 6. Already, the Parties have agreed that certain questions will require additional work, that should be concluded end 2019 at the latest.

- **System for monitoring the implementation and “enhanced” support or the Transparency Framework**

  During APA 1.6 in Bangkok, the Parties made commendable progress in developing modalities, procedures and guidelines relating to the transparency framework reflected in the Bangkok outcomes. All components of the modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPG) became clearer, including the options representing different viewpoints by Parties. At the same time, it is important to note that there is still a great deal to be done to fine tune the many remaining options and sub-options for the MPG to be adopted at Katowice (see also Section I.II).

- **2018 Facilitative Dialogue: “Talanoa Dialogue”**

  Greater clarity in the preparations for the facilitative dialogue has been noted. This must assess progress accomplished towards the Paris Agreement goal for long-term emissions and shed light on the preparation of NDC (see also Section I.12). Note that the inclusion of elements in the IPCC report on the impacts of limiting the temperature to 1.5°C (see also Section I.4), that has already identified many possible solutions, will be taken into account in the framework of the Talanoa Dialogue.

- **Global Stocktake from 2023**

  One key result of the APA 1.6 on this item was the move to a decision-based language, both for the modalities and the sources of contribution for the Global Stocktake.

- **Mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance with the provisions of the Agreement**

  Their deliberations at the APA 1.6 have helped the Parties to a better understanding of modalities and procedures for the committee to facilitate the implementation

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and promote compliance provided for in Article 15 of the Paris Agreement and have clarified certain options currently being negotiated. Adding a text on the systematic problems and its overall move to a decision-type language are noteworthy, making the outcome of Bangkok on this item\(^{68}\) a firm milestone on the road to Katowice.

- **Long-term climate financing**
  
The question relating to determining, from now, the climate action financing goal for post-2025 is still being discussed (see also Section I.9) and is a major area of disagreement between developed countries and developing countries that could compromise the ambition of developing countries when submitting the next NDC.

- **Relations between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention**
  
Additional discussions on this agenda item at COP22 were carried forward to COP24 but recommendations were made to bring the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) closer together, in order to facilitate the financing of technology action plans established from technological needs assessments in developing countries (see also Sections I.9 and I.7).

  Overall, when assessing the ambition through advances in the negotiations, it is clear that much progress has been made technically. It remains necessary, however, to pursue the efforts to finalise the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement, for sustained political will alone can finalise and adopt draft decisions in Katowice and give an assurance that pending matters will be closed at end 2019.

**Sectoral approaches**

The Bali Action Plan\(^{69}\) already referred to cooperative approaches and sectoral approaches to enhance mitigation after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This raised tremendous hope for the effective implementation of sectoral approaches under the Convention. Henceforth, all Parties to the Paris Agreement should submit an NDC; virtually all these NDC have a mitigation component and some have an adaptation component based on international cooperation. In addition, international cooperation in the field of mitigation between the Parties in implementing their NDC is permitted and the Paris Agreement and its accompanying decision recognise and encourage the efforts made by all non-Party entities to face up to and respond to climate change.

Since Lima (2014), the UNFCCC has attempted to make cooperative sectoral actions more visible, more especially those of non-State actors, by inviting them to take stock of these efforts via the portal of non-State actors for climate change\(^{70}\).

\(^{68}\) APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018k. (APA-SBSTA-SBI.2018.Informal.2.Add.8).

\(^{69}\) FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1

\(^{70}\) NAZCA platform [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/.
COP21 in Paris multiplied the phenomenon by inviting non-Party entities to multiply their efforts\(^{71}\) and support measures designed to reduce emissions and/or enhance resilience and reduce vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change (see also Section I.13).

To date, more than 10,200 cooperative initiatives have been launched in the field of climate change\(^{72}\), most of which are sectoral and sub-sectoral approaches involved public authorities and non-State actors in the most important sectors, including transport, agriculture and forestry, waste, industry, energy (access to energy, renewable energies, energy efficiency), short-lived climate pollutants or adaptation and resilience, etc.

Lastly, note the dynamics conducted outside the UNFCCC processes, for one of the highest emitting sectors, that has made noteworthy progress since 2016. This sector, through the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has managed to introduce a certain number of concrete measures in terms of technological development and international regulatory standards. In 2016, ICAO introduced regulations including a market mechanism\(^{73}\) to reduce its emissions and contribute to achieving the ambitious goals set by the Organisation and its members to be achieved by 2030. The ICAO Board adopted, in June 2018, a set of standards and recommended practices (SARP) that make it mandatory for the States and air operators to implement the ICAO Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) plan\(^{74}\). The challenge for the Parties to the Paris Agreement is to work so that this new mechanism – like those instigated in other sectors – integrates with the provisions that will be introduced under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on cooperative approaches, to guarantee environmental integrity, ensure sustainable development and avoid double counting of reductions in GHG emissions.

I.7. Development and transfer of technologies

Background

The development and transfer of technologies has always been at the heart of the negotiation agenda and the actions undertaken by the UNFCCC since its adoption in 1992. Given the practical implications of decisions, the Parties have maintained in-depth relations and negotiations fuelled by diverging geostrategic guidelines in

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\(^{71}\) Decision I/CP.21, paras. 133-134.

\(^{72}\) 10,213 initiatives as at 15 October 2018 [online] http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/

\(^{73}\) Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA); for further information [online] https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/market-based-measures.aspx.

both the frameworks to be established and in the operational pillars to be implemented to contribute to mitigation and adaptation to climate change, especially in developing countries. The evolution of negotiations on the transfer of technologies seems to be marked by a chronological series of decisive steps.

Until 2010, the UNFCCC gave shape to the ambitions, guidelines and decisions of Parties mainly under Article 4 of the Convention and Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The technology transfer framework and the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) have been able to register significant progress, especially the development of methodological guides\(^{75}\) and reports on the assessment of methodological needs, support in setting up the climate technology information portal (TT:Clear), support in organising workshops and preparing information notes on the framework beneficial to the transfer of technologies.

In addition, the products, strategic discussions and work meetings conducted by the EGTT led to the creation of the Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer (PSP)\(^{76}\) in 2008, financed by the GEF and executed by the UNEP DTU Partnership (UDP). This programme, whose third phase (TNA 3 – EBT 3\(^{77}\)) commenced in 2018, has enabled 85 developing countries to draft their technological needs assessment report mainly consisting in identifying and analysing the barriers and of the framework beneficial to developing and transferring priority climate technologies as well as the development of a technology action plan and project ideas.

In 2010, the Cancún Agreements (COP16) proved to be a decisive turning-point with the creation of the technology mechanism\(^{78}\), composed of a political arm, the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and an operational arm, the Climate Technology Network and Centre (CTCN). To contribute to the operationalisation of this mechanism, the Parties thus engaged in – through the permanent subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA) – a series of consultations and proposed texts between COP17 (2011) and COP20 (2014), including Bonn intersessions.

Given the urgency of climate action, the Parties agreed in 2015 to operationalise efficiently the technology framework\(^{79}\) of the Paris Agreement adopted at COP21\(^{80}\) and thus contribute to the sustainable development with low-carbon emissions and resilient to climate change\(^{81}\), taking into account the national circumstances of vulnerable countries.

\(^{75}\) UNDP, 2009.
\(^{76}\) Decision 4/CP.13
\(^{77}\) TNA: Technology Needs Assessment.
\(^{78}\) Decision 1/CP.16, para. 117(a) and (b).
\(^{79}\) Decision 1/CP.21, para 7.
\(^{80}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, 1 and 4
\(^{81}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, paras. 1 and 2.
Post-COP21, negotiation trends on climate change technologies

Following the decisions taken at COP21 and specifically the adoption of Paris Agreement, the Parties in agreement with the bodies of the COP (SBI, SBSTA, APA) and other bodies of the Convention organised a series of consultations to operationalise the different points of the negotiation agenda, including among others:

1. **strengthening of links and consultations** between the technology and financial mechanisms\(^82\) conveyed by the regular organisation of annual bipartite meetings, the joint development of a request for technical assistance from the CNCT through the preparatory programme run by the GCF\(^83\);

2. on-going improvement of the **Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer** (PSP) by allocating a dominant role to the framework and synergy of actions with the CNCT\(^84\) and TEC\(^85\) to contribute to the operationalisation of Technology Action Plans (TAP) and ideas for projects, which are the two major products of the said programme;

3. **independent assessment of the CTCN** and consideration of the scope and practical and strategic implications of the response strategies developed and proposed by the UNEP\(^86\), in accordance with the provisions of Decision 14/CP.23 (paras. 1-9). The draft decision reached at SBI 48 that should be submitted to COP24 for consideration and adoption is above all marked by a major point of divergence relating essential to the financial support required for the adequate operation of Designated National Entities (DNE) of developing countries;

4. **scope and modalities of the periodic assessment of the technology mechanisms;** the draft decision prepared by the designated facilitators including the annex\(^87\) during the additional session in Bangkok (SBI 48.2) should be the subject of a series of intense negotiations during COP24. In particular, the G-77 + China group deem it necessary to deepen the discussions on the practical modalities of the assessment, so that suitable and appropriate recommendations are available on improving the technology mechanism from the perspective of the implementation of the Paris Agreement;

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82. Decision 7/CP.21
83. Decision 14/CP. 22 para. 4.
84. SBI 45: Conclusions no. 84.
85. FCCC/SBI/2015/22, para. 79.
86. FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.5.
87. SBI48.2.DT.i14a.
General overview on the progress of the negotiations for COP24

On this last point, the presidents of the subsidiary bodies of the Convention agreed and published a joint concept note\(^{88}\) in mid-October 2018, setting out the conceptual proposals for the procedural modalities of the periodic assessment (sequential diagram\(^{89}\)) and taking into consideration the interrelations\(^{90}\) between the CTCN review process and the periodic review of the technology mechanism.

5. **development of the technology framework** started since SBSTA 45 continues to be marked by well-known divergences, mainly during the additional Bangkok session, where the Parties decided to carry forward the discussions on a draft decision and its annex\(^{91}\) (updated proposal for the technology framework) to COP24. The main points of divergence include, *inter alia*: consideration of circumstances and specific needs of developing countries, promotion of endogenous technologies, precise and clear definition of the said structure and above all its functional links with the technological mechanism and the other structures relevant to the Convention specifically the GCF and the importance of the contribution of the technology framework to the transformational changes that are still expected and expressed by the developing countries.

The analysis of progress registered since the technology transfer framework was created in Cancún (COP16) instituting the technology mechanism and reaffirmed further by the technology framework of the Paris Agreement suggests a genuine outlook for the development and transfer of technologies. However, the existence of challenges and blocking factors must be recognised, that as a whole have a negative effect on the efficiency of the technology mechanism and the current process to develop rules governing the technology framework. These include the limited financial resources of the CTCN, the absence of a clear architecture for the technology framework, the limited contribution of the financial mechanism etc.

From this viewpoint and given the mixed results of the additional session in Bangkok, the new joint concept note prepared by the presidents of subsidiary bodies and the joint presidents of the APA augur genuine prospects for the next negotiating sessions and above all set in motion a new constructive dynamic in order to reach consensual conclusions and decisions. And especially on the major points of divergence on the transfer of technologies, like the practical modalities of the periodic assessment of the technology mechanism, necessary support for the DNE, consideration of circumstances and specific needs of developing countries, promotion of endogenous technologies and the pressing need for the precise and clear definition of the technology framework structure.

\(^{88}\) APA, SBSTA, SBI, 2018h. (APA-SBSTA-SBI.2018.Informal.2.Add.5)
\(^{89}\) SBI49.M.i15.
\(^{90}\) APA, SBSTA, SBI, 2018h. (APA-SBSTA-SBI.2018.Informal.2.Add.5), para. 5 (CMA draft decision) et para..1 (draft decision COP24).
\(^{91}\) SBSTA48.2.DT:i5.
I.8. Capacity-building

Capacity-building in the context of international climate negotiations

Capacity-building initiatives are rooted in the observation that developing countries, as well as the so-called economies in transition, will not be able to engage in any ambitious actions, both in the area of adaptation and mitigation, without addressing the gaps and the deficiencies identified as limitations for formulating and implementing them. In this respect, capacity-building consists in improving the capacity of the individuals, the organisations and institutions in both the developing countries and in the economies in transition with the aim of identifying, planning and implementing mitigation measures, or developing low greenhouse-gas development strategies as well as climate change adaptation strategies.

Under the UNFCCC, capacity-building is designed on three levels: individual, institutional and systemic. In recent years, capacity-building negotiations have resulted in miscellaneous arrangements. The initial framework to support developing countries, more especially the LDC, SIDS and countries with economies in transition, for an effective implementation of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, following in-depth reviews, has revealed the need to be enhanced so that countries can actually fulfil their commitments under the Convention and its dependent legal instruments and bodies.

Between 2012 and 2015, the Durban forum offered countries an opportunity to engage in in-depth discussions on capacity-building in developing countries. It was organised as an annual event under the auspices of the SBI and group actors of miscellaneous origin to share experiences, good practices and lessons learned. The people involved were technical and political experts, practitioners and representatives of national governments and intergovernmental organisations, the civil society and private sector entities. At the invitation of the SBI, governments annually submitted proposals for topics to be included on the agenda of these meetings.

Capacity-building in the context of the Paris Agreement

Article 11 of the Paris Agreement underlines the importance of capacity-building in developing countries. COP21 also saw the setting up of the Paris Committee on capacity-building (PCCB) to advance consistency and coordination. The Paris Agreement provides for enhancing the capacity-building framework through appropriate institutional arrangements, including those established in the framework of the Convention to serve the Paris Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement is mandated to consider and adopt a decision on the initial institutional arrangements for capacity-building. In addition, Decision 1/CP.21 also established the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) in 2015 (see Section I.12.).

92. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 84.
Continuing talks, assessment since COP21 and looking forward to COP24

Following the setting up of the PCCB by virtue of COP21, it was expected that COP22 in Marrakech would take stock initially, especially to develop its mandate. In this respect, the deliberations on the PCCB were conducted through the SBI sessions. At the end of COP22, the PCCB mandate had been adopted in accordance with the mandate issued to the SBI by COP21\(^93\). It was especially decided that the priority theme of the PCCB for 2017 would relate to the capacity-building activities for the implementation of nationally determined contributions (NDC). A summary report on capacity-building of developing countries was also presented.

The first meeting of the PCCB\(^94\), held in Bonn on 11-13 May 2017, adopted its work procedures and modalities and made the initial efforts to implement the first phase of its work programme covering 2017-2019. These efforts included the development of an Internet portal with the support of the Secretariat, the growth of synergies with the constituted bodies, the execution modalities with a view to recommendations on the central theme of 2017 relative to the NDC and the preparation of the annual technical progress report for consideration by the COP.

The second meeting of the PCCB, which is henceforth split into four working groups, was held in Bonn in May 2018\(^95\). Measures for the implementation of the evolving PCCB work plan for 2017-2018 were presented at this meeting, mainly the establishment of a work plan for each working group, collaboration with more actors of Parties and within the Marrakech Partnership and consideration of loss and damage issues. In addition, the PCCB set its fields of interest for 2018 and 2019, including on-going capacity-building support for the implementation of NDC, recognition of human rights and questions relating to gender and fair transition. For 2019, the PCCB has invited several experts from bodies established under the Convention and the entities operating under the Financial Mechanism, along with the Adaptation Committee, Green Climate Fund, Global Environment Facility, LDC Group of Experts, Standing Committee on Finance and the Technology Executive Committee.

Under the monitoring and revision process, the summary report on capacity-building for economics in transition was submitted to COP23 by the Secretariat. The report\(^96\) recognises the advances made by these Parties, the sufficient contribution by the Annex I Parties and the GEF, but equally the multilateral development banks and international financial institutions for the implementation of these activities.

\(^{93}\) Decision I/CP.21, para. 76.
\(^{96}\) FCCC/SBI/2017/L.25/Add.1; FCCC/SBI/2017/L.27/Add.1.
The annual PCCB technical report was finalised in August 2018 and will be presented at COP24. It underlines the progress made in the cooperation with bodies dealing with different but intrinsically linked topics and the strengthening of cooperation with other entities involved in capacity-building. The annual report also highlights the importance of cross-cutting questions of gender and human rights that will be pursued in workshops, webinars and parallel events during COP24. In addition, the web portal that assembles information on capacity-building activities and additional resources, is currently being developed and put online97.

I.9. Financing

2018 was marked by two important events related to climate financing:

• The General Assembly of the Global Environment Fund (GCF) held in Vietnam concluded with the seventh replenishment of its resources, with approximately USD4.3 billion for the next 4 years (2019-2022); and

• the launch of negotiations and the preparation of the first replenishment of the Green Climate fund resources (GCF), which, since its launch in 2015, functions and finances by the mobilisation of temporary resources (2015-2018).

The main objectives for 2018 – their conclusions are expected at COP24 – will be to:

• make the best possible progress on the negotiations to provide the modalities, procedures and methodologies (Reporting Modalities Procedures and Guidelines – MPG) of the operationalisation manual of the Paris Agreement rules on finance issues, so that they are as balanced and as complete as possible;

• facilitate increased access to the GCF, Global Environment Facility (GCF), Adaptation Fund (AF), etc., by ensuring that the finance mechanism of the Convention and its instruments function adequately;

• finalise the modalities so that the AF can support the Paris Agreement.

However it is still important to highlight that these are practically the same topics and elements which keep recurring in the discussions and negotiations such as the needs, necessities, mobilisations, availabilities, flows and the State and non-State climate finance actors etc., since the previous COP under Fijian presidency (COP23 – November 2017, Bonn).

Continued on page 33

Long-term climate financing

The issue of long-term financing consists in negotiating a work programme that is constantly updated and which ensures predictability, mobilisation and access to innovative resources for long-term climate finance (between 2020 and 2030 for example), by the developed countries and other non-state actors acting voluntarily for the benefit of developing countries.

The 2018102 workshop on long-term financing was held on the fringes of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies (April-May 2018), on 7-8 May in Bonn (Germany). Its outcomes103 will be used to prepare the deliberations of the High-level Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Finance at COP24.

Standing Committee on Finance (SCF)

In 2018, the SCF continues its meetings to regulate financial issues of the UNFCCC process. Looking towards COP24, the SCF prepared and posted its annual report at the conference after its 19th meeting held in Bonn (Germany) on 29-31 October 2018, announcing useful recommendations to the operational entities of the Convention’s finance mechanism.

Green Climate Fund (GCF)

The current year has been one of the most difficult for the GCF, despite efforts by its Board and its Secretariat. At Katowice, the Parties will need to discuss, negotiate

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99. SBI, 2018c.
100. SBSTA, 2018.
101. APA, 2018b.
and decide on the content of the annual report\textsuperscript{104} submitted by the GCF Board and other issues such as:

- improved access to GCF resources;
- promotion of the commitment of the private sector;
- decision-making process;
- outcomes of the review of the initial period of mobilisation of the GCF resources and the process to implement and achieve the first creation of the GCF resources (the procedure having already been initiated by the GCF Board);
- promotion of a scheduled approach;
- accreditation issues.

**Global Environment Fund (GEF)**

2018 was also an important year for the GEF. Whilst continuing its normal activities by adopting and financing projects, it prepared and held a successful sixth assembly adopting its seventh replenishment (GEF-7), totalling USD4.3 billion covering biodiversity, combating desertification, climate change, chemical pollutants, international waters etc. It is worthwhile noting the decline in finance allocated to combating climate change due to the fact that the GCF has become operational and that the contributing countries are alert to possible duplications.

The GEF published its annual report\textsuperscript{105} to the COP, outlining in full the progress made, including the areas and sectors eligible for financing. To this end, the Parties will discuss the following at COP24:

- the new policy on co-financing of projects promoting the climate ambition;
- the procedures which will be implemented by the GEF related to the reducing the risks of money-laundering or terrorism financing of projects financed by the GEF;
- private sector participation;
- the seventh replenishment of the GEF resources and greater involvement of potential contributors.

**Adaptation Fund (AF)**

Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement there has been concern about the future of the Adaptation Fund and its dependent actions and projects. After earlier intense negotiations and during COP23, an agreement between the Parties was

\textsuperscript{104} Advance version of the GCF Annual Report to COP24 [online] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Seventh%20Report%20of%20the%20GCF%20to%20UNFCCC%20COP%20UNFCCC%20Submission.pdf.

\textsuperscript{105} Advance version of the GEF Annual Report to COP 24 [online] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Final%20GCF%20Report%20to%20UNFCCC%20COP%2024.pdf.
reached for the Fund to serve the Paris Agreement. However, there was no agreement on the manner and modalities to be used for the Fund's new role, nor the terms under which it would continue to support both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement at the same time. Neither was it agreed how and from whom they would receive its guidelines and directives. Questions that may be resolved at COP24.

**Points related to the implementation of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement**

Regarding the accomplishment and adherence to *ex ante* obligations (Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement) of developed countries (and other voluntary contributors) in terms of mobilisation and supply of adequate, sufficient and accessible financial resources for developing countries, the Parties should agree at COP24 on:

- the establishment of a process allowing a quantitative and qualitative response to the provisions taken under Article 9.5;
- the determination of the quantitative and qualitative information to highlight the *(ex-ante)* developed countries’ potential to mobilise and provide financing (UNFCCC, Annex II) for the benefit of the developing countries.

The conclusion of these two points at Katowice will deliver sufficient elements to the assessment and transparency mechanism that has to be developed in compliance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

Regarding the *ex-post* accounting modalities (Article 9.7 of the Paris Agreement) for financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions of developed countries, the consultations between the Parties have continued in 2018, with the aim of being able, in Katowice, to communicate their conclusions in order to formulate a recommendation for consideration and adoption by CMA 1.

**Quantitative collective finance target**

As for Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Paris Agreement, it is provided that “as part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilising climate finance and pursue their existing collective mobilisation goal through 2025 with a view to setting a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries.

In this context, the developing countries and the African Group (AGN) supported by other groups of developing countries, request that the process which would allow, at the right time (see inset below), to determine this quantified collective target ,within the framework of the preparatory negotiations for the implementation of the various provisions of the Paris Agreement, commences.
**Other financial issues**

Regarding the provision of financial support to the national reports of developing countries and its importance for the transparency systems to be introduced, the needs are still being expressed and turning them into reality will dictate the accomplishment, by the developing countries, of their reporting commitments.

Lastly, the other financial and budgetary questions of interest to COP24 can be summarised as:

- the activities, the significant milestones in the achievement of the programme and the financial performance of the Secretariat in 2017;
- possible prioritising approaches and the budgetary implications of the decisions;
- possible improvements to the presentation of the budget and the work programme for the two-year period 2020-2021;
- the status of contributions of Parties as at 13 April 2018;
- and the report on the technical workshop dedicated to ways of improving the effectiveness and transparency of the budgetary process.
- the restrictive guidelines of the CMA for the operation bodies of the finance mechanism;
- the introductory guidelines of the CMA for the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF);
- the modalities for communicating financial information on a bi-annual basis regarding the provision of public financial resources to the developing countries in accordance with Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement.

Discussions and debates on these matters guided by both co-presidents of the APA were compiled as an outcome of the first part of the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies in an information note[^106] which was used and updated during the second part of the same session held three months later at Bangkok and which will be continued in Katowice, for potential conclusion.

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**I.10. Adaptation**

Despite significant levels of progress made on climate change negotiations, the topics of resilience and adaptation to the effects and consequences of climate change are still being explored, not managing to mobilise a sufficient amount of effort and contribution to allow the developing countries, notably the African countries, the LDC and SIDS, to combat the increasingly pronounced impacts affecting all the regions of the world.

At COP23 (November 2017), as during the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies (April-May 2018), it did not seem evident that significant progress in the negotiations on different elements of adaptation had been made, even if a great

[^106]: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/l02a1.pdf?download#page=159](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/l02a1.pdf?download#page=159)
deal of effort was put into it and particularly to find a balanced and equitable method of handling adaptation and mitigation in form as well as in substance.

For COP24, and continuing on from the additional Bangkok session (4-9 September 2018), the reader of this guide is invited to consider closely the following topics in terms of adaptation, which could deliver favourable outcomes and will be agreed at Katowice:

- The qualitative and quantitative definition\(^{107}\) of the global adaptation objective\(^ {108}\) and its consideration in the facilitation Dialogue in 2018 as well as the first global report in 2023
- The consideration of the national communication on adaptation and its constituent elements, whether or not part of the NDC. as well as its related National Registry.

Furthermore, the consideration of the question of vulnerability in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement for African countries will be continued and should see a positive outcome at COP24.

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**General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement**

With the joint concept note\(^ {109}\) of the SBI and SBSTA presidents and the APA co-presidents, annexes (“addenda”) were published in mid-October 2018 on the elements of the Paris Agreement work programme. Addendum 3\(^ {110}\), containing draft decisions for COP24, relates to the following adaptation issues:

- Additional guidelines regarding communication on adaptation, including a component of the contributions decided at a national level, outlined in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement.
- Establishment of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 4.12 of the Paris Agreement:
- Questions related to paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21.

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107. The Paris Agreement seeks to strengthen the global response to climate change and increase everyone’s ability to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change as well as to strengthen resilience to climate change. It defines a global adaptation objective which aim is to: (i) strengthening adaptation and resilience capacity; (ii) reducing vulnerability to contribute to sustainable development; and (iii) to ensuring a suitable adaptation response within the framework of the goal of maintaining average global warming below 2°C and continuing efforts to maintain it below 1.5°C. See [online] https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-big-picture/new-elements-and-dimensions-of-adaptation-under-the-paris-agreement-article-7#goal.


Adaptation Committee

The Adaptation Committee also put forward a recommendation\textsuperscript{111} regarding the establishing of methodologies to assess the adaptation needs of the developing countries without the latter incurring any charges or additional and useless burdens.

In addition, it is worthwhile also considering the important work that the Adaptation Committee delivers in relation to “Long-term Adaptation Planning”\textsuperscript{112}. An element which could be of importance in the Paris Agreement procedure, from COP24 onwards, and even be part of the package of decisions expected within the framework of the operationalisation rules.

National Communication on Adaptation

A great deal of effort has been made to ensure that the Parties to the Paris Agreement agree on the form, substance and process of the “National Communication on Adaptation”. Will there be a separate report or a chapter on the reporting of the NDC? Which details will be necessary or indeed useful? What are the financial implications arising from the choice of the type of report?

At this stage, the “National Communication on Adaptation” has diverse and varied formats. It allows the developing countries to assess their capacities and their levels of adaptation and resilience to the effects and the impacts of climate change, to express their vulnerabilities and their needs (in the form of activities, priority national, regional or local programmes and projects etc.) to tackle adverse consequences for populations, ecosystems and economies etc. It also allows for the recording of the efforts undertaken by the developing countries as well as the national investments given to this, by seeking recognition for them but also a follow-up assessment of the adaptation actions and activities carried out or intended to be carried out by the developing countries. Finally, the different elements and conclusions of this tool could be used at the Global Stocktake in 2023.

The other topic being debated regarding the choice of the procedure for the “National Communication on Adaptation” is the involvement of financial supports arising from the form, type and uses of such reporting. To reiterate, it is evident that for developing countries any new obligation of reporting implies the developed countries making available and providing access to new and additional financial resources (and funds to which they are contributors/donors such as the GEF, GCF and LDCF or the AF), in compliance with the provisions made by COP and the meetings of its instruments (CMP/CMA). An involvement which the developed countries would like to avoid, as would the funds concerned by a lack of resources, insisting on the voluntary character of this national communication.

\textsuperscript{111} https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/l02f_1.pdf.
\textsuperscript{112} https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ac13_7b_long-term.pdf.
Registry of communications on adaptation

In this same context, the SBI continues to review the question relating to the processes and procedures of the function and use of the public communication registry on adaptation, especially:

- the links between the national communication on adaptation registry\(^{113}\) and that of NDC\(^ {114}\);
- taking into account, from its design phase, the need for the registry to feature simplicity, be user-friendly and provide secure access and use.

COP24 could maybe make a decision in relation to this within the framework of the components used for the operationalisation rules manual of the Paris Agreement, through CMA 1.

Nairobi Work Programme (NWP)

In exploring the efforts provided and the encouraging results obtained through the process linked to the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP), the Parties have submitted their points of view and suggestions on how to improve the relevance and the effectiveness of the NWP. It was thus decided that the future areas of interest of the NWP should be centred on new questions related to climate change, including specifically: extreme weather phenomena; oceans, coastal zones and ecosystems; agriculture and food security; slow developing phenomena; rural systems and rural communities; means of subsistence and socio-economic elements.

National Adaptation Plan (NAP)

Beyond the statistics provided in terms of the development of the financial support of the GCF to develop the National Adaptation Plans (NAP) for the developing countries, which do not in fact reflect their expectations, COP23 recognised in its conclusions that numerous developing country Parties still have difficulty accessing GCF financing to develop and implement their NAP\(^ {115}\), despite the inclusion of this procedure in the preparatory activities for the GCF.

SBI 48 reviewed the progress made in formulating and implementing NAP together with the outcome of the workshop\(^ {116}\) held under the Adaptation Committee on access to preparatory financial resources (GCF). SBI 48 was thus able to conclude\(^ {117}\) that the developing country Parties would be invited to submit their examples of national adaptation planning at COP24 and to decide to continue the review of this topic at SBI 49.

\(^{113}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7 para. 12.
\(^{114}\) Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 12.
\(^{115}\) IISD, 2017.
\(^{116}\) IISD, 2018a
\(^{117}\) FCCC/SBI/2018/L.16
Technical Examination Process on Adaptation (TEP-A)

Lastly, the technical examination process on adaptation (TEP-A), set up by COP21 as part of the pre-2020 enhanced action and scheduled to take place during the period 2016-2020, will have to identify concrete opportunities for enhancing adaptation and resilience, reducing vulnerabilities and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions.

I.11. Transparency

General overview of the state of progress of the negotiations on points relating to the work programme of the Paris Agreement

Addendum 6 of the joint concept note (published in October 2018) relating to the MPG (modalities, procedures and guidelines) for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement notes generally that:

- The Parties have made commendable progress on these aspects.
- All parts of the MPG have become clearer, including the different options considered by the Parties.
- Work on textual proposals to be included has advanced, as has identifying technical work to be undertaken after the adoption of modalities, procedures and guidelines at Katowice.
- It is also highlighted that much work is needed to narrow down the many remaining options and sub-options.

Aspects still to be defined or settled involve the following questions, for example:

- What flexibility can be offered to developing country Parties that need it given their capacities (for NDC reporting, for using guidelines for national inventories)?
- What is the common set of information needed to track progress in implementing and achieving all types of NDC?
- What aspects of the previous transparency framework can be mobilised for the enhanced transparency framework?
- What format for the technical examinations?
- What frequency and what timetable for the facilitation and multilateral consideration of progress?

Transparency in the context of international climate negotiations

Transparency has been an issued for several years in the internal UNFCCC processes, as the Cancún Agreements dating from 2010 already established a reporting and revision mechanism for the Parties. This precedent therefore forms a solid basis for establishing the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and in Decision 1/CP.21.

Several of the Convention’s working groups like the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) are working on defining rules and guidelines for use in setting up this enhanced transparency framework. Also, two governmental initiatives, including one supported also by an NGO, have been set up to enhance the transparency framework: the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) and the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT).

Barriers to reporting and transparency had already been identified prior to the Paris Agreement (for example, the availability and clarity of required and reported information and the lack of reporting methods and typology of different climate change activities). However, new barriers linked to the current context can be highlighted. First and foremost, there is currently no agreement on how to monitor and assess adaptation actions. In addition, beyond rules and methodologies to be set up for reporting on climate financing, a common vision of the various concepts introduced by the Paris Agreement also has to be established. This is the case, for example, in financing for the concepts of “progress in line with previous efforts” and the “provision of scaled-up financial resources”. Efforts in terms of technical and capacity-building support should also be monitored.

Key questions are therefore raised on how to define this future enhanced framework, for example:

• How to ensure sufficiently detailed information for precise and consistent monitoring, without the transparency mechanism becoming for all that a burden for the Parties?
• Given the major differences between the types of commitment made in the NDC, how can information allowing a comparison of Parties be guaranteed?
• How to deal with the question of differentiation of Parties?

Outlook for COP24

The concept note based on texts from Bangkok that was published during October 2018 by the co-facilitators of the APA, SBSTA and SBI was a key step in facilitating the negotiations scheduled for COP24 in December.

Regarding the APA agenda item 3: Guidance in relation to the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21, the structure proposed in the current document (of 35 pages) is as follows:

120. UNFCCC, 2018. pp. 3-38.
• NDC characteristics: (i) identification and list of existing characteristics, (ii) new/additional characteristics, (iii) Guidance/developing of characteristics
• Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding (ICTU): (i) Objectives, (ii) Capacity of developing countries, (iii) Procedural elements, (iv) Substantive elements.

Regarding the APA agenda item 5: *Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement*, the 75-page document is structured as follows:
a. General considerations and principles;
b. National inventory report on the anthropogenic emissions by sources and absorptions by greenhouse gas sinks;
c. Information required to monitor progress for the implementation and achievement of the NDC goals;
d. Information on the impacts of climate change and adaptation;
e. Information on financial, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support provided and mobilised;
f. Information of financial, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support needed and received’
g. Technical expert review;
h. Facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress.

The work sessions of negotiators since COP23 (November 2017) until the Bangkok conference (September 2018) this year have shown that:
• The main issues still to be defined relate to the structure of guidance, the scope of NDC, the level of information to be provided and a potential differentiation of characteristics to be respected according to the development level of the country.
• These last two aspects mentioned above are experiencing the most diverging views. Similarly, yet to be defined is whether the issues of the nature of contributions will be discussed under the agenda item on transparency or elsewhere in the negotiations.

I.12. Talanoa Dialogue

**Design, organisation and structure of the Talanoa Dialogue**

COP21 in Paris provided for the establishment of a facilitative dialogue in 2018 to provide an opportunity to present information, conditions and policy signs needed for the Parties to review their 2020 ambition upwards[121]. Between COP22

121. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.
and COP23, inclusively, open and transparent consultations with the Parties were conducted on how it should be organised. On this basis, the preparations for Dialogue were finalised during COP23, under the presidency of Fiji. The modalities of the Dialogue were adopted and it was renamed the *Talanoa Dialogue*.

### Concept of “Talanoa”

The concept of “Talanoa”\(^{122}\) refers to an inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue process, with the purpose of sharing stories, building empathy and making wise decisions for the common good. This concept has been applied to the facilitative dialogue so that, during the process, the participants can forge a bond of trust and advance by building phenomena of mutual understanding for enhanced climate ambition responding to the special circumstances and relying on each one’s capacities.

COP23 decided that the Talanoa Dialogue would be structured around three questions\(^{123}\):

- **Where are we?**
- **Where do we want to go?**
- **How do we get there?**

In terms of organisation, the Talanoa Dialogue, launched on 1 January 2018, is divided in the same year into two phases, called “technical” and “political”. It will end at COP24. It was also decided that the non-Party stakeholders (non-State actors) would be able to contribute to this dialogue by sending in their views or sharing their stories by communicating them to the Secretariat, but also by participating in various discussion forums.

### Talanoa Dialogue: an innovative forum in favour of enhanced ambition

The Talanoa Dialogue is a forum outside traditional negotiations, during which countries and other key stakeholders can meet, discuss and take stock to find together the means to enhance the global ambition in the short (pre-2020\(^{124}\)), medium and long term. In this context, the Dialogue considers, *inter alia*, the results of the special IPCC report on the 1.5°C objective (see Section I.4). The Dialogue is a key process in working towards the implementation of measures to advance the action plans for combating climate change, at the same time as sundry other targets of the Paris Agreement, such as sustainable development, eradicating poverty\(^{125}\) or climate resilience.

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\(^{122}\) https://talanoadialogue.com/.

\(^{123}\) Talanoa Dialogue – Annex II to Decision 1/CP.23.

\(^{124}\) Decision 1/CP.23, para. 13.

\(^{125}\) Decision 1/CP.22, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2, para. 1.
Different phases of the Talanoa Dialogue in 2018

The two main phases of the Talanoa Dialogue are finding their high spots simultaneously with the negotiations intersession of April-May 2018 (Bonn) and COP24 (Katowice). Prior of each of these meetings, the Parties and other stakeholders were invited to submit their views to prepare the discussions, respectively, before 2 April 2018 for the first session (May 2018) and before 29 October 2018 for the second session (December 2018).

Figure 7. Main steps of the Talanoa Dialogue in 2018

![Image of the Talanoa Dialogue Main Steps]

Preparatory phase

The Talanoa Dialogue preparatory phase run throughout 2018 has built strong evidence-based foundation for informing the political phase that will be held jointly at COP24. The preparatory phase hinges around two major points: (i) the invitation to the Parties and other stakeholders to communicate their views to the Secretariat on the Dialogue’s three central questions before 2 April and 29 October 2018 respectively and (ii) the invitation to the Parties and other stakeholders to organise a series of local, national, regional or international events in support of the Dialogue.

The first series of proposals, received before 2 April 2018 was summarised in a report by the Secretariat that informed the stakeholders for the first official

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126. According to © UNFCCC [online] https://talanoadialogue.com/important-dates. (Translation OIF/IFDD). First published August 2018. See OIF/IFDD, 2018
session of the Dialogue in May 2018. During this session, the discussions were able to explore concretely the three central questions of the Dialogue. The presidencies then published a summary of discussions130.

The preparatory phase ends at COP24, with an initial discussion space to consider the implications of the special IPCC report on global warming of 1.5°C and a final preparatory meeting before the launch of the political phase.

**Political phase**

The political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue is being held at the same time as the COP24. Based on experiences lived throughout the year, this political phase intends to unite Heads of State and high-level representatives to: (i) take stock of the collective efforts to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and (ii) Give indications for the preparation of the next NDC communication/revision cycle131.

In addition to experiences acquired, this second political phase is informed by communications of views sent to the Secretariat until 29 October 2018. A final report was published following this second series of communications. It takes into account the new contributions published between 2 April and 29 October, the outcomes of the discussions in May 2018 and the discussions on the IPCC report on the 1.5°C. As it must serve as a tool for the political leaders in Katowice, the final report is succinct, clear and credible. It also proposes ways or recommendations on how to enhance and implement the NDC132. This report was not yet available for analysis when this *Summary for Policymakers* was being prepared, however it can now be consulted on the Talanoa Dialogue online platform133.

For more extensive clarifications on the first official session of the Talanoa Dialogue (May 2018) and on the communications of views received before 2 April 2018, it is suggested that the reader consults the *Guide to the Negotiations*134 which deciphers them. As an initial source of synthetic and visual information, the next two figures give an overview respectively of:

- the organisation and sessions of the Talanoa Dialogue of May 2018 (Figure 8)
  
- the organisation of the Talanoa Dialogue and the main steps performed since 1 January 2018 until the Katowice session, inclusive (Figure 9).

130. See [online] https://talanoadialogue.com/presidencies-corner
133. Accessible at the address indicated previously [online] https://talanoadialogue.com/key-documents-1.
Figure 8. Synthetic panorama of the dynamics of the Talanoa Dialogue, May 2018\textsuperscript{135}

135. © OIF/IFDD. First published August 2018. See OIF/IFDD, 2018
Figure 9. Concept diagram of the dynamics of the Talanoa Dialogue throughout 2018

I.13. Role of non-Party stakeholders in the global climate action

Recognition of the role of non-State actors within in the post-Paris era

Following COP21, the Parties ratified the fact that combating climate change requires ambitious, wider-scale action by all sectors of society, both public and private. This is especially characterised by the insufficient commitments currently made by Parties to the Paris Agreement in their NDC to comply with the mitigation goal in the long term. This is also demonstrated by the many reactions to the United States to minimise the impacts of the decision of the federal administration to leave the Agreement. More especially, Decision 1/CP.21 contains a variety of provisions targeting non-State actors. These include inviting them to (non-exhaustive list) provide support for the preparation and communication of the NDC of Parties that may need such support, work closely with the Parties (and vice versa) to encourage the enhancement of mitigation and adaptation activities, participate in the technical examination processes of adaptation and mitigation actions, etc.

Decision 1/CP.21 also recognised the voluntary commitments launched under the Lima Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and furthermore recalls the urgent need to intensify global climate action. In order to create a link between the Convention and the multiple voluntary initiatives, it was decided that “two high-level champions” would be appointed annually by the COP Presidencies (current and future) during the period 2016-2020. The first champions appointed thus defined a new Climate Action Agenda, made up of a Global Climate Action Plan. COP22 was an opportunity to pursue these efforts, mainly by adopting the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action, which fixes a programme of actions in the period 2017-2020 to catalyse and support international climate action of Parties and non-Party stakeholders.

Assessment between COP23 and COP24

The next paragraphs propose an assessment of the main steps overcome during COP23 and covered during 2018 which, in some cases, end at COP24.

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137. See UNFCCC, 2016, UN Environment, 2017, or Climate Interactive, 2018.
138. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 15.
139. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 118.
140. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 119; based on the provisions referred to in paras. 109 and 124.
141. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 106-132; paras. 134-137.
142. LPAA – Lima Paris Action Agenda.
143. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 122.
144. UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership, 2016a.
145. UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership, 2016b.
Organisation of a first formal, open and “historic” Dialogue between Parties and other stakeholders on 8 November 2017 in parallel to COP23

According to the Fijian Presidency\(^\text{146}\), this Dialogue was a “historic” event, convening “for the first time during formal proceedings [of the Convention] an official dialogue between Parties and non-Party stakeholders”. Policy recommendations by the Fijian presidency were formulated on the two main topics that set the tone for the discussions: (i) enhancing the ambition level and implementation of NDC and (ii) enhancing access and participation of observers to the formal processes under the auspices of the Convention. Poland, as the incoming presidency of COP24, confirmed the organisation of a similar Dialogue at Katowice.

Continuation of activities of the Global Climate Action Plan during COP23

Under the Global Climate Action Plan of the Marrakech Partnership, the COP23 events\(^\text{147}\) hinged around sector workshops during themed days and high-level sessions. An overview is given in the next figure.

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147. https://unfccc.int/climate-action/marrakech-partnership/events/gca-at-cop-23
Note also, at the same time as COP23, the publication of the first edition of the Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2017 – Marrakech Partnership, which addresses a certain number of key messages to the Parties to reinforce the synergies for global climate action. Also, on 12 November 2017, the Bonn-Fiji Commitment was adopted during the Summit of local and regional leaders, characterising the commitment of more than three hundred signatory subnational governments to implement the Paris Agreement.

148. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 According to UNFCCC.
149. UNFCCC – Marrakech Partnership, 2017.
151. Climate Summit of Local and Regional Leaders, 2017.
**Local communities and indigenous peoples platform**

This platform was established at COP23 to enhance the knowledge, technologies, practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous peoples\(^{152}\) in relation to climate change, but also to facilitate the exchange of experiences and improve the participation of local communities and indigenous peoples in the UNFCCC process. A draft text was drawn up for review and adoption at COP24 to make progress toward the operationalisation of the platform.

**Continuing work on the technical examination process and technical expert meetings**

COP23 also adopted a decision (Decision 13/CP.23) regarding technical expert meetings on mitigation and adaptation, assessing the technical examination process (TEP)\(^{153}\), as provided for during COP21\(^{154}\). Globally, the Parties suggested a certain number of points to make the TEP more effective, be it in terms of mitigation, adaptation or how it was organised and progressed.

**2018 facilitative dialogue, called the “Talanoa Dialogue”**

Lastly, COP23 was a crucial step in preparing the 2018 facilitative dialogue, renamed the *Talanoa Dialogue* (see also Section I.12), which included both Parties and other stakeholders. Throughout 2018, the dynamics of the Dialogue were thus strengthened by events held at local, national, regional and international levels. During a Talanoa organised during the Global Climate Action Summit (September 2018, San Francisco)\(^{155}\), UN Environment presented a chapter from its future *Emissions Gap Report*, that relates specifically to the action of non-State and subnational actors\(^{156}\), underlining that their efforts could reduce GHG emissions to a total of between 15 and 23 Gt CO\(_2\)-eq per year until 2030 compared with the current political scenario\(^{157}\). The Talanoa Dialogue concludes at Katowice, with its political phase.

**I.14. Current climate initiatives**

The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 conveys and recognises the efforts made by a plethora of actors for enhanced global climate action. The mobilisation of non-State actors had been categorically encouraged previously by the introduction

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\(^{152}\) Decision 2/CP.23

\(^{153}\) Decision 13/CP.23 – Assessment of the technical examination processes on mitigation and adaptation.

\(^{154}\) Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 113 and 131.

\(^{155}\) https://www.globalclimateactionsummit.org/

\(^{156}\) UN Environment, 2018.

\(^{157}\) UN Environment, 2018, p. 5.
of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA). To facilitate information and monitor initiatives of LPAA, the NAZCA Platform\textsuperscript{158} was set up 2014. It has recently been updated to capture and steer better any initiatives that move global climate action forward.

**Launch of the Global Climate Action Portal (NAZCA 2.0)**

In September 2018, NAZCA platform version 2.0 was launched. The platform was thus renamed with the title “Global Climate Action Portal and brings together commitments between: (i) cooperative initiatives and individual actions. They can then be filtered by: (i) eight main themes: land use, oceans and coastal areas, water, human settlements, transport, energy and industry and (ii) five types of actor: cities, regions, companies, investors and civil society organisations.

As at 15 October 2018, 19,136 actions were registered on the portal, with 10,221 collective actions and 8,915 individual actions. On the same date a total of 12,403 stakeholders were committed, including 9,524 cities\textsuperscript{159}, 78 regions\textsuperscript{160}, 2,430 companies\textsuperscript{161}, 354 investors\textsuperscript{162} and seventeen civil society organisations\textsuperscript{163} along with 83 collective initiatives\textsuperscript{164}, demonstrating a growing mobilisation of all actors, both in developed and developing countries.

Faced with the shortfall in governmental ambition (see Sections (I.4 or (.5), these initiatives are today considerable essential to reduce the gap between the goals of the Paris Agreement and achieving them, confirming the need for joint, decompartmentalised collaboration between State and non-State actions (see also Section I.13). Studying these initiatives also attests to the fact that they are a way of helping to respond to the many aspects of combating climate change in the field, in the short, medium and long term, under cover of a global, multi-sector approach in terms of both mitigation and adaptation\textsuperscript{165}.

\textsuperscript{158} “Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action” [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/.
\textsuperscript{159} http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=cities.
\textsuperscript{160} http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=regions.
\textsuperscript{161} http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=companies.
\textsuperscript{162} http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=investors.
\textsuperscript{163} http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/stakeholders.html?type=csos.
\textsuperscript{164} http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/cooperative-initiatives.html.
\textsuperscript{165} \textbf{Note:} It is suggested that the reader of this Summary consults the Guide to the Negotiations, where a certain number of initiatives is listed and described. The Guide is accessible [online] https://www.ifdd.francophonie.org/ressources/ressources-pub.php?id=13. Otherwise, the reader can consult the Global Climate Action Portal directly [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
I.15. Gender and gender equality

“Gender”, “gender equality” and climate

Gender refers to the analysis of the status of men/women, the characteristics of each sex, social relationships between women and men and socio-cultural perceptions linked to each sex\(^\text{166}\). In the context of international climate negotiations it has been recognised that it was important to involve men and women as equals in the Convention process and also in the development and implementation of national climate policies, which should strive for this gender equality. This resulted in a specific agenda item in the negotiations conducted under the Convention, “gender and climate change”. This also subsequently resulted in integrating a general objective in the Paris Agreement that is related to the issue of gender equality in combating climate change.

Figure 11. Decisions relating to gender adopted by the COP\(^\text{167}\)

\(^\text{166}\) Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). Why “gender”?
\(^\text{167}\) © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
Questions on “gender” and “gender equality” and the Paris Agreement

Following the work conducted under the aegis of SBI in 2014, COP20 developed the Lima work programme on gender that covered two years, with a report planned for 2016 to coincide with COP22. The adopted Decision recommends Parties to “advance gender balance”, particularly regarding the representation of women and “achieve gender-responsive climate policy in all relevant activities under the Convention”. In 2015, the Agreement adopted in Paris targets “gender equality”, to ensure recognition of the necessary equal involvement of both sexes in combating climate change, in its inherent adaptation and in the theme of capacity-building.

Overall, Decision 1/CP.21 includes the theme of gender by “acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind and that “Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on [...] gender equality [and] empowerment of women”". In 2015, the adoption of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was also an occasion to highlight the importance of gender and gender equality, via the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), particularly SDG 5 focusing specifically on “achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls”.

Continuation of work on gender and gender equality following COP21

At COP22 (2016), the Parties decided to continue and enhance the Lima Work Programme on gender for a period of three years. An initial workshop session was held on 10 and 11 May 2017 in Bonn at the 46th session of the SBI, on the potential elements of a new action plan. Following the proceedings conducted under the aegis of SBA 47 (November 2017), COP23 adopted a decision for the “establishment of a gender equality action plan”. This decision reaffirms Decisions 36/CP.7, 1/CP.16, 23/CP.18, 18/CP.20, 1/CP.21 and 21/CP.22, the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with the main objective being to pursue and make progress on work on gender equality.

168. Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.
169. See “Continuing work on gender and gender equality following the Paris results” above.
170. Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.
171. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, para. 5.
172. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 11, para. 1
173. Decision 1/CP.21
174. The points relating to the continuation of this work programme are included in Decision 21/CP.22, paragraphs 7 to 30.
176. FCCC/SBI/2017/1.
178. Decision 3/CP.23
Regarding progress made, the COP requested the Secretariat to establish a summary report for consideration by the SBI at its November 2019 session. This report should also highlight the relevant areas for improvement and the additional work to be done under subsequent action plans, to develop recommendations that COP25 (November 2019) could consider to plan the next steps, including an assessment of the impacts of the action plan.

The COP also decided the themes of the annual workshops run during the sessions of subsidiary bodies during 2018 and 2019. The first workshops were run at the same time as the April-May 2018 sessions of subsidiary bodies. All the information on these two workshops (agenda, presentations, workshop reports, etc.) may be viewed online.

Note lastly that between these two workshops, on 5 May 2018, a dialogue was conducted to address the recommendations issued by the Secretariat in its technical report defining entry points for integrating gender considerations in workstreams under the UNFCCC process. This dialogue was a chance for the Parties to discuss possible actions within each of the constituted bodies’ respective workstreams involving gender considerations, to enable progress towards the goals set by the Parties in terms of gender balance. This report will be submitted for consideration at COP24.

I.16. Agriculture

Discussions related to agriculture started in 2008 under the aegis of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). At COP17 (Durban, 2011), the COP requested the SBSTA to consider agriculture-related questions for the Parties to exchange views with each other. Henceforth, this new item on the SBSTA negotiations agenda incorporates the themes of adaptation and mitigation under a broad prism and also brings together developing as well as developed countries around these issues. Between the 36th (May 2012) and 47th (November 2017) sessions of the SBSTA, the Parties and accredited observers exchanged their views on these issues, via communications and talks during the negotiations, as well as via five workshops that were held between 2013 and 2016, at the same time as the SBSTA sessions.

179. Decision 3/CP.23, para. 5.
183. FCCC/TP/2018/1
184. Decision 2/CP.17
“Koronivia joint work on agriculture” programme

At SBSTA 47 (November 2017), the exchange of viewpoints continued, considering the results of the last five workshops of the aforementioned sessions. At the end of SBSTA 47, the Parties recommended a draft decision entitled “Koronivia joint work on agriculture” which was adopted by COP23. This decision is viewed as a historic agreement for negotiations on agriculture, requesting the SBSTA and SBI “to address jointly issues related to agriculture, including through workshops and expert meetings, working with constituted bodies under the Convention and taking into consideration the vulnerabilities of agriculture to climate change and approaches to addressing food security.” Regarding the monitoring of progress made and outcomes for all the work, the subsidiary bodies are requested to report to COP26 (in November 2020).

Roadmap for 2020 on the Koronivia work programme on agriculture

At the 48th session of the permanent subsidiary bodies (SB 48 – April-May 2018), the SBSTA and SBI continued to consider issues related to agriculture, based mainly on the communications of views by the Parties and observers up to 31 March 2018. At the end of SB 48, the Parties adopted a “roadmap” to operationalise the Koronivia joint work programme on agriculture, which will be concluded in 2020 at the 53rd sessions of the SBSTA and SBI. This roadmap plans for workshops held at the same time as the future sessions of the standing subsidiary bodies, and should address the various points specified in Decision 4/CP.23, paragraph 2. Prior to each session, the Parties and observers are invited to communicate their views on the issues related to the upcoming workshops. After each workshop, a report will be published and reviewed at the following session of the subsidiary bodies.

Parallel sessions at COP24 and next stages

Regarding the 49th SBSTA and SBI sessions in Katowice, the Parties and observers have been invited to communicate their views on the modalities of the implementation of the results of five session workshops held on issues relating to agriculture.
and other future topics that could emerge from this work\textsuperscript{191}. In accordance with the conclusions of SBSTA/SBI 48.1\textsuperscript{192} (April-May 2018), the Secretariat was requested to invite the representatives of the bodies constituted under the Convention, particularly emphasising the first workshop that is planned to Katowice for December 2018, which will also bring Parties and observers together in the talks.

In terms of prospects, note that the subsidiary bodies invited the Parties and observers to submit their views on future topics which are not listed in Decision/CP.23, as well as on the progress made on the Koronivia work programme until 28 September 2020, for consideration by the subsidiary bodies in their report to COP26 (November 2020)\textsuperscript{193}.

\textsuperscript{191} Work programme in Decision 4/CP.23, para. 2(a).
\textsuperscript{192} FCCC/SBSTA/2018/4; FCCC/SBI/2018/9.
\textsuperscript{193} Decision 4/CP.23, para. 4.
II.A. Implementation of the Agreement... From Fiji/Bonn (COP23) to Katowice (COP24)

Over and beyond the Fijian impetus and introduction of the “Talanoa” Dialogue, the outcomes of negotiations during COP23 that should lead to technical progress in the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the Paris Agreement Work Programme – PAWP) are still fairly limited. The main advances for a large majority of informal negotiating texts were improved reflection of the positions of all Parties. As such, the informal notes reflecting the viewpoints of Parties were expanded considerably, without for all that moving towards clear negotiating options. It was impossible to overcome several political barriers in Bonn, mainly in terms of a new approach to the differentiation of responsibilities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Many participants had the impression that progress was uneven between the different negotiating issues. The question of the organisation of work was also at the heart of interim negotiations between COP23 and COP24.

Another gap has appeared between the developing and developed countries around the issues of climate finance definition and mobilisation, which remains a major issue influencing the entire negotiating process. Whilst the developed countries have called for restricting the negotiations to the framework of the Paris mandate, the developing countries believe that many important questions are not considered in sufficient depth, like the predictability of climate financing flows and support for adaptation efforts. In particular, the question of pre-2020 action was put forward by the developing countries as a crucial issue to simulate political will and weave bonds of trust.

Looking ahead to COP24, the main challenge will be to finalise the negotiations on the PAWP so that operationalisation rules can be adopted for the Paris Agreement, thereby ensuring, especially, full implementation of the NDC, cooperation between countries to do this, on-going enhancing of ambitions in order to reach the goal of the Agreement to limit the increase in temperatures (2°C/1.5°C) by the end of the century. At the end of the negotiations at the additional Bangkok session in September 2018, the informal notes prepared by the PAWP were compiled in a 307-page document, taking stock of the variable quality in the level of detail and structuring depending on the negotiating points.
To facilitate the negotiations during COP24, the joint presiding officers of the subsidiary bodies and the APA produced a joint concept note on progress made and the identification of means of progressing, this time containing proposed texts in mid-October 2018 in all informal notes linked directly to the PAWP. By developing these proposals, the joint presiding officers sought to harmonise the state of progress between the different notes, streamline the texts and eliminate or combine similar options, whilst proposing solutions where possible. At the same time, the joint presiding officers underlined in their note that the substantive content of the text is still determined by the Parties and that all key options remain on the negotiating table.

In parallel to rounds of negotiations, the Talanoa Dialogue ends with its political phase at COP24. It is planned that the COP will therefore welcome high-level political representatives to take stock of the collective efforts by Parties to achieve the long-term temperature limitation goal. The political phase of the dialogue is also informed by the special IPCC report on the 1.5°C goal published in October 2018 and by the results of the Dialogue’s preparatory phase. This political phase should mainly inform the preparation of the communication or revision of NDC and constitute initial experience with a view to the Global Stocktake.

Note, lastly, that the Polish presidency of COP24 has indicated the goals fueling its political coordination on the web portal dedicated to the Conference. In particular, the presidency seeks to defend the principle of voluntary action provided for under the Paris Agreement together with appropriate consideration of commitments given the different stages of development of the countries. The Polish presidency also wishes to develop political declarations on carbon neutrality, based on carbon sequestration by forests and soils as well as the promotion of electric vehicles and the “fair transition” of active workers in the operation of fossil fuels.

II.A.1. Sessions and outcomes of permanent subsidiary bodies between COP23 and COP24

In the continuation of COP23 (November 2017, Bonn), the April – May 2018 negotiation intersession was also unable to formulate informal negotiating texts, thereby justifying the need for an additional session in Bangkok (September 2018). The negotiations intersession stood out for a growing tendency to explore the synergies between the different negotiating points to achieve a “balanced and comprehensive package”. Oppositions between blocks of developed countries and developing countries also tightened. Draft decisions for consideration and adoption by the COP were only developed for a limited number of topics relating to agriculture, education and awareness, the forestry sector, the CTCN and the LDC work programme.

194. APA, SBI, SBSTA, 2018b.
SBI 48.1 and 48.2

The Parties were unable to reach consensus on the question of common timetables for NDC in order to formulate a draft decision at the April-May 2018 intersession. In Bangkok, these negotiations were marked by the question of selective differentiation in rules between the developed and developing countries. A conference room paper on financing climate action under Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement was circulated during the negotiations in Bonn. This was taken into account during the revision of the informal note. The predictability of climate financing flows is one of the sensitive points in the negotiations. The negotiations around this issue risk furthermore to block the talks within the APA on the transparency framework. Otherwise, SBI 48.2 only considered the points included in the “decision package” to be adopted during COP24.

SBSTA 48.1 and 48.2

The negotiations in relation to the cooperation mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement were slowed substantially during the April-May 2018 intersession, due to the links highlighted with the negotiations on climate finance. Also, the positions within the developing countries vary over this link between cooperation mechanisms and climate finance. However, at the Bangkok session, progress was made in the negotiations on the international cooperation approaches based on market and non-market mechanisms.

The accounting modalities for financial resources provided and immobilised by public interventions, in accordance with Article 9.7 of the Paris Agreement, is another contentious issue. The developed countries would like to continue to produce climate financing reports with methodologies varying from one country to the next, whilst developing countries would like an approach based on detailed regulations that use the concept of “grant equivalence” for loans and the inclusion of loss and damage. In this respect, the Bangkok negotiations managed to reduce the text from sixty to six pages.

The SBI and SBSTA held common negotiations on the impact of response measures. Both bodies fixed the scope of the review of the work of the improved forum which will be the basis for developing the forum’s work programme. It has been suggested that the forum serve the implementation of the Paris Agreement from December 2018 (subject to the decision taken at CMA 1.3).

II.A.2. Sessions and outcomes of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement between COP23 and COP24

APA 1.5 and 1.6

The joint presiding officers of the APA prepared “tools” on the informal notes so that negotiations could proceed in a more structured fashion. These tools and the meetings with heads of delegations were deemed highly useful during APA 1.5 in May 2018. This approach was therefore maintained for APA 1.6 in September. Key frictions in negotiations within the APA relate to the differentiation in relation to the guidelines on the mitigation section of NDC and in relation to the transparency framework. The debate surrounding the questions of climate
finance is conducted within APA under agenda item 8, where the developing countries are pushing for the setting up of a process to define a new climate finance goal by 2025.

**II.B. Deciphering succinctly the Paris Agreement**

The next part summarises the Paris Agreement using images that show schematically the central points of the main articles of the said Agreement. For more detailed deciphering of the Paris Agreement, it is suggested that the reader of this *Summary* consults the *Guide to the Negotiations*, available online on the OIF/IFDD site[^196].

**Form and legal implications**

As opposed to the Kyoto Protocol containing legally binding commitments with figures for the Parties registered in Annex B, the Paris Agreement commits all Parties to adopt internal measures with the aim of conducting mitigation objectives that are self determined. The sophistication of the architecture of the Paris Agreement can be seen as a hybrid model reconciling the efforts that are “top down” and “bottom up”[^197]. This architecture has turned out to be the most efficient to reconcile the divergent views of the Parties and render the agreement acceptable to all[^198]. However, given that the Agreement must be ratified entirely and without reservations[^199], several analysts have concluded that the legal form is globally binding once in force even though it contains elements that are not binding[^200]. Among the non-binding elements are, for example, financing[^201] and emissions reduction[^202] whilst binding aspects include the periodic communication of NDC at regular intervals of five years[^203], transparency of actions and support[^204].

**Summary of the Paris Agreement**

The Paris Agreement is annexed to Decision 1/CP.21, which targets its operationalisation. The Agreement consists of 29 articles, which can be structured into three parts (see Figure 12):

[^197]: See discussions by Bodansky, 2016, p. 18-20  
[^199]: Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 27 stating that “no reservations may be made to this Agreement”. Note that in practice, certain countries ignored this and issued reservations when depositing their ratification instrument.  
[^200]: See Bodle I., 2016 and Jeyaratnam *et al.*, 2015.  
[^204]: IDDRI, 2015
• The context, principles and objectives of the Agreement, addressing the treatment of cross-cutting issues;
• The main obligations relating to substantive issues, in particular mitigation, adaptation, financing, the development and transfer of technology, transparency of action and support and capacity-building;
• Institutional, procedural and legal issues.

During COP21, in Paris, the Parties adopted the first “universal” climate agreement, bringing together all Parties to the UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, which is aimed at operationalising it, enabled real progress to be made with regard to global issues (see Figure 13). In addition to including all the Parties to the UNFCCC, a certain number of issues were reaffirmed and/or confirmed, such as mitigation and market mechanisms, and also adaptation, loss and damage, financing, technology transfer, capacity-building, and the recognition of the role and necessary involvement of all players in combating global warming, and all this through the prism of monitoring implementation and transparency, with a view to achieving the targets. At the end of COP21, the Parties agreed to implement a real long-term programme, a particular feature of which is the target henceforth set in an international legal instrument of limiting the global temperature increase to “well below 2°C”, even 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. The fundamental principles of the Convention and of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities were reaffirmed.
Diagram of the structure of the Agreement and its main elements

Figure 12. Concept diagram of the structure of the Paris Agreement

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Figure 13. Concept diagrams showing the main articles of the Paris Agreement

**PREAMBLE**

Introduces the founding principles of the Paris Agreement

Reaffirmation of principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, mitigation issues and taking adaptation into account, right to food security and right to development, the role and necessary involvement of all actors in combating climate change, etc.

**ARTICLE 1**

Definition of terms of the Paris Agreement

2. "Conference of the Parties", for Conference of the Parties to the Convention
3. "Party", understood as Party to this Agreement

**ARTICLE 2**

Paris Agreement objectives

Strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, mainly by:

- a) Holding the increase in the global temperature to well below 2 °C, even 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels by 2100;
- b) Increasing the ability to adapt and promote resilience to climate change without compromising food production
- c) Making finance flows consistent with low-carbon and resilient development

**ARTICLE 3**

Commitments, NDC and raising the ambition level

It is incumbent on all Parties to undertake and communicate on ambitious efforts through their NDC, which represents advancement over time, whilst recognising the need to support the DC for the effective implementation of the goals of this Agreement

**ACRONYMS**

NDC - Nationally Determined Contributions
DC - Developing countries

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206. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
### PARIS AGREEMENT

#### MAIN ARTICLES - 2/3

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<td>Peaking of emissions as soon as possible to</td>
<td>Preserve and strengthen the GHG sinks and</td>
<td>General framework for the cooperation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>achieve the long-term temperature goal laid</td>
<td>reservoirs, mainly the forests</td>
<td>activities, mitigation and adaptation activities,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>down in Article 2</td>
<td>Pursue and enhance arrangements adopted by</td>
<td>sustainable development and environmental integrity</td>
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<td>Each Party must establish its NDC</td>
<td>virtue of the Convention (REDD+)</td>
<td>Cooperative approaches; transfer of results of</td>
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<td>corresponding to its highest possible ambition</td>
<td>promote the adoption of non-carbon-related</td>
<td>mitigation; mechanisms to contribute to mitigation</td>
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<td>level; Reviewable every five years, always</td>
<td>measures</td>
<td>and support sustainable development</td>
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<td>upwards; Each Party is invited to communicate</td>
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<td>Enhance adaptation capacity, increase</td>
<td>Avoid and reduce as much as possible the</td>
<td>Financial resources for mitigation and</td>
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<td>resilience, reduce vulnerability to climate</td>
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<td>change and sustainable development</td>
<td>change and remedy it, mainly in a sustainable</td>
<td>implementation of objectives</td>
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<td>Strengthen support and international</td>
<td>development framework</td>
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<td>cooperation, mainly in favour of</td>
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<td>developing countries; communication of national</td>
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<td>increase resilience to climate change and</td>
<td>developing countries, mainly the most</td>
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<td>reduce GHG emissions</td>
<td>vulnerable, faced with the effects of climate</td>
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<td>Creation of a Technology Mechanism by virtue</td>
<td>change</td>
<td>Cooperation; development and deployment of</td>
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<td>of the Convention; strengthening of</td>
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<td>technologies; access to financing; communication of</td>
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<td>cooperation; technical and financial</td>
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<td>capacity-building activities</td>
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#### ACRONYMS

- NDC: Nationally Determined Contributions
- GHG: Greenhouse gases
### PARIS AGREEMENT

#### Main Articles - 3/3

**ARTICLE 12**

*Education and awareness*

Contribute to the awareness of the importance of measures to combat climate change.
The Parties cooperate in taking measures to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information.

**ARTICLE 13**

*Transparency*

Build up mutual trust and promote effective implementation.
Creation of an enhanced transparency framework of measures (mitigation and adaptation) and support for developing countries, technical review by experts.

**ARTICLE 14**

*Five-year global stocktake*

First global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter, to update and enhance the measures, as for international cooperation in achieving objectives.

**ARTICLE 15**

*Facilitation of implementation and compliance with provisions*

Creation of a facilitation mechanism for implementation of the Agreement and compliance with its provisions formed by a committee of experts, acting in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner.

**ARTICLE 18**

*Subsidiary Bodies*

The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention serve, respectively, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement.

**ARTICLE 19**

*Directives for subsidiary bodies*

Subsidiary bodies or other institutional arrangements established by or under the Convention to help implement the Paris Agreement; the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) specifies their functions and may provide further guidance to such subsidiary bodies and institutional arrangements.

**ARTICLE 20**

*Signature and ratification*

The Paris Agreement is open for signature from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017 and is open for accession from the day following the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, taken to be the Depositary.

**ARTICLE 21**

*Entry into force*

The Paris Agreement enters into force on the thirtieth day after the date at which 55 Parties, accounting for 55% of the total global greenhouse gas emissions, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance or accession.
Figure 14. Summary of the key components of the Paris Agreement

- **Long-term goal**: Limit global temperature increase as close as possible to 1.5°C
- **Pre-2020 action and ambition**: Foster immediate and ambitious action by all, including non-State actors
- **Transparency and periodic assessment**: Robust transparency and accounting, enhanced by five-year global stocktaking
- **Finance, technology and capacity-building**: International cooperation and support for implementation for a low-carbon and climate-resilient future
- **Mitigation and voluntary actions**: All Parties must communicate and implement climate plans (NDCs), report on progress and raise the level of ambition continuously
- **Adaptation and loss and damage**: Enhance the adaptation efforts and assist the most vulnerable countries facing the effects already suffered of climate change

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207. © Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018 Adapted according to UNFCCC, 2018, see [online] https://unfccc.int/resource/annualreport/media/UN-Climate-AR17.pdf.
Part III.  
Understanding international climate negotiations: general information

III.A. Brief history of international negotiations on climate change

This part sets out a brief history of the negotiations. To offer the reader a real framework for understanding the issues discussed in this document, recent conferences are described in more detail, from COP20 (inclusive), following which the Paris Agreement was adopted. For a more detailed description of the main stages in the climate negotiations, it is suggested that the reader of this Summary consults the Guide to the Negotiations, available online on the OIF/IFDD site.


The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Through UNFCCC, Parties undertake to stabilise the greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994. To supplement the commitments made at Rio and reinforce the global response to climate change, the Parties to the UNFCCC launched into international negotiations, with a first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC organised on 28 March-7 April 1995 in Berlin (Germany). At the end of COP3, the Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol (December 1997), forming the first international legal instrument for a quantified limitation of GHG emissions established under the auspices of the Convention.

This forces the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC (developed countries) that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to reduce individually or jointly the emission level of six greenhouse gases (GHG) by 5% compared with the 1990 emissions level in the period 2008-2012. Certain points of the Protocol could not be settled in Kyoto and the Parties continued to negotiate on miscellaneous

209. Human origin
212. Kyoto Protocol, Art. 3, para. 1
controversies in subsequent years. The Marrakech Accords finally allowed the adoption of the operationalisation modalities for the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. However, the Protocol only came into force in February 2005 and its implementation was delayed in most countries. Australia, for example, only ratified it in December 2007, Canada withdrew in 2011 and the United States, the largest GHG emitter in the world until 2004 (since passed by China), has never ratified the Protocol.

With the aim of continuing to combat climate change following the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties embarked on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Two ad hoc working groups were set up in 2005 and 2007 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved an Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP – set up in 2005 in parallel with the dialogue on long-term cooperation), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA – set up in 2007), which constituted a specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention.


COP13 (2007) produced a two-year road map, constituted by the Bali Action Plan, with the goal of agreeing in 2009, in Copenhagen, on a new post-2012 climate regime under the auspices of the Convention. The Parties did not manage to reach a detailed agreement at the planned date. The negotiations therefore continued during the subsequent sessions of the COP (Cancún in 2010 and Durban in 2011), before culminating in Doha in 2012. At the same time, the Parties, acting as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), agreed on an amendment to the Protocol providing for GHG reduction targets during a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. With these decisions, the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP18) to the UNFCCC and the 8th session of the CMP (CMP 8) in Doha brought the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) to an end.

At the same time, a new stage had commenced with the creation in 2011 (COP17) of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) with the mandate of implementing a “process to prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties which should enter force in 2020” to be adopted in 2015 and scheduled to enter into force from 2020 onwards213. The next COP sessions, in Doha, Warsaw

213. Decision 1/CP.17, paras. 2 and 4.
and Lima, moved in this direction, whilst working to plug the ambition gap between the commitments taken by the Parties by 2020 and those necessary to limit global warming to less than 2°C by 2100.

**Lima Call for Climate Action and the road to Paris (2014)**

On the final straight to Paris, the Lima Conference (COP20) capitalised on the outcomes of previous COP and managed to lay the bases for the future agreement of 2015. After extended negotiations, the Parties adopted in December 2014 “the Lima Call for Climate Action”, which contains especially in its annex a draft version of the future “Paris Agreement”\(^\text{214}\). The text also states that this should give balanced consideration to six issues: mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, capacity-building and transparency of measures and support. The Lima Call also includes a decision about the “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDC). This sets out their scope, the data they can contain, the submission methods and measures to be taken by the Secretariat\(^\text{215}\). The Parties are invited especially to include elements on adaptation and implementation resources and also to state why their effort will be “fair and ambitious”\(^\text{216}\).

The Parties also adopted a set of decisions under the COP and the 10th session of the CMP (CMP 10) that was held at the same time. These contribute among other things to the operationalisation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. It established the Lima work programme on gender\(^\text{217}\). The Lima Ministerial Declaration on education and awareness-raising was also adopted during COP20\(^\text{218}\). This aims to raise the awareness of children and the general public to the effects of climate change and encourage them to change their behaviour. Progress on adaptation remained modest in Lima. In addition, the COP expressed its concern in Lima over the lack of funds to meet the needs of the LDC, and notably the deficit in the least developed countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which could support the formulation and implementation process for national adaptation plans\(^\text{219}\).

The next figures look back over the main points discussed above which concluded with the adoption of the Paris Agreement during COP21.

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214. Decision 1/CP.20, Annex
215. Decision 1/CP.20, paras. 9-16.
217. Decision 18/CP.20
218. Decision 19/CP.20
219. Decisions 3, 4 and 8/CP.20
Figure 15. International climate negotiations, main stages from 1988 to 2015 (1/2)

**TIMELINE OF CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS - 1988 - 2015**

**1988 - Creation of the IPCC**
Placed under the auspices of the UNEP and WMO, it is responsible for scientific monitoring of global warming processes

**1992 - Earth Summit at Rio**
Creation of the UNFCCC, recognition of the existence of climate change and the human contribution to this phenomenon

**1994 - Entry into force of the UNFCCC**
21 March 1994, the UNFCCC enters into force, in accordance with the conditions provided for in its Article 23

**1995 - COP1**
On 28 March-7 April 1995 COP 1 is held in Berlin (Germany) under its Article 23

**1997 - Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol**
First binding commitment on GHG emissions under the UNFCCC under its Article 23

**2001 - COP7 Morocco**
Adoption of the Bonn and Marrakech Agreements, opening the way to the ratification process for the Kyoto Protocol for its entry into force

**2005 - Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol**
55 Parties accounting for 55% of global GHG emissions ratified the Kyoto Protocol

**2007 - COP 13**
Adoption of the Bali Action Plan
Lays the foundations for negotiating a future agreement, mainly under the Kyoto Protocol

---

**ADP** Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action  
**CC** Climate change  
**UNFCCC** United Nations Framework on Climate Change  
**COP** Conference of the Parties  
**INDC** Intended Nationally Determined Contributions  
**GHG** Greenhouse gas  
**WMO** World Meteorological Organization  
**UNEP** United Nations Environment Programme

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Figure 16. International climate negotiations, main stages from 1988 to 2015 (2/2)\textsuperscript{221}

\textbf{TIMELINE OF CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS - 1988-2015}

\textbf{PART 2}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{2009 - COP15 Copenhagen}
    Adoption of the Copenhagen Accord. The developed countries commit themselves to assembling 100 billion dollars a year for the developing countries by 2020
  \item \textbf{2008 - COP18, Doha}
    Commencement of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
  \item \textbf{2010 - COP16, Cancun}
    Adoption of the Cancun Accords, with a certain number of technical advances like the creation of the Green Climate Fund and REDD+
  \item \textbf{2011 - COP17, Durban}
    Creation of the ADP, for the adoption of a new agreement in 2015 - Effective launch of the Green Fund - Definition of a second period for the Kyoto Protocol
  \item \textbf{2012 - COP18, Doha}
    Commencement of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
  \item \textbf{2013 - COP19, Warsaw}
    Launch of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol - Launch of the INDC process
  \item \textbf{2014 - COP20, Lima}
    Lays the foundations for the new international climate agreement planned for COP 21
  \item \textbf{2015 - COP21, Paris}
    Adoption of the first universal climate agreement including all UNFCCC Parties
\end{itemize}

\textbf{ADP} Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
\textbf{CC} Climate change
\textbf{UNFCCC} United Nations Framework on Climate Change
\textbf{COP} Conference of the Parties
\textbf{INDC} Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
\textbf{GHG} Greenhouse gas
\textbf{WMO} World Meteorological Organization
\textbf{UNEP} United Nations Environment Programme

\textsuperscript{221} \textcopyright{} Guide to the negotiations of COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018
The Paris Agreement, adoption of the first universal climate agreement (2015)

During COP21, in Paris, the Parties adopted the first “universal” climate agreement, bringing together all Parties to the UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, which are aimed at operationalising it, enabled real progress to be made with regard to global issues (for a more detailed description of the Agreement and, see Section II.B). At the end of COP21, the Parties agreed to implement a real long-term programme, a particular feature of which is the target henceforth set in a legally-binding instrument of limiting the global temperature increase to “well below 2°C”, even to 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. The fundamental principles of the Convention and of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities were reaffirmed.

One of the main innovations emerging from Paris is the introduction of nationally determined contributions (NDC), i.e. the commitments established in sovereign fashion and determined freely by the States constituting their national climate targets, which must be renewed every five years and always upwards. The Agreement provides for global climate action progress to be reviewed through a “Global Stocktake” starting in 2023 and then every five years thereafter. This global stocktake will not only review progress and mitigation efforts deployed, but will also take into account other crucial elements provided for by the Agreement, such as adaptation or the means of implementation and support (financing, technology, etc.).

Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the programme of negotiations provided for by Decision 1/CP.21, with the annexed Agreement, outlines a certain number of elements for its operationalisation and application, planned initially for 2020. This work is split between the permanent subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA), which also serve the Paris Agreement, and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA). This is an ad hoc negotiating body for preparing for the entry into force and operationalisation of the Agreement by developing draft decisions that the COP will recommend to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) for review and adoption at its first session (CMA 1), once the Agreement has entered into force. The APA has been holding its sessions at the same time as the sessions of the subsidiary bodies since 2016.

Marrakech: the “Action Conference”

Announced as the “Action Conference” following the adoption of the Paris Agreement the previous year, COP22 (Marrakech, 7-18 November 2016) plotted the path for the operationalisation of the goals set in Paris. The keen interest surrounding the event was boosted by the unprecedented speed with which the Agreement entered into force, on 4 November 2016, just a few days before the start of COP22. In
accordance with this, the Marrakech Conference also saw the holding of the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1).

The Parties adopted over thirty decisions at the end of this Conference, mainly relating to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement. The following advances were made possible by the decisions of the Parties (non-exhaustive): the Adaptation Fund should serve the Agreement, the definition of the mandate of the Paris Committee on capacity-building (PCCB) and the launch of the process for identifying information to be provided by the developed countries in their biennial financial communications. Also, 2018 was set as the deadline for defining implementation modalities of the Paris Agreement (constituted by the work programme of the Paris Agreement as set out in Decision 1/CP.21) and their adoption by CMA 1. Other cross-cutting themes for the implementation of the Agreement were defined, for example developing the 2018 Facilitation dialogue or enhancing pre-2020 action.

COP22 was also an opportunity to enhance the visibility of climate governance and environmental multilateralism on the international stage, with the adoption of two political decisions: the “Marrakech Proclamation” affirming the commitment of the Parties to continue implementing goals set and the “Marrakech Partnership” that fixes a programme of actions for the period 2017-2020 by recognising the essential role that the non-Party stakeholders should play in global climate action and sustainable development alongside States.

Although the Conference failed to return concrete results on a number of key elements on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, it did serve to understand better the viewpoints of Parties and move the talks forward on a large number of questions. Note lastly that a shadow was cast over COP22: the announcement that Donald Trump had won the United States Presidential election during the Conference. During his campaign as a candidate, Trump had indicated that he would withdraw from the Paris Agreement if elected. For a certain number of observers and delegates, fears over the ambition of international climate action rose to the surface, mainly in terms of the impact on financing or, inter alia, achieving the mitigation goals in line with the issues during the pre-2020 period.

222. Accessible [online] https://unfccc.int/decisions?f%5B0%5D=conference%3A4A052.
224. In accordance with Paris Agreement, Article 9, para. 5.
225. Decision 1/CP.22 para. 10; in accordance with Decision 1/CMA.1 para. 5-7.
226. Decision 1/CP.22 para. 16.
227. Decision 1/CP.22 paras. 17-22.
Bonn Conference under Fijian Presidency:
the “Transition Conference”

COP23 was held in Bonn under Fijian Presidency on 6-17 November 2017. It also included the 13th session of the CMP (CMP 13) and the second session of the first part of the CMA (CMA 1.2), the 47th sessions of the permanent subsidiary bodies (SBI 47 and SBSTA 47) and the fourth part of the first session of the APA (APA 1.4).

Overall, the Bonn Conference under Fijian Presidency was technical in nature and constituted a “Transition Conference” towards 2018, a step in the main negotiating cycle in progress, with the adoption of the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement. This Conference was also transitional in the sense that one of the main goals of the Fijian Presidency was to assess efforts deployed and prepare the next deadlines until 2020, whilst enhancing the climate ambitions and efforts in the pre-2020 period.

As such, one of COP23 priorities was to finalise preparations for the Facilitative Dialogue and design its modalities. At the end of COP23, this was renamed the Talanoa Dialogue (reflecting a process of inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue in the tradition of the Pacific islands), deciding that it would be structured around three questions: Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there? COP23 decided that the Talanoa Dialogue would be launched on 1 January 2018 and divided in the same year into two phases, called “technical” and “political”, and would conclude at COP24. It was also decided that the non-Party stakeholders (cities, regions, businesses, investors and other actors in the civil society) would be able to contribute to this dialogue. In parallel with COP24, the political phase marks the culminating point of the Dialogue processes and should take stock of the collective efforts to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and give indications for the preparation of the next NDC communication/revision cycle.

At the end of the Conference, the Parties adopted a total of 31 decisions, including 24 and seven under the COP and CMP respectively. For the vast majority of them, the COP decisions moved the work on the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by 2018 forward. The decision entitled “Fiji Momentum for Implementation”, for example, urged the Parties to continue the efforts in this context. The same decision contains many provisions, especially relating to the Talanoa Dialogue, on the enhancing of the ambition level by 2020, recalling mainly the goal of mobilising USD100 billion annually in favour of developing countries, but also deciding to organise at both COP24 and COP25 an “assessment of the implementation and ambition level by 2020”.

231. Talanoa Dialogue – Annex II to Decision 1/CP.23.
233. See [online] https://unfccc.int/decisions?f%5B0%5D=conference%3A4100
234. Decision 1/CP.23
More globally, COP23 made operational the platform of local communities and indigenous peoples235, introduced an action plan for gender equality236 (see Section I.15), adopted a “historical” decision on agriculture237 (see Section I.16) and continued the work on climate financing238 (see Section I.9). COP23 also set out guidelines for the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts239.

From the point of view of non-Party stakeholders, COP23 was also an occasion to reaffirm their ambition to participate in global climate action (see section I.13). Note, for example, that COP23 welcomed for the first time an Open Dialogue between Parties and other stakeholders on 8 November 2017240. COP23 also allowed activities relating to the Global Climate Action Plan to continue and also non-Party stakeholders to make parallel commitments. In this respect, note especially the adoption of the Bonn-Fiji Commitment of local and regional leaders by more than three hundred subnational signatory governments to enhance climate ambition in achieving the Paris Agreement goals.

Conclusions and opening: From the Fiji/Bonn Conference to the Katowice Conference

Between the Fiji/Bonn Conference and the Katowice Conference, the Parties have continued work on the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement, first and foremost through the negotiating intersession of April-May 2018, hosting the 48th sessions of the subsidiary bodies (SBI 48 and SBSTA 48), and the first part of the first session of the APA (APA 1.5)241. Faced with the extent of the work programme to formulate the necessary draft decisions for Katowice, an additional negotiating session was organised on 4-9 September 2018 in Bangkok (Thailand), bringing together once more the subsidiary bodies to continue on from their previous sessions (SBI 48.2 and SBSTA 48.2) and the APA for the sixth part of its first session (APA 1.6)242.

At the end of the session, the Secretariat published a compilation of 307 pages243, which takes stock of the status of the negotiations related to the work programme of the Paris Agreement and offers an overall viewpoint on all elements from the talks under the aegis of the various negotiation bodies. Although it forms an initial

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235. Decision 2/CP.23
236. Decision 3/CP.23
237. Decision 4/CP.23
239. Decision 5/CP.23
243. UNFCCC, 2018
solid base for the Katowice negotiations, this document nevertheless still does not bring out clear options on many elements, thereby creating a real challenge for Katowice. Negotiators and delegates will only have a few days in Katowice to finalise draft decisions and submit them to the COP which should recommend them to the CMA for review and adoption.

Faced with a persistent lack of precision and rationalisation, the Parties mandated the APA, SBSTA and SBI joint presiding officers to prepare a “joint concept note” on progress made and the identification of means of progressing, this time containing proposed texts, for publication in mid-October 2018. This was yet another key stage in facilitating the Katowice negotiations.

To reduce the time pressures at Katowice, it was decided to start the Conference on Sunday, 2 December 2018, a day before the date planned initially\textsuperscript{244}, as the available time could then be used to finalise the negotiations under the Paris Agreement work programme. This early opening has also been supplemented by formal preparatory meetings prior to the Conference. The pre-session preparatory meetings are planned as follows:

- 26-27 November 2018: Least Developed Countries (LDC)
- 28-29 November 2018: Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
- 28-29 November 2018: African Group
- 30 November – 1 December 2018: Group of 77 and China (G77/China)

### III.B. Structure of the Convention and description of the role and mandate of its main bodies and ad hoc groups

The UNFCCC comprises many bodies that play a decision-making or consultative role and are allocated to precise or cross-cutting issues. The following figure and table list and describe respectively the main decision-making bodies and ad hoc working groups constituted\textsuperscript{245}.


\textsuperscript{245} For a more detailed description, it is suggested that the reader of this Summary consults the Guide to the Negotiations, accessible [online] https://www.ifdd.francophonie.org/ressources/ressources-pub.php?id=13.
III.B.1. Structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Figure 17. Concept diagram of the Convention structure

246. © Guide to the Negotiations of the COP24-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2018, according to the IPCC.
### III.B.2. Description of the role and mandate of the main decision-making bodies and ad hoc working groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conference of the Parties (COP)</strong></td>
<td>The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention. It is an association of all country Parties to the Convention. The COP reviews the implementation of the Convention and considers the commitments of Parties in the light of the Convention goal, new scientific discoveries and experience accumulated in implementing climate change policies. The COP meets every year, unless the Parties decide otherwise. The <strong>Bureau of the COP</strong> administers the intergovernmental process for the COP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conference of Parties acting as the meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)</strong></td>
<td>The CMP is the supreme decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. It has also met every year since its entry into force. Parties discuss the implementation, execution and effectiveness of the Protocol at these meetings. The <strong>Bureau of CMP</strong> administers the intergovernmental process for the CMP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)</strong></td>
<td>The CMA is the supreme decision-making body of the Paris Agreement. It met for the first time in November 2016.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Subsidiary bodies common to the COP, CMP and CMA

- **Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)** Advises the COP, CMP and CMA on scientific and technical issues which are specific to or shared by them.
- **Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)** Advises the COP, CMP and CMA on improving the effective application of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

#### Specialist bodies created by virtue of the COP

- **Technology Executive Committee** Seeks to carry out the application of the framework for implementing meaningful and effective actions to enhance the transfer of or access to technology.
- **Climate Technology Centre and Network** Facilitates the establishment of a network of organisations, initiatives and national, regional, sectoral and international technology networks.
- **Standing Committee on Finance** Helps the COP to carry out its functions relating to the Convention’s financial mechanism.
- **Adaptation Committee** Promotes the implementation of enhanced action for adaptation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee of the Warsaw international mechanism on loss and damage</td>
<td>Addresses loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, in particular extreme weather events and phenomena that are gradual, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Committee on Capacity-building</td>
<td>Provided for by the Paris Agreement to address gaps and meet needs, both current and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing country Parties and further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard to coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities. The Committee’s mandate was adopted during COP22 in Marrakech. The Committee met for the first time in May 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum on the impact of response measures247</td>
<td>Helps the countries concerned to deal with the impacts of response measures that have been implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ad hoc working groups created by virtue of the COP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)</td>
<td>Prepares for the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by developing draft decisions that the COP will recommend to CMA 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist expert groups created by virtue of the COP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Group of Experts on national communications of non-Annex I Parties (CGE)</td>
<td>Assists the non-Annex I Parties in preparing their national communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LDCEG)</td>
<td>Advises the least developed countries on preparing and implementing NAP plans, among other things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist bodies of the CMP</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)</td>
<td>Ensures the effective implementation and correct operation of the CDM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JI)</td>
<td>Spearheads the implementation and verification of the JI in the Annex I countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Committee</td>
<td>Is responsible for guaranteeing compliance with commitments and supports the Parties finding it difficult to comply with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. This committee includes a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist body of the CMA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance with the provisions of the Agreement Paris</td>
<td>Should be made up of twelve experts focused on facilitation. It should function in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner. The APA should submit the modalities of the committee to the CMA no later than at during COP24, in 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination body</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of the UNFCCC</td>
<td>It supports the application of the Convention. It coordinates and organises the meetings of the various bodies and provides technical expertise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

247. Work programme overseen by subsidiary bodies
Lastly, there are two partner organisations of the UNFCCC that play a key role in the process:

- The **Global Environment Fund (GEF)** that has been in existence since 1991 and was named as the entity responsible for administering UNFCCC funds earmarked to help developing countries and
- The **Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)**, which helps to establish the scientific base by publishing climate change assessment reports and specialist studies on specific topics.

### III.C. Presentation and positions of different negotiating groups

Every Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement can be represented at the sessions organised under the auspices of the Convention, its ancillary legal instruments and their constituted bodies by a national delegation made up of one or more civil servants and experts accredited to represent and negotiate on behalf of their government. In practice, the climate change negotiation process revolves around regional groups\(^248\) and negotiation coalitions. Apart from the African countries, that gather in a group that also acts as negotiating coalition (see below, the African Group of Negotiators), the member countries of other regional groups for the most part negotiate within strategic alliances – coalitions (informal negotiating groups) – formed around common interests to be sponsored in the climate negotiations.

#### III.C.1. Presentation of the main negotiating groups

**Formal negotiating groups\(^249\)**

The African Group of Negotiators\(^250\) (AGN) comprises 54 member countries. The Group currently makes common declarations, mainly on questions relating to adaptation, transfer of technologies, capacity-building, transparency and financing, all of which are central to the implementation of ambitious climate actions for the countries represented within the AGN. The group’s presidency rotates between the five African sub-regions (North, East, Centre, West and South). It changes every two years to ensure the greatest possible continuity and stability. Currently, up to December 2019, Egypt has the presidency, having succeeded Mali on behalf of the West African region.

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248. (i) Africa; (ii) Latin America and the Caribbean; (iii) Asia and the Pacific Region; (iv) Eastern Europe; (v) Western Europe and “Others”.
249. Formal or Informal is used in this case in accordance with the recognition of the group by the United Nations System in the majority of UN negotiating forums. As an example, the informal groups do not name/elect representatives in the groups formed under the UNFCCC.
The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) is a group of island States that are active as a coalition in both the United Nations negotiations and under the UNFCCC. For the first time, in 1992, the SIDS was recognised as a group of developing countries in its own right, in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in Rio de Janeiro.

The Least Developed Countries (LDC) are low income countries confronted by heavy structural obstacles. They have few human resources and are highly vulnerable to economic, climate and environmental shocks. There are currently 47 countries classed in the LDC list which was updated by the United Nations in 2017 following the graduation of Equatorial Guinea (2017) three years after that of Samoa in 2014.

The Group of 77 + China (G-77 + China) is an alliance of developing countries formed in 1964. It has 134 members. The group tries to develop a common position on the main negotiating topics, supporting the economic interests of its members in miscellaneous issues. Maintaining group unit remains a major challenge given their huge diversity on several viewpoints.

The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union of 28 member countries. The EU is itself a Party to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, without however having a separate voting right from that of its individual member countries. The EU member countries manage to coordinate, adopt a common position and speak with a single voice. The country holding the EU presidency – which rotates every six months – thus speaks for the EU and its 28 member States.

The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the EU. It comes from the JUSSCANNZ group and is active in all United Nations forums.

The Environmental Integrity Group was formed in 2000 by members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Mexico and South Korea. It has subsequently been joined by Monaco and Liechtenstein. Member countries are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts. The group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.

252. 33 in Africa, thirteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean.
254. http://www.g77.org
255. Despite Brexit, the United Kingdom remains so far a full member of the EU and the resulting rights and obligations continue to apply fully to this state and its territory.
256. Initially as the European Economic Community
257. The Presidency of the EU Council is held by Austria from July to December 2018.
258. JUSSCANNZ is an acronym for Japan, United States of America, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand.
Informal negotiating groups

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) unites small island and low-lying coastal countries sharing development problems and similar concerns in terms of environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. AOSIS groups 44 States and observers, Thirty-nine are members of the United Nations.

The Coalition for Rainforest Nations was formed in 2005 on the initiative of Papua New Guinea. The goal is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. The coalition includes some 52 countries.

The BASIC group is formed by Brazil, South Africa, India and China. It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the Copenhagen Conference (COP15). Since then, the group regularly meets in order to coordinate its positions and to develop a shared strategy.

The Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM) groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I Parties with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.

The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) became a six-country coalition in 2010: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

The Like Minded Group of States (LMDC) is a coalition of countries created during the Bonn Conference on climate change in May 2012. LMDC is made up of several countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active South American and African Parties.

The Arab Group is made up of 22 member States from the League of Arab States. The contours of this coalition are well defined inasmuch as its members have been accustomed to working together since 1945 as a pressure group towards international institutions. Their positions in the climate negotiations are regularly and carefully coordinated, often by Saudi Arabia.

The Climate Vulnerability Forum (CVF) is an international South-South cooperation partnership to together in the face of global climate change. It met for the first time near Malé, in the Maldives, in November 2009. The Marshall Islands currently hold the presidency.

261. SEI, 2010
263. https://thecvf.org/about/.
Several other groups or formal and informal coalitions work also to defend their common interest under the international climate change negotiations within UNFCCC. These include the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Cartagena Dialogue and the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC – see below) to cite the most active.

III.C.2. Positions of the main negotiating groups

Africa is unusual in that it defends a common position carried by the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), which is nevertheless decided and adopted by their Ministers for Environment during African Ministerial Conferences on the Environment and the Committee of African Heads of State and Governments on Climate Change. The group emphasises the flexibility to be granted to Africa, the most vulnerable continent to climate change (264), and the historical responsibility and leadership of developed countries.

The Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) defends the special case of its extreme vulnerability to the rise in ocean levels. One major objective is to limit global warming to 1.5°C above the pre-industrial era by the end of the century.

The Least Developed Countries (LDC): During the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the group strongly supported a path to limit the temperature to 1.5°C and the need to agree on binding provisions.

The G-77 + China articulates its position, when I can, around the call to developed countries to be at the forefront in combating climate change. It also underlines the importance of financial support and its transparency.

The European Union (EU) adopts and defends the position whereby the emerging developing countries should commit to reducing emissions, in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement, but also during the pre-2020 period (265).

The Umbrella Group takes the position that the reduction of GHG emissions to reach the target of maintaining the temperature below the bar of 2°C should result from efforts by all Parties, obeying the same transparency requirements. In this respect, the group puts forward that the historical emission levels should not therefore be taken into account to determine the level of ambition of efforts to be made.

The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) seeks to facilitate rapprochements between the Parties by constructing gateways with other groups. Its positions are often close to the EU positions. It regularly defends the fact that developed countries cannot provide aid without comprehensive mitigation actions by developing countries.

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ALBA defends the premise that the developed countries are historically responsible for climate change and must reduce their emissions drastically and pay their “climate debt” to the developing countries.

The Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) has a progressive vision and expects from developed countries an up-front commitment on reducing emissions and financial support that must condition the implementation of a low-carbon development strategy. It is one of the results of the Cartagena Dialogue initiated by Costa Rica in 2011.

The Like Minded Group of States (LMDC) considers the efforts to combat climate change as a brake to the socio-economic development of members of this group. The position of the group turns on the fact that the developed countries must set an example and play a pioneering role in terms of mitigation, in compliance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

The Arab Group emphasises the negative impacts of measures to combat climate change on their economies. It believes that the developed countries should therefore make a substantial financial contribution to the collective effort.

The BASIC Group insists that it is a coalition within the G-77 + China and not a negotiating group. The group takes the position that any flexibility in the context of negotiations must be extended to all developing countries without distinction.
Annexes

A.1. Themed sheets

Sheet 1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry into force</th>
<th>21 March 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratification status</td>
<td>197 Parties(^{267}), including 196 countries and the European Union (EU)(^ {268})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme decision-making body:</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties (COP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main objective</td>
<td>[Article 2]: “…stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNFCCC Annexes**

- **Annex I** – List of 41 Parties, including the EEC\(^ {269}\): developed countries and countries with economies in transition\(^ {270}\);
- **Annex II** – List of 24 Parties, including the EEC\(^ {271}\): developed countries members of OECD included in Annex I, excluding countries with economies in transition\(^ {272}\);
- The Parties not included in Annex I are essentially developing countries; the least developed countries (LDC) classified as such by the United Nations receive special attention under the Convention\(^ {273}\).

**Commitment of the Parties**

- **II Parties**: for example, prepare a national greenhouse gas emission inventory, implement mitigation programmes and adaptation actions, offer cooperative support in technological research and dissemination and facilitate the education and awareness of the general public (Article 4.1).
- **Annex I Parties**: mainly, implement national policies to mitigate climate change and weaken emissions in the long term (Article 4.2).
- **Annex II Parties**: support developing countries financially and technically, mainly by helping to prepare their national communications, easing their adaptation to climate change and encouraging access to technologies (Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5).

**Useful links**

- Convention website: www.unfccc.int
- Convention text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf

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268. The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
269. EU today
271. EU today
272. Originally 25, but Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered into force on 28 June 2002, in accordance with Decision 26/CP.7
### Sheet 2. Kyoto Protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry into force</th>
<th>16 February 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>192 Parties(^{274}), including the EU(^{275}); five Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification status of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>117 Parties(^{276}).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme decision-making body:</td>
<td>Conference of Parties acting as a meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main objective</td>
<td>Establish quantified and binding targets for limiting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions to boost the UNFCCC goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Protocol Annexes | • Annex A: List of the six greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO\(_2\)), methane (CH\(_4\)), dinitrogen oxide (N\(_2\)O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF\(_6\)).
• Annex B: List of 39 Parties, included the EEC\(^{277}\): developed countries and countries with economies in transition which have made quantified commitments to reducing or limiting greenhouse gas emissions. |
| Commitment of the Parties | Parties included in Annex B:
• Limit or reduce by 5.2% the quantity of GHG emissions compared with 1990 emissions, except countries with economies in transition, which can choose a reference year other than 1990\(^{278}\);
• Implement national or regional policies and measures to fulfil compliance with quantified commitments to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (Articles 2 and 4). The Parties can fulfil their commitments through domestic measures and flexibility mechanisms;
• Publish an initial report giving the information required to implement the commitments, especially for the accounting of assigned amounts (Article 7);
• Publish a report demonstrating the progress made in achieving commitments (Articles 3 and 7); and
• Set up a national emissions inventory system based on methodologies approved by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Article 5);
All Parties: Prepare programmes to establish the national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, to mitigate and facilitate the adaptation to climate change, cooperate to support technology transfer, research and education and present in their national communications information on the actions undertaken to combat climate change (Article 10);
Parties included in Annex II of the UNFCCC: Finance developing countries, mainly to help them set in place their national emissions inventory and encourage technology transfer (Article 11). |

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\(^{275}\) The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).

\(^{276}\) As at 15 October 2018 [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_en

\(^{277}\) EU today

\(^{278}\) Article 3 para. 5 of the Kyoto Protocol.
| **Doha amendment** | The second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at CMP 8\(^{279}\) under the title "Doha Amendment". It commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 2020\(^{280}\). Thus this period will last eight years and not five years as for the first period. Regarding its effective date, although the Doha Decision encourages countries to implement the second commitment period before the countries ratify it, the countries are free to choose from what date they will enforce it. |
| **Useful links** | • Text of the Protocol: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpfrench.pdf.  
• Text of the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol according to Article 3, paragraph 9 (Doha amendment) for the second commitment period: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/fre/13a01f.pdf. |

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279. Eighth Conference of Parties acting as a Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  
280. Decision 1/CMP.8
### Sheet 3. Ratification status of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal instruments</th>
<th>Ratification status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>197 Parties(^{281}), including the European Union (EU)(^{282})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>192 Parties(^{283}), including the EU(^{284}); five Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>117 Parties(^{285}).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Agreement</td>
<td>181 Parties(^{286}), including the EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

282. The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
284. The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
### A.2. Negotiation document nomenclatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision x/CP.x</td>
<td>COP decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision x/CMP.x</td>
<td>CMP decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision x/CMP.x</td>
<td>CMP decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/CP/x</td>
<td>COP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/KP/CMP/x</td>
<td>CMP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/KP/AWG/x</td>
<td>AWG-KP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SBI/x</td>
<td>SBI preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SBSTA/x</td>
<td>SBSTA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/SB/x</td>
<td>Preparatory document or provisional or current agenda of the two subsidiary bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCC/APA/x</td>
<td>APA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCF/x</td>
<td>Preparatory document of the Green Climate Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/ARR/x</td>
<td>Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory (from 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/TRR/x/x</td>
<td>Report of the technical review of the biennial report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/WEB/IRI/x</td>
<td>Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory/Document published on the Web only (listing used until 2004 inclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/ASR/x</td>
<td>GHG inventory annual status report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/WEB/SAI/x</td>
<td>GHG inventory summary and assessment report/Document published on the Web only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/COM/x</td>
<td>National communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/DPR/x</td>
<td>Demonstrable Progress Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/IDR.x</td>
<td>In-depth Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM EB-x</td>
<td>CDM Executive Board Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMSN/IGO/x</td>
<td>Document submitted by intergovernmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMSN/NGO/x</td>
<td>Document submitted by non-governmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/TP/x</td>
<td>Technical document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Add.x</td>
<td>Text added to a document presented previously (Addendum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Amend.x</td>
<td>Amendment to a text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Corr.x</td>
<td>Correction of a text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/CRP.x</td>
<td>Conference Room Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/INF.x</td>
<td>Information series containing general information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/L.x</td>
<td>Limited distribution document: Draft report or text (limited document)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/MISC.x</td>
<td>Miscellaneous documents: Points of view of Parties and observers; list of participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Rev.x</td>
<td>Text revision which supersedes the text published previously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non paper</td>
<td>Internal, unofficial document to facilitate the negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

- x indicates a serial number a year.
- For the Green Climate Fund documents (GCF/x), see: [www.gcfund.org/documents/in-session-documents.html](https://www.gcfund.org/documents/in-session-documents.html)
- Access all documents on the Convention website: [https://unfccc.int/documents](https://unfccc.int/documents)
### A.3. Abbreviations and acronyms
(French – English)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABPA</td>
<td>Alliance bolivarienne pour les Peuples de notre Amérique (ALBA en espagnol)</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA in spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AILAC</td>
<td>Alliance indépendante de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes</td>
<td>Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Alliance bolivarienne pour les peuples de notre Amérique</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND</td>
<td>Autorités nationales désignées</td>
<td>Designated National Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEI</td>
<td>Alliance des petits États insulaires (<a href="http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis">www.sidsnet.org/aosis</a>)</td>
<td>Alliance of Small Island States AOSIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Groupe de travail spécial de la plateforme de Durban pour une action renforcée</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEI</td>
<td>Analyses et Examens internationaux</td>
<td>International Analysis and Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAI</td>
<td>Consultations et Analyses internationales</td>
<td>International Consultations and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCNUCC</td>
<td>Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches</td>
<td>Framework for Various Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>Contribution déterminée au niveau national</td>
<td>Nationally Determined Contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CdP</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Comité exécutif</td>
<td>Executive Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESNU</td>
<td>Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Comité exécutif de la technologie</td>
<td>Technology Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDN</td>
<td>Contribution prévue déterminée au niveau national</td>
<td>Intended Nationally Determined Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Comité permanent des Finances</td>
<td>Standing Committee for Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties servant en tant que Réunion des Parties de l’Accord de Paris</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRP</td>
<td>Conférence des Parties agissant en tant que Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRTC</td>
<td>Centre et Réseau des Technologies du Climat</td>
<td>Climate Technology Center and Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Conseil de Stabilité financière</td>
<td>Financial Stability Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Démarches concertées</td>
<td>Cooperative Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSE</td>
<td>Dialogue structuré entre experts</td>
<td>Structured Expert Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EET</td>
<td>Équipe d’experts techniques</td>
<td>Team of Technical Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Entités opérationnelles désignées</td>
<td>Designated Operational Entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Fonds pour l’adaptation</td>
<td>Adaptation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEM</td>
<td>Fonds pour l’Environnement mondial</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPMA</td>
<td>Fonds des pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPP</td>
<td>Fonds de Préparation de Projets</td>
<td>Project Preparation Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSCC</td>
<td>Fonds spécial des Changements climatiques</td>
<td>Special Climate Change Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVC</td>
<td>Fonds vert pour le climat</td>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEMO (ou PDVS)</td>
<td>Groupe d’États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)</td>
<td>Like Minded Developing Countries (Like Minded Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEPMA</td>
<td>Groupe d’Experts sur les pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>Least Developed Country Expert Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GES</td>
<td>Gaz à Effet de Serre</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GETT</td>
<td>Groupe d’Experts pour le Transfert de la Technologie</td>
<td>Expert Group on Technology Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIEC</td>
<td>Groupe intergouvernemental d’Experts sur l’évolution du Climat</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gt éq-CO2</td>
<td>Gigatonne d’équivalent CO2</td>
<td>Gigaton of CO2 equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTS-AP</td>
<td>Groupe de Travail spécial pour l’Accord de Paris</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77 + Chine</td>
<td>Groupe des 77 et Chine (<a href="http://www.G77.org">www.G77.org</a>)</td>
<td>Group of 77 and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>Évaluation et Révision internationale</td>
<td>International Assessment and Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIEDE</td>
<td>Association internationale pour l’échange de droits d’émission</td>
<td>International Emissions Trading Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Mécanisme de Crédit conjoint</td>
<td>Joint Crediting Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALP</td>
<td>Plan d’action Lima-Paris</td>
<td>Lima-Paris Action Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAN</td>
<td>Mesures d’Atténuation appropriées au niveau national</td>
<td>Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDD</td>
<td>Mécanisme pour un Développement durable</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>Mécanisme de Développement propre</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNV</td>
<td>Mesure, Notification, Vérification</td>
<td>Measuring, Rapportage, Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Mise en œuvre conjointe</td>
<td>Joint Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;P</td>
<td>Modalités et Procédures</td>
<td>Modalities and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMM</td>
<td>Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché</td>
<td>New Market Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>Niveaux de référence</td>
<td>Reference Levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRE</td>
<td>Niveaux de référence des émissions</td>
<td>Reference Emission Levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OACI</td>
<td>Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODD</td>
<td>Objectifs de Développement durable</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCDE</td>
<td>Organisation de Coopération et de Développement économiques</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMM</td>
<td>Organisation météorologique mondiale</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONG</td>
<td>Organisation non gouvernementale</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONU</td>
<td>Organisation des Nations unies</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCST</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de Conseil scientifique et technologique</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSMOE</td>
<td>Organe subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANA</td>
<td>Plan d’Action national d’Adaptation</td>
<td>National Adaptation Programme or Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED</td>
<td>Pays en développement</td>
<td>Developing country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEID</td>
<td>Petits États insulaires en développement</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PET</td>
<td>Processus d’examen technique</td>
<td>Technical examination process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PET-AD</td>
<td>Processus d’Examen Technique sur l’Adaptation</td>
<td>Technical examination process on Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIB</td>
<td>Produit intérieur brut</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>Protocole de Kyoto</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMA</td>
<td>Pays les moins avancés</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Plan National d’Adaptation</td>
<td>National Adaptation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTN</td>
<td>Programme de Travail de Nairobi sur les incidences des changements climatiques et la vulnérabilité et l’adaptation à ces changements</td>
<td>Nairobi Work Program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Rapport biennal</td>
<td>Biennial Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBA</td>
<td>Rapport biennal actualisé</td>
<td>Biennial Updated Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMD</td>
<td>Responsabilités communes mais différenciées</td>
<td>Common but differentiated responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMD-CR</td>
<td>Responsabilités communes mais différenciées et capacités respectives</td>
<td>Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD</td>
<td>Réduction des émissions issues de la déforestation et de la dégradation forestière</td>
<td>Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RET</td>
<td>Réunion d’experts techniques</td>
<td>Technical Expert Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIT</td>
<td>Relevé international des transactions</td>
<td>International Transaction Log</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité</td>
<td>Workstream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA1</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité 1</td>
<td>Workstream 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA2</td>
<td>Secteur d’activité 2</td>
<td>Workstream 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE</td>
<td>Union européenne</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UQA</td>
<td>Unité de quantité attribuée</td>
<td>Assigned Amount Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URCE</td>
<td>Unité de Réduction certifiée</td>
<td>Certified Emission Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTCATF</td>
<td>Utilisation des terres, changement d’affectation des terres et forsterie</td>
<td>Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.4. Agenda for meetings during the Katowice Conference

COP24 – 2-14 December 2018

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organisational matters:
   a. Election of the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session;
   b. Adoption of the rules of procedure;
   c. Adoption of the agenda;
   d. Election of officers other than the President;
   e. Admission of organisations as observers;
   f. Organisation of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies;
   g. Dates and venues of future sessions;
   h. Adoption of the report on credentials.
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies:
   b. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation;
4. Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
5. Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Convention under Article 15:
   a. Proposal from the Russian Federation to amend Article 4, paragraph 2(f), of the Convention;
   b. Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico to amend Articles 7 and 18 of the Convention;
   c. Proposal from Turkey to delete the name of Turkey from the list in Annex I to the Convention.
7. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.

8. Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism:
   a. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
9. Second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention.
10. Matters relating to finance:
    a. Long-term climate finance;
    b. Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance;
    c. Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund;
    d. Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility;
    e. Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement.
11. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.
12. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention
13. Capacity-building under the Convention.
14. Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention:
    a. Implementation of the Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures (decision 1/CP.10);
    b. Matters relating to the least developed countries.
15. Gender and climate change.
16. Other matters referred to the Conference of the Parties by the subsidiary bodies.
17. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
    a. Audit report and financial statements for 2017;
    b. Budget performance for the biennium 2018-2019;
    c. Decision-making in the UNFCCC process.
18. High-level segment:
    a. Statements by Parties;
    b. Statements by observer organizations.
19. Other matters.
20. Conclusion of the session:
    a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-fourth session;
    b. Closure of the session.
**CMP 14 – 2-14 December 2018**

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organisational matters:
   a. Adoption of the agenda;
   b. Election of additional officers;
   c. Organisation of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies;
   d. Adoption of the report on credentials;
   e. Status of ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies:
4. Matters relating to the clean development mechanism.
5. Matters relating to joint implementation.
7. Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund.
8. Report on the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments.
9. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I:
   a. National communications;
10. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.
11. Matters relating to:
   a. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Kyoto Protocol;
   b. Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol.
12. Other matters referred to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol by the subsidiary bodies.
13. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
   a. Audit report and financial statements for 2017;
14. High-level segment:
   a. Statements by Parties;
   b. Statements by observer organizations.

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289. The term “Party included in Annex I” is defined in Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol.
15. Other matters.
16. Conclusion of the session:
   a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its fourteenth session;
   b. Closure of the session.

SBSTA 49 – 2-8 December 2018

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organisational matters:
   a. Adoption of the agenda;
   b. Organisation of the work of the session;
   c. Election of officers other than the Chair;
   d. Mandated events.
5. Development and transfer of technologies:
   a. Technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement;
   b. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
6. Research and systematic observation.
7. Koronivia joint work on agriculture.
8. Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.
9. Impact of the implementation of response measures:
   a. Improved forum and work programme;
   b. Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;
   c. Matters relating to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Kyoto Protocol.
10. Methodological issues under the Convention: emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport.
11. Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement:
   a. Directives on the cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement;

b. Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement;

c. Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement.

12. Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement.

13. Reports on other activities:
   a. Annual report on the technical review of information reported under the Convention by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in their biennial reports and national communications;
   b. Annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
   c. Annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories and other information reported by Parties included in Annex I, as defined in Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol.

14. Other matters.

15. Closure of and report on the session.

**SBI 49 – 2-8 December 2018**

1. Opening of the session.

2. Organisational matters:
   a. Adoption of the agenda;
   b. Organisation of the work of the session;
   c. Multilateral assessment working group session under the international assessment and review process;
   d. Facilitative sharing of views under the international consultation and analysis process;
   e. Other mandated events.
   f. Election of officers other than the Chair.

3. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention:
   a. Status of submission and review of seventh national communications and third biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
   b. Compilations and syntheses of second and third biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;

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4. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention:
   a. Information contained in national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
   b. Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
   c. Review of the terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
   d. Provision of financial and technical support;
   e. Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports of Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.

5. Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement.

6. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.

7. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.

8. Matters relating to the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol:
   a. Review of the modalities and procedures for the clean development mechanism;
   b. Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the Kyoto Protocol.

9. Koronivia joint work on agriculture.


12. Matters relating to the least developed countries; and matters referred to in paragraphs 41 and 45 of decision 1/CP.21.


14. Development and transfer of technologies:
   a. Scope of and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism in relation to supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement;
   b. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
   c. Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer.

15. Matters relating to climate finance: identification of information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement.
16. Matters relating to capacity-building for developing countries:
   a. Capacity-building under the Convention;
   b. Annual technical progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building;
   c. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.
17. Impact of the implementation of response measures:
   a. Improved forum and work programme;
   b. Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;
   c. Matters relating to Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol;
   d. Progress on the implementation of decision 1/CP.10.
18. Gender and climate change.
20. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
   a. Audit report and financial statements for 2017;
   b. Budget performance for the biennium 2018-2019;
   c. Budgetary matters;
   d. Continuous review of the functions and operations of the secretariat.
21. Other matters
22. Closure of and report on the session.

**CMA 1.3 – 2-14 December 2018**

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organisational matters:
   a. Adoption of the agenda;
   b. Application of the rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties;
   c. Election of additional officers;
   d. Organisation of work;
   e. Status of ratification of the Paris Agreement;
   f. Adoption of the report on credentials.
3. Matters relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
4. High-level segment.
5. Other matters.
6. Conclusion of the session:
   a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;
   b. Closure of the session.

APA 1.7 – 2-8 December 2018

1. Opening of the session.

2. Organisational matters:
   a. Election of officers;
   b. Adoption of the agenda;
   c. Organisation of the work of the session;

3. Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21 on:
   a. Features of nationally determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 26;
   b. Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally
determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 28;
   c. Accounting for Parties’ nationally determined contributions, as specified in
paragraph 31.

4. Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including,
   inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to
in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement.

5. Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for
   action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

6. Matters relating to the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris
   Agreement:
   a. Identification of the sources of input for the global stocktake;
   b. Development of the modalities of the global stocktake.

7. Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to facilitate
   implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15, paragraph
   2, of the Paris Agreement.

8. Further matters related to implementation of the Paris Agreement:
   a. Preparing for the convening of the first session of the Conference of the
   Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
   b. Taking stock of progress made by the subsidiary and constituted bodies in
   relation to their mandated work under the Paris Agreement and section III
   of decision 1/CP.21, in order to promote and facilitate coordination and
   coherence in the implementation of the work programme, and, if appropriate,
   take action, which may include recommendations.

9. Other matters.


Bibliography


APA (2018b). Revised additional tool under item 8 of the agenda. Further matters related to implementation of the Paris Agreement: (a) Preparing for the convening of the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement Informal document by the co-facilitators. Second iteration, 9 September 2018. https:// unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ APA1.6_RevisedTools_ APA%20AF%208_SEpt.pdf


OSCST (2018). DRAFT TEXT on SBSTA agenda item 13 Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement Version 3 of 8 September 2018 2256H. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Draft%20Conclusions_SBSTA%2048.2_SBSTA%20item%2013.pdf


ENERGIES 2050 was born with the certainty that the development trajectories of our societies are not inevitable. As an informal network since 2007, and as a French non-profit and non-governmental organisation working exclusively in the general interest since 2011, ENERGIES 2050 contributes relentlessly to the transformation of our societies for a more humane, plural and united future, both at international level with States and international institutions and also in close cooperation with territories and local governments, public and private economic actors and citizens. Gathering members and partners from more than sixty nationalities, ENERGIES 2050 works to set up a new, positive and inclusive development model and to convert constraints into action possibilities. As a collective adventure in the quest for better ways of living together, ENERGIES 2050 has committed to the Great Transition, including combating climate change, implementing sustainable development, the energy transition, sustainable cities and regions and the shift towards a more humane, plural and united society, bringing peace and respecting the common goods of humanity.

ENERGIES 2050 breaks its activities down into five complementary areas:

• Executing demonstrative and repeatable projects accompany by technical studies and research actions to show the possibilities;
• Organising or attending meetings and conferences in order to expand the opportunities for sharing, exchanges and discussions;
• Publishing the results of research using a format in line with target audiences to pool and share knowledge and go beyond the restricted circles of experts and the normal dissemination circles.
• Educating, training and building the capacities so that each individual can understand, know, feel concerned and act;
• Communicating to the greatest number to inform, mobilise and unit the desire to act.

ENERGIES 2050 and its partners implement projects in more than forty countries. ENERGIES 2050 is active in the following topics: eco-development and sustainable development; combating climate change; climate, environment and energy policies; research and innovation; sustainable cities and the challenges and opportunities in rural areas; low-carbon development strategies; energy transition and development of renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and controlling demand for energy; responsible and sustainable tourism; buildings and the construction sector; natural resources and the common goods of mankind such as biodiversity, water and agriculture; ecological and environmental economics; responsible business dynamics and corporate performance; gender; environmental education; circular economy, social and united dynamics; behaviour change and citizen action expressed in all its forms be they artistic or applied in daily behaviour changes so that each individual becomes and responsible, united eco-citizen.

ENERGIES 2050 is a recognised player in climate change negotiations and in preparing and setting up national and international low-carbon strategies and action programmes. ENERGIES 2050 is also known for successfully introducing concrete mitigation and adaptation projects with huge innovation potential and for deploying essential capacity-building programmes to support country ownership and boost national excellence and that of actors involved. ENERGIES 2050 has especially been privileged to support several African countries in preparing their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) and in producing briefing files for submission to the Green Climate Fund. The association also launch ethiCarbon Afrique® in 2012. This strong, solidarity-based and innovative tool is designed to contribute to a real African energy revolution.

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The Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development) is a subsidiary body of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF – International Organisation of the Francophonie) and its headquarters are in Quebec City.

Under its original name of Institut de l’Énergie des Pays ayant en commun l’usage du Français (IEPF – Energy Institute for Countries with French as a common language), the IFDD came into being in 1988 following the 11th Summit of the Francophonie held in Quebec in 1987. It was created in the wake of the global energy crises and from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. In 1996, the Institute took the resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 as the major guide for its action and became the Institut de l’énergie et de l’environnement de la Francophonie (Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) And in 2013, following the Rio+20 Conference, it was renamed Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development).

Its mission is to contribute to:

• training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
• support for development players in initiatives to prepare and implement sustainable development programmes;
• the promotion of the sustainable development approach in French-speaking countries;
• the development of partnerships in the various economic and social development sectors, mainly environment and energy, for sustainable development.

IFDD action falls under the Strategic Framework of the Francophonie, within mission D “Sustainable development, economy and solidarity” and Strategic Objective 7 “Contribute to the preparation and implementation of the post-2015 development programme and sustainable development goals”.

The Institute is in particular lead partner in the following two programmes under the OIF 2015-2018 schedule, implemented in partnership with other OIF units:

• Increase the capacities of target countries to develop and implement national, regional and local sustainable development strategies which are inclusive, participative and results-based;
• Build up the capacities of French-speaking players to allow active participation in international negotiations and decisions on the economic, environment and sustainable development, and their implementation.
The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a language - French - and common values. It currently groups 88 States and governments, including 54 Members, seven associate members and 27 observers. The 2018 Report on the French language worldwide sets the number of French speakers at 300 million.

The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies.

The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman and official representative.

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27 observers:
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This Summary for Policymakers supplements the Guide to the Negotiations, documents produced every year by IFDD as support for the sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Aimed at helping negotiators to understand better the challenges of the 24th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP24), Part I of the guide sets out the current major issues. Special attention is paid to the elements making up the Paris Agreement work programme, whose operationalisation rules should be adopted at COP24. Part II sets out the progress made in the negotiations between COP 23 and COP25 and deciphers succinctly the Paris Agreement and the operational modalities emerging from Decision 1/CP.21. Part III offers a general conceptual framework, comprising a brief history of the climate negotiations, a description of the Convention and its main bodies and ad hoc groups as well as a presentation of the main negotiating groups and their positions.

Although this publication is intended especially for negotiators from Francophone countries, it should also be a useful tool for all other interested stakeholders. The Guide to the Negotiations and this Summary for Policymakers is enhanced year on year and goes beyond the climate change negotiating structure. This is strengthened under the current international climate action which, following the adoption of the Paris agreement, is targeting officially the setting up of seamless multi-actor and multi-sector dynamics. Academics, public or private figures and representatives of civil society organisations or international institutions - they are all using the Guide and the Summary increasingly as an independent, factual and up-to-date source of information for the negotiations with an analytical, dynamic review of the issues.

We are hopeful that the various contributions will meet the expectations of our readers.